

# 1 Sovereignty, boundaries and violence

## Constructing the Basque national self (1959–2011)

*Daniele Conversi*

The modern notion of sovereignty developed in tandem with the post-Westphalian state system and with its systematic use of violence. It cannot be disentangled from violence itself. The shift from absolutist to popular sovereignty in the aftermath of the French Revolution implied an intensification of the modern state's violence and centralization, usually directed against both internal and external foes. In the logic of 'state-making and war-making as organize crime' (Tilly 1992, 2002), the modern state controlled, vetted, spied, imprisoned, persecuted, expelled and murdered its own citizens while reinforcing its boundaries with war. Amongst its internal victims, recalcitrant minorities stood out for specific forms of persecution going from assimilation to mass expulsion and elimination. The very existence of non-hegemonic groups, stateless nations and cultural, linguistic and religious minorities became incompatible with the homogenising visions that permeated the making of Western statehood. Cultural homogenization became the hallmark of the emergence and spread of the nation-state system (Conversi 2007, 2010) and the *conditio sine qua non* prelude to WWI, fascism and genocide. The latter would be unthinkable without the prior emergence of the former. Yet, is the relationship between sovereignty and violence only applicable to the state? Is the same relationship applicable, although perhaps to a lesser extent, to 'nations without a state'?

This chapter analyses the Basque case and sets it within the broader historical horizon of changing concepts of sovereignty. After briefly exploring the historical trajectory of the term 'sovereignty', this chapter considers some of the competing meanings currently associated with it. It does so first at a general theoretical level, and then at the level of transitional Basque politics. The time frame spans from 1959, when a 'rupture' within underground Basque nationalism gave rise to ETA (*Euzkadi 'ta Askatasuna*; Basque Homeland and Freedom), until 2011, when ETA announced a definitive unilateral cessation of armed struggle. In the everyday Basque experience, the militancy associated with ETA has had a significant impact on perceptions of national sovereignty, with ETA raising the demand for Basque sovereignty as their key political objective. This has certainly had a great impact on the way 'sovereignty' began to be conceived, especially by the younger generations (Conversi 1997).

### Sovereignty's semantic changes

The 'sovereign' was once a person within whom ultimate political authority resided and whose jurisdiction extended to, and was invested in, a specific territory. Charles Tilly identified 'fragmented sovereignty' as the dominant mode of governance in medieval and early modern Europe, with hundreds of city-states and minor principalities competing with empires and national states for territorial control – often over the same piece of land (Tilly 1992: 21, 31 and 40–41).<sup>1</sup>

Following the Reformation, religious conflict engulfed large swaths of the continent. According to the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* ('whoever rules, his religion') adopted by the Peace of Augsburg (1555), the incumbent ruler's religious confession should apply to the whole citizenry within his territory, thus introducing state religion. The wars of religion took place also to make the state's territory more 'congruent' with the ruler's religious creed. Wars of religion constituted attempts at ideological rather than cultural homogenization: The former resulted in the expulsion and massacre of religious minorities, in which ideas of morality, righteousness and political legitimacy were all expressed through the adherence to an overarching shared religious idea and creed, while the latter would later result in the twentieth-century persecution of 'counter-entropic' minorities, in which common language, norms, traditions and set of behaviours, including dress and musical taste, were deemed to constitute a potential problem for, threat to, or deviance from patriotic loyalty. Thus the move was from religious persecution to cultural homogenization.

After the wars of religion, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) recognized, among others, the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of all signatories. Westphalian sovereignty applied to specific territories, providing the foundation of the modern (i.e., Western) international state system, centred on the mutual respect of the principle of territorial integrity – thereby placing sovereignty in the hands of the ruler, as 'Power was circumscribed by whatever territory a ruler controlled' (Biersteker and Weber 1996). After the French Revolution, the entire edifice of absolutist legitimacy crumbled, and political authority became valid only if it reflected or embodied the will of the people (or nation). Since nationalism was predicated on the myth of a common origin, language provided the raw material and *prima facie* evidence of shared descent (i.e., nationhood). Yet, the state form was kept intact. Absolutist centralism became revolutionary centralism, and the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* was replaced by that of *cuius regio, eius natio* ('whoever rules, his nation'). The relationship between Paris and the 'provinces' was not altered in form, but in intensity. And yet, the sovereign world order is a recent phenomenon and the 'pre-sovereign era' enveloped most of human history (Bellamy 2006). After the French Revolution, the state, as the key political institution, appropriated for itself the notion of sovereignty so that political legitimacy became increasingly based on national criteria. Modernity soon became articulated around the nation-state (Conversi 2012). Not only incumbent rulers and governments, but the entire state structure with its institutions had, at least

nominally, to represent the ‘people’ they ruled, and these were defined on the basis of ethno-national criteria (Connor 2002). In the era of fiercely competing nation-states, popular sovereignty presupposed an internal cohesion and homogeneity (the ‘people’) that rarely, if ever, existed in reality. ‘Counter-entropic’ groups and individuals were eliminated through assimilation, discrimination, expulsion and mass murder (ethnic cleansing, genocide) (Mann 2005).

Sovereignty’s meaning has shifted again since the inception of neoliberal globalisation. In most of the world, prevailing notions of sovereignty are being questioned after the social and political turmoil brought about by neo-liberal globalization since the 1980s (Conversi 2009). Already in the mid-1990s, Saskia Sassen described a ‘de-sovereignization’ that later on became obvious and all pervasive:

U.S. firms such as Ford, IBM, and Exxon now employ well over fifty percent of their workers overseas, rankling both domestic workers who argue that jobs are being exported while unemployment soars at home and activists who contend that wealthy corporations are exploiting low-wage workers in Third World nations. And as immigration levels soar, the very concept of citizenship has moved to the top of political agendas around the world.

(Sassen 1996)

These changes have detracted legitimacy from the nation-state, as well as from specific governments, which are seen as no longer in charge, nor accountable. Walker Connor has underlined how political legitimacy became an essential attribute of modern governance and the very presence of a nationalist movement indicates how far a degree of political illegitimacy is vested in a particular ‘host’ state (Connor 2002). However, liberal pluri-national democracies cannot simply rest on mere majority rule (Conversi 2012), but require the successful involvement of all sections of society in the administrative process (Hannum 1996). The issue of sovereignty is therefore central to that of political legitimacy.

The next section charts the development of some of the above notions of sovereignty in the Basque context in the last about half a century.

### **Basque sovereignty and violence (1959–80)**

At its inception, Basque nationalism was radical, but not violent. The choice of political violence was the distillation of long debates turning around mere survival and hopes of regeneration in one of the darkest hours of Basque history. ETA (Euzkadi ‘ta Askatasuna; Basque Homeland and Freedom) was founded on 31 July 1959, and its initial activities consisted largely of study meetings, producing a first assessment of the possibility to articulate a mass movement for Basque sovereignty and statehood. This was also the year that the Spanish economic policy changed into one of fast development (*desarrollismo*). Urbanization had begun to move vast numbers of people from Spain’s countryside into Bilbao and other cities.

ETA's evolution accompanied, and reflected, all these developments. Initial public actions, while limited to the display of *ikurriñas* (Basque flags) and hand-daubing slogans and other graffiti, already implied the vision of a sovereign Basque homeland to be achieved through statehood. Amongst ETA's militants and supporters, ideals of sovereignty were visualised in a project of political independence. As we shall see, a class dimension was slowly added with the declared goal of a sovereign *socialist* republic.<sup>2</sup>

Whereas the early nationalism of Sabino Arana Goiri (1865–1903) focused on the centrality of race and religion (integral Catholicism), ETA was secularly oriented and rejected racism (Clark 1979, 1984; Garmendia 1979: 23; Gurrutxaga 1989; Ibarra Güell 1987; Letamendia Belzunde 1977; Pérez-Agote 1984, 1987). In their place, language emerged as the cornerstone of Basque identity. But, with the number of Basque speakers rapidly declining, the language-centred approach revealed a new anxiety about language shift and the possible eclipse of Basque identity. Gurutz Jáuregui Bereciartu uses what is, I believe, one of the clearest and most concise concepts coined for the study of Basque nationalism in general and in particular the feelings and attitudes prevailing in those years: '*sentimiento agónico*' or 'a feeling of agony' (Jáuregui Bereciartu 1981, 1996).<sup>3</sup> One of ETA's internal communiqués alarmingly declared that 'once language is lost', race could not sustain Basque identity.<sup>4</sup> This approach anticipates the more recent argument about the 'morality and mortality of nations' (Abulof 2015). Yet, these were largely the reflections of a highly conscious elite. How could violence arise from this?

It is crucial to consider that ETA was born as a political movement articulated around cultural concerns, first of all the fate of Euskera and local culture (Pérez-Agote 1984: 91). Since its beginning, the achievement of Basque independence went hand in hand with the revival of Basque culture and language. Given such cultural orientation, ETA remained for a long time partly at the margins of Basque society, counting on a few hundred activists and sympathizers. It remained so until state intervention and repression changed the social dynamics and cemented a shared sense of grievance within Basque society as a whole.

