

14 Resisting primordialism and other *-isms*

In lieu of conclusions

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If the study of nationalism has reached academic maturity, the main reason may be that it is now predicated on more solid definitional and conceptual grounds – a task for which Walker Connor’s work has been highly relevant. However, some great obstacles remain. This concluding chapter will try to identify some of them.

One of this book’s distinctive outcomes has been the collection of several chapters canvassing on an open ‘primordialist’ approach, including a few attempts to engage in a debate with primordialist approaches. Most contributions have referred in one way or another to ‘primordialism’. This chapter will deal with the possible problems stemming from this, while proposing new ways of identifying old problems.

Although ‘primordial’ has been identified by Anthony D. Smith (1996, 1998) as ‘preceding state organization’, ‘primordialism’ as a scholarly approach or trend still eludes scholarly scrutiny. So what is ‘primordialism’? As expected, not a single unanimous definition of the term has emerged and the very concept remains shrouded in ambiguity. What have emerged instead are the following three competing meanings (possibly ranging from the most to the least benign ones):¹

- 1 Primordialism as a belief-system, as a passionate and deeply-felt attachment to one own’s ethnic values and identity. This may be compatible or not with any rational endeavours and attitudes. This approach has been highlighted by Joshua Fishman’s chapter.
- 2 Primordialism as abdication, reflected in the erstwhile academic attitude of dismissing ethnic and other attachments as irrational relics of a bygone past, contrary to ‘rational’ nation-building and hence not worth studying or defining. This is the ‘renunciative’ view sketched, among others, by Shils and Geertz. It was assumed by most modernization theorists in the 1960s and 1970s, and has been well identified in Donald Horowitz’s chapter.
- 3 Primordialism as *essentialism*, the idea that groups are clearly identifiable actors which can be transparently recognized by the author(s) as self-perpetuating homogeneous units with specific interests and agendas. This is the approach considered, at least in part, by William Safran.

Is any of these three meanings identifiable in Walker Connor’s work? In the name of clarity and precision, Connor has always rejected all forms of compartmentalization,

name-calling, and labelling. He has done so because, as an anti-essentialist, he is well aware that realities are more complex and nuanced than they appear to the external eye, that individuals and groups are situated in a continuum of shaded and, very often, incoherent positions. Yet, these and similar themes permeate the literature referring to Connor's writings, including many of this book's chapters. Let us therefore briefly examine each of the three views in relation to Connor.

- 1 Connor's focus on emotions is very distinct from Joshua Fishman's own defence of these emotions. Both may reflect Blaise Pascal's dictum that 'the heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of'. But Connor's task is to highlight the powerful impact of non-rational behaviour and attitudes, rather than to uphold them. However, Fishman's piece, which partakes openly this viewpoint, is also in line with Connor's critique of elitism, insofar as 'primordialism' is meant to challenge top-down constructivist propositions. By focusing on the emotions of intellectuals, artists, leaders and followers, old ivory towers are more likely to crumble.
- 2 Walker Connor's entire work is a critique of point 2 above, especially as associated with the modernization theory, namely the idea that ethnic sentiments are quaint remains of a bygone age. If by 'primordialism' we mean a view of ethnic sentiments as casual relics of a pre-modern past, then we fail to see them as actually and modernly viable – which is far from the truth. As we have seen, Connor has turned modernization postulates topsy-turvy. But, by emphasizing the non-rational character of nationalism, he has certainly not asserted that this feature should, or may, preclude its scholarly study.
- 3 Connor has avoided as much as possible essentialist inclinations. No homogeneity of culture is inferred, although a certain coherence of intentions, beliefs, values and behavior, is ascribed to national groups. Even though nationalism is a mass phenomenon and mobilizes groups as cohesive communities reflecting an inner perception of homogeneity, the task of the scholar should not be to indulge in the belief of its subjects and groups as organic wholes. This is still in line with Kant's and the positivists' vision of the ideal scholar as immune from ideologies, power and cultural constraints. As both O'Leary and Kaiser remind us, Connor (1994: 57) has stressed the need to recognize the analytical bias introduced by the 'predispositions of the analyst'. The arbitrary identification of Connor with primordialism stems mostly from an article, 'Beyond Reason' (Connor 1993), where the non-rational essence of nationalism is underscored. Yet, as explained in the introduction, his one is not an apotheosis of irrationality.

Of the three forms of primordialism so far identified, I feel that the first two have been sufficiently covered in this book, but the third one (essentialism) needs further exploration. Therefore, what follows is the identification of some trouble spots still plaguing the study of ethnicity and nationalism, as also reflected in some of the book's chapters. It is therefore an implicit call to overcome these obstacles, straighten the discipline and make it more scholarly sound.

