

The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict

SECOND REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION



Editor

John Coakley

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures	vii
List of Maps	ix
Notes on Contributors	x
Preface to Second Edition	xiii
1. Introduction	1
The Challenge	
<i>John Coakley</i>	
2. Canada	22
The Case for Ethnolinguistic Federalism in a Multilingual Society	
<i>Jean Laponce</i>	
3. Northern Ireland	43
Religion, Ethnic Conflict and Territoriality	
<i>Joseph RuaneJennifer Todd</i>	
4. Belgium	70
From Regionalism to Federalism	
<i>Liesbet Hooghe</i>	
5. South Africa	95
The Failure of Ethnoterritorial Politics	
<i>Anthony EganRupert Taylor</i>	
6. Israel	114
Ethnic Conflict and Political Exchange	
<i>Alex Weingrod</i>	
7. Pakistan	138
Ethnic Diversity and Colonial Legacy	
<i>Charles H.Kennedy</i>	
8. Sri Lanka	166
Ethnic Strife and the Politics of Space	
<i>A.Jeyeratnam Wilson</i>	

9.	The Dissolution of the Soviet Union Federation, Commonwealth, Secession <i>Ronald J.Hill</i>	191
10.	The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia A Case of Failed State Building? <i>Stanislav J.Kirschbaum</i>	221
11.	The Dissolution of Yugoslavia Secession by the Centre? <i>Daniele Conversi</i>	257
12.	Conclusion Towards a Solution? <i>John Coakley</i>	285

The Dissolution of Yugoslavia

Secession by the Centre?

DANIELE CONVERSI

The dissolution of three multinational states in central and eastern Europe in the early 1990s posed a major challenge not only to the international community but also to the world of the social sciences. The break-up of a state is not just traumatic for its inhabitants (though many of them may welcome this development); it may also threaten the stability of neighbouring states and it is an event that requires explanation both as an important theoretical question and because of its public policy implications.

This chapter explores the circumstances behind the break-up of Yugoslavia. It begins with a discussion of general theories relating to secession. It then proceeds to examine the Yugoslav case in the light of these, providing an outline of the evolution of the national question in Yugoslavia, assessing the role of the various forces that contributed ultimately to the collapse of the state and looking at the mechanics of this process itself. In particular, this chapter considers the argument that, in addition to the most obvious factors that contribute to the fragmentation of a state (secessionist tendencies in its peripheries clashing with an initial unwillingness on the part of the international community to accept the break-up of a political system), Yugoslavia's fate was also conditioned by a disposition on the part of its 'core' Serbian nationality to follow its own path of secession in purely ethnic terms.¹

SECESSION: GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

Why are theories of secession relevant to an understanding of developments in Yugoslavia? Misunderstanding about political phenomena rooted in inadequate concepts may have repercussions in real political life: international misconceptions about the origins of a crisis are likely to promote unsound foreign policy decisions. In other words, ideas and concepts are crucial in framing action. The study of secession has been seriously impeded by an obvious dearth of theoretical tools. In the case of Yugoslavia, this vacuum has been filled by impromptu interpretations, such as the 'ancient-hatred' theory, the 'clash of civilizations' paradigm, various 'civil war' explanations and competing conspiracy theories.²

Theories of Secession

The idea of secession is an unattractive one in international politics. The term has acquired a distinctly negative connotation in American political thought, parlance and practice, based on the memory of the American civil war, when 11 Southern states attempted to secede by forming the 'Confederate States of America' (1861–65).³ The USA has had a generally adverse stand towards secession internationally. This was the perspective that informed American support of the Pakistani regime against Bangladesh's struggle for independence and of the Indonesian army's invasion of East Timor.⁴ It also led to the initial refusal to recognize Slovenia and Croatia before 1992. The attitude was simultaneously confirmed during George Bush's trip to Kiev, Ukraine (29 July–1 August 1991), when the US President publicly condemned the country's secessionist drive, warning the Ukrainians against 'hasty' moves towards independence. However, less than a month later (24 August 1991), Ukraine indeed declared its independence—in the immediate aftermath of the failed Communist Party *putsch* (19–21 August).

For geopolitical and demographic reasons of power and prestige, secession is seen as illegitimate and hazardous in diplomatic circles and is sternly resisted by states and governments world-wide. According to Ralph Premdas, 'no state dismembers itself willingly; no separatist movement has been proffered victory on a platter'.⁵ There is therefore a prostrate bias in all, or almost all, international relations accounts of internal conflicts. This bias is shared by politicians, who often instinctively support central states against secessionist trends, a position that has been criticized as 'catastrophic short-termism'.⁶

In recent years secession has received belated, though abundant, scholarly attention—an attention which has obviously increased in the 1990s. Even though some scholars had dealt before with related phenomena, the first low-key attempt to formulate coherent theories of secession appeared in the 1970s from several disciplinary angles.⁷ Anthony D. Smith in sociology and Walker Connor in political science approached the issue from the standpoint of 'separatism' and 'self-determination', while Colin Williams collected a series of contributions on 'national separatism'.⁸ Crawford Young attempted the first systematic comparisons in former colonial areas, notably in Africa and Asia, while Donald Horowitz was possibly the first to conduct a wide-ranging comparative investigation of ethnic conflict, in which secession was analysed in detail as one of the possible outcomes.⁹ The moral implications of secession also began to be questioned in political philosophy.¹⁰ In general, these early works were conceived in the framework of wider scholarly endeavours, and hence were often less than systematic. On the other hand, the literature on 'self-determination' was more extensive, but it concentrated primarily on former colonial countries.¹¹

Finally, the 'discovery' of nationalism (and, hence, secession) in international relations just about preceded the collapse of communism. Most international relations theorists, such as James Mayall, took the view that the international

system had placed permanent restraints on the possibility of secession, failing to contemplate that until 1989 such a world order was a by-product of the Cold War and hence was far from being a long-term solution.¹² This may suggest that, given the intrinsic conservatism and state-centred bias of the discipline, international relations is inescapably a late-comer to the socio-political developments of its times. However, the study of secession began really to take off after the break-up of ex-Communist multinational states, generating a veritable industry. The post-Cold War literature included contributions from several theoretical and disciplinary angles, ranging from rational choice theory to peace studies and moral philosophy.¹³ In the last of these areas, the focus on the 'legitimacy' of secession also dealt with its causes and *raison d'être*, thus containing both a prescriptive and an analytical dimension. A typology of possible ways of 'regulating' ethnic conflict has also been delineated for us. This brackets secession with 'partition', and presents both in the framework of self-determination as a political principle.¹⁴

What is the relationship between secessionism and irredentism?¹⁵ Donald Horowitz has identified a 'convertibility of claims' between the two, a coinage that, as we shall see, well fits our description of Serbian secessionism-cum-irredentism.¹⁶ However, in principle, the two dimensions should be kept clearly distinct. Irredentism is often considered one of the most dangerous forms of nationalism precisely because it unremittingly identifies nation and state. Minorities which are supposed to be 'stranded' abroad or to have drifted apart from their homeland are expected to be redeemed by association with a sole unitary state, a single government, culture, language, power hierarchy and set of laws. Irredentism articulates itself as a series of mega-projects (Greater Germany, Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia, Greater Hungary, Greater Romania, Russia's 'near abroad' and so on) which have in common their underlying reciprocal intolerance and, hence, their mutual incompatibility. It conceives the nation as an organic, homogeneous whole, all members of which are supposed to dwell under a common political roof and to bow to a single authority.

In the twentieth century, irredentism played a central role in the explosion of two world wars and endless conflicts, including the first two Gulf wars and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Moreover, one can find a mirror-like (and relatively unexplored) relationship between irredentism and ethnic cleansing, which runs as follows: if the existence of 'external' minorities is considered an unbearable injustice and the presence of ethnic kin outside one's state borders is assailed, then 'internal' minorities are also perfunctorily repudiated, finding themselves under severe threat. The generalized rallying cry becomes homogenization. When 'stranded' minorities are seen as victims, internal minorities are simultaneously seen as an enemy fifth column and as a menace to the country's integrity. The designated 'victims' can only be redeemed with the help of the fatherland. In brief, ethnic cleansing can be seen as irredentism's logical finale. Finally, irredentism creates immense international instability by

attempting to aggrandize existing states, hence propagating alarm and panic amongst both neighbours and the international community at large.

Secession by the Centre

Despite the burgeoning literature in this area, the possibility of secession occurring from within the centre has been largely ignored. The prevalent assumption is that secession can only take place in the periphery. The possibility that central authorities, or even dominant ethnic groups, may be willing to secede is not even contemplated. A partial exception is represented by Allen Buchanan, who makes two interesting distinctions: central versus peripheral secession, and majority versus minority secession.¹⁷ In the first case, the area wishing to secede occupies a peculiar (central) geographical position within the country, forming its very core. Buchanan aptly describes this pattern as ‘hole-of-a-donut’ secession—it will not merely create a landlocked polity, but one entirely encircled by its erstwhile host state. For this reason, the secessionists could in principle free-ride on the public goods of the state even after secession has taken place. If, for instance, Tatarstan were to secede from Russia or some Indian reservations from the USA, they would have to rely entirely on the host state for some basic functions, such as national defence. Therefore, this type of secession rarely occurs, as geopolitical conditions discourage it; neither is it likely to be accepted by the host state.¹⁸ As a rule, that is why secession occurs almost always in the geographical periphery of the host state.

As for the distinction between majority and minority secession, Buchanan does not perhaps sufficiently clarify whether ‘minority’ is merely a demographic concept or also entails a sociological dimension (related to such characteristics as relative social status or practices of discrimination). Indeed, as he recognizes, majority secession is usually referred to in the literature as ‘exclusion’ of the majority by the minority (as in South Africa in the heyday of the apartheid system, or in Serbian-occupied Kosovo before 1999). In short, the first criterion is entirely territorial or geographic, while the second is mostly demographic or sociological. But neither is suitable as an explanation of the wish of a dominant group to carve out an irredentist project from a territory which was at least in part under its direct political control (albeit such control did not remain uncontested in the Serbian case, given the counter-balancing power of other groups).

Although this chapter focuses on Yugoslavia as the quintessential example of central secession, other candidates should not be ruled out. For instance, Czechoslovakia’s division can arguably be analysed as an example of peaceful secession by the centre (the Czech Republic), rather than by the periphery (Slovakia). As is well known, the democratizing government in Prague opted to solve its financial and political disputes with Bratislava by getting rid of the burden at once—by allowing Slovakia to secede, rather than conceding it more autonomy. However, the reality was that the main nationalist movement operated

in Slovakia, while the Czech side was relatively free of nationalist mobilization. The centre never developed a fully-fledged secessionist movement, but simply allowed the federation to dissolve.¹⁹ Similarly, the case of Russia can probably be better described as one of ‘laissez-faire’ pragmatism rather than as secession by the centre in a strict sense.

In some cases, particular parties or movements appear to advocate secession by the centre, or at least ‘majority secession’ from the minority. One example is the Reform Party in Canada, which claims to represent English-speakers from the ‘oppressed’ majority and favours a centralized, mono-cultural Canada, even if this means ‘seceding’ from Quebec. English mother-tongue speakers are a clear majority of Canada’s population (about 60%; see [chapter 2](#)), so the demographic imbalance is conspicuous here. However, the Reform Party is electorally stronger in Canada’s western periphery (extending to British Columbia), rather than in the centre of the country per se (Ontario and the capital Ottawa), so ‘secessionism by the centre’ would be a misnomer. The picture is further complicated by the existence of a competing ‘secessionist’ movement, claiming a separate identity for each western province as well as for Western Canada as a whole, and overlapping with Native American land rights claims.²⁰

Neither can the Eritrea-Ethiopia relationship be considered a case of secession by the centre. Eritrea was able to secede from Ethiopia in 1993 only after its allies, the troops of the Ethiopian liberation movement, had captured the capital, Addis Ababa, ushering in a new regional order. Since the movement developed in the periphery, this is again not a case of secessionism by the centre. Moreover, the Amhara minority (32%, if counted with the Tigreans) had consistently tried to dominate the country with a mixture of pure coercion (during Col. Menghistu Haile Mariam’s Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, 1977–91) and consensus (during Emperor Haile Sellassie’s rule to 1975, through the use of more neutral imperial symbols, the co-optation of local elites and networks, and the emphasis on a common Coptic Christian heritage). In any event, the Amharas never did attempt to secede from the rest of the country, or at least they did not openly and successfully do so.²¹ After 1993, resistance against Eritrean ‘invasion’ was pitiless and fierce due to Amhara fear of losing their centuries-old privileged status.²²

Finally, the Malaysia-Singapore relationship can be included as a possible contender. Singapore’s independence in 1965 was warmly encouraged, or even pushed, by the Malaysian Federation, since its Chinese majority exerted an all-too-powerful influence on the mainland’s own ethnic Chinese minority. By contrast with Yugoslavia, the international community did not contest this particular type of secession; hence, the move occurred peacefully and in mutual agreement. This may be defined as a case of secession by the centre, but not in an unqualified way. In fact, Singapore better matches the process defined by Alexis Heraclides as ‘ejection’, as it was in practice ‘booted out’ by the Malaysian federation.²³

Thus, secessionism by the centre is a rare phenomenon. Even in the case of the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, political fragmentation can be seen as part of a larger historical pattern of state dissolution and decolonization. The Yugoslav case was different: in Serbia, a powerful nationalist movement emerged before the break-up of the state, and indeed actually encouraged this outcome. From a distant, foreign, international perspective, secession seemed to occur first in the periphery (Slovenia and Croatia). Yet, these republics had been pressed into developing their reactive forms of secessionism as the state's continuing legitimacy was called into question. Nationalist movements were already at work in Slovenia and especially Croatia, but, given their recent (indeed persisting) experience of lack of democratic freedoms, they had to wait for strong signals from the centre before setting their own secessionist agenda and openly declaring their statements of purpose. Once the central state was delegitimized, both central and peripheral nationalism took advantage of the legitimacy vacuum to press their claims in the direction of independence.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

As in the analysis of nationalist tensions in other societies, two principal issues are relevant to our understanding of the circumstances in which political conflict in the former Yugoslavia came to a head in the early 1990s. The first is the political and constitutional context, viewed historically: the process of state building, and the shape that the Yugoslav state finally took in the years before its collapse. The second is the ethnonational balance, and the dynamics of competition between the various nationalities. We now look at these issues in turn.

