

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON POLITICAL CHOICES: LANGUAGE MAINTENANCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CATALAN AND BASQUE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

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Historians and political scientists alike often assert that the link between language and nation has been a prominent feature of modern politics since the eruption of Romantic nationalism.¹ Nationalism can be defined as the struggle of a culturally distinct group to achieve the control of the state (that is, the maximum form of legitimate political power in the modern world), either in the form of devolution of powers or straightforward independence. Yet, in practical terms, the link between state and language long preceded Romanticism.² Even in France, this link, although drastically emphasised from the Jacobins onwards, was already established before the times of Cardinal Richelieu (1620s).³ Richelieu's first radical plans of state centralisation under Louis XIII's despotic absolutism were paralleled by increasingly ruthless attempts to impose a unified standard French norm.⁴ Seton Watson has acknowledged that language was probably the main instrument of *grandeur* and nation-building in France (1977: 48).

Among most present-day ethnonationalist movements, language continues to be the basic criteria of self-definition and nationhood.⁵ As a consequence, the sociolinguistic vitality of these languages can be extremely important in determining future political developments. Starting from this premise, this paper will show how difficult it is to choose another element as a symbol and carrier of nationhood where the ethnic language is dying out or very scarcely spoken. Furthermore, the absence of a clear symbol of national cohesion can bring about ambiguity in the nationalists' political programmes.

In my comparative case study, I will show how language has been a core value for the Catalan people and intelligentsia, while it has not been so for their Basque counterparts, at least until very recently. This different emphasis is related to the lesser diffusion of the Basque language (*Euskara*)⁶ in comparison with the liveliness of Catalan.

The overall conclusion is that linguistic nationalism in the periphery offers more prospects of political negotiation with the centre, in comparison to other kinds of nationalism.⁷ At the same time, linguistic nationalism (which is the nationalism based on ascriptive criteria such as race, religion or putative origin) tend to be *exclusive*, since these primordial symbols do not hold the same differentiating and integrative capacities as language.

In general, nationalism develops as a process of negotiation between peripheral and central elites, characterised by advances and setbacks. The availability of some central element or ethnic marker is an important factor in

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determining the outcome of these negotiations. In other words, the non-negotiability of some elements—which are selected as core values—makes other elements more negotiable, as soon as there arises some agreement on the latter's secondary importance.⁸ The tendency to stress the value of language has grown in recent years. Its non-negotiability can be gauged, among other things, by the fact that both nationalists and non-nationalists share a common desire to see Basque and Catalan languages fully normalised.⁹

Language has the advantage of being an acquirable item, whilst other elements, such as religion and race, are—or tend to be—inherited. Language is the carrier of culture and culture is adaptive. Through trial and error, experimentation and learning, courage and perseverance, human beings can acquire and finally make their own an initially alien culture. This is more likely to happen if the host nationality controls the instruments of national socialisation and if the national language is efficiently promoted by the existing institutions. Also for this reason, ethnic territorial minorities all over the world aspire to exert some form of control over the state. The existence of migratory movements and the difficulty in regulating them make this aspiration even more urgent and drastic.

THREE SOCIOLINGUISTIC PANORAMAS

As in other Western countries, historical nationalities are defined in Spain on the base of language. Although we can find seventeen official Autonomous Communities, there are four well-distinguishable historical nationalities:¹⁰ Castile, Galicia, Euskadi and Catalonia. They are based on linguistic criteria, since every nationality is differentiated by its respective language: Castilian, Galician, Euskara and Catalan (Ninyoles 1977). However Castilian is the dominant language, while the other three are still struggling for their survival.¹¹

Comparing the three regions, we observe, contrary to many naïve assumptions, that the strength of nationalism is inversely proportional to the diffusion of the local language. The contrast between the three regions is stark. Galicia is the region which enjoys the highest degree of language maintenance, with more than 80% of the population speaking Galician. Yet, the nationalist movement is very weak, as it can be judged by the low percentages of votes given to the nationalist parties and by the scarce mass mobilisation in support of nationalist goals.

In Catalonia proper (excluding Valencia and the Balearic Islands), we can find the greatest degree of language loyalty among the native population, and, in particular, among the upper and middle classes. This is an ideal condition for language spread and, indeed, a great deal of data confirms this trend. In the last census (1986), 90,3% of the population claimed to understand Catalan, showing an increase of over 10% in only five years, and more than 60% declared their ability to speak it or read it (CIDC 1987).