Although occasional acts of political violence had occurred already in 1961,<sup>5</sup> still in 1962 there was no agreement on the use of violence within ETA.<sup>6</sup> The first direct, armed attack occurred in 1965 (a robbery of a bank courier), and the first premeditated political killing was carried out in 1968 (the police commissioner Melitón Manzananas).

ETA's First Assembly (1962)<sup>7</sup> oriented the organization towards a 'revolutionary movement for national liberation' (Garmendia 1979: 19–21). In the book *Vasconia* (1963) by Federico Krutwig Sagredo (1921–98), a sovereign Basque imaginary was associated with a more clearly defined political, ideological and military programme (Krutwig Sagredo 1973).<sup>8</sup> Already in 1956, Krutwig had argued that, considering the decline of Euskera and other elements of Basque distinctiveness, 'violence' had become necessary to create a Basque nation (Krutwig Sagredo 1987). At that time, notions of sovereignty were couched in vague terms, and Krutwig envisaged it mostly on the basis of a federalist (or cantonalist) union

of Basque territories. However, a map sketched in *Vasconia* incorporated a much broader territory than usual, including portions of the French region of Gascony (French: *Gasconne*, Spanish: *Gasuña*). Race was replaced by the concept of *ethnos*, as manifested through language and culture. Embracing stern anti-clericalism, religion was replaced by nationalism and the movement redefined as a-confessional and patriotic (Letamendia Belzunde 1975: 279). Krutwig's idea of politics as a vocation owed much to Ernest Renan's (1823–92) voluntarist view of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite' (Jáuregui Bereciartu 1981: 152). In fact, the stress on voluntary participation was, and remains, central to Left Basque nationalism. The strategic choice of guerrilla war as the only means to liberate Euskadi was inspired by the Algerian and Cuban revolutions, largely absorbed through the readings of Franz Fanon (1925–61). Anti-colonial violence was promulgated as a liberating force, essential to the psychological well-being of the 'oppressed' (Conversi 1993). The decision to embark on a violent path was confirmed in a forty-six-page booklet, *Insurrección en Euskadi*, written by José Luís Zalbide under the pseudonym of 'Zunbeltz' (Zalbide 1963). Entirely devoted to armed struggle, the pamphlet soon began to be used like a guerrilla manual, reiterating Krutwig's military strategy and emphasizing the Maoist aphorism of the guerrilla fighter who moves among his people as a 'fish in the water' (Krutwig Sagredo 1973: 330). Krutwig's and Zalbide's theses were approved in ETA's Second Assembly (1963), in which armed struggle was perceived as the only method of liberating Euskadi from its political shackles and cultural chains.

The Third Assembly (1964) saw a further shift towards the theorization of political violence, defining ETA as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist organization working for Euskadi's freedom, as well as for the emancipation of the working class.<sup>9</sup> The Fourth Assembly (1965) further stressed the programmatic link between social and national sovereignty, between class struggle and Basque liberation. Zalbide's theory of the 'cycle of action/repression/action' was approved by ETA as an article of faith (Zalbide 1963). It held that, where popular protest against injustices met with oppression, the revolutionary forces should act to punish the oppressor. The occupying forces would then retaliate with indiscriminate violence, since they would not know who the revolutionaries were, causing the population to respond with increased protest and support for the resistance in an upward spiral of resistance to the dictatorship. This theory was to provide the overall framework of ETA's strategy throughout its long evolution, turning it into a paramilitary organization. On the one hand, the revolutionary hypothesis rested on spurious empirical grounds, being largely imported from extra-European, non-liberal contexts. On the other hand, the relationship between state repression and the escalation of violence has been recently confirmed by social movement studies and political violence research (della Porta 2014).

Trotskyist, Third-Worldist (*tercermundista*), Maoist and 'culturalist' factions, the latter chiefly concerned with the survival of euskera and other elements of Basque culture, pursued their own visions of a sovereign state, which in turn reflected their respective ideological inclinations. The Fifth Assembly (1966–67) employed the concept of *Pueblo Trabajador Vasco* (Basque Working People) and

vowed to combine nationalist with class struggle by joining labour unions' disputes, including direct support for the *Comisiones Obreras*, the pro-Communist clandestine labour union (Garmendia 1979). Intense ideological debate took place in an atmosphere of confrontation polarized by secrecy and the fear of police intrusions. These conditions demanded one simple and unchallenged ideological choice. But this in turn led to excommunication and the proliferation of splinter groups and sub-groups in an unceasing process of self-definition. Yet, most people in Euskadi were oblivious to such internal conflicts and saw ETA as a homogeneous entity.

As mentioned earlier, political murders and assassinations began in June to August 1968. Despite hundreds of arrests and exiles, ETA continued to grow. In 1970, the Burgos Trial against sixteen ETA cadres (*etarras*) charged with the murder of Manzananas became a potential catalyst for Spain's democratic opposition, as well as an international standard to be invoked amongst left socialists worldwide (Halimi 1971). In all cases, Euskadi was conceived both as an internal colony and as an urban society in which the working class should play a decisive role in the building of Basque socialism. As most workers were immigrants from other regions of Spain, the emphasis had to be on class, rather than ethnic, conflict – pushing ETA's ideology further to the left. Indeed, ETA's radicals quickly found out that the immigrants were more likely to be involved whenever actions prevailed over theory and over 'abstract' debates on Basque identity (Zabalo et al. 2013).

Within Basque nationalism, the cultural nationalists played a key role in reinvigorating political nationalism by attempting to build up an inter-class alliance amongst all nationalist forces and focusing on visions of 'cultural sovereignty', that is, by pursuing the goal of an independent society articulated around the defence of a threatened cultural identity. Around 1971, the 'culturalists' within ETA proposed a *frente nacional* ('national front') to reunite all Basque nationalists from Left to Right in a common struggle to defend Basque identity and culture. The difference between ETA's Marxist leaders and 'bourgeois' nationalists was still problematic.

As regards Basque language, the early 1970s also saw an unprecedented revival through the expansion of the *ikastolak*, the primary and secondary schools where Euskera was the (main or only) medium of instruction. Although they had spread to most cities and villages, these efforts were heavily repressed under Francoism. The desire to protect and revive Basque culture, particularly language, transcended nationalism, and the non-nationalist Left played a key role in setting up the first *ikastolak*. While the spiral of violence grew, central authorities identified the entire cultural movement, including the *ikastolak*, as a receptacle for terrorism. The idea of a separate cultural sphere of sovereignty, however, was intrinsically tied to notions of political sovereignty, as culture and politics could not be easily disentangled.

During late Francoism, ETA reached a period of unequalled expansion, in which a fusion between Marxism and nationalism proved to be highly attractive. In this expansion, a new kind of sovereign imaginary linked up with the traditional stress



on Basque egalitarianism and craving for social justice (Conversi 1997: 180; Hess 2009: ch. 1), whose roots can be traced back to the egalitarian ‘familism’ of the *baserritarrak*, that is, people whose livelihood is centred on the traditional Basque farmhouse or *baserri* (Zulaika 1988: 127).<sup>10</sup> Basque sovereignty was thus ideally conceived as reflecting a just and democratic space rooted in a clearly demarcated territory comprising all of its seven ‘provinces’ across the Pyrenees.

With the killing of the expected successor of Franco, Admiral Carrero Blanco (December 1973), ETA’s star among their followers reached its pinnacle. Yet, internal fragmentation led ETA’s fronts to act autonomously and in mutual competition, as did different sub-factions within them.<sup>11</sup> In 1974, an important split took place between ETA-m (ETA militar) and ETA-pm (ETA político-militar), while new mass protests prompted further states of emergency.

After the death of Francisco Franco (20 November 1975), Juan Carlos de Borbón was crowned King of Spain and immediately proclaimed a first general amnesty for about 15,000 political prisoners and exiles. Demands for a total amnesty deeply conditioned the relations between Basque activism and Madrid throughout the ‘Transition’. As democratization continued, so did nationalism, the two being tightly bound up. Beyond free and fair elections, lifting the veil of censorship offered to many Basques their first opportunity for unrestricted expression. Notions of sovereignty were articulated and solidified in a context of weak state legitimacy and mounting popular mobilizations.

In 1976, under a King-appointed cabinet led by Adolfo Suárez, most political parties were legalized. Since the 1980 regional elections there has been considerable electoral stability with little transfer of votes between the two main blocks (nationalists and non-nationalists), and constant nationalist hegemony by the Basque National Party, PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, or Eusko Alberdi Jeltzailea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco, EAJ-PNV). With around forty per cent of the votes, the moderate nationalists have thus remained consistently ahead of other parties.

### **Changing practices of Basque governance and national sovereignty**

While the very visions of Spanish sovereignty seemed to mutate with the Transition, so did visions of Basque sovereignty. Immediately after the 1977 general elections, the new elites rapidly embarked in the *proceso constituyente* (constitution-making), and a new constitution was approved in 1978. Although the Constitution maintained the state’s unitary form (that is, it did not formally accept federalism or historical rights), it still granted and recognized the right to autonomy. However, constitution-making encountered difficulties in the Basque Country, where most nationalists opposed, or abstained from approving, the existing text of the Spanish Constitution on the ground that it did not recognize the specific historic rights of the region (Gunther et al. 1988: 123–24).