The Evolution of the State

The *first Yugoslavia* was established on 1 December 1918 as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by bringing together a number of existing entities carved out of the former Ottoman Empire (before the First World War) and the former Habsburg Empire (as a consequence of the war). The most important of these was the Kingdom of Serbia. The core of what is now central Serbia had achieved the status of an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire already by 1815 and, more substantially, in 1830–33. It became formally independent in 1878, and extended its borders southwards to include what are now roughly Kosovo and Macedonia (1913). The second component was the Kingdom of Montenegro, which had long maintained its status as an independent principality ruled by Orthodox prince-bishops. Its independence was recognized internationally in 1878, and in 1910 it proclaimed itself a monarchy. Third, two Hungarian possessions were absorbed: Croatia-Slavonia (an autonomous region of Hungary, formerly the old Kingdom of Croatia), and Vojvodina (a southern Hungarian district then inhabited by several ethnic groups, mostly Germans,

Hungarians and Serbs). Fourth, two major zones of Austria were incorporated: Carniola, a predominantly Slovene-speaking autonomous crownland with other areas inhabited by Slovenes, and Dalmatia, a predominantly Croatian autonomous Austrian possession on the Adriatic coast with important Italian minorities. Finally, the new state also included Bosnia-Herzegovina, a distinctive territory that had long been part of the Ottoman empire, but which had been occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and formally annexed in 1908 as a territory under joint Austrian-Hungarian tutelage.

The new state was a mainstay of the Anglo-American international order resulting from the re-drawing of the world map after the First World War. The name 'Yugoslavia' was officially adopted on 3 October 1929 by a decree of King Alexander I (1888–1934). This replacement of the earlier multi-national name symbolized the strongly centralist tendencies of the interwar state, and resulted in nationalist unrest spreading throughout the country, culminating in the assassination of the king in 1934. Yugoslavia's constituent parts had entered the union with different objectives and for different reasons. Some envisaged it on a federal basis of mutual respect and appreciation, but the actual outcome was a centralized structure.

The reality was that, as the former Kingdom of Serbia lay at the core of the new arrangement, its ruling dynasty had indeed assumed power in the new state. A sizeable portion of Belgrade's elites saw the new state as an arena for nationalist expansion and consolidation—and as 'war booty' from the victorious superpowers. With the rise of centralist nationalism and fascism all over Europe, state elites saw a chance to establish complete supremacy for the Serbian element. The fact that the capital was located in Belgrade, seat of the old Serbian kingdom, meant that, already at its inception, Yugoslavia was tempted to identify with the foregoing polity and, following the prevailing *Zeitgeist*, to centralize itself on the general model of the surrounding European nation-states. As Slovenian, Croatian and Macedonian elites were to discover, the international conditions of the time were propitious for extreme centralization. Under the impact of expanding fascism even a multinational state such as Yugoslavia was able to recentralize itself in the name of 'national unity'.

This first Yugoslavia survived until 1941, when the country was occupied by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which dismembered it, turning Croatia into a puppet state, the so-called 'Independent State of Croatia' (1941–45). This came under the rule of Ante Pavelic's *Ustasha* movement, whose principal aim was an ethnically pure Croatia. Other areas were annexed by Italy and Hungary.

The *second Yugoslavia*, known as the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, came into being following the partisan victory at the end of the Second World War, and lasted until its disintegration in 1991. The reconstitution of the state and its success until the late 1980s—notwithstanding economic difficulties, including falling real incomes and rising unemployment in its later years—owed much to the leadership and vision of the charismatic partisan leader Marshall Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980), himself of mixed Croat-Slovene

parentage. Tito's efforts to smooth interethnic conflict by restraining Serbian centralism and chauvinism and drawing all Yugoslavs into a common front against Fascism were successful, and laid the basis for new federal arrangements, which were also, of course, a reaction to the centralism of the interwar period. Tito was himself fond of repeating what was later to become a clichéd summary of the country's new structure: Yugoslavia had six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one party.²⁴ Overworked though it may be, the first and last points in this summary provide a useful framework for analysis of Yugoslavia's polity, and the remaining points (to which we turn in the next section) draw attention to the central characteristics of Yugoslav society.

Under Tito, several constitutions (1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974) were approved: each defined clearly the relationship between centre and periphery and each deepened the decentralization implicit at the outset, when the federal character of Yugoslavia was still conceived in imitation of Lenin's federal restructuring of the USSR. The new state was made up of six autonomous republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), a gesture designed to recognize both its multinational character and the long-established borders that had been wiped out in the centralizing state established in 1918. In addition, two regions of Serbia (Kosovo-Metohija—later known simply as Kosovo—and Vojvodina) were given autonomy, and this was greatly extended in 1974. The areas and populations of the republics and provinces are indicated in [Table 11.1](#).

The 1963 constitution introduced the practice of 'self-management', inaugurating a phase of economic liberalization and 'market socialism' which became a powerful myth for the West's liberal left. Economic liberalization called for greater transparency in decision making and for new forms of power sharing. But, although liberalization began far ahead of other communist states, political parties remained illegal until the late 1980s. Democratic reform followed, rather than preceded, the example of other East European countries.

The 1974 constitution marked a decisive step towards confederation, paving the way for an institutionalized political balance and a power-sharing 'government by consensus'. Tito himself attempted to prepare the country for post-Titoism by emphasizing decentralization and equality between the republics, which now obtained a veto over federal legislation: decision making required consensus among the republics, thus encouraging participation while preserving national unity. The constitution was thus a *tour de force* of balanced interethnic engineering to check the impending growth of Croatian and especially Serbian nationalism. It also set the basis for a rotating presidency in the post-Tito era: one representative of each of the six republics and of Serbia's two autonomous provinces would form a collective presidium, and the post of Federal President would rotate between them annually.²⁵ These provisions initially succeeded in their aim of preventing the return of Serbia's domination, but at the cost of weakening the Federal President's role. The constant rotation of leaders

TABLE 11.1 YUGOSLAVIA: AREA AND POPULATION BY REPUBLIC, 1981–91

Republic	Area km ²	Population (000s)	
		1981	1991
Serbia	88,361	9,314	9,779
<i>Central Serbia</i>	55,968	5,705	5,809
<i>Kosovo</i>	21,506	1,574	1,956
<i>Voivodina</i>	10,887	2,035	2,014
Montenegro	13,812	584	615
Croatia	56,538	4,601	4,784
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,129	4,124	4,365
Slovenia	20,251	1,892	1,966
Macedonia	25,713	1,909	2,034
Total	255,804	22,425	23,543

Source: *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1992*. 1st edn. (London: Europa, 1992); 3rd edn. [for 1997] (London: Europa, 1996).

contributed to a sense of generalized inefficiency and excessive bureaucracy, a shortcoming that was later to be skilfully exploited by Milošević with his populist ‘anti-bureaucratic’ campaign, which was in reality an attack on the constitution.

Thus, even before Tito’s death in 1980, the constitutional and political links holding Yugoslavia together had become looser. By 1974, the autonomy framework had created a situation in which each republic had become a semi- or quasi-sovereign entity. By now, the entire country was held together not merely by the Titoist *nomenklatura*’s tight centralized control, but also by continuous negotiations and accommodation, resulting in an internal system of ‘balance of power’.²⁶

A potentially important counterbalance to the centrifugal tendencies of the constitution was the centralizing force of a unitary communist party (renamed the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1952). Although the party became organized along federal lines, and the various republican sections were able to achieve considerable autonomy in time, the dominance of the party’s central committee long remained unchallenged. The party retained control over government appointments, notwithstanding the implications of this practice for economic reform and inter-republican cooperation. Unlike other communist parties, it was rather independent of Moscow, especially after 1948, when Tito unexpectedly broke with Stalin, pulling Yugoslavia out of the Cominform, the international communist organization (this also led to Yugoslavia’s leading role in an international ‘third force’, the non-aligned movement, after 1956).

As the party became increasingly stratified between federal and regional organizations, however, its capacity to provide the cement to hold Yugoslavia’s loose constitutional building blocks together became increasingly undermined.

The Serbian party was the first to adopt a strong nationalist line, but in general all parties were able to incorporate demands emerging from grassroots movements, the most important of which was towards self-determination. In republics other than Serbia and Montenegro, the local communist parties reacted to the rise of Milošević by refusing to accept his policy. This led them to align themselves with powerful emerging mass movements in favour of democracy and self-determination. But, notwithstanding efforts to redefine themselves, the renamed communist parties were replaced in most republics by nationalist coalitions.

Nations and Minorities

The very idea that Yugoslavia had ‘five nations, four languages, three religions and two alphabets’ raises serious issues about Yugoslav state-craft. The challenge of listing the nations and the languages lies at the core of this difficulty. Identifying the three religions and the two alpha bets is much easier. Originally, the five nations were the three mentioned in the original name of the state after 1918 (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) plus the Macedonians and the Montenegrins. Recognizing the existence of a separate Macedonian nation (and language) was not unproblematic, but it seems to have been a genuinely positive gesture that was effective in reconciling the population of this contested region to the post-1945 state. The existence of a Montenegrin identity separate from a Serbian one depends largely on adherence to historical symbolism rather than to contemporary divisions in the domains of language, religion and culture. Census data show that most Montenegrins feel themselves not to be Serb.

On the other hand, what of the ‘nations’ not included in this list? Five of the Yugoslav Republics corresponded to one or other of the five nations just listed; but in the sixth, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbo-Croatian speaking Muslim group (which constituted a plurality but not a majority of the population) was reluctant to accept the designation ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’; the recognition of a separate ethnic ‘Muslim’ nation (*narod*) followed. Furthermore, one of the largest minority groups, the Albanians, was not formally classified as a ‘nation’ at all; it was a ‘national minority’, and thus not entitled to its own republic. The Hungarians, too, were classified as a ‘national minority’; like the Albanians, they had their ‘own’ state elsewhere, outside Yugoslavia’s frontiers, and were entitled only to autonomy within Serbia.

Neither is the listing of Yugoslavia’s languages easy. Adding Macedonian to Serbo-Croat and Slovene gives us a list of three Slavic languages. But most students of linguistics have seen Serbian and Croatian as no more than dialectal variants of the same language, Serbo-Croatian, differentiated most obviously by the fact that the latter, like Slovene, uses the Roman alphabet while the former typically uses a variant of the Cyrillic alphabet. Yet, even this distinction was sometimes blurred, as until 1991 the Montenegrins used mostly Cyrillic, and the Serbs used both alphabets.²⁷ The Bosnian Muslims preferred the Roman

alphabet. Macedonian, a new language that has been developed most intensively in the twentieth century, also uses Cyrillic script. Once again, however, we need to note the numerical significance of speakers of certain non-Slavic languages, including Hungarian and especially Albanian.

This pen-picture of the national question in Yugoslavia may be completed by considering the importance of religion. In some cases, religious and linguistic frontiers reinforce each other strikingly: Slovenes tend to be of Catholic origin, for instance, Albanians are typically Muslim and Macedonians are Orthodox. But the Serbo-Croatian speaking population is divided by putative 'religion', which in these cases presents national boundaries more robust than those of language. We thus get a strong linkage between Croats and Catholicism and between Serbs and Montenegrins and Orthodoxy, while Serbo-Croatian speaking Muslims tend to opt for a separate identity. However, religion was not a perfectly differentiating factor, since there were Catholic Serbs and Orthodox Croats, albeit in small numbers.²⁸ More important still, the official doctrine of atheism had affected religious beliefs in all three religions, though to different extents.

An indication of the national composition of Yugoslavia and its component parts on the very eve of its dissolution is given in [Table 11.2](#) and the geographical distribution of the major nationalities is illustrated in [Map 11.1](#). This shows the ethnic breakdown in each republic in 1991, though the census taken in this year is particularly problematic, as it was conducted during a state of war. It will be seen that only one republic, Slovenia, was substantially mono-ethnic (while only a negligible number of Slovenes lived outside their own republic). All the other Republics had sizeable minorities, and in one (Bosnia-Herzegovina) none of the three groups (Serbs, Muslims, Croats) actually had a majority.²⁹

ETHNONATIONAL TENSIONS AND THE STATE

We have already referred to the relatively loose nature of the Yugoslav federation. Before exploring the separatist trends that broke the surface in a range of different contexts it should be stressed that there were also powerful forces working to hold the state together. One of these, the Communist Party, has already been discussed; indeed, it was precisely the weakening authority of the party, arising not only from ethnonational considerations but also from the collapsing prestige of communist ideals in the late 1980s, that facilitated the break-up of the state.

The second centralizing institution was the Yugoslav People's Army. In many countries, the military establishment is the sector most prone to use force as an answer to ethnic tensions. By definition, the military see themselves as defenders of the sacred unity of their 'fatherland', and the Yugoslav army was no exception. In this, the ethnic structure of the senior ranks of the army was both a strength and a weakness. Already in 1986, well before the break-up, 60% of the higher cadres and officer corps were ethnic Serbs.³⁰ Despite Tito's overall efforts

TABLE 11.2 YUGOSLAVIA: NATIONAL COMPOSITION BY REPUBLIC, 1991

Republic	Serb	Monte- negrin	Croat	Muslim	Slovene	Mace- donian	Yugo- slav	Other
Serbia	65.9	1.4	1.1	2.5	0.0	0.5	3.3	25.3(a)
<i>Central Serbia</i>	87.9	1.3	0.4	3.0	0.0	0.5	2.5	4.4
<i>Kosovo</i>	9.9	1.0	0.4	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	85.1(b)
<i>Vojvodina</i>	56.8	2.2	3.7	0.3	0.0	0.9	8.7	27.4(c)
Montenegro	9.3	69.1	1.0	14.6	0.0	0.2	4.3	1.5
Croatia	12.2	0.2	78.1	0.9	0.5	0.1	2.2	5.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	31.2	.	17.2	43.4	.	.	5.5	2.7
Slovenia	2.4	0.2	2.8	1.4	87.8	0.2	0.6	4.6
Macedonia	2.1	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	65.3	0.8	30.3(d)
All republics, 1991 (%)	36.3	2.3	19.8	9.9	7.4	5.9	3.1	15.3 (e)
All republics, 1981 (%)	36.3	2.6	19.7	8.9	7.8	6.0	5.4	13.3 (f)

Note: Due to widespread non-cooperation with the census by Albanians in Kosovo in 1991, the data reported here are not the 'official' census data. In the 'other' column, the figures include the following groups in the case of the respective notes: (a) Albanians 17.1%; (b) Albanians 81.6%; (c) Hungarians 16.9%; (d) Albanians 21.7%; (e) Albanians 9.2% and Hungarians 1.6%; (f) Albanians 7.7% and Hungarians 1.9%.