In contrast, in the Basque Autonomous Community only 20% of the population knows Euskara, with a maximum of 35–40% in Gipuzkoa and a minimum of 4–5% in Araba (Eustat 1988, Letamendia 1987). The increase recorded between the last two municipal censuses, respectively held in 1981 and 1986, is of little more than 4% (Eustat 1988).

No reliable data is available in respect to the late 19th century, when nationalism began to take form.¹² Obviously, all three languages were then much more widely spoken within their regions than they are today, although diglossia was the norm. Their ranking order in percentage of speakers was broadly the same, with Galicia and Catalonia nearer to each other (between 90% and 100% degree of language maintenance) and the Basque Country far behind.

In their political selection of a symbolic element of national identity, the Catalan leaders were, thus, greatly favoured by the availability of a thriving, rich and widespread language. In contrast, the Basques found themselves in a much more difficult position. Hence, the first attempts at defining Basque nationality wavered between race and religion, via laws, territory, and voluntary action.

The inability to steadily and persistently define one core value, and the consequent weakness of cultural nationalism has led to the prevalence of other kinds of political activism. In its turn, this ambivalent attitude concealed a deep conflict over the forms of political mobilisation to be adopted. Since the primary focus and defining element of European stateless nations has been (and still is) language, a contradiction between this requisite and the lack of a shared language has necessarily arisen within Basque nationalism.

Every nationalist movement attempts to construct a positive image of the nation through the exaltation and upgrading of its most important historical and cultural elements. However, ethnic groups in inter-cultural contacts, as well as ethnic leaders and nationalist intellectuals, usually select one or more elements for special attention, and as worthy of political mobilisation in themselves. Smolicz (1988) defines as *core values* of a culture those 'pivots around which the whole social and identificational system of the group is organised'¹³. Since the core values of a people are likely to be elements of central concern for them, they will be even more so for their political leaders.¹⁴

In the next section, I will present a few quotations from the most important Basque and Catalan nationalist leaders, in order to understand the differential importance which language played in the two national movements. The period covered will start from the first overt nationalist formulations, 1886 for Catalonia and 1892 for the Basque Country.¹⁵ A brief reference to more recent changes will also be mentioned, in order to stress both the increasing importance of language as a core value for contemporary ethno-territorial movements and the difficulty encountered in choosing alternative values where language is lacking.

THE HERDERIAN CONNECTION IN CATALONIA

Catalanism has based most of its claims on the issue of linguistic rights. For the nationalists, as well as for the average Catalan, language represents the central element around which national identity and political life turn. This concern is reflected in, and inspired by, the writings and speeches of its main leaders.

The first clear nationalist programmes was formulated by the federalist Valentí Almirall (1841–1904). In his writings, a previously vague and unsophisticated regionalism starts to be transformed into nationalism, as he singles out the outstanding aspects of the Catalan character and mentality. Here,

language starts to assume its central importance, although as one among a few other means of defining national identity.

However, Catalan nationalism began to achieve a wide popular success only at the beginning of the 20th century. Its seminal figure was Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917). Profoundly inspired by German Romanticism, he admired Herder, ‘the man of great intuitions’ (Prat 1894). As is known, the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) envisaged language as the most basic channel for the preservation of ‘national spirit’, and the lens through which individuals perceive and experience the world. A different world-vision corresponds to each language. Herder argued that nations should be defined on the basis of language and, therefore, every distinct group so defined should be granted self-government.¹⁶ Such a doctrine struck a sensitive chord in Catalonia, where the consciousness of having a different lifestyle and mentality was already widespread in virtue of the region’s different economy. Herderian thought was introduced in Catalonia by Ramon Martí d’Eixalà (1808–1857) and by his disciple Francesc-Xavier Llorens i Barba (1820–1872), lecturer of Metaphysics at the University of Barcelona. Llorens, who relied heavily on German idealism, drew upon the Herderian concept of *Volksgeist*. His most important work is significantly titled ‘Philosophical thought is the product of national spirit’. In every people, historical circumstances create a national spirit, which is reflected in all aspects of its culture, including philosophy. Llorens was an important figure in Catalan and Spanish thought, and among his disciples we can count the Catalan bishop Torras i Bages, the philologist Menéndez y Pelayo, and Prat de la Riba (Bilbeny 1984: 52, 1988: 60, Llobera 1983, Vicens Vives 1958: 199–200).