The *-isms* which follow should be intended as potential trends rather than as

closed boxes or rigid categories. But their pervasive use should not be seen as being in flagrant contradiction with Connor's methodological premises. Connor has stressed the need to avoid 'name-calling' and the temptation to essentialize and simplify his colleagues' ideas. Scholarly categories are indeed more fluid and nuanced than outer ascription to over-simplifying categories can allow: no single scholar can be easily put in a conceptual box or definitional heading as most authors span several categories. Yet, this endeavour is necessary for any discipline to advance – although unpalatable and distasteful to some. Therefore the theoretical taxonomies I propose below should not be intended as blocs to confine the quoted authors.

Essentialism

Essentialism is often recognizable by the reiterated and totalizing use of *ethnonyms*: entire groups are hypostatized as cohesive entities obeying self-perpetuating mandates and enduring injunctions.² In this way they appear to be ensnared in their historical legacy.³ For instance, some authors write about 'the French', 'the Arabs', 'the Croats', 'the Serbs', 'the Armenians', etc. and other peoples as if they were coherent homogeneous entities endowed with their own collective will and goals. There is a tendency, perhaps understandable, to over-generalize and ascribe attitudes to the population at large for which there is no real evidence. However, this is different from saying that this population does not share some myths of common descent to maintain social cohesion. Moreover, essentialists usually fail to identify the substantial actors of ethnic processes, such as the French political élites or a particular person or group of persons (rather than 'the French').⁴

The essentialist view has been bestowed an evolutionary rationale in Donald Horowitz's chapter, which discusses Brewer and Miller's 'evolutionary primordialist' approach (Chapter 4). However, the application of essentialism in the academia was preceded by its celebration in the media and among politicians. This has been, and is, true of US media dealing with international affairs: academics have simply followed the political leaders' lead mostly remaining uncritical towards such mainstream usages.

Essentialism is often approached with the best of intentions, but eventually with unintended results: as well illustrated by Robert Kaiser, 'map-making' is among the most essentializing projects and it is central to nation-making, despite the existence of compatible localized homeland identities. Essentialism is hence quintessential *reification*, the transformation of beliefs, ideas and perceptions into animated entities and inherent 'wholes'. It displays an innate tendency to homogenize, to impose patterns, and, more dangerously, to ignore what does not fit the paradigm employed.

A particularly essentialist construct is the concept of '*self-determination*'. As famously expressed by Ivor Jennings in 1956, the problem is that in order to apply this principle you have to establish first who is the 'self' to be 'determined'. Any third-party intervention based on such a vaporous concept is bound to essentialize the 'self' as a coherent whole. At the same time, self-determination is also predicated on social engineering as it imposes rigid patterns upon plural environments.

But, although the concept of self-determination is based on essentialist postulates, it would be impossible to discard it altogether, lest half of mankind might be subjected to some form of unwelcome domination. The task of the scholar, the theoreticians and the international lawyer, should hence be either to dismantle the concept, or to find suitable applications, flexible enough to be adapted to human diversity, plurality, overlapping boundaries and ethnoterritorial mixing.

This is precisely one of the aspects appraised throughout the book's third section, with its emphasis on the practical implications of Connorian analysis. Brendan O'Leary has discussed the varieties of territorial federalism, while William Safran has dealt with self-determination as a plausible tool of international relations and conflict resolution. But other formulas are available to policy makers – with disparate results: pillarization or consociation (Lijphart 1977, 1996), cantonization (Henders 1997), hegemonic control (Lustick 1979) and various forms of non-territorial autonomy (Coakley 1994).⁵ There is no need to recur to extreme solutions, be they either secession or centralization (Guibernau 1999, Keating 1999, Loughlin 2000).⁶

Essentialism may be naïve, but it becomes detrimental if applied to any dimension of foreign policy analysis.⁷ It forces upon reality a rigidity of patterns which makes ultimately impossible any plural accommodation except by means of war or total victory. To essentialize the outsider is to prepare for war. In more academic terms, to infer a homogeneous and widespread popular feeling from élites' and political minorities' decisions is reversing elitism top-down, thereupon performing a parallel deformation of reality. As essentialism is the utmost version of primordialism, it prompts an abdication of etiology, of the study of the causes of ethnic conflict. Conflicts are simply seen as irrational and unaccountable. For the essentialist, conflicts occur because they do: they are inscribed in groups' primordial instincts. But if the study of the causes is so promptly relinquished, how could one even identify any possible path to conflict resolution?

Once the roots of ethnic conflicts are analysed in depth, their evolution and profile usually change and the panorama becomes less shallow. Once names and actions of single individuals pop up, generalizations become harder, while clues as to the strategic or tactical choices of élites or proto-élites begin to emerge. In this way it is feasible to ascertain why some leaders, groups or organizations 'adopt violent strategies'.⁸

Finally, essentialism is linked with at least two forms of fashionable determinism. First, it is associated with *cultural*, or *ethnocultural*, *determinism*, the view that we are all intrinsically enslaved in our petty cultural habits and that these are ethnically (in extreme cases, biologically) determined, rather than determined by culture *per se*. Second, it is often associated with *historical determinism*, the view that the past has got a hold on the present, and that you cannot escape its grasp. There are obviously other forms of determinism, some moribund (racial determinism), other persisting (economic determinism), but the ensuing two have acquired in the 1990s an aura of respectability which needs to be tested and challenged.