Sources: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, *Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1999* (Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office, 1999), and, for Albanians, Milovan Zivkovic and Milutin Prokic, 'Official Statistics on National Minorities', paper presented at the IAOS Conference on Statistics, Development and Human Rights, 4–8 September 2000, Montreux, Switzerland; available www.statistik.admin.ch/about/international_zivkovic_final_paper.doc [2002–03–06]; Republic of Croatia, *Census of Population, Households, Dwellings and Farms 31st March, 1991: Population according to Ethnic Group by Settlement*. Documentation 881 (Zagreb: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1992); *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia 2001* (Ljubljana: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2001), available www.gov.si/zrs/eng/index.html [2002–03–05]; *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 1997*, 3rd edn. (London: Europa, 1996).

to decentralize the country, the army stood as a lone exception and was one of the few institutions to remain heavily dominated by Serbs but committed to defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.³¹ The army was a unitary structure imbued by communist ideology; yet, notwithstanding its centralizing influence, there were powerful factors working in an opposite direction, and it is to these that we now turn.

Serbian Nationalism

Apart from the small principality of Montenegro (independent de facto since 1718 and de jure since 1878), Serbia was the first nation in the Balkans after Greece (1822) to fully enfranchise itself from the Ottoman 'yoke' (1878). It was

thus also the least likely to renounce independence in the name of Yugoslav principles. As Seton-Watson put it, Serbia would not allow its 'strong wine to be dissolved in the weak water of Yugoslavia'.³² The irredentist ambitions of the Serbs became manifest under the dictatorship of King Alexander, and Ivo Banac observed that during the first Yugoslavia the monarchy was seen as 'the visible symbol of Serbia's state continuity'.³³ Since the first Yugoslavia was centred on the Serbian monarchy in Belgrade, most Serbs considered the new state as a 'natural' successor and continuation of the old Kingdom of Serbia.


This attitude alienated non-Serbs, who took every available opportunity to rebel. Following German occupation during the Second World War, two major forces emerged in Serbia: the Yugoslav Communists led by Tito's partisans, and the Serbian nationalists, guided by Draza Mihailovich (1893–1946) and his *Chetnik* movement. The Serbian *Chetniks* were initially seen by the Allies as potential partners in the fight against the Germans, but, because of a degree of Serbian-Nazi collaboration, and the *Chetniks*' obvious incapacity to hold the country together, the Allies decided finally to support the Communist-led partisans.³⁴ The *volte-face* of Britain, a traditionally pro-monarchical country, created a sense of betrayal among Serbs everywhere, including the important Serbian diaspora in the UK, which remained nationalist and anticommunist to the backbone. This 'high treason' was particularly resented by the *Chetnik* sympathizers converging around the figure of the exiled king in London.

Croatian Nationalism

The roots of Croatian nationalism date back to the eighteenth century, when Croatia belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire. Unlike nationalism elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Croatian nationhood was initially less founded on cultural or linguistic grounds than on historical memories of statehood. Insofar as one was a Croatian nationalist, linguistic identity was downplayed in favour of historical, ethnic and even religious elements. Serbo-Croatian had been early identified as a common language. In 1850, a literary agreement was signed accepting the *stokavian* dialect for a standard orthography for both Serbian and Croatian, while incorporating spelling reforms to draw them as close together as possible.³⁵ The Croatian elites, though accepting this compromise, were concerned more about historical continuity than language. Their emphasis was on 'historical rights' and on continuity with a suitable medieval state embodied in the *Triune* (three in one) Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. Ethnic origin was initially less important than institutional continuity.³⁶

In addition to the distinguishing features of religion and alphabet already discussed, different conceptions of what it meant to be a Croatian have been competing over the years. The 'Great Croatia idea' espoused by Ante Starčević (1823–96) was a re-interpretation of the nineteenth century 'Illyrian' (proto-Yugoslav) ideal in Croatian ultra-nationalist terms.³⁷ Differences between Serbs and Croats were alleged to be inherently biological. Paradoxically, however, as

MAP 11.1 YUGOSLAVIA: MAJOR NATIONALITIES BY REPUBLIC, 1991



soon as a Serb accepted Croat national consciousness, such differences would no longer matter. Starčević and other authors simultaneously included Serbs in the Croat nation and branded them as an inferior race, but this ambiguity reflected the authors' implicit admission of the fundamental similarity between the two peoples.³⁸

This theme was taken up by other Croat nationalists, who emphasized the allegedly huge biological differences between Serbs and Croats. As elsewhere, such an emphasis on race (which in the Balkans is coupled with a tendency towards politically motivated historical revisionism) served to compensate for the absence of clearly defined cultural markers between the two groups. As a consequence, nationhood was to be both inclusive and exclusive. The view was taken that 'the Croatian nation should include those who, in the course of time, had become Orthodox or Muslims... It was possible to speak of those who lived in the region known as Serbia as "Serbs", but it was wrong to speak of Serbs as a nation'.³⁹

Croats and Serbs cooperated in their struggles against Hungarian domination (in 1848 and in 1867–68). Liberal Catholics inspired by pro-Illyrian Bishop Strossmayer (1815–1905) and his People's Party were particularly open to collaboration with Serb leaders. In truly pre-ecumenical spirit, Strossmayer's goals were even more ambitious, as he strove to unite both churches, Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox, around a common Serbo-Croat language and a shared Yugoslav idea— despite Serbian nationalist accusations that this was a prelude to conversion to Catholicism and other fears of potential Croatian domination.

Following a period in which Croatian nationalism took a relatively moderate form through the Peasant Party in the first Yugoslavia, Croatia was conferred a form of 'statehood' as an Axis puppet state under the *Ustasha* regime of the dictator Ante Pavelić (1889–1959). In reality the country was divided into two spheres of influence, respectively German/Nazi and Italian/Fascist. In the German-controlled area some of the worst crimes against humanity occurred; as is widely known, the *Ustasha* regime was responsible for the murder of tens of thousand of Jews, Gypsies, Serbs and Croat opponents.

With the advent of Titoism, Croatian national sentiments did not die out. The economic prosperity of the 1960s eventually triggered demands for political freedom. The 'Croatian Spring' (1969–71) was a broadly based movement led by local Communists who demanded reform in the areas of politics (further decentralization and autonomy), culture (the recognition of Croatian language) and the economy (a call for transparency of economic transactions between republics). The movement was soon banned, resulting in the arrest of its main leaders—but it was to remain a catalyst for subsequent developments, especially after Tito's death. It ended in late 1971 with the arrest of large sections of the Croatian leadership (including the former partisan General Franjo Tuđman). In December 1971 a purge of the Croatian party began, followed by similar purges in Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia and continuing well into 1972. From that

moment until early 1991, Croatian nationalism was apparently mastered. But the party and the state skilfully incorporated some of the Croatian requests, as well as the concerns of other republics, culminating in the adoption of the 1974 constitution.

Slovene Nationalism

Though lacking a memory of past statehood, Slovenia was clearly identified as a nation on the basis of its language. Fearful of Germanization while still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Slovenian elites emphasized linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, rather than history and ethnicity. This provided a shared 'core value' around which they could easily build a solid national identity; Slovene borders were clearly identifiable on quasi-objective criteria and hence became less disputable.⁴⁰ Slovene nationalism was thus under less pressure than nationalism elsewhere in the Balkans to stress interethnic boundaries. As a result, it manifested itself in a more peaceful character. This self-confidence was reinforced by the fact that Slovene remained an official language throughout Yugoslav history.

Within Socialist Yugoslavia, the Republic of Slovenia was one of the driving forces towards increasing decentralization. The second most prominent member of the old regime after Tito, Edvard Kardelj (1910–79), a Slovene deeply committed to federalist principles, was the main theoretician of the self-management doctrine. As the former head of Slovenia's partisans he enjoyed unparalleled respect, and following his role as Yugoslavia's first Vice-President (1945–53), he played a leading part in drafting all of the federal constitutions—in particular, that of 1974, whose main goal was to curb Serbian hegemonism.⁴¹ Given its success in this respect, and due to its wealthier status, Slovenia was a crucial force in keeping the federation together. Secessionist aspirations were muted and toned down before the rise of Milošević. In other words, Slovenian elites had vested interests in the continuation of Yugoslavia as a unified country and as a single economic market, notwithstanding their complaints about what were in effect financial subsidies by Slovenia to poorer republics and the potential economic attractions of Slovene independence.

The Question of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Although Bosnia had experienced its own interethnic tensions over the centuries and these had survived in certain districts, a rich tradition of diversity, pluralism and tolerance developed there over many centuries and flourished until quite recently, only to be shattered at the close of the millennium.⁴² A Bosnian state was created in the twelfth century and reached its apogee under King Tvrtko I (second half of the fourteenth century). The medieval neo-Manichaean religion of the Bogomils had its centre in Bosnia. Bosnian's pluralist heritage in terms of syncretic movements and 'religious bridge building' dated back at least to the

late Middle Ages.⁴³ In the contemporary period, everyday practices and traditions of consensus were echoed in the political sphere by coalition building and a custom of pragmatic compromise.⁴⁴ Being one of the most ethnically diverse republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina was seen as the crucible of ethno-national accommodation in Yugoslavia and the litmus test of supranational multiethnicity.

In 1971, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina were elevated to full national status, from national minority to constituent nation (*narod*), although the new status was constitutionally enshrined only in 1974. By the early 1990s, local dynamics appeared to be contributing to the emergence of a new Bosnian identity, a blending of people from Muslim, Serbian and Croatian backgrounds, in a highly secularized society where intermarriage was increasingly the norm. The older bridge-building tradition was reinforced under Tito: each group was treated equally, while official persecution against all three religions faded after 1950. Although state-sanctioned atheism persisted and had a lasting effect in undermining the religious basis of society, religiously-derived identities re-emerged in the 1990s as a consequence of ethnic essentialism. Religion played a largely symbolic role, since official atheism had left a strong secular mark on society: 40 years of atheist propaganda succeeded in substantially erasing religious beliefs, but this only resulted in reinforcing formerly 'religious' boundaries that were now devoid of theological or normative content. The conflict that subsequently developed can hence be described as a war between Catholic atheists, Orthodox atheists and Muslim atheists. A secularized form of 'religious belonging', referring mainly to ethnicity and descent, had become the only widely-shared and binding element used to differentiate Serbs from Croats and others.⁴⁵

Other Forms of Nationalism

While in the early 1990s world attention was focused on the war between Belgrade and its three northern republics, other tensions appeared not far below the surface. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating, the Macedonians were faced with an unwelcome dilemma: whether to remain within what would now be an overwhelmingly Serb-dominated Yugoslavia or face the risks (both external, given long-standing Greek claims, and domestic, in view of the size of the Albanian minority) of pursuing independence. For Montenegrins, too, the relationship with Serbia would in future be fundamentally different. But even within Serbia itself storm clouds were gathering, as tensions with the Albanian population of Kosovo grew.

Macedonian nationalism has been visible since at least 1894 (with the establishment of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), and a separate Macedonian language was envisaged around that period amongst the Macedonian diaspora, notably in St. Petersburg (1902). True to its Leninist principles, already by 1924 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had promised

Macedonians the right of self-determination, and in 1934 a Communist Party conference voted for the establishment of a separate Macedonian Party. Following the partisan victory, a Macedonian state was proclaimed on 2 August 1944. The government of the People's Republic of Macedonia was set up in 1945 and soon, as part of Yugoslavia, adopted a constitution (1946) with Macedonian as the official language. In 1967 a Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences and an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church were created, marking substantial recognition of the distinct character of the republic.

The position in Montenegro was rather different. Ethnically, Montenegrins are not distinguishable from Serbs, but memory of past statehood is strong. Under Austro-Hungarian tutelage, Montenegro remained an independent principality and achieved full independence in 1878. However, it was occupied by Austria during the First World War, and King Nikola I fled to Italy. The power vacuum was immediately filled by Belgrade's monarchy, which annexed the country despite wide-spread popular resistance culminating in the so-called Christmas Uprising (7 January 1919)—a rebellion that persisted until at least 1926.

With its predominantly Albanian population but deep roots in the historical consciousness of the Serbs as a core part of the original Serbian monarchy, Kosovo was also in a special position. Recognition of the area's special status within Serbia, first as an autonomous region, then as an autonomous province, failed to resolve the problem. The 1974 constitution granted Kosovo more autonomy, weakening Serbia's capacity to intervene. Tension along the Serbia-Kosovo line spilled over into violence in 1981, however, and the relationship with Belgrade remained tense. In an important sense, one of the first battles in the war that resulted in the break-up of Yugoslavia took place there, when, in 1989, Serbian President Milošević in effect abolished Kosovo's autonomy. This was written into the Serbian constitution of 1990—which also ended the autonomy of Vojvodina—notwithstanding resistance from the local Albanian population and protests from the other republics.

THE PATH TO DISSOLUTION

The circumstances that finally led to the collapse of the old Yugoslavia shared some similarities with parallel processes elsewhere. On the one hand, the collapse of communism took place at an uneven pace in the various regions, providing additional ideological fuel to an escalating ethnonational conflict. On the other hand, the international community belatedly began to show a disposition to offer recognition to fragments of former multinational states, an attitude that had traditionally been resisted because of fear of a 'domino effect'.⁴⁶ The distinctive feature of the Yugoslav case, however, was the new nationalist drive within the Serbian core of the state and the reaction that this evoked within the peripheral regions, topics to which we now turn.