Violence had begun to decline after the approval of the Statute of Autonomy in 1980: ETA-pm abandoned violence postulating in favour of a negotiated settlement

and pardons through political participation, chiefly joining the Euskadiko Ezkerra coalition (EE, Basque Left, founded 1977).

As a theoretical and methodological approach, *historical institutionalism* focuses on institutions, particularly the state, as the most suitable agent in the solidification of sub-state identities. Since institutions are normatively and cognitively ‘internalized’, ‘human agency is embedded in the institutional contest’ (Lecours 2007: 13). Although institutions cannot provide the sole explanatory variable, various levels of personal and collective sovereignty can be attached to them through their ‘identity-generating potential’. Moreover, institutions can ‘launch and sustain a process of identity construction quite independently of agency’ (Lecours 2007: 15). For instance, Cantabria was officially ‘invented’ during the transition to democracy when the Castilian province of Santander (La Montaña) was given a separate status among Spain’s seventeen autonomous communities (Conversi 2000, 2002). Endowed with a set of symbols, landmarks and myths including a colourful flag, a powerful geographical context (the Cordillera Cantábrica or Cantabrian Mountains) and even an associated ethnonym (the tribal Cantabri confederacy mentioned first by Strabo and then by Julius Caesar in his *De Bello Gallico*), Cantabria’s autonomy statute (1981) pushed local intellectuals on the path of developing a regional identity. This led to new claims, for instance the claim that Cantabrian was a distinct language. In short, a new regional identity was developed after autonomous Cantabrian institutions had been set up. However, not everything can be said to be determined by institutions, as shown by the birth and development of Asturian nationalism during the pre-autonomy years – including the existence between 1976 and 1982 of a radical branch with ETA links (Zimmerman 2012).

Coming back to our key argument, Basque institutions (Gasteiz government, provincial *diputaciones*, their associated departments, like health, education, welfare, etc.) have contributed to solidify a sense of distinctive Basque sovereignty.

A pure institutionalist approach would seem to counter much of the recent literature on the impossibility of artificially creating distinctive ethnic identities, a view most profoundly articulated by Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach (Smith 1996, 1998, 2009). According to this view, the case of ‘millennial’ Basque resilience reveals that institutions can make identities, but cannot break them.<sup>12</sup>

### The ‘war on terror’ and declining Spanish sovereignty

A turning point occurred under José Maria Aznar’s mandate, particularly during Spain’s incorporation into the US-led ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWT), when ‘the political climate in the Basque country was the most volatile and tense it had been since the end of the dictatorship’ (Lecours 2007: 2). At the same time, the confluence of international and domestic policies under Aznar contributed to radicalize public opinion in Catalonia, where the dominant narrative of the ‘war on terror’ seemed to converge with broader perceptions of a recurring and inveterate Spanish nationalism (Beilin 2012).



Aznar's adherence to the unpopular US-led campaign was received with disappointment and apprehension by an overwhelming majority of Spaniards, with opposition voiced across the political spectrum, despite that reactions within the conservative Partido Popular were most often muted. Surveys at the time of the Iraq war (2002–03) showed an overwhelming ninety-one per cent opposition to the GWT across Spain (Tremlett and Arie 2003), which indicates that a majority of the rank and file within the Partido Popular privately opposed the war. Within the Basque Country and in the diaspora, the rationale of the 'global war on terror' has been submitted to robust critical assessment (Aretxaga 2002, 2005; Zirkazadeh 2010; Zulaika 2010a, 2010b; Zulaika and Alonso 2009; Zulaika and Douglass 2008). Re-cast as part of the Bush administration's remapping of the world order into 'good' and 'evil', an internationally emboldened Spanish nationalism had *de facto* put a halt on decades of progress towards deepened political participation, risking a regression to the dark days of authoritarianism. Aznar referred to all possible negotiations as 'appeasement' to terrorism (Mees 2003: 116).

The brief return of the Socialists in power (March 2004) led to great expectations of a 'second transition' to democracy (Encarnación 2008). However, massive demonstrations against terrorism had already created a more suitable environment for ETA's 'permanent ceasefire' in March 2006, and the subsequent Donostia-San Sebastián International Peace Conference in Aiete (17–20 October 2011), which resulted in ETA's 'definitive cessation of armed activity'. Over a decade of pressure from peace groups and civil society organizations had yielded positive results in terms of peacemaking independently of the government's persistent refusal to deal with ETA. However, Madrid's initiatives and progresses in many realms had been insignificant and did not outlast the Partido Popular's return to power after the 2011 Spanish general election. The overwhelming victory of Partido Popular, and ensuing methods of governance informed by Spanish-centred majoritarianism (Conversi 2012), precipitated a descent into mutually recriminating nationalisms, particularly radicalizing the conflict between Catalonia and Madrid (Guibernau 2013).<sup>13</sup>

In the Basque country, the edifice of political legitimacy built around ETA was beginning to dissolve. Discourses that offered legitimation to violence encountered an increasingly more vocal, less muted reception. Such discourses had previously been associated with the 'dirty war' conducted by the central state in the 1980s, and reflected a fall of its overall political legitimacy (Encarnación 2007). The discursive apparatus used to legitimate violent action was among a range of oppositional practices and expressions manifesting themselves side by side with mainstream political culture. As a result, the Basque country became fragmented along three political and social cultures: the nationalist, the radical left and the Spanish constitutionalist.

The role of the 'war on terror' on Spain's politics is important. Joseba Zulaika perceptively applies Giorgio Agamben's notion of the 'paradox of sovereignty' to the 'war on terror' and its accompanying 'states of exception' (Zulaika 2010b: ch. 7; 2011). Significantly, in the USA as in other countries drawn into this 'global war', the 'sovereign' placed himself 'at the same time, outside and inside the

judicial order' so that, in this way, counter-terrorism discourse could be effortlessly twisted to legitimate authoritarianism and unaccountability – a drift exemplified in the USA by the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and the suspension of *habeas corpus* (Zulaika 2010b: 32). In a democratic world, this leads not only to contestations of the legitimacy of political order, but also to questions about the legitimacy of judicial power itself and the associated system of norms and laws. Following the GWT, the 'counter-terror' bio-political machine has shaped new geographies of exception through the imposition of a new *nomos*, 'within which decision is produced by a permanent state of exception, and where law exists only through its endless strategic (dis)application' (Minca 2007).

While Zulaika largely refers to the USA, the implications of the new 'paradox of sovereignty' have not been lost to critics of Madrid's harsh neo-liberal politics. Indirectly, this critique has also been seized by pro-independence movements in Catalonia. These have progressed in the legitimacy vacuum opening up with Madrid's slow disengagement from flexible dialogue through a stern 'winner-takes-all' majoritarianism (Conversi 2012). The accompanying regurgitation of Spanish nationalism verged on the partial dismantling of the pacts and agreements that had shaped the transition to democracy.

In the Basque country, the historical relationship with Madrid is perhaps best described as *pacted sovereignty*. Pactism (*pactismo*, a reliance on signed agreements) has deep historical roots, enshrined in local rights (*fueros*) and parliamentary institutions. As an historical doctrine, *pactismo* developed in the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, serving efficiently as an ideological alibi for limiting the absolute power of the monarch. Joseba Agirreazkuenaga (2012: 35–36) rightly encourages us to 'rethink and to inquire into different forms of sovereignty', focusing on valid traditional models of complex interdependence. According to Agirreazkuenaga (2012), this is pertinent even today, for the debate about how to build future models of 'diversity in unity'.

### **Land and soul: the territorial articulation of national sovereignty**

In the nationalist worldview, territory is the single most important element of national sovereignty: No sovereignty can be imagined without a territory attached to it and constantly experienced through a collective imaginary, re-enacted in daily life rituals. Still, because the ultimate actor of this territorial entrenchment is the Westphalian state itself, stateless nations can hardly escape its iron cage. Nations without a state provide no exception to the logic of territoriality, since they manifest themselves and operate in an international system of states. This system is far from having lost its main prerogatives: 'Invested with a kind of meta-capital, the state remains a crucial presence, a screen for political desires and identifications as well as fears' (Aretxaga 2003: 393).

The main theorist of this relationship between sovereignty and violence was Carl Schmitt (1888–85), sometimes identified as the organic intellectual of the Nazi regime although his influence outlasted the demise of the regime. Schmitt

argued that sovereign authority is indispensable for a smooth functioning of the legal order. Because sovereignty is inextricably bound to a territory, for Schmitt it is ‘unthinkable without an “outside”’ (Bauman 2003: 288). Schmitt’s vision is thus ‘as “localized” as the sovereignty whose mystery it aims to unravel’ (ibid.) and ‘does not step beyond the practice and cognitive horizon of the made-in-heaven wedlock of territory and power’. However, ‘the power of exemption would not be a mark of sovereignty, were the sovereign power not wedded first to the territory’ (Bauman 2003: 288). This leads inevitably to an exclusivist dimension. The main targets of the era of ascending ‘nation-statism’ were indeed stateless nations, peoples and territories, the ‘dirty monsters’ whose fearing semblance were mobilized by the ruler to chip away ever more rights and culture from their terrorised populations: in the words of Zygmunt Bauman (2003: 289), ‘sovereignty being the power to define the limits of humanity, the lives of those humans who have fallen or have been thrown outside those limits are unworthy of being lived’. And here we can also return to Agamben’s vision of the *homo sacer*, who is banned and can be killed by anybody with impunity, though he cannot be sacrificed for religious rituals (Agamben 1998). Giorgio Agamben also traces exclusion and inclusion to Schmitt’s work. For Agamben (2005: 35), ‘Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty derives [. . .] from the state of exception, and not vice versa’.