Other sources of Prat de la Riba’s inspiration were the works of Hugo, Niebuhr and Savigny. *Law* was at the basis of his organicist¹⁷ definition of the nation (‘Every people has their own laws, the only ones which fit to their needs and respond to the idiosyncrasy of their temperament’, 1894: 74). The same was true of *language*. Language and law were ‘elements of the same concrete social individuality, product of the same mysterious force’ (1894: 74).

But we did not doubt, no, we did not. We saw the national spirit, the national character, the national thought; we saw the law, . . . and from the law [we saw] the language and the organism. The national thought, the character and the spirit bring about the Nation; that is, a society of people who speak a language of their own and have the same spirit that manifests itself or is characteristic for the whole variety of the whole collective life (Prat 1978).

Further elements of his definition of nationhood were national *art*—the ‘common nexus and seal of the national character’ (1894: 77)—, *territory*—however, defined by the extension of language—and the idea of *Volksgeist*. However, many passages emphasise language as the more visible expression of the national soul and prime bond of union between the different Catalan-speaking territories.¹⁸

The Herderian link has been repeatedly revived in the Catalan academic world and society, from several perspectives, different political sides and academic milieux. Thus, linguistic theories of the deep existing links between language and thought, have reached far beyond the academic circles (Tuson 1988) to be reflected in many contemporary political pamphlets and programmes.¹⁹

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LANGUAGE SHIFT IN EUSKADI

Modern Basque nationalism was created by Sabino Arana (1865–1903). He formulated the first political programme aimed at the rebirth of the Basque nation,²⁰ founded its first political organisation,²¹ wrote its national anthem,²² designed its flag,²³ coined its name,²⁴ and defined its geographical extension.²⁵

Like most modern nationalisms, Basque nationalism was born as a typically urban phenomenon. Industrialism, urbanisation, increased state control, the abolition of local rights and laws (*fueros*), and, in particular, immigration from Castile, produced an explosive situation that was later to find its political expression through nationalism. However, its full success came about nearly a century later, in the 1980s.²⁶ Today, both Basque and Catalan nationalism can be counted amongst the most successful recent examples of nation-making in western Europe.

Other early nationalists, such as Father Evangelista De Ibero, stressed race (and religion) as the most important factors in determining national identity.²⁷

Rather than trying to revive or encourage the spread of Euskara, Arana and his followers used it as an ethnic border. His aim was to preserve a sense of 'unique' Basque racial purity, dividing the autochthonous population from the newcomers, who he called *maketos*.²⁸ This sharp contrast with the Catalan programme was outlined by the same Arana:

For the Catalans it would be a great glory if the Spanish government appointed Catalan as the official language of all Spain; on the contrary, if it were to do the same with Euskera, it would be for us the final blow of unavoidable death dealt by the most refined diplomacy (Arana 1982 *ca.* 1: 404).

The apparent paradox is that Arana himself was extremely concerned about the fate of the language. He dedicated many years of his life trying to provide it with an unified orthography, whilst attempting to purify its lexicon from Spanish 'borrowings' and interferences.²⁹

However, we must remember that in the cities Euskara was barely spoken. This is especially true in Arana's home city, Bilbao, where he conducted most of his political activity and created the first nuclei of Basque nationalism.³⁰ Arana perceived clearly this *débaçle*, when he stated in a disenchanted but sorrowful mood: 'Euskara is fading away. We must acknowledge this fact as an undeniable reality of which everybody is aware' (quoted by Corcuera 1979: 395).

Race proved to be a much more pervasive and ready-made catalyst. The reasons for this preference of race are:

(1) A powerful myth of collective nobility already existed. It emphasised the common noble character of all persons of Basque ancestry. This putative title singled out the Basques in respect to all outsiders.

(2) The belief in an interrupted tradition of Basque isolation and separateness from immemorial times.³¹ In the last century, this uniqueness was just being sustained by scientific investigations on various aspects of Basque biology.

Thus, for some nationalists language was important insofar as it was the living proof of the Basques' immemorial isolation, and a symbol of the uncontaminated purity of their 'specie' from other ones. Race was then defined by language.³²

(3) At the turn of the century 'race' was a fashionable element and it did not carry any of the negative implications of the post-World War II era. Rather, it was the strongest channel for legitimising ethnic claims and differences, since it provided an apparently unshakable scientific 'proof' to demonstrate a nation's distinctive character.³³

(4) Lastly—and most importantly—all other elements of common differentiation were either vague, unevenly distributed or in the process of becoming blurred and vanishing into mainstream Spanishness. That is to say, no other shared cultural elements were then available.