Discontent in the Centre

A key date in the process of Yugoslavia's break-up was September 1986, when the first draft of a Serbian nationalist *Memorandum* appeared, with signatures by the major Serbian intellectuals. This had originated in an earlier decision of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Science and was part of a plan backed by the army, police, state security services and the church. The document's secessionist content hid behind a veil of unitarist rhetoric, but was nevertheless palpable. The Serbs were portrayed as victims of 'genocidal terror' by the Albanians, of 'economic exploitation' by the Slovenes, of cultural assimilation by the Croats, of religious conversion by the Muslims, and of systematic historical impairment by the Titoist regime—including an alleged attempt to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with Latin script and the supposed stealing of Serbian writers by 'others'.⁴⁷ The undertone was also strongly irredentist; as Noel Malcolm states, 'the fundamental argument of the Memorandum was that the "Serb people" throughout Yugoslavia was a kind of primary entity, possessing a unitary set of claims and rights which transcended any mere political or geographical division. It was the pursuit of that "integrity" which would eventually destroy Yugoslavia'.⁴⁸

Slobodan Milošević's ascent to power as President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (and, thus, as de facto leader of the republic) in 1987 marked a significant political advance for this perspective. A turning point in the translation of Serbian nationalism into political reality took place in 1989, when Milošević abolished Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomy, engendering intense protest in all other republics. Finally, Serbian secessionism culminated with the approval in 1990 of the Republic of Serbia's constitution, in which the word 'Yugoslavia' is not mentioned once.⁴⁹

The Albanian demographic explosion, that is the high fertility of Albanians in comparison to Serbs (their birth rate being many times higher), exerted a crucial emotional impact on the emergence of present-day Serbian nationalism. In Tito's years, remarkable economic aid had been channelled into Kosovo, making it the most heavily subsidized Yugoslav region, but this development strategy did not result in a change of basic demographic patterns. This fear of demographic decline was mostly derived from rapid urbanization and de-ruralization. Although it was also experienced in Croatia and by other ethnic groups, it was only in Serbia that it was systematically and unremittingly utilized to stir up the flames of radical nationalism.

Another ingredient encouraging the Serbian campaign was the fact that the Serbs were indigenous to seven of the eight federal units; as in the case of the Croats, Albanians and Bosnians, their alleged territorial contiguity was broken by what nationalists perceived as Tito's 'imposed' boundaries. If the Serbs had made up an absolute majority of the population, perhaps Serbian secessionism would have been undermined, as other roads, such as assimilation, hegemonic control and religious conversion would have been seen as feasible or practicable in order to secure their dominant position.

Dissent in the Peripheries

The rise of Milošević and his assault on provincial autonomy caused great concern amongst all other republics. With control of Kosovo and Vojvodina now in Serbian hands and Montenegro generally sympathetic, Milošević could normally count on the support of four of the eight members of the Yugoslav collective presidency. But it was in the most economically advantaged and wealthy republic, Slovenia (the most vociferous defender of Kosovo's autonomy and an active campaigner for Albanian rights) that these concerns began to translate into concrete political propositions. The first stirrings of a more overtly independence-minded attitude took place in the capital, Ljubljana. An amendment to the constitution adopted in 1989 by the Slovene Assembly transformed the republic into a quasi-sovereign state, whose parliamentary laws were given precedence over those of Belgrade in several areas. The first postwar multiparty parliamentary elections (April 1990) were won by *Demos*, a coalition of democratic anti-regime forces, campaigning on a self-determination ticket. In a gesture of symbolic continuity, Milan Kučan, candidate of the former Communist Party, was elected President of the Republic (while the Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle became head of the government).

In response to Belgrade's threats, Slovenia adopted a declaration of sovereignty, with its new constitution implying the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation. In retaliation, Belgrade introduced customs duties on Slovene products. This was followed by a referendum (23 December 1990), in which 88.2% of Slovene voters opted for independence (voter turnout was 93.2%). The results were officially declared on 26 December 1990—now annually celebrated as Independence Day. The Slovene Assembly began transferring powers from federal to republican institutions in March 1991 and unilaterally declared its independence on 25 June 1991 (along with Croatia, as discussed below). The outcome was a short, sharp war with a decisive outcome. On 27 June 1991, the Yugoslav army set out across Slovenia to seize border posts. But this advance was halted by Slovenian territorial defence units, which also blockaded Yugoslav army barracks. The war lasted ten days and resulted in nearly 100 casualties. On 7 July, the Yugoslav army desisted from further military attacks. At the encouragement of the European Community, Slovenia accepted a moratorium on independence, and international bodies continued for some time to treat Yugoslavia as a single entity (it was only three months later that Ljubljana took over control of its own borders and introduced its own currency). The Yugoslav army withdrew its last soldier from Slovenian soil on 25 October 1991.⁵⁰

While military resistance to Slovenia's secession was ultimately limited, the case of Croatia suggests a quite different strategy on the part of Belgrade: the seizing of as much land as possible before external forces would agree on a new international order. The initial goal of the Yugoslav army was to destroy all forms of resistance in Croatia and to bring it to heel. Under the nationalist leadership of

Franjo Tudjman, Croatia soon mobilized on the pattern of Slovenia. A two-round election (April-May 1990) was won by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), a Christian Democrat and nationalist coalition campaigning for the republic's self-determination within its current boundaries. The HDZ achieved an absolute majority in the Parliament after Tudjman was elected President (8 April 1990). Belgrade's response to the nationalist advance in Croatia was to mobilize Serbian minorities living in Croatia along ethnic lines (particularly in Knin, Krajina and Eastern Slavonia). The war thus took an irreversible ethnic turn. On 17 August 1990 a Belgrade-inspired revolt by Croatian Serbs in Knin started the armed conflict and by 17 March 1991 a Serbian Republic of Krajina declared its independence. This resulted in the first attempts to establish ethnically pure areas. Serbian *ethnic* secession preceded Croatia's declaration of independence on 'non-ethnic' *territorial* grounds (25 June 1991).

In a nutshell, Belgrade's position was that Slovenia could opt, if it so chose, to exit immediately from the federation, whereas Croatia could only exit after radically changing its boundaries along ethnic lines. It is important here to stress the 'could' factor: the possibility of accepting external secession *faute de mieux* as a masquerade for promoting central secession. When the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia, it did so on the grounds that it had to protect the frontiers of Yugoslavia, rather than to protect a Serbian ethnic minority there. The legitimizing principle was entirely different in the two cases. In Slovenia, it could be presented as a last-ditch attempt to hold Yugoslavia together. In contrast, the attack on Croatia could be more easily identified as a Serbian separatist assault to destroy what remained of the federation from within. Its results were the first cases of ethnic cleansing carried out by Yugoslav army-supported militia groups against non-Serbs, mostly Croats.

The position in Bosnia-Herzegovina was yet more complex. Unlike other Yugoslav republics, it was never allowed to develop an ethnically exclusive identity. Balkan nationalism is typically predicated on an ethnic basis; but as Bosnia was a multiethnic republic, it encountered serious problems of legitimacy from the outset. Only a civic form of nationalism could have held the republic together. However, at the beginning of post-communist transitions civic institutions were by definition fragile; and since ethnonationalism is almost everywhere a more powerful force than civic nationalism, Bosnia suffered from a major drawback.

Largely in response to developments in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia declared its independence on 1 April 1992. Immediately, a Belgrade-inspired rebellion of ethnic Serbs led by Radovan Karadžić was sparked off. Shortly before this, all Bosnian Serbs in the Yugoslav army had been transferred to units stationed in Bosnia. In this way, Belgrade 'handed over to Karadžić an army of 80,000 soldiers fully equipped with sophisticated weapons which they used to target civilians while Milošević contrived to pay and supply this army by stealth so that he could deny having any connection with it'.⁵¹ Boundary building became an extremely ferocious process, since many of those defined *post-facto* as

'Muslims' were formerly identified as either Serbs or Croats, or as some combination of the two. Years of regional mobility between the republics had fostered many mixed marriages, where the partners and often their offspring did not consider themselves as either Serbs or Croats, but simply as Serbo-Croats, Bosnians, or even 'Yugoslavs'.

By the early 1990s a Croatian project to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina had already begun on the pattern of its Serbian 'role model'.⁵² This resulted in atrocious acts of ethnic cleansing and in the destruction of symbols of interethnic understanding by Croatian ultra-nationalists, most notoriously the bridge of Mostar. With the further eruption of the conflict, couples of mixed nationality and individuals of heterogeneous identity were compelled to make ethnic choices; in a pattern common in such war situations, national belonging was forced upon average citizens by violence. Mixed marriages and their offspring, however reluctant to accept ethnic categorization, were forced to opt for just this. Ethnic 'cleansing' followed, amounting to precisely what the words imply.

The final outcome in Bosnia was largely dictated by the international community. Already on 29–30 June 1991, following the Yugoslav army's intervention in Slovenia, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and other leaders had proposed the recognition of the seceding republics at a European summit. However, this was strongly opposed by the USA, Britain and France.⁵³ The latter countries supported the preservation of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, while allegedly keeping an eye on the possibility of new federal arrangements.⁵⁴ The delayed process of recognition is often identified as a key factor in the war escalation. Slovenia and Croatia finally became members of the United Nations on 22 May 1992, along with Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁵

With the structure of the old state substantially destroyed, the last stages in its disintegration proceeded. Following a referendum, Macedonians voted for independence on 8 September 1991. The Republic adopted a new constitution on 17 November 1991, but it was recognized internationally only in 1993, its name posing a particular difficulty in the eyes of Greece. Its official name is now the 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' (FYROM), a label designed to sidestep the difficulty that Macedonia is also the name of a Greek province. As the century drew to a close, relations between the Macedonian authorities and the large Albanian minority deteriorated dangerously, though the arrival of NATO forces in 2001 helped to contain tensions.

This left Montenegro as the only other republic, apart from Serbia, in what was now a two-member Yugoslav federation. Constitutionally, Montenegro is on a par with Serbia, but the political and demographic imbalance is huge (the population of Serbia outnumbers that of Montenegro by about 15 to 1). Notwithstanding close cultural and historical links between Montenegro and Serbia, Montenegro, too, began to edge towards independence, but this was opposed by the West. Under encouragement from the European Union, Serbia and Montenegro began to negotiate a new federal relationship, one that would replace the structures of the 'third' Yugoslavia.

But, as is well known, there were problems not only between the republics and Belgrade, but also within the Republic of Serbia itself. Here the central problem was that of Kosovo, whose autonomy had been brought to an end in 1989–90. Efforts by the Kosovo assembly to establish the province's independence failed, and in the mid-1990s confrontation with the Milošević regime escalated. Ethnic Albanian militants were able to mobilize and arm fairly effectively, engaging in a guerrilla war in response to Serbian attempts to control the situation by means of forced population transfers. This culminated in NATO involvement in the conflict and a decisive defeat for Belgrade in 1999, with Kosovo being placed under UN administration and becoming virtually a UN protectorate.

CONCLUSION

Two major sets of factors led to the break-up of Yugoslavia: internal factors and international ones. These can in turn be subdivided into secondary sub-factors. This chapter has mostly focused on the internal dimension of the break-up—the international dimension has been addressed in separate studies.⁵⁶

The key internal factor was the advent of a new form of power at the centre—the rise of Milošević and Serbian nationalism. The movement personified by Milošević proposed a radical form of ethnic irredentism whose effect would be to destroy the constitution from within. With the undermining of the constitution and its delicate system of balance of power, there had in effect been a Serbian *coup d'état*. Given the high level of national consciousness in other republics, notably Croatia and Slovenia, this development was highly subversive of existing Yugoslav institutions.

This is not the place to review in detail the international factors that formed the backdrop to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Initial western support for the preservation of Yugoslavia under Milošević changed very slowly. Initially it was unanimous, but a few countries soon began to break ranks and to distance themselves from Belgrade. In a process that I have documented elsewhere, this resulted in tensions between western governments as some began to abandon the principle of maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia as a member of the international community.⁵⁷ As is well known, Milošević survived the break-up, until the US-led NATO intervention. It could indeed be argued that the American century, inaugurated by Woodrow Wilson's massive propaganda to win Europe's hearts and minds, concluded with the defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo and the end of Milošević in 1999.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NOTES

1. The theory of 'secession by the centre' as applied to former Yugoslavia has been thoroughly discussed in Daniele Conversi, 'Central Secession: Towards a New Analytical Concept? The Case of Former Yugoslavia', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2000), pp. 333–56. The internal and international dimensions of the break-up have been explored in Daniele Conversi, *La desintegració de Iugoslàvia* (Barcelona/Catarroja: Editorial Afers-El Contemporani, 2000).
2. For a critique of the 'clash of civilizations' paradigm and the 'ancient-hatred' theory, see Daniele Conversi, 'Resisting Primordialism and other—isms', in Daniele Conversi (ed.), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Theory of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2002).
3. See Philip Abbott, 'The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Secession', in Percy B. Lehning (ed.), *Theories of Secession* (London: Routledge, 1998).
4. See Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (London: Verso, 2001).
5. Ralph R.Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S.W.R.de Samarasinghe and Alan B.Anderson (eds.), *Secessionist Movements* (London: Pinter, 1990), p. 13.
6. John Roper, cited by Milan Popovic, 'Before the Storm', *Montenegrin Mirror*, September 2000, accessed at www.ndc.cg.yu/eng/DOCUMENTS/Mnmirror.pdf [2002–03–18].
7. Following decolonization, many studies dealing with the topic appeared. Sir Ivor Jennings wrote about the difficulty of universally applying the principle of self-determination—quoted in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies in Protracted Ethnic Conflict* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 12. Perhaps the best known is Rupert Emerson's analysis of the break-up of empires and secession; see *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
8. Walker Connor, 'Self-Determination: the New Phase', *World Politics*, Vol. 20 (1967), pp. 20–53, reprinted in Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also Anthony D.Smith, 'Separatism and Multi-Nationalism', in *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), Ch.6, pp. 123–42; and Colin Williams (ed.), *National Separatism* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press; Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982).
9. Crawford Young, 'Biafra, Bangladesh and Southern Sudan: the Politics of Secession', Ch.12 of *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Donald L.Horowitz, 'The Logic of Secessions and Irredentas', in Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). For a more recent development of Horowitz's approach, see Donald L.Horowitz, 'Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law', in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (eds.), *Ethnicity and Group Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
10. Harry Beran, 'A Liberal Theory of Secession', *Political Studies*, Vol. 32 (1984), pp. 21–31. For a recent re-statement of this early approach, see Harry Beran A

Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World Order', in Lehning, *Theories of Secession*.