There are grounds for scepticism in the face of a state purporting to act as paladin of ecological sovereignty. The growing bio-political management of citizens parallels state- and market-led political claims to sovereignty over the natural world – at a time when Schmitt’s states of exception, unable to uphold the singularity of each individual human being, are becoming, in Agamben’s words, a global bio-political norm (Smith 2009).

Although the territory is sacrosanct, its boundaries are subjected to change. In the Basque case, the territorial imaginary mutated from Arana’s earlier focus on Bizkaia in *Bizkaia por su independencia* (Arana Goiri 1980) to his synthetic motto *zazpiak-bat* (seven in one)<sup>14</sup> and the equally concise formula ‘ $4 + 3 = 1$ ’ (four plus three equals one). These shifts continued later on, for instance with Krutwig’s inclusion of the French region of Guascony in his Vasconia (Krutwig Sagredo 1973). However, the realm of the seven provinces has firmly established itself in the *abertzale* sovereign worldview, as visible in virtually all nationalist maps and logos: ‘Seven (provinces) in one’ alludes to the three provinces and Navarre on the Spanish side (Hegoalde) and the three *départements* on the French side (Iparalde). In the aspirations of most nationalists, the seven areas are imagined as, and will one day be, autonomous participants in a free and sovereign Euskal Herria.

Important rituals have been established to link and bond the territory: since 1980, the *Korrika* running race aligns the entire territory of Euskal Herria, with a popular defence of the Basque language, Euskera (Valle 1994).<sup>15</sup> This groundbreaking initiative has spanned replicas and emulative runs in the defence of other European minority languages.<sup>16</sup> Since the early twentieth century (and 1935), but truly beginning in 1980, championships of *bertsolariak* (singers of *bertso*, improvised musical verse) are held four times annually in each of the seven provinces (Aulestia 1995), along with other annual gatherings and sparring matches of *bertsolarism*, including

amongst the Basque diaspora (Aulestia 2000). Basque oral poetry is declaimed in popular Euskera, allowing for much more flexibility and spontaneity than with the standard *batua*. These developments occurred in the same years when the Statute of Autonomy (ratified in 1979) began to be put into practice through the transferral of administrative competences (*transferencias de competencias administrativas*). This seems to indicate a direct linkage between the establishment of semi-sovereign institutions and cultural revival. Imagined sovereignties overlap with the sovereignties of ordinary daily life through the impact of really existing institutions. The competing levels of everyday enactments of sovereignty correspond to the overlapping layers of multi-level governance (municipal, provincial, regional), as well as the imagined supra-layer of the Euskal Herria imaginary.

The next section addresses the ultimate consequences of sovereignty's semantic shift from the nested pluralism of the Middle Ages to the complex plasticity of the 'postmodern' condition.

### Liquid sovereignty

The idea that we have moved into a post-sovereign world order is by now acknowledged in most disciplines from different angles and perspectives. It cannot be easily denied that the notion of sovereignty has entered a deep, perhaps terminal, crisis – whether or not the state is part of the crisis (Walker 1992).<sup>17</sup> Not only 'post-sovereignty' is enshrined by most institutions and through multiple governance levels within the EU, but the UN and a host of other international bodies supervise and have a say in many 'domestic' policies. North Korea, a country whose constitution explicitly enshrines 'sovereignty' in its pursuance of reunification with the South, is certainly an exception rather than the rule. Indeed, multiple overlapping sovereignties may have become the rule, rather than the exception, in what is increasingly recognized in international relations and political philosophy as a post-Westphalian world order.

What exceptions can there be? Putin's Russia has tried simultaneously to hold on to older conceptions of national sovereignty, while acting as patron and supporter of separatist movements and quasi-states in the 'near abroad' – in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and, more recently, in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine with the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk thug 'Republics' (Bonnot 2014). All these areas are characterized by a dense post-sovereignty. In India, the Hindutva movement pushes for a homogenizing vision of greater Hindustan, threatening Christian, Muslim and other minorities while retaining a parvance of pluralism in its approach to the multiple manifestations of Hinduism, whose alleged 330 million deities are increasingly conceptualized as expressions of one Supreme Being. Even in highly centralized China, transnational environmental advocacy merged with Tibetan nationalism, revealing the 'competing entanglements' of Chinese, Indian, and Tibetan sovereignties (Yeh 2012). Probably the most conspicuous manifestation of obstinate Westphalian state sovereignty is the 'wall' Israel has built around itself as part of a process of Palestinians' 'dispossession and containment' (Bowman 2007).

Yet, experiments with a post-sovereign new order have also expanded, the EU providing perhaps its most advanced arena (Conversi 2014a). Neil MacCormick described Europe as a ‘non-sovereign confederal’ space (MacCormick 1999). This concept of post-sovereignty is in turn reflected amongst nations without a state. For Michael Keating, statehood is no longer the leading goal among sub-state nationalisms (Keating 2001). In fact, sub-state nations have a gamut of possible options that they can choose to determine their relationships with both the central government and the wider world. Within the EU, Basque politics has spawned its own goal of shared sovereignty through the *Ibarretxe Plan* for Basque ‘co-sovereignty’ or ‘free association’, which includes the right to self-determination (Keating and Bray 2006; Lecours 2007).<sup>18</sup> In Québec the term ‘sovereignty’ has been in use since at least the 1960s and 1970s, and from Québec the term *souveranisme* or ‘sovereignism’ has expanded to other stateless nations, entering into the Catalan vocabulary as *soberanisme* and then into Castilian as *soberanismo*.<sup>19</sup>

Zygmunt Bauman associates the notion of *Liquid Modernity* (Bauman 2000, 2010) with a word that cannot stand still and, like liquid, is in perpetual movement. It is a world permeated by precariousness, uncertainty (Bauman 2005), fear (Bauman 2006) and the frailty of human bonds (Bauman 2003). Could we also speak of *liquid sovereignty*? As an expression of late modernity, liquid modernity is configured by a shifting relationship with a specific (or ‘solid’) territory, rather than a staying and grounded relationship with it, while human, social and political relationships become increasingly characterized by provisional, rather than permanent, commitment. In this fluctuating environment, it becomes next to impossible to speak about sovereignty in its post-Westphalian, state-centred meaning. If globalisation has led to a decline of state sovereignty, then its ultimate consequence is likely to be at further erosion of state sovereignty, seemingly verging towards the implosion of the very notion of sovereignty.

The short circuit produced by neoliberal globalization is visible in the ultimate challenge posed by climate change as the eventual terminator and dismantler of state sovereignty in any meaningful sense. *Liquification*, rather than liquidity, becomes a suitable description of the melting state at the edges of the neo-liberal *cul-de-sac*. Incidentally, the fact that neither neo-liberal ideology nor consumer behaviour have been able to reform themselves during and after the 2010’s economic recession is a powerful reminder that they are unlikely as a political economic system to be able to face the unprecedented challenges posed by climate change. The answers will probably have to come from beyond the spent and outdated mental map of neo-liberalism (Moreno and Conversi 2017a, 2017b).

Ulrich Beck describes the formation of ‘cosmopolitan communities of climate risk’ as a global effort to avoid a consumerism-induced cataclysm. These are defined as ‘new transnational constellations of social actors, arising from common experiences of mediated climatic threats, organized around pragmatic reasoning of causal relations and responsibilities’ (Beck et al. 2013: 2). Thus, Ulrich Beck prefigures the optimistic vista of a ‘globalized change of consciousness and practice’ and a ‘reorientation towards “*cosmopolitization*”’ (Beck et al. 2013). But, behind this optimism, one can still discern the undisclosed chain of calamities



looming ahead. Climate change's impact on any form of sovereignty is likely to be devastating, while the current global plunder already reveals an overall lack of state control inherited by both the Westphalian and post-Westphalian orders. In fact, both reproduce incrementally, each in its own way, the developmentalist drive of the Western modernist, state-centred world order. Only recently, a wholesale alternative to state- and market-centred developmental modernism has begun to emerge. This has implicated, and has been reflected in, a new notion of sovereignty that is explored in the next section.

### Back to basics: land grabs vs. food sovereignty

'We are what we eat', goes the old adagio. In fact, food not only affects our physical being and quality of life, but it also exercises a deep impact on our personal and collective identity – at both the individual and collective level. Unlike language, which is composed of, and conveyed by, symbols (sounds and letters), food is physically graspable, materially grounded and directly consumable. As the culinary historian Massimo Montanari has shown, 'everything having to do with food – its capture, cultivation, preparation, and consumption – represents a cultural act'; in other words, 'food is culture' (Montanari 2004, 2006). It is therefore not surprising that food has been under attack by the forces of unregulated globalization, which have dispensed with traditional agriculture by forcing standardized modes of production and consumption upon millions of people. The response to agro-business' relentless march has been a proliferation of initiatives centred on the need to reassert sovereignty over food. The 'food sovereignty' (*soberania alimentaria*) movement was launched in 1996 by *Via Campesina* ('Peasants' Way'), an international network of peasant organizations. The whole idea is centred on the notion of food as a basic human right. 'Food sovereignty' is about popular sovereignty rather than the sovereignty of the state, which sets it against 'food security' as a national (or state) security issue (Conversi 2016).