Race was then the 'soul and substance of the nation' (Arana, cited by Jaureguiberry 1983: 96 and Darré 1990: 235).³⁴ Parallel with the construction of Basque national identity, there was a converse de-construction of the (still-dominant) Spanish 'race'. The *maketos* were stereotyped in an unflattering way and attributed with all the negative traits which the Basques abhorred. To every positive characteristic assigned to the Basques, a negative one was applied to stigmatise the 'invaders'.

Yet, for some Basque nationalists language represents a primary concern. Its importance can be gauged by considering the self-description of many Basques. In fact, a Basque can also define himself or herself using the term *Euskaldún* which means a person who has (-*du-n*) the Basque language (*Euskal-*). Many present-day Basque nationalists often prefer to use the word *Euskal-Herria* (or *Euskalerrria*) to define their country, rather than the more commonly accepted term Euskadi.³⁵ The former refers—at least in its original sense—to the whole of the people who speak Euskara and means the 'Country of Euskara' (*Euskal* = Basque language, *-Herri* = Country or People). Finally, a measure of the increasingly inclusive character of most Basque identity is given by the emergence of a new term, *Euskaldunberri* (*Euskaldún* = Basque-speaker, *-berri* = new).³⁶ Rejecting the old dichotomy between *euskaldunes* (Basque-speakers) and *erdaldunes* (speakers of any other language),³⁷ contemporary nationalists have chosen to stress the importance of the 'new Basque speakers', both immigrants and autochthons, to emphasise their shared participation in the construction of Euskal-Herria.³⁸

CONCLUSION

After an initial period of introspection and re-definition of the autochthonous values, most Catalan nationalists have chosen and fostered language as the basic element of nationhood. This persistent attitude gave Catalan nationalism a solid base from which it launched its bargaining process with the central power. In their turn, Madrid democratic political elites took advantage of this emphasis on culture in order to improve their relationships with the elites of Catalonia upon a stable basis.

On the other hand, these favorable conditions were not present in the Basque Country. Euskara was already fading away by the time Arana's writings first tried to define and inspire a modern Basque identity. Basque nationalism, lacking a stable cultural basis, has been, thus, more ambiguous both in its self-definition and in its position *vis-à-vis* the central government. Although language

has been a central concern for most Basque nationalists, its scarce diffusion and its fragmentation into dialects led most of them to play it down, falling back on more ethnocentric or 'pre-national' factors, such as religion³⁹ and race.⁴⁰

Furthermore, nationalism arose among those urban milieux who had since long given up the use of Euskara.⁴¹ Although they glorified it as a vessel of ethnic identity, they did not yet consider it a viable means of modern interaction.⁴²

The contrast between the two national movements that I have presented refers in particular to their early phase. However, in recent times things have changed: both movements now stress the centrality of language in the definition of their national identity.⁴³ Apparently, even non-nationalists share a real concern for the survival of the two language.⁴⁴ In the case of Euskara, however, this desire for full normalisation cannot often be put into practice, since the intrinsic difficulties of mastering it are considerable, in contrast to the relative ease with which a Castilian-speaker can learn Catalan, a closely related tongue.

The aim of this paper has been to demonstrate the different role played by language in the formation and programmes of the two nationalist movements, and how the absence or presence of such a significant element of distinctiveness has affected the growth of the two social movements.

Since other values are more vague or difficult to define, language has recently been raised to prominence at a time when nationalism is undergoing a radical process of change and expansion.

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NOTES

1. Some go as far as to suggest that nationalism was a 'conspiracy of German Romantic intellectuals' (Kedourie 1985, Gellner 1983).
2. Fishman (1972, 1985) has traced the link between language and ethnicity back to ancient Greece and ancient Judaism.
3. In 1539, François I's Edict of Villers-Cotterets made French the sole official language of the Crown's administration. See also Petschen Verdaguer (1990: 1: 112-3).
4. The *Académie Française* was founded in 1635 by the same Richelieu, who was concurrently engaged in the systematic destruction of the castles of the great rebel lords. Its main aim was the observation, control and surveillance of the French language.
5. In respect to this, some cases are nearly at the antipodes. At one extreme there is the case of Northern Ireland, where the linguistic claim appears very rarely in the nationalists' programmes. At the other extreme, one can quote the Catalan case, where the struggle for the recovering of the language involves the whole civil and political society, and not only the nationalists.
6. In this paper, I have chosen to use the official (*batua*) spelling for the names in Euskara, except for those few names which can be translated in English (for instance, Navarre or Navarrese). Similarly, I stick to the original spelling used by Arana where I quote from his works, because in Arana's times a standardised Basque lexicon was still only in the planning stage. For instance, I report literally Arana's spelling of the words 'Euskera' or 'Euzkadi', rather than the present-day *batua* 'Euskara' or 'Euskadi'.