11. Ioann Lewis, 'Introduction', in Ioann Lewis (ed.), *Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa* (London: Ithaca Press, 1982); Benjamin Neuberger, *National Self-Determination in Post-colonial Africa* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986); Alexis Heraclides, *The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 21–32.
12. James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
13. On the respective areas, see Michael Hechter, 'The Dynamics of Secession', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 35 (1992), pp. 267–83; Robert A. Young, 'How do Peaceful Secessions Happen?', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1994), pp. 773–92; and Will Kymlicka, 'Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secession?', in Lehning, *Theories of Secession*.
14. McGarry and O'Leary, *Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, p. 14.
15. Donald L. Horowitz, 'Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected Connections', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 33, Nos.1/2 (1992), p. 118–30; Naomi Chazan (ed.), *Irredentism and International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner; London: Adamantine Press, 1991).
16. Horowitz, 'Irredentas and Secessions'.
17. Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 51, 151–62; see also Allen Buchanan 'The International Institutional Dimension of Secession', in Lehning, *Theories of Secession*.
18. Similarly, Beran argues that 'enclaves are anathema in contemporary politics', even though a few remnants (Monaco, San Marino, Vatican City) persist in present-day Europe; Harry Beran, 'A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for a New World Order', in Lehning, *Theories of Secession*, p. 51.
19. On the break-up of Czechoslovakia, see Jiri Musil (ed.), *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Prague, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
20. See Don Ray and Ralph R. Premdas, 'The Canadian West: A Case of Regional Separatism', and Alan B. Anderson, 'Ethno-nationalism and Regional Autonomy in Canada and Western Europe', in Premdas, Samarasinghe and Anderson, *Secessionist Movements*.
21. On the contrary, the Amhara have developed over the centuries a certain assimilationist tradition; see Christopher Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 1–30.
22. See Ruth Iyob, *The Eritrean Struggle For Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941–1993* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Dan Connell, *Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997); Roy Pateman, *Eritrea: Even the Stones Are Burning* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997).
23. Heraclides, *Self-Determination*, p. 25
24. Some variants added that Yugoslavia had 'seven neighbours' (or, sometimes, 'seven frontiers'); others replaced 'one party' by 'one country' or 'one goal'.
25. Branka Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980–92* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 291.

26. Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Sabrina P. Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Insurrection in Kosovo* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).
27. Thomas F. Magner, 'Yugoslavia in Sociolinguistic Perspective: Introduction', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, No.52 (1985), pp. 5–8.
28. For instance, Seton-Watson mentions a small community of Catholics in Southern Dalmatia who considered themselves to be Serbs; Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and State: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 134.
29. The first constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia (1946) already recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state of equal citizens—Serbs, Muslims and Croats.
30. According to James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 139–52. See also Robin Alison Remington, 'State Cohesion and the Military', in Melissa K. Bokovoy, Jill A. Irvine and Carol S. Lilly (eds.), *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945–1992* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 61–78.
31. See Tom Cushman, *Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia* [Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 13, 1998] (Seattle: University of Washington Press/Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies); and Conversi, 'Central Secession'.
32. Quoted in Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide* (London: Hurst; New York: New York University Press, 1999).
33. Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 145.
34. On Serbian-Nazi collaboration, see Philip J. Cohen, *Serbia at War with History* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996) and Walter R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941–1945*, new edn. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987).
35. Damir Kalogjera, 'Attitudes towards Serbo-Croatian Language Varieties', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, No. 52 (1985), pp. 93–110. Thus, the other two Croatian dialects, *kajkavski* (spoken in an area of Northern Croatia contiguous to Slovenia) and *čakavski* (spoken in Istria and the islands of the Dalmatian coast), which were less similar to Serbian, were marginalized; Banac, *National Question*, pp. 77–81; Elinor Murray Despalatovic, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly; New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
36. On the language issue, see Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Frits W. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); James W. Tollefson, 'The Language Planning Process and Language Rights in Yugoslavia', *Language Problems and Language Planning*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1980), pp. 141–56; James W. Tollefson, 'Language Policy and Power: Yugoslavia, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian Refugees in the United States', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, No. 103 (1993), pp. 73–95. Even by early 2002, the federal constitution of the third 'Yugoslavia' (in effect, of Serbia-Montenegro) mentioned Serbian as the official language, while the Serbian constitution paradoxically speaks of Serbo-Croatian.

37. The Illyrian movement proposed a union of all Southern Slavs (Yugo-Slavs); among its inspirers were the Croatian writer Ljudevit Gaj (1809–72), a precursor of Yugoslavism and collaborator with the Bosnian Serb language scholar Vuk Karadjic (1787–1864). It is significant that a square in Zagreb was named after Ante Starcevic in 1990 as part of a wider revisionist plan; see Srdjan Trifkovic, 'The First Yugoslavia and the Origins of Croatian Separatism', *East European Quarterly*, Vol.26, No.3 (1992), pp.345–70; Slavenka Drakulic, 'The Smothering Pull of Nationhood', *Yugofax*, No.6 (1991), p.3. According to some, this was one of a host of semiconscious choices implemented by Franjo Tudjman's nationalist government in order to 'invite' Serbian repression; see also Tom Gallagher, *Outcast Europe: The Balkans, 1789–1989: From the Ottomans to Milošević* (London, New York: Routledge, 2001).
38. Trifkovic, 'First Yugoslavia', pp. 365–6.
39. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, p. 134. The role played by opposition has been crucial in the construction of both Serb and Croat national identities. As Trifkovic ('First Yugoslavia', p. 366) points out, even to an Ustasha (supporter of the Nazi-puppet state created during the Second World War) 'the Serb' was 'an integral part of his Croatness. Without him, Croatdom could not be defined, let alone practiced'.
40. Joseph Paternost, 'A Sociolinguistic Tug of War between Language Value and Language Reality in Contemporary Slovenian', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, No. 52 (1985), pp. 9–30; Tollefson, 'Language Policy'.
41. Carole Rogel, 'Edvard Kardelj's Nationality Theory and Yugoslavian Socialism', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1985), pp. 343–57
42. Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994).
43. H.T.Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society Between Europe and the Arab World* (London: Hurst, 1994), pp. 263–8.
44. Robert J.Donia and John V.A.Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Hurst, 1994).
45. Daniele Conversi, 'Nationalism, Boundaries and Violence', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1999), pp. 553–84.
46. For a challenge to the international security assumption that secessionist movements are likely to spawn a generalized 'domino effect', see Daniele Conversi, 'Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The influences of international events and political ideologies on Catalan and Basque nationalism', *West European Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1993), pp. 245–70.
47. See also Nenad Dimitrijevic, 'Words and Death: Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals 1986–1991', in Andras Bozoki (ed.), *Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 119–48.
48. Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*, p. 207.
49. This should be distinguished from the constitution of Serbia and Montenegro, adopted on 27 April 1992, and paradoxically known as 'constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'.
50. Slovenia's new constitution (adopted on 23 December 1991) established a democratic republic with conventional political institutions. Two autonomous national communities, the Italian and the Hungarian (less than 1% of the population) are represented in the National Assembly and have been granted recognition in other areas, including the right to form their own organizations and

- institutions (in the media, economic, cultural and scientific research fields, education in their own language, and the right to develop relations with the respective 'motherlands').
51. Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books/BBC Books, 1995), pp. 245–50.
 52. Attila Hoare, 'The Croatian Project to Partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990–1994', *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1997), pp. 121–34.
 53. Daniele Conversi, *German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia*, Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, No. 16 (Seattle: University of Washington Press/Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 1998); Wolfgang Deckers, 'Two Souls, Twin Realities: German Foreign Policy from Slovenia to Kosovo', *Central Europe Review*, Vol. 2, No. 26 (2000), [online version: www.cereview.org/00/26/deckers26.html]; Ramet, *Balkan Babel*; Brendan Simms, *Unfinest Hour: How Britain Helped to Destroy Bosnia* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 2002); Karl Cordell, 'Germany's European Policy Challenges', *Regional and Federal Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2000), pp. 141–5.
 54. Gallagher, *Outcast Europe*; Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty Coffin, 'German Foreign Policy toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991–1999', *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2001), pp. 48–64.
 55. The attitude of the international community to Bosnian independence was ambiguous, and recognition was half-hearted; on the consequences, see Mark Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); Branka Magas, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980–92* (London: Verso, 1993); Simms, *Unfinest Hour*; David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997).
 56. Conversi, *German-Bashing*; Daniele Conversi, 'Moral Relativism and Equidistance: British Attitudes to the War in Former Yugoslavia', in Tom Cushman and Stipe Mestrovic (eds.) *This Time We Knew: Western responses to the War in Bosnia* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).
 57. Conversi, *German-Bashing*; Simms, *Unfinest Hour*.

Conclusion

Towards a Solution?

JOHN COAKLEY

The contributions that constitute the core of this volume provide sufficient material for us to seek to generalize, in conclusion, about the character of the state's response in the territorial domain to the issues raised by ethnic conflict. An obvious approach is to begin with the issue raised in the introduction: the menu of options open to the state. Following an elaboration of this point, the discussion turns to the theme of this book, as developed in the chapters that have undertaken case studies of the territorial management of ethnic conflict. Looked at from the perspective of the state elites, the question is this: what patterns are there in approaches to the management of ethnic problems, and how may the selection of one of these rather than another be accounted for? Finally, a short concluding section seeks to highlight some common themes that emerge from the book.

STATE AND TERRITORY: THE OPTIONS

In the context of persistent and powerful ethnic demands, the state has a number of options open to it.¹ Some of these are essentially or entirely non-territorial. Those which do have a territorial component may all be classified in terms of the pattern of division of power between a political centre and sub-state units. One of the more systematic explorations of these relationships is Duchacek's 11-point scale, useful as a framework for describing this pattern. At one extreme lies totalitarian centralism, the ultimate stage in unrestricted elite control; following this, we have a less thoroughgoing variant, authoritarian centralism. The next three stages correspond with different types of unitary state: those which are pluralistic but centralized, those which are moderately decentralized, and those which are highly decentralized. At the mid-point in the scale lies federalism. This is followed by formal confederation, and then by permanent regional organizations or common markets. The last three points on the scale are made up of different kinds of relationships between sovereign states: inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies; permanent leagues of states; and temporary associations of states.²


For present purposes, this scale is unnecessarily refined. In examining the relationship between the political centre and its territories, we may therefore

FIGURE 12.1 DUCHACEK'S TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION SCALE

1	Temporary associations (alliances)
2	Permanent leagues of sovereign states
3	IGOs (UN and specialized agencies)
4	Permanent regional organizations (OAS, OAU), common markets (EU)
5	Formal confederations (on way to federalism)
6	Pure federalism
7	Highly decentralized unitary states
8	Moderately decentralized unitary states
9	Pluralistic unitary states
10	Authoritarian centralism
11	Totalitarian centralism

group some of these positions (specifically, the first three, the second two, and the last four) to produce a five-class typology; some of the resulting categories are renamed. The first category is that which ignores territory and seeks alternative solutions to problems of ethnic conflict, solutions that rest on an assumption of territorial *centralism*. Second, the state may in varying degrees acknowledge the existence of alternative territorial power centres within the state itself. In such cases, the relationships between the state and sub-state territories may for convenience be placed in three categories: *regionalism*, where the state has devolved power to subordinate units, *federalism*, where a balance is maintained between jurisdictions at the two levels, and *confederalism*, where the central state exists only because of powers devolved on it by its component members.³ These categories shade into each other, and particular states may well have evolved in one or other direction between regionalism and confederalism, but the distinction in principle remains clear: whether ultimate authority remains at the central level (regionalism) or at the level of the component units (confederalism), or is shared between the two (federalism). We also need to consider the end of the road as far as devolution from the centre is concerned: political *disintegration*. Finally, it should be noted that not all relationships between the

FIGURE 12.2 THREE MODELS OF ETHNIC CONTACT



Note: Each model is based on the assumption that there are two ethnic groups of equal size, represented respectively by the colours black and white.

centre and the component units are symmetrical; we need to consider also the special case of *asymmetrical* relationships between a centre and adjacent territories.

It should not be assumed, however, that elites are unconstrained in determining the shape of ethnic policy. The geography of ethnic settlement patterns plays a crucial role in ruling out certain types of approach and in facilitating others. Effective territorial approaches imply a minimum degree of spatial segregation, but in concrete cases this is commonly absent. Indeed, we may identify three models of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups (let us assume for simplicity that there are only two groups, and that they are of equal size).

The first model is one of complete intermingling: the two communities are distributed randomly in the same geographical space, and no area, large or small, is inhabited entirely by members of one community. There is, of course, no perfect example of this, but contemporary Northern Ireland comes close to illustrating this pattern (see [Map 8.1](#)), as did Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia. Although the population is far from being randomly distributed, both communities are spread throughout the entire territory. Thus, the 1991 census showed that none of the province's 556 electoral wards was entirely monoethnic (though in one ward in Belfast's suburbs there were only three Catholics, while in another ward in the centre of Derry there was only a single Protestant).⁴ At a higher level of aggregation, only two of Northern Ireland's 26 districts had a minority of less than 10%; and most districts (17) had a minority greater than 25%.