The movement was also spawned by the ultimate form of sovereignty obliteration, 'land grabs', which have massively expanded since the 2007–08 global food-price crisis. Patterns of territorial acquisition and enclosure within alleged development schemes have radically altered land use through a dramatic increase in large-scale land deals (Kish 2011). The very nucleus of sovereignty as a viable human condition has been subverted to the core by shifting public lands into the hands of foreign or domestic investors; in most of these cases the 'sovereign' state has often surrendered its sovereignty to more powerful economic forces (Wolford et al. 2013).

This links us back to the passage to the nation state and imperial era, which was characterized by a process of annexation and border-building (Conversi 2014b). The seizing of territory remained its main scope, involving sweeping expropriation of property from its erstwhile usufructuaries (Levene and Conversi 2014). Since then, the modern era has been characterized by a frenetic rush to seize, re-size, bound, enclose and classify, all of which nourished an obsession with border-building and, subsequently, cultural homogenization. This rush is re-enacted with



contemporary ‘land-grab’ mega-events, in which governments and global companies have connived to appropriate huge expanses of rural lands by exploiting legal niches, imprecise mapping, overlapping territorial claims, ‘cycles of contentious politics’ and vague or blurred acquisition processes (Neville and Dauvergne 2012). For many NGOs, these gerrymandering and appropriation practices exemplify the plunder, rapaciousness and spoils of applied neo-liberal ideology (Kish 2011; Oxfam 2011).<sup>20</sup> Large-scale deals shifted ownership from public lands to the hands of unscrupulous investors. Land grabs can be seen as a contemporary re-enactment of the British enclosure acts on a global scale (Levene and Conversi 2014). The role of the post-sovereign state is often shadowy and ambiguous and never operating with a single voice. Deals are often made secretly and away from the public gaze, while the mass media prefers to focus attention on less substantial events.

While seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonial settler projects were already eliminationist acts of massive land grabs, we are now witnessing an epochal ‘condensation of a series of linked crises’ rapidly leading to ‘an ecological tipping point’ with profound new ontological implications (McMichael 2014). The response to these massive shifts of sovereign power has been articulated in various ways. Notwithstanding global media bowdlerization and expurgation, the ‘climate transition’ has begun to spawn a ‘grand narrative’ guided by its own cosmology in pursuit of a more resilient, sovereign future founded on agro-ecological production. The ‘transition movement’ includes intellectuals who have helped to shape an agenda for a global coalition based on international solidarity against nutritional impoverishment and the corporate greed and abuses of agro-food biotechnologies (Sage 2014). The emerging agrarian and peasant social movements amalgamate anti-globalization, pro-democracy and environmentalist agendas under the banner of global food sovereignty (Teubal 2009). This new political constellation reflects increasing needs to integrate agro-ecological science and indigenous knowledge systems (Altieri and Toledo 2011). In terms of sovereignty, what is propounded here is nothing less than a ‘sovereignty model founded on practices of agrarian citizenship’, in the awareness of how agriculture has been historically linked to successive ‘metabolic ruptures between society and nature’ (Wittman 2009).

As land grabbing rests on the previous identification of the most fertile areas, it also includes ‘*water grabbing*’, just as water is becoming a scarcely available, vital supply for millions of peoples (Franco et al. 2013). The focus on alimentation is thus a focus on the very fundamentals of human development, which incidentally includes water quality and water availability as keys to human survival – well beyond notions of ‘sustainable sovereignty’.

While the looming reality of climate change begins to alter the deepest gist and significance of ‘sovereignty’ as a viable concept, *territoriality*, that is, the territorially entrenched nation state, provides a major stumbling block towards the achievement of an orderly retreat from the fossil-fuel-driven global economy (Kythreotis 2012). Repeatedly, states and governments have blocked any meaningful advance towards the abandonment of the hegemonic, fossil-fuel-energised economy of profit, being much keener to address the ‘threat’ of poorer countries’

collapse onto 'us', rather than attempting to give serious consideration as to how the transition might be accomplished (Abbott et al. 2006: 28, Levene and Conversi 2014: 289, Parenti 2011: 14–20).

What is the impact of all of this on Basque society and sovereignty? How far has the notion of 'food sovereignty' penetrated everyday practices and images of Basque society? Within Basque society the concept found a fertile ground for experiencing new modes of agricultural self-organization and production: the creation of Euskal Herriko Laborantza Ganbara (EHLG, Chamber of Agriculture of the Basque Country) in January 2005 as a NGO depending on donations and local institutional support. The latter includes labour unions, town councils, civics associations and *udalbiltzak* from the seven Basque Provinces – the latter are associations of municipal elected officials, mayors and town councillors (Letamendia Belzunde 2006).<sup>21</sup>

Beside this, the labour union EHNE (Euskal Herriko Nekazarien Elkartasuna, Farmer's Solidarity of the Basque Country) is active in a series of campaigns designed to address issues of sustainability, safety and quality, articulated around the notion of food sovereignty (Mann 2014: 117–139). EHNE is part of a broader movement for union renovation deeply intermeshed with both radical Basque nationalism and the global movement of peasants' resistance (Elorrieta 2014). Founded in 1976, EHNE has acted in the defence of *baserritarriak* interests, initially supporting the creation of farmers' cooperatives and support for their productivity in front of the challenge posed by EU agrarian policies (Egaña 1996: 228). In May 1993, it participated in the foundational meeting of Via Campesina. According to Paul Nicholson, EHNE's European coordinator for Via Campesina, EHNE stresses food sovereignty as a 'new way of internal democracy' (Holt-Gimenez 2013: ch. 1). In recent years, EHNE has exposed the lack of consideration for the rural consequences of megaprojects like motorways and the controversial TAV (*Tren de Alta Velocidad*, High-Speed Train) with detailed reports listing previously underplayed collateral effects, like seizure of land, parcel fragmentation, loss of access, impact on human and animal health, building stability, consequences for adjoining plots of land, damage to landscape and cultural heritage and patrimonial devaluation (Barcena and Larrinaga 2009: 87–99). Other projects and activities include the Euskal Herriko Hazien Sarea (*Red de Semillas de Euskadi*, Seed Savers Exchange of the Basque Country), created in 1996 for the recovery of local seed varieties once the loss of this biodiversity heritage and culture became evident. It can count with over hundred partners and collaborators and acts as official interlocutor on issues of agro-biodiversity. Several other initiatives go hand in hand with the emerging notions of alimentary sovereignty, including local purchasing, local currency, *ferias de productos ecológicos* (ecological products fairs) and rural markets,

### **Beyond sovereignty? Emerging sovereign scenarios in Basque society**

This chapter's methodological approach is historically grounded and theoretically oriented more than empirically anchored. The goal is to contribute to a political

theory of ‘sovereignty without a state’ by addressing the changing perceptions of the sovereign *imaginaire* amongst Basque citizens in their everyday life, as well as to identify possible future trends of how, or if, sovereignty could be imagined and practiced in the future.

A minimal amount of empirical data has been used to support this chapter’s main argument. A focus interview has been carried out amongst non-representative samples of the postgraduate student population at the Universidad del País Vasco (UPV, University of the Basque Country) with a focus group of six participants who addressed some conceptual issues raised by the multiple usages of the term ‘sovereignty’. During the guided discussions, the possible multiple understandings of the meaning of sovereignty have been explored.

The results are as follows. Although some participants found the concept of sovereignty difficult to grasp, it was generally understood that the notion might refer to an internationally recognized, independent state. Yet, there was awareness that sovereignty is nowadays a fuzzy, nebulous and relative notion and that its achievement is not, or no longer, fully possible given an increasing inter-dependence at the global level. Some participants identified a personal layer of sovereignty akin to the philosophical notion of individual self-determination.

The notion of ‘food sovereignty’ emerged early on in the discussion group. Although this has not yet penetrated everyday practices, its significance was grasped promptly, perhaps more easily than the notion of political sovereignty. Its usage is still limited to a restricted niche, but it emerged early on in the focus group while discussing the intersection between personal and collective identities and focusing on how sovereignty can be put into practice with immediate effects. This contrast between personal and collective sovereignty is explored below.

There are several layers to which the concept of sovereignty can be applied. Amongst these, two main co-existing layers can be discerned: a personal and a collective one. At the *personal* level, any individual is potentially sovereign insofar as s/he can exercise different degrees of control over one or more domains of his/her life. At the *collective* level, a group is likely to enjoy sovereignty insofar as it maintains the capacity to control resources over a specific territory and exercise decision making over a set of policies within it. Therefore the territorial dimension of sovereignty becomes apparent at the collective level, although it is also incarnated in various ways at the personal level.