7. This argument only applies to stateless nations and not to already formed states, since state imposed nationalism can be an entirely different phenomenon from grassroots ethnic nationalism.
8. See Linz (1990), on the successful settlement of Catalan nationalist aspirations in the last fifteen years. 'The tension between an *españolista* [= centralising] Spanish nationalism and the autonomist aspirations of Catalonia has nearly disappeared' (Linz 1990: 662).
9. Even in the Basque case, after decades of uncertainty, a consensus is gradually being built in order to find in language an element of national consensus beyond the nationalist/anti-nationalist divide.
10. The use of the term 'nationalities' is the official one. Their rights are enshrined in the Spanish Constitution, whereby they are not specifically mentioned. However, most nationalists reject this term and prefer rather to speak of 'nations'.
11. Basque is spoken in the two Autonomous Communities of Euskadi and Navarre, while Catalan is the co-official language of three Autonomous Communities: Catalonia, Balearics and Valencia (where it is called Valencian). Finally, Galician is official only in Galicia. In contrast, Castilian is the sole unchallenged official language in all the remaining Autonomous Communities (eleven). It is also official and mandatory all over Spain and the Constitution defines it as the compulsory language of the Spanish 'nation'.
12. Nuñez (1977) presents some good speculative data for Euskara in 1867, that is to say, before the radical changes brought about by industrialisation after 1876.
13. They form 'the heartland of a group's culture and act as identifying values which are symbolic of the group and its membership... Removal of such pivots, through enforced "modernisation" or dominant assimilation, would result in the entire edifice crumbling to pieces' (Smolicz 1988: 394). *
14. There are many ways of identifying the core values of a particular group. Ortner (1973: 133) quotes five ways of identifying them, which he prefers to call *key symbols* (1) The natives tell us that *x* is culturally important; (2) they seem positively or negatively aroused about *x*, rather than indifferent; (3) *x* comes up in many different contexts (behavioural or systemic); (4) there is a greater cultural elaboration surrounding *x* and (5) there are greater cultural restrictions surrounding *x*, either in sheer number of rules or severity of sanctions regarding its misuse.
15. 1886 is the year of the appearance of Almirall's *La Catalanisme*. In 1892 Sabino Arana published his manifesto, *Bizkaya por su independencia*. Two years later, Arana designed the Basque flag and wrote the basis of his nationalist doctrine.
16. 'The view that only those who share (or at least did once share) a common language and literary tradition were worthy of recognition as a nation, and as such should constitute a State, not only laid the ideological foundation of nationalist doctrine; it also led to the prodigious philological research which accompanied nationalist agitation' (Barnard 1965: 62).
17. Citing Herder, he states that 'a language is an organic whole which lives, grows and dies like a living being' (Prat 1978: 76).
18. 'Those people who have been unable to establish their own language are unfortunate, because language is the most perfect manifestation of the national spirit, and the most powerful instrument for the nationalisation, the maintenance and the life of a nation' (Prat 1978: 84).
19. Although the theories of the linguists Sapir and Whorf are not explicitly mentioned, there are plenty of cases in the local daily press, pamphlets and books, where language is associated to the specific Catalan mentality and world-vision.

On the direct influences of Von Humboldt and Herder in Catalan philosophy, see Bilbeny (1978). Linguistics and philology, together with the natural sciences, have

proven to exert a leading influence on nationalist thought since the last century (Kemiläinen 1964: 80-ff.).