Next is the intermediate position: neither group has a coherent territory, but there is no intermingling at local level. Instead, the two communities are entirely ghettoized, with points of contact at a minimum. Pre-partition Cyprus comes close to illustrating this model. According to the 1960 census, a clear majority of the island's 635 villages (463) were entirely monoethnic, and many of the

remainder were almost entirely so. If we move to a higher level of territorial organization, however, we find that none of the island's six districts had a Turkish majority. Indeed, the Turkish minority was represented in all districts, its share of the population ranging from 12.6% to 24.4%.⁵

In the third model there is complete, large-scale territorial segregation, with the two communities occupying entirely separate territories. Belgium comes close to illustrating this pattern. According to the 1947 census (the most recent official statistical source in this area), most communes were overwhelmingly dominated by one language group; eight of the nine provinces had very small minorities (the proportion of French speakers in the four Flemish provinces ranged from 3.1% to 8.6%, and the proportion of Dutch speakers in the four Walloon provinces ranged from 0.3% to 2.7%); and even the mixed province of Brabant was divided between a French-speaking south (3.9% Dutch) and a Dutch-speaking north (5.7% French, if we ignore the capital territory of Brussels).⁶ Overall, as Liesbet Hooghe shows in [chapter 4](#) of this volume, French speakers accounted for only 4.9% of the population in Flanders and Dutch speakers for only 2.0% in Wallonia (see also [Map 4.1](#); for similar patterns in Canada and former Czechoslovakia see [Map 2.1](#) and [Map 10.2](#)). In Cyprus, following the massive re-settlement of Greeks in the south and Turks in the north that accompanied partition in 1974, spatial polarization became even starker than in Belgium. By 2002, the proportion of Turks in the (southern) Republic of Cyprus was 0.1%, and of Greeks in the north 0.2%.⁷

Centralism

The refusal to concede territorial recognition of ethnic diversity may, then, arise from a pattern of ethnic intermingling that makes spatial devolution of power impossible. But it may also reflect a type of 'melting pot' assimilationist strategy. This 'Jacobin' solution has been characteristic of certain European states (with France since the Revolution as the prototype), and it was the general model followed with great success in the English-, French-, Spanish- and Portuguese-dominated colonies and former colonies of the western hemisphere, and with lesser success in the African and Asian colonies of European powers. The notion of assimilation to the dominant culture appears to be by far the most common strategy of all for dealing with problems of ethnic diversity. In the contemporary western world, it is more obvious in cases where it is still resisted (such as Turkey) than where it has substantially succeeded (such as several states of western Europe); but there are other parts of the world (such as central and eastern Europe) where policies of overt assimilation have been discontinued decades ago.⁸

In other cases, perhaps because subordinate minorities are seen as unthreatening or as too threatening, or perhaps for some other reason, the state may decide to concede certain collective rights of a non-territorial kind. There are several ways in which it can do this, none of them precluding additional

measures of territorial devolution. Essentially, these approaches may be either politico-administrative or linguistic-cultural, and, in each of these cases, they may apply to all of the state (including its centre) or to particular domains only. The following strategies may, then, be identified:

1. A sharing of central resources takes place within the context of politico-administrative centralization of power. This may be implemented as some kind of informal ethnic incorporation by the introduction of ethnic quotas, as in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, or it may take the form of fully-fledged *consociationalism*, with elaborate post-sharing and compromise arrangements, as in Belgium and Switzerland.⁹
2. Politico-administrative power is decentralized along non-territorial lines. Since the exercise of real political power normally requires the fixing of territorial frontiers, the extent of power that may be devolved to authorities whose jurisdiction is non-territorial is limited. This mechanism is often referred to as *cultural autonomy*, and it was applied in inter-war Estonia after 1925 and in contemporary Belgium (though in the latter case it has been overshadowed by the parallel state reform along territorial lines).¹⁰
3. The same linguistic-cultural provisions apply to the whole state, but these permit the use of more than one language in interactions with the public authorities. The provisions themselves may vary from case to case, with such countries as Finland and Canada in the most liberal position, where there is, at least in theory, *state-wide bilingualism* and all citizens are entitled to use their own language with the central administration. The existence of *state-wide diglossia* is rather different: here a single language is recognized as valid for interaction with the central state (whether an external language, such as English and French in many African states, or an internal one, such as Russian in the former Soviet Union), even if a majority of the population uses a different language for domestic and other local purposes.
4. Separate linguistic regimes operate in different parts of the state. Certain regions may be granted the right to use a local language for official purposes in a system of *inter-regional bilingualism*, as in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. Additional examples are Finland and Belgium, which illustrate the fact that the language regimes in operation at state and sub-state levels may be independent of each other.

In some circumstances, the depth of the division between ethnic groups may be so profound that no accommodation of the type described above is possible. Instead, a variety of ingenious devices is used by the dominant group to liaise with the estranged minority in areas where, for practical reasons, some kind of contact is essential. The ‘shadow games’ played by Palestinian representatives in Jerusalem with city officials from 1967 to the late 1980s are one such example (see Alex Weingrod’s account in [chapter 6](#) of this volume). The ‘incident centres’ operated by Sinn Féin with British government approval in Northern Ireland

during 1975 are a second. In each case, minority grievances on practical matters could be referred to the state by a mechanism that did not commit the minority to recognizing the legitimacy of the regime.

A final ethnic-management instrument that has proved valuable to the central state is the party. In single-party states, the official party may seek to reflect ethno-territorial differences (as in the former Soviet Union) or to paper them over (as in Kenya and Tanzania), but in each case the party has played a powerful role in ethnic integration. Thus, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Kenya African National Union and the Revolutionary Party (CCM) in Tanzania played significant roles in ethnic conflict management.

Regionalism

The regionalist strategy is based at least in part on the premise that ethnic protest can be undercut by the concession of at least a symbolic degree of regional autonomy. Arguments relating to economic planning and administrative rationality are also normally present, however, and regionalization is typically embarked on as a measure designed to resolve a number of problems.¹¹ Its essential principle is the devolution of authority from the centre to regional authorities; its essential weakness lies in the fact that the centre can limit or withdraw this autonomy, subject only to the political feasibility of this course of action.

Regional devolution varies both in the extent to which it recognizes sub-state ethnic boundaries and in the degree of power devolved. Three large western European states, France, Italy and Spain, began to follow their own distinctive paths in this direction in the 1970s, but with rather different outcomes.¹² In Italy and in Spain a great deal of power was devolved, and early recognition was given to units where there were elements of ethnic distinctness—in Italy, to Sicily and Sardinia already in the 1940s, and in Spain to Catalonia and the Basque Country in 1980.¹³ In fact, Spain ultimately became in effect a federal-type state, with the powers of the regions (called autonomous communities) being constitutionally copper-fastened (see below). In France, by contrast, fewer powers were devolved, though there was significant recognition of ethnic factors if the regional reforms there are viewed against the back-drop of the Jacobin tradition of the French state.¹⁴ Examples of two types of sleight of hand by central governments in their regionalization experiments are afforded by these cases, both calculated to undercut regional ethnic distinctiveness. On the one hand, in Italy the concession of autonomy to the region of Trentino-Alto Adige in 1948 represented the creation of a new region, in which overwhelmingly Italian-speaking territory was added to the German-speaking province of South Tyrol to dilute the German character of the new entity. In Spain, in a rather different approach, Valencia was not included in the new region of Catalonia, while Navarre was excluded from the Basque Country; and in France the

département of Nantes, historically part of Brittany, was excluded from the new region of Brittany.¹⁵

Federalism

While federalism bears some similarity to regionalism, there is an essential difference: powers are not merely devolved by the centre, but a division of powers between the two levels (together with a definition of concurrent powers) is formally written into the constitution.¹⁶ Federalism is not necessarily a response to ethnic diversity, and, indeed, many of the best-known examples of federal government are in states whose populations are mono-ethnic, or almost so. To take them in descending order of population size, the examples of the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Germany, Argentina, Venezuela and Australia illustrate this. In other cases, such as Austria, the state is now virtually mono-ethnic, even though the multinational nature of pre-1918 Austria was one of the reasons for the institutionalization of this form of government.

In other cases, a federal arrangement was either adopted initially or was retained to deal with problems of ethnic diversity.¹⁷ We may detect three patterns of relationship between ethnic territories and federal units of area. In the first, the ethnic divisions cut across the boundaries of the federal units; there is little correspondence between ethnic and political boundaries. Malaysia is an example: the principal ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese and Indians) are dispersed over the 12 states. India and Pakistan might at one time have been additional examples, but both have been moving in the direction of the third category described below.

In the second type, minority ethnic groups are given autonomy but they may be divided among several federal units, and the dominant ethnic group is also so divided. Spain, to the degree that it may legitimately be described as 'federal', is one example: it has 17 regions (12 Castilian, two Catalan and one Galician, with two other areas: Valencia with a 49% Catalan-speaking population, and the Basque Country, approximately 25% Basque speaking). Canada is another example: its 13 provinces and territories are mainly English-speaking but one, Quebec, is French-speaking (another, New Brunswick, has a large French-speaking minority and is officially bilingual) and the new territory of Nunavut, created in 1999, has an Inuit majority. Similarly, Switzerland, though formally a confederation, is in reality a federation of 26 cantons and half-cantons; of these, 19 are German-speaking, six French-speaking and one predominantly Italian-speaking.

Third, in a few cases the boundaries of the ethnic groups correspond with those of the federal units. The former Soviet Union, with its 15 union republics, offers such an example. The former Yugoslavia is a more ambiguous case: five of the six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia—that is, all except Bosnia and Herzegovina) corresponded with varying degrees of accuracy to the territories of ethnic nationalities (though the distinction between

Montenegrins and Serbs is not clear-cut, and the ethnic Muslims were a minority of 40% in their 'own' republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina). The former Czechoslovakia, with a clearly defined federal division between Slovakia and the Czech lands, is a better example; and, apart from the issue of control of the capital territory of Brussels, the partition of Belgium between Flanders and Wallonia is yet another case. These last examples draw attention to the exceptional difficulties that arise in dyadic federations, where there are only two territorial units, often of similar size and power, and therefore more likely to be engaged in a polarized struggle than in the case of federations made up of larger numbers of units.¹⁸

Confederalism

Although confederalism may be defined relatively easily in principle, it appears in practice to be an intermediate stage between federalism and decomposition into independent states. The fact that 'pure' examples are so difficult to find points to the essential instability of this strategy of dealing with ethnic tensions: confederations appear to be half-way houses from federation to independence, or, in the opposite direction, from international organization to federation.

There are three recent examples of the first of these types of confederation, each of them discussed elsewhere in this volume: the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia and the former Czechoslovakia. In each case, efforts were made to halt a slide from federation to disintegration by devising a looser form of association. The Commonwealth of Independent States, linking most of the former Soviet republics, initially appeared to be the most successful of these initiatives, but has receded into relative insignificance.

There are several obvious examples of movement in the opposite direction. The Swiss 'Confederation' may, indeed, once have lived up to its name, but in recent years (and, perhaps, since 1848) it has in effect been a federation. German unity in 1871 was preceded by several confederal experiments, with the German Confederation (1815–66) as the longest-lasting of these. In the western hemisphere, the Confederacy of the United States of America (1781–89) was an important predecessor of the United States as we know that entity today, but even after the latter had come into existence in 1789 the real source of power—whether this lay in Washington, DC, or in state capitals—continued to be a matter of dispute. It was only after the civil war of 1861–65, as significant for the definition of the character of the political system as the Swiss *Sonderbund* war of 1847, that it became clear that ultimate power lay in the centre, and that the political system was a federal rather than a confederal one.¹⁹ Confederalism may also have been a stage in the rapid evolution of the European Economic Community into the European Community and then into the European Union.

Disintegration

It is hardly possible to go further in yielding to ethnic minority demands than the actual concession of the minority's right to sovereign statehood. Historically, of course, the route to statehood has depended on organic territorial evolution over a long time-span, with military conquest by an emerging centre and dynastic union of existing hereditary possessions as very common paths, and free association of adjacent territories in pursuit of common interests as an occasional factor. But once this process had largely absorbed all territories likely to acquire statehood by this means—essentially, by the nineteenth century—other routes became more prominent.²⁰ The disintegration of empires and secession from other multi-national states became increasingly common phenomena. The process of European withdrawal from colonial territories overseas was one aspect of this, especially in the middle of the twentieth century; rather more traumatic was the disintegration of empires made up of adjacent territories and built up over a long time-frame, as in the case of the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918, of the Ottoman Empire even earlier than this, and in 1991, of the Soviet Union (whose ancestor, the Russian Empire, had survived remarkably well in a territorial sense after 1917–18).²¹

Fragments of disintegrating empires are frequently anxious to establish their complete sovereignty with respect to their former ruling powers, but looser associations of states sometimes take the place of former empires. Thus, the British Empire became transformed into the Commonwealth of Nations (1931), though some countries, such as Ireland and Burma, eventually preferred to remain aloof. Efforts on the part of France to emulate this model through the creation of a French Union (later, French Community) that would include the territories of the former colonial empire were rather less successful. The Soviet Union's space on the map was occupied by the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991), though, again, some countries—notably, the Baltic republics—chose an entirely separate path.

Asymmetrical Relationships

The discussions above have by default rested on an assumption of symmetry: that the centre relates to all of its regions in essentially the same way. Even classical federalism is, however, not normally strictly symmetrical; certain regions may be given more powers than others,²² the capital territory may fall outside the ambit of the federal arrangement, and there may be special territories, such as virgin lands, which are administered directly by the federal authorities.²³ Indeed, an early analysis of types of federalism identified an asymmetrical model as an alternative to the more typical symmetrical model, recognizing the fact that different territories might relate to the centre in different ways.²⁴

Asymmetrical approaches to the territorial management of ethnic conflict are common, and rest on the assumption that, while it may be possible to treat the

regions of the 'core' territory of the state in a uniform way (for example, by subjecting them directly to central government), peripheral ethnic dissent can be undermined by the concession of some kind of special status to peripheral areas, normally by the introduction there of an extra layer of government. In principle, the division of powers between such areas can follow the same pattern as in regional, federal and confederal arrangements.

The most obvious examples of asymmetrical autonomy fall into the first of these categories: the central authorities have conceded autonomy to certain regions, but the survival of this autonomy rests on the continued willingness of the central authorities to tolerate it. The special position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom from 1921 to 1972 is one example; in the same category fall the five regions of Italy to which certain powers were devolved before state-wide regionalism was implemented in 1970, and Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain before a general federal-type structure was introduced. The relationship of Slovakia to Czechoslovakia before 1968 and of Kosovo and Vojvodina to the Yugoslav republic of Serbia were similar, and particularly elaborate schemes of asymmetrical devolution were implemented in the former Soviet Union. In addition to symmetrical federalism at union level, certain union republics devolved power to autonomous republics, autonomous regions and autonomous areas. Thus, there were 16 autonomous republics within the Russian federation, two in Georgia and one each in Azerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan; there were five autonomous regions in the Russian federation and one each in Georgia, Azerbaidzhan and Tadzhikstan; and there were 10 autonomous areas, all in Russia. Similarly, India has introduced elements of asymmetrical autonomy in its contentious relationship with the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Examples of asymmetrical territorial distributions of power in which the centre permanently cedes power to the sub-state level are more difficult to find. In principle, Russia's autonomous republics and Serbia's autonomous areas fall into a category corresponding with federalism, but in practice in such arrangements the relative power of the centre tends to be so great that the autonomy of the units to which power has been devolved cannot be guaranteed. The manner in which Serbia managed to undermine the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina illustrates this. One of the few examples of a territory where there is a firm, constitutionally guaranteed form of asymmetrical federalism is the Åland Islands, which have had autonomous status within Finland since 1920, though this arrangement rests not merely on the Finnish constitution but on international guarantees. It is even more difficult to find examples of asymmetrical relationships that correspond to confederalism. These examples tend to be micro-states, ranging from the Isle of Man's relationship with the United Kingdom (with formal sovereignty vested in the British crown) to Monaco's association with France (where the principality remains formally independent).

GENERAL PATTERNS

Having provided a framework for analysis of the territorial options open to states in dealing with their ethnic minorities, we may go on to try to generalize about the experience in the case studies undertaken in this volume. Broadly speaking, we may detect three general approaches (entailing a further grouping of the territorial options discussed in the previous section): attempts to preserve as much as possible of the power and authority of the central state (though perhaps arranging for some forms of non-territorial devolution, or power sharing), attempts to reconcile minority demands with the integrity of the state by embarking on a policy of territorial restructuring, and attempts to buy peace (or attain other objectives) by allowing the state to disintegrate. It may be difficult to place a particular case unambiguously in one of these categories. The priorities of elites may change radically over time, different sections of the elite may advocate different approaches, and there may be cases that fall into more than one category, or perhaps outside all of them.