In philosophy, the concept of ‘self-determination’ similarly focuses on the individual through the idea that we are the ultimate arbiters of our destiny and through the exercise of ‘free will’ (Latin: *liberum arbitrium*). Immanuel Kant theorized the importance of ‘individual self-determination’ as the *personal* ‘moral autonomy’ that occurs when an individual’s decision on a course of action stems from his respect of a moral duty. Amongst the theorists of nationalism, only Elie Kedourie identified Kant’s principle as lying at the basis of *collective* national self-determination. Indeed, Kedourie himself argued that Kant’s notion of individual self-determination lies at the root of nationalism (Kedourie 1993). In fact, one can also say that rational self-determination at both the individual and socio-political level was the goal of the Enlightenment project.<sup>22</sup> Despite being once a fundamental

legitimizing principle of the international system, its presence in public discourses and practices has sharply declined over the last half century.

Yet the passage from individual to collective identity needs a broader cultural context. Notions of cultural sovereignty, as introduced above while mentioning the cultural revival in both its pre-political and political forms, also emerged earlier on in the discussion, largely associated with the struggle to preserve Basque identity, with a particularly keen awareness of the memory of state repression against traditional Basque symbols and culture.

How do notions of culture and practices of cultural revival reflect on Basque sovereignty? The focus group provided a potential context in which to connect sovereignty with culture in the broader sense. However, the concept of *culture* appears to be even more weakly defined and difficult to grasp than the notion of sovereignty. Although ‘culture’ is often meant as ‘language’, some participants identified culture in other ways and, generally, as a lifestyle and set of inter-generationally inherited traditions.

On the other hand, notions of ‘culture’, as defined by the mobilized protagonists, articulate discourses on national sovereignty. Understanding the role of culture is, therefore, an important and often lost dimension needed to explain the dynamics of ethnic conflict de-escalation, political settlement, the establishment of peace and long-term stability. The contrasting dimensions of cultural loss and revival have permeated the entire discourse on Basque sovereignty since before the rise of nationalism. Cultural variables should therefore be identified as major determinants in violent vs. non-violent strategy choices in sovereignty disputes.

### Conclusions: elements of sovereignty

Although sovereignty is an ‘essentially contested’ concept, there is general agreement that it is related to power.<sup>23</sup> Moreover it is *relational*: One is always sovereign in relationship with, and in respect to, another (person or group), and this sovereignty is bounded in space and grounded within a specific territory. I have begun by tracing the conceptual shifts in the notion of sovereignty throughout the modern age, from late-medieval Europe to the era of neo-liberal globalization. The contemporary international system works in such a way as to make the very exercise of sovereignty nearly unattainable. Sovereignty has thus become a largely obsolete concept in its analytical form, rarely applied to denote something substantial. Yet, the signifier has changed, but the signified has not: the image of sovereignty retains a powerfully evocative force, just as its promise of self-determination evaporates. Subsequently, the chapter has tracked the development of grassroots concepts of Basque sovereignty since the foundation of ETA (1959) through the democratic transition (1975–80) up to the current peace process (2011). During the transition to democracy, notions of sovereignty were articulated in the context of a process of falling state legitimacy and mounting popular mobilizations. Changing practices of governance were reflected in shifting perceptions and discourses of sovereignty from the implementation of the statute

of autonomy to the peace process. These changes included the way sovereignty and territoriality were imagined and debated through evolving visions of political legitimacy and political representation. It may be argued that the four separate Basque provinces, Araba, Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa and Navarre,<sup>24</sup> have increasingly acted as *de facto* sovereign entities since the establishment of the autonomy statutes of the Basque Country and Navarre, and hence could be perceived as sovereign spaces and political units. The level of prerogatives, attributes, capacities and resources enjoyed by the Autonomous Communities and the *Diputaciones* or provincial governments is, at least in some respects, on a par with those of a *de iure* sovereign state.<sup>25</sup> In fact, this chapter has also illustrated how Basque sovereignty is currently imagined, not necessarily in a distant future, but as being enacted in the present moment. Yet, as we shall see, contemporary challenges do not allow for foregone conclusions.

Global political and economic shifts have been largely reflected in Basque political culture, where sovereignty remains a protean notion, rapidly adapting to changing macro circumstances. The concept of ‘liquid sovereignty’ highlights contemporary tensions, sorrows and distresses, leading us to question whether it can be applied to the case of Basque resilience. The following elements of sovereignty have been found to possess a relevant meaning in distinctive adaptations of political identity through successive stages in the evolution of Basque nationalism: political sovereignty, personal sovereignty, cultural sovereignty and food sovereignty.

At first sight, the inclusion of the last element may seem out of place, but one of the article’s assumptions is that the new socio-economic conditions brought about by neo-liberal globalization (and its crisis) have inspired a vast array of responses that directly bear upon the very idea and perception of sovereignty. These have converged around notions of food sovereignty, where sovereignty is acquiring new meanings untypical of either the modern era of nation-states or the pre-modern era of overlapping sovereignties.

The chapter has finally moved the attention towards food sovereignty, which appears to be an eminently practical and feasible form of sovereignty (Conversi 2016). This is because, if we choose so, we can exercise at least some control over what we eat, provided that we have the legal-political resources, know-how and willingness to set free from food retailers’ and agro-business’ encroachment. The goal is partly to regain control over the channels of transmission or communication from where aliments are cultivated to where they are actually consumed. This is cogently felt precisely because it may not be a sovereign option in vast areas of the world, where the food chain is subjected to lack of redistributing power (hunger) or selective distribution (low-quality preheated, precooked, pre-packaged standardized foodstuffs sold via franchise operations, or overconsumption). Food sovereignty thus reunites many of the dimensions of sovereignty we have discussed so far – personal, cultural, political – and is certainly the less ‘liquid’ of all these forms. Opting for this notion of quotidian sovereignty, one can perform an act of sovereignty that is simultaneously political, cultural, territorial and personal.



In this way, the eco-political emergency propels us towards a new direction in which all of the above levels of sovereignty can be currently practiced and simultaneously present: from the political to the personal, from the consumer to the producer, while encompassing more hazy notions of malleable ‘post-sovereignty’. In other words, all these forms are highly interconnected, and such interconnectedness is emphasized by the notion of food sovereignty.

To sum up, the Basque political scenario has not been immune from the conceptual turns associated with the meaning of sovereignty. While political violence has informed previous concepts of sovereignty, so did the end of violence, and this article has explored one of the possible directions in which sovereignty may develop at both the local and global level.

## Notes

- 1 Between two and three hundred city-states were co-existing in Italy’s territory in AD 1200 (Waley and Dean 2010), roughly the same number of ancient Greek city-states at the times of Pericles – most of them proudly independent, albeit under Athenian hegemony.
- 2 On Basque nationalist graffiti, see Chaffee (1993).
- 3 Perhaps reflecting the ‘*sentimiento trágico de la vida*’ (tragic feeling of life) of Miguel de Unamuno or the ‘*sentimiento agónico de la existencia*’ (agonizing feeling of existence) of Antonio Machado, by way of existentialism.
- 4 *Cuadernos de ETA*, as cited in Garmendia (1979: 22).
- 5 According to Txillardegui, by 1960 more than 300 militants had passed through its *cursillos de formación* (training courses): Interview with Txillardegui, reported in *Garaia*, vol. I, n° 1, 1976, pp. 24–25. The Basque linguist and writer José Luis Alvarez Enparantza, aka Txillardegui (1929–2012) was the most prominent figure within ETA’s cultural branch.
- 6 *Zutik* still reported that ‘between Gandhi’s non-violence and a civil war there are intermediate methods of struggle [. . .] which we want to put in practice’ (*Zutik*, n° 19 reported in *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, 229).
- 7 Although only four members of ETA remained then in Spain as a consequence of repression, this did not deter it from launching a series of frenetic activities, such as the adhesion to workers’ struggle, the enrollment of women, the extension of activities in Navarre, printing, producing propaganda, etc. See ETA 1979–81, *Documentos Y*, vol. 2, page 5).
- 8 Krutwig was the son of a German industrialist living in Bilbao and an ex-secretary of the Basque Language Academy, never being a member of ETA.
- 9 By 1963, ETA had already participated in the organization of working-class strikes. In his *Carta a los intelectuales* (Letter to the intellectuals), Zalvide postulated the basic principles to be adopted by ETA. Reprinted in Garmendia (1979: 287–303).
- 10 *Baserritarrak* are those living on a *baserri*, the typical Basque house-barn farmhouse. *Familism* is ‘a social pattern in which the family assumes a position of ascendance over individual interests’ (see *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, [www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/familism](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/familism)).
- 11 For instance, in 1974, the Labour/Workers and the Cultural fronts split off to form their own autonomous parties, LAIA and EHAS.
- 12 For an approach combining institutionalism with the *longue durée* of ethno-symbolism, see (Agirreazkuenaga 2004, 2012).
- 13 For the exploration of more general factors, see Cramer (2014) and Stegmann and Sancliment-Solé (2014).