20. See his *Bizkaya por su independencia* (1892).
21. The PNV (*Partido Nacionalista Vasco* = Basque Nationalist Party) was founded in Bilbao. Although informally created in 1895, a political 'bureau' was founded only two years later (San Sebastian 1984: 29, Corcuera 1979: 413, Elorza 1978) and the first formal organisation to carry that name emerged in 1920 (Clark 1979: 49).
22. The anthem of the PNV, *Gora ta Euzkadi*, became in 1980 the national anthem of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi.
23. The *ikurriña* was officially adopted by the PNV in 1933 and became the official flag of Euskadi in 1936 (Corcuera 1979: 226).
24. The neologism *Euzkadi* was later universally accepted as the national name for the Basque Country in its recently standardised (*batua*) version, *Euskadi*.
25. This was synthesised in the motto *Zazbiak-bat* (= Seven in one) and in the logo $4 + 3 = 1$, alluding to the four provinces in the Spanish side (*Euskadi Sur*) and to the three departments in the French side (*Euskadi Nord*), which one day will be united in a free Euskadi.
26. The nationalists registered their first major electoral victories from 1914 to 1918, aided by the wave of economic prosperity brought by Spain's neutral position in World War 1. However, most of their impact was then limited to the province of Vizcaya, where they gained the absolute majority of the seats in the provincial government, achieving only marginal results in Gipuzkoa and Navarre.
27. On Father de Ibero and his Catechism, with its typical technique of question and answer, see Martínez-Peñuela (1989: 38-48).
28. One of the consequences of rapid industrialisation was the arrival in Vizcaya of unprecedented numbers of immigrants from non-Basque regions of Spain.
29. He pursued this goal with a quasi-fanatical zeal which led him to 'invent' a purified idiom totally alien from the language spoken by the common people. However, many terms he invented have been successfully adopted by other nationalists and, subsequently, by many average Basque speakers.
30. The first mass political mobilisation in favour of Basque nationalism occurred in this city in 1893, spreading a few days later in San Sebastian/Donostia (Clark 1979: 47-8).
31. In Catalonia, a similar myth of exclusivity did not exist. Rather, there was a myth of 'miscegenation' based on the glorious commercial past of a mercantile empire which extended over the Mediterranean.
32. This viewpoint is explicitly stated in De Ibero's Catechism (quoted by Clark 1979: 45-6).
33. In the Catalan case, race was not an issue. On the contrary, Prat assured that 'the race does not make the nation, although it is a very important factor of it' (1978: 82-3).
34. 'Race' was normally traced back through people's surnames, as proof of a putative Basque ancestry.
35. The term *Euzkadi* (*Euskadi* in contemporary *batua*) is normally used by non-Basque speakers, while *Euskal-Herria* is preferred by the Euskaldunes. This latter term is the original one. It has been used for centuries, long before the advent of nationalism, in order to define the collectivity of the Basques through the most visible element of their differentiation: language. Before inventing the term which later became commonly accepted, Arana also used the term *Euskeria*, referring to the language as well.
36. This term began to be used in the mid 1960s, referring to those adults who were voluntarily learning Euskara, in order to differentiate them from the native *Euskaldun-zaharra* (*zaharra* = old). This was also a result of the success of the *ikastolas*, a semi-clandestine network of schools where Euskara was the only medium of instruction.

37. *Erdara* (*Erdara* in *batua*) = any language other than Basque.
38. At least three other important elements are present in Basque nationalism: law (the abolition of the *fueros* or local rights is seen by most historians as a decisive factor in the birth of Basque nationalism), territory (which is the base of all nationalist movements) and voluntary action (which is central to the definition of Basque identity as participation to a common goal).
39. On the religious basis of Arana's programme, resumed in the motto *Jaungoikua eta Lagizarra* (God and the Old Law), see Corcuera (1979: 314–27).
Perez-Agote (1990) demonstrates how present-day's mass secularism has largely discouraged the possibility that religion can become a determining factor of Basque identity.
40. On Arana's emphasis on race as an isolationist reaction to massive immigration from Castile, see Corcuera (1979: 383–94).
41. In contrast, at least since the late 1970s, nationalism appears to be more firmly rooted where Euskara is the daily language of most of the population (Clark 1987: 439). Likewise, the use of Euskara is increasingly associated with group loyalty, confirming a shifting trend in Basque identity and its core values. This is part of a process which has been defined as the 're-foundation' of Basque nationalism (Gurrutxaga 1990).
On these changes of identity patterns, see also different contributions included in the volumes edited by Perez-Agote (1989), Cuco' and Pujadas (1990) and Llobera (1991).
42. Arana himself learned Euskara from scratch, using as his only source a French-Basque dictionary written by Van-Eys (Basaldua 1977: 47). Most of his first works were etymologies and his main commitment was to write a Basque grammar (1977: 53).
43. It is a view that cut across the gamut of political groups. The unanimity on the need to recover Catalan is so far reaching that all parties and movements, even the right, recognise this need. On the increasing importance of Euskara as the defining symbol of Basque identity, see Tejerina Montaña (1990).
44. On the successive legislative measures designed to promote of Euskara, and for a comparison with other stateless western European languages, see Petschen Verdaguer (1990).

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