Defending the State

A very characteristic reaction by dominant elites to challenges from minorities is to seek to incorporate their elites in the state structure, especially if the minorities possess such political and other resources that they can be neither ignored nor repressed. The long-running, violent conflicts in Israel, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka indeed suggest that certain subordinate groups possess or possessed sufficient military capacity to threaten the stability of the state. In two of these cases, Northern Ireland and South Africa, a peace process of relatively long duration created negotiating space within which the outlines of a settlement could be hammered out; in the other two, it is too early to assess the prospects for a political settlement.

In South Africa, as Anthony Egan and Rupert Taylor show, the initial response of the minority white regime under apartheid was to follow a twin track: on the one hand, to hive off the African population into 'homelands' or 'bantustans' where they would be encouraged to accept autonomy or 'independence'; on the other, to incorporate the Coloured and Indian populations by offering each of them its own house of parliament, alongside that of the Whites, which would continue to be the dominant one. This reflected the reality that, like pre-1974 Cyprus, South Africa was characterized by a form of ghettoization; but the government was sufficiently powerful to contemplate changing the realities of geography by encouraging the 'resettlement' of the African population in the bantustans, thus producing a pattern more akin to that of large-scale spatial separation, at least between Africans and the rest of the population. Not surprisingly, with the dismantling of apartheid, the new system reacted strongly to both prongs of this approach. On the one hand, the new constitution of 1996 provided for a system that fell well short of federalism, though the new

provinces were given considerable powers; and the redrawn provincial boundaries gave priority to physical and administrative criteria over ethnic ones. Second, the new constitution also reacted to the consociational tendencies of the old regime (consociationalism, indeed, had acquired a negative reputation given its use as a prop for apartheid); individual equality before the law and majority rule were the guiding principles of the new order. Constitutionally, then, the central state was strengthened; White minority rule sustained through policies of ethnic devolution (territorial and non-territorial) was replaced by the force of universal, equal suffrage that brought the African population into a position of political dominance.

Although the Northern Ireland peace process was strongly influenced by the South African model, there were important respects in which its thrust was quite different. If we look first at Northern Ireland as a self-contained entity, majority rule had been the preferred formula of the Unionist (Protestant) ruling group from the establishment of the regime in 1921 down to its collapse in 1972. This formula guaranteed political power over the 35% Catholic minority. The key strand in the 1998 agreement represented a reversal of this approach: the new Northern Ireland administration was essentially consociational, with parliamentary strength being translated into seats in the government in accordance with the d'Hondt principle. But, as Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd point out, Northern Ireland cannot simply be seen as a self-contained entity: its majority feels British and wishes to remain within the United Kingdom, while its minority stresses its Irish links. The spatial intermingling of the two populations (though modified by a degree of ghettoization in larger urban areas) militates against any kind of internal territorial solution; but the external associations of the two communities have encouraged another, very imaginative, territorial approach. In a second strand, the 1998 agreement provided for the creation of a set of all-Irish bodies that would promote cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and provide an outlet for the Irish identity of the community. In a third strand, it also provided for a British-Irish Council linking the two islands, a development of particular interest to the unionist majority. It should also be pointed out that reference to 'majority' and 'minority' is hazardous: Catholics are now close to 50% of the population, and another provision of the 1998 agreement allows Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and join the Republic, if a majority so wishes—an unusual indication by a state of willingness to allow a portion of its territory to secede freely.

Given the profound differences between Northern Ireland and South Africa, and the further distinctiveness of a third case, Israel, the tendency for inter-continental links between these cases to be perceived and articulated strongly is striking. In the summer of 2002, many Israeli flags were to be seen in the Protestant districts of Belfast, while Palestinian flags were flown on the Catholic side. These same Catholic districts had earlier supported the ANC in South Africa, just as many Protestants had supported the National Party regime there. Indeed, the dilemma for Israeli Jews shows some similarities to that of Northern

Ireland Protestants. In both cases, the dominant community is of immigrant origin (though long-established in Northern Ireland, and much more recent in the case of Israel).²⁵ In Israel, too, the demographic lead of the Israeli Jewish population is insecure. As Alex Weingrod shows, Jews account for about 55% of the population within the borders of the territories under the control of the government. Within Israel proper, the Israeli Palestinian minority is sufficiently small (19%) not to pose a threat, and is politically marginalized. In the West Bank, where the bulk of the Palestinian population is concentrated, Jewish settlements have contributed to a steady change in the spatial relationship between the two populations, and have made more feasible the prospects of a bantustan-type approach, by which Palestinians would be allowed 'independence' in a set of separate, mainly land-locked entities. Securing agreement on the shape of a territorial carve-up is likely to prove formidably difficult; but even that would leave other questions unanswered, with the issues of control over Jerusalem and the right of Palestinian refugees to return as further major stumbling blocks. Asher Arian summarized the relationship between Israeli Jews and the Palestinian territories eloquently, in a way that also epitomized the historical choice facing Whites in South Africa and Protestants in Northern Ireland:

The dilemma is stark—if the territories are annexed, what is to become of the inhabitants? It is inconceivable that they not be granted full citizenship rights, a fact that would sharply tip the demographic trends and endanger the Jewish state in the sense of having a Jewish majority. Tampering with voting rights would be unacceptable, and depleting the population would be unconscionable. Continuing the military rule is also inappropriate; as the issue festers, it becomes more difficult to solve.²⁶

In Sri Lanka, too, the prospects for an ultimate settlement remain uncertain. Here, consociational elements, fitfully present since independence in 1948 and surviving until the early 1980s, helped to accommodate the Tamil minority, as Jeyaratnam Wilson shows. The degree of spatial polarization of the two main communities has been sufficient to allow the Tamils to demand autonomy for their own area in the North, but population movement and state-sponsored colonization policies have undermined the ethnic cohesiveness of this area. As in the three other areas discussed above, relationships between the communities have been aggravated by historical disparities in the socio-economic status of the various groups, with one group—not necessarily the majority—being seen as associated with traditional privileges (South African Whites, Northern Ireland Protestants, Israelis, Tamils). Although the groups are in varying degrees spatially concentrated, the pursuit of a territorial settlement in these cases has been aggravated by the fact that the contending groups typically wished to control much more land than they actually inhabited—normally, the whole of the territory that they shared with the other group or groups.

Restructuring the State

In a second group of cases, the state structure lends itself to the accommodation of ethnic dissent, or it can at least be overhauled with a view to doing so. Of all such structures, it is perhaps the federal one that is best equipped to cope with ethnic problems. Many instances could be cited, but Switzerland offers an apposite example. There, the 'Jura problem' was substantially resolved by allowing the Jurassiens to establish their independence—from the canton of Bern! The Jura was then duly welcomed into the Swiss Confederation in 1979 as a new canton.

In Belgium, as Liesbet Hooghe shows, the state was fundamentally restructured, explicitly to take account of the ethnic (or communal) problem. Although its ancient liberal democratic constitution endorsed the principle of majority rule, this in effect copperfastened the position of dominance of Belgium's French-speaking elites (themselves linked to a linguistic community that was smaller than Belgium's Flemish-speaking majority). The position changed only slowly in the middle of the twentieth century and several strands of reform took off in 1970. One of these was an increasingly explicit consociationalism; the second was a form of communal or non-territorial autonomy, with the creation of separate cultural councils for the two communities; and the third was regional reform. While consociationalism has continued since then at the level of the central state, the most dramatic developments have been at the other two levels. Given the relatively clear-cut spatial polarization of the two communities (if we ignore the issue of Brussels), it is not surprising that community-based devolution on non-territorial lines has been difficult to achieve: the Flemish-speaking community and the region of Flanders, for instance, are virtually identical in territorial extent, and it made sense for the Flemish cultural council and the regional council of Flanders to merge in 1980. Indeed, territorial reorganization of the Belgian state went well beyond mere regionalization; in a series of further constitutional reforms, it had been transformed into fully-fledged federalism by 1993.

If the federalization of Belgium followed an intensification of the ethnic problem, the relationship in Canada was the reverse of this. The federation came first; the Quebec issue, at least in its current intense form, followed. Of course, the roots of the conflict in Canada lie in part in the very different histories of the country's various parts, and in particular in the distinctive legacies of British and French rule. Unlike the United States, where former Dutch, French and Spanish territories fell victim to the cultural hegemony of the British presence, Francophone culture managed to thrive in Canada, partly because of a departure from British cultural policy elsewhere that permitted this outcome. The federal system acted as a sympathetic framework within which the Francophone population of one province, at least, could protect and cultivate its heritage. Later pressure for a higher degree of autonomy from Canada, or for complete independence, raised a number of issues, as is clear from Jean Laponce's

discussion: for minorities within Quebec, for Quebec's relationships with the broader Francophone community in Canada, for this community's relationship with the Canadian federation and its bilingual status, and for the character of Canadian federalism. It also raised the issue of symmetry within federations: may certain component units be more independent than others, or should concessions to one unit be accompanied by concessions to all? This difficulty remains unresolved, and Quebec's right to independence continues to be much more vigorously contested than the right to secession in other cases discussed in this book (especially in central and eastern Europe).

The case of Pakistan raises yet further questions. Here the formal federal structure dated from independence, but it was the very creation of the state itself (rather than its internal structure) that was designed to respond to a particularly intense problem: the relationship between Hindus and Muslims on the Indian subcontinent. This problem remains unresolved, as the continuing conflict over Kashmir shows. Charles Kennedy focuses on another set of fascinating relationships: between the various ethnic groups within Pakistan, the provinces within which they are concentrated, and the state itself. Although there have been numerous central government plans to decentralize authority in the state, and intense, if episodic, demands for greater provincial autonomy, Pakistan has thus far remained in reality a highly centralized state. The current military government's attempt to devolve authority to Pakistan's 104 largely mono-ethnic districts, the 'Local Government Plan', remains highly contested, as do the decentralization provisions embedded in the proposed constitutional reforms promulgated in mid-2002. The unfortunate reality is that two of Pakistan's other problems overshadow the question of ethnic devolution (though each of them has implications for this): the conflict with India over Kashmir, and the spillover effects of the war in Afghanistan in a context where ethnic groups straddle the border with Pakistan.

Dissolving the State

Finally, in three chapters in this book authors examine cases of state dissolution. The three cases have a number of obvious features in common. First, all three parent states were multinational entities in which ethnic boundaries were extremely clearly drawn at the social level. We can measure precisely and reliably the relative size of the different ethnic communities, in a way that would be impossible in western Europe and that is difficult outside Europe.²⁷ These differences were also reflected in the territorial structure of the state, whose federal system sought, in varying degrees, to give political expression to the interests of the major national groups. Second, and perhaps related to this, all three entities were located in the continent of Europe, a circumstance that may have facilitated acceptance of the process of disintegration by the international community, which, as Daniele Conversi points out in [chapter 11](#), has traditionally been supportive of the geopolitical status quo. It is likely— though

not certain—that the international community would have fought harder to maintain the integrity of those multinational states in Asia where ethnic tensions are present; and international opposition to the disintegration of African states would probably be even more intense, given the Pandora's box that secession by even one ethnic group there would open up. International opposition to the secession of Katanga from the Congo and of Biafra from Nigeria in the 1960s illustrated this, and it was Eritrean determination rather than international sympathy that permitted Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia in 1991. Fears of this kind are more muted in Europe, where the political integration of western Europe—to be followed by the steady incorporation of much of central and eastern Europe—has been the dominant theme of recent decades. Third, and most obviously of all, the disintegration of the three entities coincided in each case with the collapse in the authority of a powerful and relatively centralized ruling party, the Communist Party. An essential ingredient in the disintegration of the state was a concomitant disruption of the authority of the party: on the one hand, the party itself came under pressure from its ethnonational components; on the other it lost state power to alternative political forces.

These processes were to be seen most clearly in the former Soviet Union, as Ronald Hill shows. There, national minorities made up approximately half of the population, and the larger of these possessed formidable political, cultural and economic resources. Indeed, 14 of them already had their own state structure, with some of the trappings (if not the reality) of sovereignty. Two, Ukraine and Belorussia, were even members of the United Nations. Furthermore, the international community had never fully recognized the territorial integrity of the post-war Soviet state: the incorporation of the three Baltic republics was deemed illegal, and a number of western states continued to recognize diplomats appointed by regimes that had gone out of existence in 1940. Given the character of the ethnic mosaic that was the Soviet Union, the Communist Party played a critical role in maintaining political cohesion. The collapse in the authority and popularity of the party under the presidency of Gorbachev was therefore catastrophic, and left space for the emergence of a powerful alternative focus of power in Russia proper.

The pattern of disintegration in Yugoslavia resembled this. The historically dominant nationality, the Serbs, were in an even weaker position than their Russian counterparts, accounting for only 36% of the population. The smaller nationalities were thus relatively more powerful than in the Soviet Union: the Croats and Slovenes were not only large as a share of the population, they also occupied the most economically developed part of the state. With the exception of the ethnic Muslims, a minority even in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the major nationalities each had a republic of its own, even if it also had to contend, typically, with local minorities, as Daniele Conversi points out. The partition of Yugoslavia may also have been assisted by geopolitical history. Croatia and Slovenia had belonged, for centuries, to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro had been part of, or claimed by, the Ottoman

Empire, while Bosnia-Herzegovina was a frontier zone, part of the Ottoman Empire that was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878 and formally annexed in 1908. It is unlikely that even six decades of co-existence in a common state would have eliminated perceptions of these differences from the subconscious mind of Yugoslavs or, indeed, of the international community; the evidence suggests that, in a pattern not dissimilar to the Soviet Union, a sufficiently strong shared Yugoslav identity had simply failed to develop. The Communist Party, similarly, had begun to fragment into its separate national groups even before it lost power to other political forces in most of the republics. Since the only remaining traditional agency of cohesion, the army, also found itself neutralized, as in the Soviet Union, there was nothing to prevent the collapse of the state.