- 14 This motto was first used by the Navarrese Euskaros to replace the older *laurak-bat* (four in one), limited to the four provinces on the Spanish side..
- 15 The *Korrika* is organized by Alfabetatze Euskalduntze Koordinakundea (AEK), a grouping of *euskaltegis* (Euskera academies or centres for Basque language learning).
- 16 The Basque initiative provided a model for similar events in other regions of Europe, with Correlingua covering the Catalan-speaking areas across the Pyrenees (f. 1993), Correlingua in Galicia (est. 1997), Ar Redadeg running through Brittany's five *départements* (est. 2008) and Rith in support of the Irish language in Ireland (est. 2010). All these initiatives have been sponsored by their respective language-centered association, like the Coordinadora d'Associacions per la Llengua Catalana (CAL) or various Galician groups. Since 1993, the Correlingua is organized in combination with the Corsa d'Aran per sa Lengua in the Valley of Aran, where Aranese, a variety of Occitan, is spoken.
- 17 The idea has been around for a while. I have counted seven books titled 'beyond sovereignty' published since 1986: Soroos, Marvin S. (1986) *Beyond sovereignty: The challenge of global policy*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; Elkins, David J. (1995) *Beyond sovereignty: Territory and political economy in the twenty-first century*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; Farer, Tom J. (ed.) (1996) *Beyond sovereignty: Collectively defending democracy in the Americas*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Cusimano, Maryann K. (ed.) (2000) *Beyond sovereignty: Issues for a global agenda*. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's; Ieda, Osamu and Balázs Majtényi (eds.) (2006) *Beyond sovereignty: From status law to transnational citizenship?* Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University; Grant, Kevin, Philippa Levine and Frank Trentmann (eds.) (2007) *Beyond sovereignty: Britain, empire and transnationalism, c. 1880–1950*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Leahy, D. G. (2010) *Beyond sovereignty. A new global ethics and morality*. Aurora, CO: Davies Group.
- 18 This owed much to the historical examples of Québec, adding the novel dimension of 'sustainable human development' (Ibarretxe Markuartu 2011, 2012). Also important was Puerto Rico's movement for 'sovereign free association', a more popular option than full 'independence', as revealed in the 2012 status referendum.
- 19 If one had to speak of political sovereignty within the international system, what minimal level would be acceptable? Probably the smallest nominally sovereign 'quasi state' in the world is the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (It., *Sovrano Militare Ordine di Malta*). It consists of a few buildings in the heart of a Rome, and its sovereignty is practiced by issuing stamps, coins (the Maltese *scudo*), passports and car license plates. Largely borrowing from the Vatican example of nested statehood, this kind of minimal attribution of sovereignty prerogatives can be defined as the 'Lateran' model of sovereignty. It is just one of the several multiple levels in which sovereignty can be circumstantially applied. It may not be satisfactory for some, but it may be for others.
- 20 In Guatemala, where at least forty-six per cent of smallholder lands have been seized by imported African palm plantations, drug-traffickers, cattle ranchers and international corporations, the military can be identified as the main 'shadow beneficiary' of a World Bank-induced agrarian reform (Grandia 2013). In Madagascar, government officials and elites routinely ignore the existing land laws in defence of local rights in front of agribusiness-led land appropriation (Burnod et al. 2013). However, in Costa Rica a popular movement against transnational mining concessions and land deals was articulated around notions of a bounded national territoriality threatened by obscure imperial forces (Graef 2013). At the same time, 'Chinese land-based interventions multiply across the African continent' (Buckley 2013).
- 21 See Euskal Herriko Laborantza Ganbara [www.ehlgbai.org/en](http://www.ehlgbai.org/en)
- 22 Kedourie overlooked the wider impact of the French Revolution and preferred instead to describe nationalism as a sort of 'conspiracy' of German Romantic intellectuals.

- 23 On the notion of ‘essentially contested concepts’, see Collier et al. 2006 and Freedon (1996). The concept was originally introduced in an essay by W.B. Gallie (1955), reprinted in Gallie (1968).
- 24 Although, out of simplicity, I describe Navarre (*Nafarroa*) as a province, it is actually a ‘Foral Community’ (*Comunidad Foral de Navarra*, or *Nafarroako Foru Komunitatea*, approximately the ‘chartered’ Community of Navarre).
- 25 For an analysis of the impact of Basque semi-sovereign institutions, see Goikoetxea 2014.

## References

- Abbott, C., Rogers, P., and Sloboda, J. 2006. *Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century*. Oxford: Oxford Research Group.
- Abulof, U. 2015. *The Mortality and Morality of Nations*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Agamben, G. 1998. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- . 2005. *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Agirreazkuenaga, J. 2004. *Historiade Euskal Herria: Historiageneral delos Vascos*. Donostia-San Sebastian: Lur, 6 vols.
- . 2012. *The Making of the Basque Question: Experiencing Self-Government, 1793–1877*. Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada Press.
- Alonso, A., and Zulaika, J. 2009. *Contraterrorismo USA: profecía y trampa*. Irun: Alberdania Editora.
- Altieri, M. A., and Toledo, V. M. 2011. ‘The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America: Rescuing Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants’, *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(3): 587–612.
- Arana Goiri, S. de. 1980. *Bizkaya por su independencia*. Bilbao: Geu (Reprod. facs Bilbao: Tipografía de Sebastián de Amorrortu, 1892, 3 ed.).
- Aretxaga, B. 2002. ‘Terror as Thrill: First Thoughts on the “War on Terrorism”’, *Anthropological Quarterly*, 75(1): 139–150.
- . 2003. ‘Maddening States’, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 32: 393–410.
- , ed. 2005. *Empire and Terror: Nationalism/Postnationalism in the New Millennium*. Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada Press.
- Aulestia, G. 1995. *Improvisational Poetry From the Basque Country*. Reno, NV: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada Press.
- . 2000. *The Basque Poetic Tradition*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.
- Barcena, I., and Larrinaga, J., eds. 2009. *TAV. Las Razones Del No*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.
- Bauman, Z. 2000. *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2003. *Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2005. *Liquid Life*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2006. *Liquid Fear*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 2010. *44 Letters From the Liquid Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, U., Blok, A., Tyfield, D., and Zhang, J. Y. 2013. ‘Cosmopolitan Communities of Climate Risk: Conceptual and Empirical Suggestions for a New Research Agenda’, *Global Networks*, 13(1): 1–21.
- Beilin, K. O. 2012. ‘Bullfighting and the War on Terror: Debates on Culture and Torture in Spain, 2004–11’, *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 25(1): 61–72.

- Bellamy, R. 2006. 'Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights Within the EU', in R. Bellamy, ed., *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 167–190.
- Biersteker, T. J., and Weber, C., eds. 1996. *State Sovereignty a Social Construct*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Bonnot, M. 2014. *Des États de facto: Abkhazie, Somaliland, République turque de Chypre nord*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Bowman, G. 2007. 'Israel's Wall and the Logic of Encystation: Sovereign Exception or Wild Sovereignty?', *European Journal of Anthropology*, 50: 127–135.
- Buckley, L. 2013. 'Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal', *Development and Change*, 44(2): 429–450.
- Burnod, P., Gingembre, M., and Ratsialonana, R. A. 2013. 'Competition Over Authority and Access: International Land Deals in Madagascar', *Development and Change*, 44(2): 357–379.
- Chaffee, L. G. 1993. *Political Protest and Street Art: Popular Tools for Democratization in Hispanic Countries*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Clark, R. P. 1979. *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.
- . 1984. *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Collier, D., Hidalgo, F. D., and Maciuceanu, A. O. 2006. 'Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 11(3): 211–246.
- Connor, W. 2002. 'Nationalism and Political Illegitimacy', in D. Conversi, ed., *Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism*. London: Routledge, pp. 24–49.
- Conversi, D. 1993. 'Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism', *West European Politics*, 16(3): 245–270.
- . 1997. *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization*. London: Hurst & Co.
- . 2000. 'Autonomous Communities and the Ethnic Settlement in Spain', in Y. Ghai, ed., *Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122–144.
- . 2002. 'The Smooth Transition: Spain's 1978 Constitution and the Nationalities Question', *National Identities*, 4(3): 223–244.
- . 2007. 'Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should We Still Read Ernest Gellner?', *Nations and Nationalism*, 13(3): 371–394.
- . 2009. 'Globalization, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationalism', in B. Turner, ed., *Handbook of Globalization Studies*. London: Routledge/ Taylor & Francis, 1st ed., pp. 346–366.
- . 2010. 'Cultural Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide', in R. A. Denmark, ed., *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Boston, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 719–742.
- . 2012. 'Majoritarian Democracy and Globalization Versus Ethnic Diversity?', *Democratization*, 19(4): 789–811.
- . 2014a. 'Between the Hammer of Globalization and the Anvil of Nationalism: Is Europe's Complex Diversity Under Threat?', *Ethnicities*, 14(1): 25–49.
- . 2014b. 'Modernity, Globalization and Nationalism: The Age of Frenzied Boundary-Building', in J. Jackson and L. Molokotos-Liederman, eds, *Nationalism*,

- Ethnicity and Boundaries: Conceptualising and Understanding Identity Through Boundary Approaches*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 57–82.
- . 2016 Sovereignty in a changing world: From Westphalia to food sovereignty', *Globalizations*, 13(4): 484–498.
- Cramer, K. 2014. *Goodbye, Spain? The Question of Independence for Catalonia*. Sussex: Sussex Academic Press.
- della Porta, D. 2014. 'On Violence and Repression: A Relational Approach', *Government and Opposition*, 49(2): 159–187.
- Egaña, I. 1996. *Diccionario histórico-político de Euskal Herria*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.
- Elorrieta, J. 2014. *Renovación sindical*. Tafalla: Txalaparta.
- Encarnación, O. G. 2007. 'Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain', *Human Rights Quarterly*, 29(4): 950–972.
- . 2008. *Spanish Politics: Democracy After Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Franco, J., Mehta, L., and Veldwisch, G. J. 2013. 'The Global Politics of Water Grabbing', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(9): 1651–1675.
- Freedon, M. 1996. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Gallie, W. B. 1955. 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 56(1): 167–198.
- . 1968. *Philosophy and the Historical Understanding*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Garmendia, J. M. 1979. *Historia de ETA*. Vol. 1. San Sebastian: Haranburu.
- Goikoetxea, J. 2014. 'Nation and Democracy Building in Contemporary Europe: The Reproduction of the Basque Demos', *Nationalities Papers*, 42(1): 145–164.
- Graef, D. J. 2013. 'Negotiating Environmental Sovereignty in Costa Rica', *Development and Change*, 44(2): 285–307.
- Grandia, L. 2013. 'Road Mapping: Megaprojects and Land Grabs in the Northern Guatemalan Lowlands', *Development and Change*, 44(2): 233–259.
- Guibernau, M. 2013. 'Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy', *Ethnopolitics*, 12(4): 368–393.
- Gunther, R., Sani, G., and Shabad, G. 1988. *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gurrutxaga, A. 1989. *La refundación del nacionalismo vasco*. Bilbao: Servicio Editorial Universidad del País Vasco.
- Halimi G. (1971) *Le procès de Burgos*. Paris: Gallimard (Préf. de Jean-Paul Sartre).
- Hannum, H. 1996. *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hess, A. 2009. *Reluctant Modernization: Plebeian Culture and Moral Economy in the Basque Country*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Holt-Gimenez, E., ed. 2013. *Food Movements Unite! Strategies to Transform Our Food System*. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.
- Ibarra Güell, P. 1987. *La evolución estratégica de ETA: de la "Guerra revolucionaria" (1963) a la negociación (1987)*. Donostia: Kriselu.
- Ibarretxe Markuartu, J. J. 2011. *The Basque Case: A Comprehensive Model of Sustainable Human Development*. Arlington, VA: The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution/George Mason University.
- . 2012. *El caso vasco: El desarrollo humano sostenible*. Bogotá: Editorial Oveja Negra/Centro Vasco Euskal Etxea.
- Jáuregui Bereciartu, G. 1981. *Ideología y estrategia política de ETA: análisis de su evolución entre 1959 y 1968*. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

- . 1996. *Entre la tragedia y la esperanza: Vasconia ante el nuevo milenio*. Madrid: Editorial Ariel.
- Keating, M. 2001. *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Keating, M., and Bray, Z. 2006. 'Renegotiating Sovereignty: Basque Nationalism and the Rise and Fall of the Ibarretxe Plan', *Ethnopolitics*, 5(4): 347–364.
- Kedourie, E. 1993. *Nationalism*, 4 ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kish, Z. 2011. 'Land Grab', in D. K. Chatterjee, ed., *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Krutwig Sagredo, F. 1973. *Vasconia*, 3 ed. Buenos Aires: Norbait (Originally published as Sarraih de Ihartza, Fernando. *Vasconia*. Buenos Aires: Norbait, 1962).
- . 1987. 'El echo vasco, el euskera, y el territorio de Euskadi', *Euskal Batzar Orokorra. Congreso Mundial Vasco. 2º aniversario*. Vitoria: Gobierno Vasco, pp. 130–131.
- Kythreotis, A. P. 2012. 'Progress in Global Climate Change Politics? Reasserting National State Territoriality in a "Post-Political" World', *Progress in Human Geography*, 36(4): 457–474.
- Lecours, A. 2007. *Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.
- Letamendia Belzunde, F. 1975. *Historia de Euskadi. El nacionalismo vasco y ETA*. Paris: Ruedo Ibérico.
- . 1977. *Les Basques: Un peuple contre les états*. Paris: Seuil.
- . 2006. 'Las organizaciones agrarias vascas: el ejemplo de Euskal Herriko Labortantza Ganbara', in F. L. Belzunde, ed., *Acción colectiva Hegoalde-Iparralde*. Madrid: Ed. Fundamentos, pp. 228–243.
- Levene, M., and Conversi, D. 2014. 'Subsistence Societies, Globalisation, Climate Change and Genocide: Discourses of Vulnerability and Resilience', *International Journal of Human Rights*, 18(3): 279–295.
- MacCormick, N. 1999. *Questioning Sovereignty: Law State and Nation in the European Commonwealth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mann, A. 2014. *Global Activism in Food Politics: Power Shift*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mann, M. 2005. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- McMichael, P. 2014. 'Rethinking Land Grab Ontology', *Rural Sociology*, 79(1): 34–55.
- Mees, L. 2003. *Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Minca, C. 2007. 'Agamben's Geographies of Modernity', *Political Geography*, 26(1): 78–97.
- Montanari, M. 2004. *Il cibo come cultura*, 1 ed. Roma: GLF editori Laterza.
- . 2006. *Food Is Culture*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Moreno, L., and Conversi, D. 2017a. 'Modelo Social y Límites al Crecimiento en el Antropoceno', *Eunomía*, (12): 310–314.
- . 2017b. 'Antropoceno, Cambio Climático y Modelo Social', *Documentación Social (monográfico sobre 'Cambio climático y crisis socioambiental')*, (183): 13–30.
- Neville, K. J., and Dauvergne, P. 2012. 'Biofuels and the Politics of Mapping', *Political Geography*, 31(5): 279–289.
- Oxfam International. 2011. *Land and Power: The Growing Scandal Surrounding the New Wave of Investments in Land*. Oxford: Oxfam International.



- Parenti, C. 2011. *Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence*. New York: Nation Books.
- Pérez-Agote, A. 1984. *La reproducción del nacionalismo: el caso vasco*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas /Siglo XXI.
- . 1987. *El nacionalismo vasco a la salida del franquismo*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Sage, C. 2014. 'The Transition Movement and Food Sovereignty: From Local Resilience to Global Engagement in Food System Transformation', *Journal of Consumer Culture*, 14(2): 254–275.
- Sassen, S. 1996. *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Smith, A. D. 1996. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- . 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- . 2009. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, M. 2009. 'Against Ecological Sovereignty: Agamben, Politics and Globalisation', *Environmental Politics*, 18(1): 99–116.
- Stegmann, T., and Sancliment-Solé, M., eds. 2014. *Katalonien: Der diskrete Charme der kleinen Staaten*. Münster: Lit Verlag.
- Teubal, M. 2009. 'Agrarian Reform and Social Movements in the Age of Globalization: Latin America at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century', *Latin American Perspectives*, 36(4): 9–20.
- Tilly, C. 1992. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD. 990–1990*, 2 ed. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- . 2002. 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in C. L. Besteman, ed., *Violence: A Reader*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 35–60.
- Tremlett, G., and Arie, S. 2003. 'Aznar Faces 91% Opposition to War', *The Guardian*, 29 March. [www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/29/spain.iraq](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/29/spain.iraq).
- Valle, T. del. 1994. *Korrika: Basque Ritual for Ethnic Identity*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.
- Waley, D. P., and Dean, T. 2010. *The Italian City Republics*. Harlow: Longman.
- Walker, R. B. J. 1992. *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Wittman, H. 2009. 'Reworking the Metabolic Rift: La Via Campesina, Agrarian Citizenship, and Food Sovereignty', *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(4): 805–826.
- Wolford, W., Borras, S. M., Hall, R., Scoones, I., and White, B. 2013. 'Governing Global Land Deals: The Role of the State in the Rush for Land', *Development and Change*, 44(2): 189–210.
- Yeh, E. T. 2012. 'Transnational Environmentalism and Entanglements of Sovereignty: The Tiger Campaign Across the Himalayas', *Political Geography*, 31(7): 408–418.
- Zabalo, J., Mateos, T., and Iraola, I. 2013. 'Conflicting Nationalist Traditions and Immigration: The Basque Case From 1950 to 1980', *Nations and Nationalism*, 19(3): 513–531.
- Zalbide, J. L. 1963. *La insurrección en Euskadi*. Bayonne: Goiztiri.
- Zimmerman, P. W. 2012. 'The Conceyu Nacionalista Astur and the Delegitimization of Nationalist Violence in Post-Franco Asturias, 1976–82', *International Journal of Iberian Studies*, 25(1): 21–40.
- Zirakzadeh, C. E. 2010. 'Joseba Zulaika's Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy', *Anthropological Quarterly*, 83(4): 931–936.



- Zulaika, J. 1988. *Basque Violence: Metaphor and Sacrament*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.
- . 2010a. ‘The Terror/Counterterror Edge: When Non-Terror Becomes a Terrorism Problem and Real Terror Cannot Be Detected by Counterterrorism’, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 3(2): 247–260.
- . 2010b. *Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2011. ‘The War on Terror and the Paradox of Sovereignty: Declining States and States of Exception’, in C. J. Greenhouse, ed., *Ethnographies of Neoliberalism*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Zulaika, J., and Douglass, W. A. 2008. ‘The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity’, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 1: 27–36.

Taylor & Francis  
Not for distribution