In many respects, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was the most surprising of all. It is true that the two major nationalities, Czechs and Slovaks, were relatively clearly defined in terms of geographical origin and political history (having belonged respectively to the increasingly separate Austrian and Hungarian parts of the Habsburg monarchy). But culturally they were close, and, although the Slovak language was developed in a way that highlighted its differentiation from Czech, this was by no means an inevitable development. The state had become a symmetric dyadic federation in 1968, as Stanislav Kirschbaum shows, after a long period during which the *de facto* domination of the Czechs was reflected also in constitutional law. Precisely because of the relatively powerful position of the Czechs (who not only amounted to 63% of the population but also enjoyed a higher level of economic development), the prospects for maintaining the integrity of the state seemed reasonable. As in the case of Yugoslavia, it is likely that a long period of political co-existence since 1918 had failed to replace entirely older territorial loyalties by a new shared spatial image. In any case, the collapse of the Communist Party need not have led as painlessly as it did to the separation of the two parts of the state. It is possible that in this case, again, the international stakes were lower because of the existence of an expanding European Union.

CONCLUSION

As pointed out in the introduction to this book, the cases analysed in detail here are not—and could not be—perfectly representative of the global position. Before seeking to draw more definite conclusions, it is appropriate to make some general remarks about the overall pattern. It would be refreshing to be able to base these on quantitative analysis; but ethnic conflict is hard enough to define, and even harder to measure, while ‘territorial restructuring’ presents similar challenges. But it would probably be safe to say that most states do not react to ethnic conflict by conceding territorial autonomy. Of the world’s 191 states in 2001, approximately 23 were classed as federal, and a few others recognized distinctive regions with varying degrees of autonomy. But the number of states experiencing ethnic conflicts or with politicized communal minorities at this time

was very much greater: depending on the instrument of measurement, this ranged from 41 to 116 (see Introduction). There may, of course, have been good reasons for this: the minority may live in dispersed areas, or its demands may be directed at goals other than territorial autonomy. But even if we look at the most systematic approach to sub-state autonomy, federalism, it becomes clear that its relationship to efforts to resolve ethnic conflicts is imperfect, as we have seen already. It is true that in some cases —Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus (in a formal sense), Ethiopia and Russia—the federal system is indeed a response to ethnic diversity. In a larger number of cases, however, it is not: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Germany, Mexico, the United States and Venezuela are obvious examples. So too are the smaller federations of Comoros, the Federated States of Micronesia, Saint Christopher and Nevis, and the United Arab Emirates, where, however, there are strongly defined territorial identities (indeed, the Emirates is arguably the best example of a confederation). Austria now belongs to this category too, even if it was once deeply divided ethnically (though that was before 1918). This leaves us with a few cases where the federal system was introduced for other reasons but was in time found to constitute a useful contribution to the resolution of ethnic problems: Canada, India, Pakistan (though the constitution is currently undergoing a wholesale revision), Switzerland and the new Yugoslavia, and in Malaysia where the federal system cuts across existing lines of ethnic division rather than coinciding with them.

The discussion of ethno-territorial relations in this chapter has of necessity over-simplified a very complex phenomenon. It is appropriate therefore to qualify this discussion by drawing attention to four caveats. First, 'ethnicity' has been discussed here as a relatively simple, objective phenomenon and, by implication, it has been assumed that populations can be partitioned into neatly-defined, discrete categories. Ethnic affiliation is in reality much more complex. On the one hand, people vary in the intensity of their attachment to the ethnic group to which they are attributed; on the other, 'membership' of an ethnic group need not be exclusive. There may be an overlapping set of communities with which people feel a sense of affiliation (for instance, Antwerp-Flanders-Belgium-Europe) and it may be quite misleading to attempt to attribute a person's basic identification to a single level. While census takers in central and eastern Europe may thus force individuals into a restricted set of ethnic categories, survey evidence from western Europe illustrates a much more complex set of overlapping loyalties.²⁸ Furthermore, ethnic identity is far from being an immutable independent variable; it may itself be influenced by the process of ethnic mobilization (rather than simply constituting a contributory force for this).

Second, ethnic conflicts are not always simply about symbolic matters (indeed, perhaps they are *never* confined to these). Competition over resources and economic arguments frequently underlie political arguments in favour of territorial restructuring, and in some cases such considerations outweigh ethnic ones. The process of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was similarly assisted by sharply diverging ideological preferences between the

centre and the peripheries, with Communists lingering in power at the centre while pro-capitalist forces took control in certain republics. The fact that political forces associated with sharply different ideological positions came to power in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia was a contributory factor to the break-up of Czechoslovakia, as noted by Kirschbaum ([chapter 10](#), this volume). The struggle of Russia for independence of the Soviet Union similarly makes little sense if viewed as an ethnic conflict between an entrapped nationality and the centre; ideological conflict and a struggle for power within the political elite go further in explaining what was on the surface an essentially counter-intuitive process. By ‘counter-intuitive’ here is meant failure to conform to the logic of ethnoterritorial power: dominant ethnic groups typically seek to maximize their territorial control (for example, it is unlikely that England will try to secede from the United Kingdom). On the other hand, Conversi argues (this volume, [chapter 11](#)) that the Serbian role in the break-up of Yugoslavia was calculated, and one can indeed see advantages from the Serbs’ perspective: a territory with which they had identified since 1918 might have disintegrated and they might have lost more of its territory than they had expected, but they are now a decisive majority rather than being simply a large minority. The Flemish relationship with Belgium also raises interesting questions: though constituting a majority of the population, Dutch speakers had historically been characterized by relatively low social status and political marginalization, and their political resurgence in recent decades was associated with the goal of autonomy in relation to Belgium rather than with the object of capturing the institutions of the state.

Third, the capacity of territorial restructuring to resolve ethnic tensions should not be overestimated. It has already been pointed out that ethnic boundary lines are rarely clearly drawn. Certain tensions in a polyethnic state may be resolved by dissolution into units corresponding to the component ethnic groups, but there tend to be problems in principle and in practice. The problem of principle is that the new units are typically also polyethnic, and conflicts have been simply moved to a different level and multiplied, with the original conflict possibly being reproduced in microcosm. The problem of practice is that in many cases the successor states are much less tolerant of ethnic minorities than the original parent state, as may be seen in certain former Soviet and Yugoslav republics. Indeed, the discussion of the Soviet Union by Ronald Hill (this volume, [chapter 9](#)) draws attention to the possibility that some sets of ethnic relations are so complex that they simply cannot be disentangled by any form of territorial restructuring.

Fourth, and most importantly, the whole definition of any ethnic conflict is a matter of political perspective. The detached observer may see obvious signs of ethnic conflict, often very violent ones; but identifying what the problem is may be much more difficult. Is the state simply doing its best to ensure that the greater material and symbolic good of the greatest number is satisfied? Or is an ethnic group simply giving legitimate expression to its right to cultural and political self-determination? This question has been side-stepped in this chapter,

but by implication the issue has been addressed from the perspective of the state rather than from that of the subordinate ethnic group. This is not to deny the validity of the other perspective (which, indeed, finds expression elsewhere in this volume, most notably in the contributions of Laponce, Kirschbaum and Wilson); rather, it represents a necessarily arbitrary device to simplify a problem of rather exceptional complexity.

Nevertheless, the material considered in this book shows that ethnicity has a striking capacity to bring about the downfall of even the most powerful of states and to cause the territorial restructuring of others (though in many cases the disruptive capacity of ethnic tensions is reinforced by other factors). It is also paradoxical that as the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were breaking up and Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom and Canada were looking for new ways to shift power to their regions, a countervailing process has also been at work. This is the political integration of Europe, an example that runs sharply contrary to the general trend of decentralization of power (though it must be acknowledged that the European integration movement has also had strands supportive of regional autonomy).

Indeed, the historical experience of the latter decades of the twentieth century suggests that these apparently very different forces have a momentum of their own. The process of European integration has advanced through a number of steady stages, and there is no evidence that it is yet close to its final point. The decentralization of power from the centre, similarly, seems to have an irreversible and progressive character. But it would be unsafe to assume that no change in direction is possible: autonomous regions have lost their autonomy in the past, and will do so in the future. But political autonomy that is congruent with the geographical spread of an ethnic community tends to reinforce ethnic commitment, other things being equal. This feature of the relationship between politics and society is likely to make it increasingly difficult for those states that have embarked on territorial reorganization projects designed to resolve ethnic tensions to undertake a fundamental change in this broad approach to one of the political world's more intractable issues.

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NOTES

1. For reviews, see John Coakley, 'The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology', *International Political Science Review* Vol. 13, No. 4 (1992), pp. 341–56; and John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, 'Introduction: The Macro-Political

- Regulation of Ethnic Conflict', in John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1–47.
2. Ivo Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimension of Politics within, among and across Nations* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), pp. 112–18.
 3. In this chapter, these three words are used to refer to forms of political organization; they are, of course, frequently used in other contexts to refer to political programmes or ideologies of specific kinds, or to refer to the movements that seek to advance these programmes or ideologies.
 4. Calculated from data supplied by the Office of the Registrar General for Northern Ireland.
 5. Calculated from *US Army Area Handbook for Cyprus* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964).
 6. Calculated from *Annuaire statistique de la Belgique*, Vol. 81 (1960), p. 50, and Kenneth D. McRae, *Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Belgium* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), p. 40.
 7. Calculated from data supplied by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, April 2002.
 8. See George Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power: The New Politics of Europe* (London: Hurst, 2000); and Daniele Conversi, 'Post-Communist Societies between Ethnicity and Globalization', *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2001), pp. 193–6.
 9. Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).
 10. On this concept, see Kenneth McRae, 'The Principle of Territoriality and the Principle of Personality in Multilingual States', *Linguistics* Vol. 158 (1975), pp. 33–54.
 11. For a review, see Michael Keating, *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European State* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), esp. pp. 167–244.
 12. See Yves Mény, 'The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France, Spain', in Roger Morgan (ed.), *Regionalism in European Politics* (London: PSI, 1987), pp. 1–28; Siamak Khatami, 'Decentralization: A Comparative Study of France and Spain since the 1970s', *Regional Politics and Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1991), pp. 161–81.
 13. See Robert Leonardi, 'The Regional Reform in Italy: From Centralized of Regionalized State', *Regional Politics and Policy*, Vol. 2, Nos. 1–2 (1992), pp. 217–46; Cezar Diaz Lopez, 'Centre-Periphery Structures in Spain: From Historical Conflict to Territorial-Consociational Accommodation', in Yves Mény and Vincent Wright (eds.), *Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 236–72; Daniele Conversi, 'Autonomous Communities and Ethnic Settlement in Spain', in Yash Ghai (ed.) *Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Jean-Claude Douence, 'The Evolution of the 1982 Regional Reforms: An Overview', in John Loughlin and Sonia Mazey (eds.), *The End of the French Unitary State? Ten Years of Regionalism in France (1982–1992)* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 10–24.
 14. See John Loughlin, 'Regionalism and Ethnic Nationalism in France', in Mény and Wright, *Centre-Periphery Relations*, pp. 207–35; and John Loughlin, A New Deal

- for France's Regions and Linguistic Minorities', *West European Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1985), pp. 101–13.
15. In the Spanish cases, long-established historical traditions and public opinion played a role in determining the shape of these arrangements; in Navarre, for instance, there was substantial opposition to the province's incorporation in the Basque Country. In France, similarly, it was the relatively weak sense of Breton territorial identity that permitted the partition of Brittany between two regions.
 16. For early general but still very useful descriptions of federalism, see K.C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 4th edn. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) [first published 1946]; and Carl J. Friedrich, *Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968). Later general overviews include Ivo D. Duchacek, *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970); Preston King, *Federalism and Federation* (London: Croom Helm, 1982); Murray Forsyth (ed.), *Federalism and Nationalism* (London: Leicester University Press, 1989); Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon (eds.), *Comparative Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and Future Directions* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993); and Bertus de Filliers (ed.), *Evaluating Federal Systems* (Cape Town: Juta, 1994).
 17. On this issue, see Alain-G. Gagnon, 'The Political Uses of Federalism', in Burgess and Gagnon, *Comparative Federalism*, pp. 15–44 (at pp. 21–6). See also Graham Smith (ed.), *Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge* (London: Longman, 1995), and Brendan O'Leary, 'Federations and the Management of Nations: Agreements and Arguments with Walker Connor', in Daniele Conversi (ed.), *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Theory of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2002).
 18. See Ivo D. Duchacek, 'Dyadic Federations and Confederations', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1988), pp. 5–31.
 19. For a review of these and other cases, see Murray Forsyth, *Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation* (London: Leicester University Press, 1981).
 20. For a general review of the state-building process, see Walter C. Opello, Jr., and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999). The same process is extensively examined from the perspective of international law; see, for example, Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights* (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press, 1992), and Antonio Cassese, *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
 21. The Soviet Union failed in the long term to hold onto the old tsarist territory of Poland and the autonomous grand duchy of Finland; it won back its losses in the Baltic states and in Bessarabia in 1940. For interpretative overviews of the dissolution of these empires, see Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997); and for a systematic analysis of the withdrawal of European powers from their overseas possessions see Muriel E. Chamberlain, *The Longman Companion to European Decolonisation in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longman, 1998).
 22. For example, in both Spain and Italy (discussed above in the context of symmetrical models) certain regions are given 'special' powers that are not exercised by others.

23. Ramesh Dutta Dikshit, *The Political Geography of Federalism: An Inquiry into its Origins and Stability* (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 243–52.
24. Charles D. Tarlton, 'Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation', *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1965), pp. 861–74. For a discussion of this concept at a different level, see Michael Keating, 'Asymmetrical Government: Multinational States in an Integrating Europe', *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1999), pp. 71–86.
25. The proportion of Jews in the present territory of Israel or under Israeli occupation was 4.0% in 1882, rising, mainly as a consequence of immigration, to 63.8% in 1982; see Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1985), p. 21.
26. Arian, *Politics in Israel*, pp. 6–7.
27. In this, language assists: the English word 'nationality', for example, is translated into at least two quite different terms in Russian: *grazhdanstvo* (meaning political nationality, or citizenship) and *natsional'nost'* (meaning ethnic nationality); yet another term, *narodnost'*, is used to refer to smaller ethnic groups. This distinction is normal in other eastern European languages, but does not exist in the major languages of western Europe.
28. On the political implications of enforced choice in the census, see Paul Teleki and Andrew Rónai, *The Different Types of Ethnic Mixture of the Population* (Budapest: 'Athenaeum', 1937), esp. pp. 28–30; on overlapping loyalties in western Europe see John Coakley, 'Conclusion: Nationalist Movements and Society in Contemporary Western Europe' in John Coakley (ed.), *The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements: The Contemporary West European Experience* (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 212–30.