Cultural determinism

In popular and scholarly literature, ethnicity and culture are often seen as intrinsically linked, one reinforcing the other. This confusion indicates not only a lack of precision, but also that essentialism is alive and kicking. Of the two concepts, culture is by far the most difficult to grasp. It remains still largely undefinable, as noticed already in the 1950s by US anthropologists Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, who identified over 100 competing definitions of ‘culture’ (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). But, for the sake of clarity, I shall re-state a cardinal distinction: *ethnicity* can be easily defined as a group’s shared and subjective belief in common descent, whereas *culture* can be identified in the objective existence of an innerly coherent, yet plural, set of tangible outputs (including material artifacts) whose proper crafting is passed on through generations (and renewed with each generation) within a system of values and codes conveyed by its own symbolism.⁹ Of course, culture needs reproduction and inter-generational transmission in order to survive and thus is permeated by ethnicity. But, although culture is attached to ethnic continuity, the two concepts should always be distinguished.

The confusion between ethnicity and culture is particularly pervasive in what I defined above as cultural determinism. The latter comes in at least two main variants, ethnocultural and ‘civilizational’, both of which have recently witnessed a resurgence in US media and academia. The very use of the term *ethnocultural* indicates confusion between the two. Precisely because this approach is essentialist, ethnicity and culture are conflated as nearly synonymous. Thus, ethnic wars become culture wars.

On the other hand, ‘strict’ cultural determinists may be aware of the distinction between ethnicity and culture, since they argue that national conflicts are rigorously cultural in origin. Communication gaps arising from ‘cultural’ differences are seen as conflict-engendering and being at the heart of misunderstandings. They thereby focus on pretentiously unbridgeable ‘fault lines’ derived by the imprint of greater, mostly non-ethnic, cultural blocs or civilizations. Conflicts occur at the intersection between culture and modernization: It is the latter’s disruptive impact, together with the devastating repercussions of an all-mighty Western culture, which generates the unavoidable collision.

The most famous interpretation in this line comes from Samuel Huntington (1995) and his theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’. Accordingly, the new post-Cold War world order has been reshaped no longer along ideological cleavages, but along cultural fault lines – where ethnicity plays a merely interstitial role as a sub-component of civilization. In other words, instead of competing nationalities or the two blocs, we have now entered an era in which being either Western, Muslim, Christian Orthodox, Latin American, Confucian, African, Hindu, Buddhist or Japanese matters more than ever before. This is occurring despite increasing secularism and modernization, indeed, precisely as a result of that: religions are not to be taken as they were in the past, that is, as belief systems, but rather as civilizational aggregates. But this view of the strength of civilizations reveals that religion has been secularized, at least in ethnic conflicts. As shown by John Coakley,

secularism, rather than other-worldly faith, nurtures the political use of religion.¹⁰ In his study of Muslim society, Gellner (1981) defines Islamic fundamentalism as a regional variant of Western modernism and nationalism. Brought to its logical conclusions, even Osama Bin Laden's ideology can be seen as a form of patriotism, religious in form, but nationalist in substance. Bin Laden himself has built his political career in the fight against US military presence in his native Saudi Arabia. He can be seen alternatively as an Arab nationalist or as a pan-Islamic irredentist.

Huntington has applied this approach to, and was probably inspired by, the Yugoslav wars. All the 'warring' parties of the Yugoslav drama were merely re-enacting ancient civilizational alliances and obeying the lust of primordial dictats. Thus, for instance, Greece was viewed as unshakably tied to, say, Serbia and Russia by virtue of its Christian Orthodox legacy (Michas 2002). Centuries of common cultural heritage and interactions between Orthodox and non-Orthodox within the Ottoman Empire fold were ignored or elided.

An avalanche of critiques has submerged this thesis.¹¹ Civilizational determinists overlook many exceptions: for instance, Serb nationalists have not always been pro-Greek and erstwhile versions of pan-Serbianism claim the region of Greek Macedonia, including Thessaloniki, as part of Southern Serbia.¹² In the Caucasus, Christian Armenia has forged a highly favorable relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran, whereas Christian Georgia has created preferential links with Muslim Azerbaidjan and Turkey, rather than with Armenia.

Various reasons can be advanced for the emergence of this vision in the 1990s and these should be the subject of a separate investigation. The emergence of civilizational approaches could also prosper because it had the explicit support of the *éminence grise* of US foreign policy, the Cold War strategist Henry A. Kissinger (Hitchins 2001). In tune with Huntington's postulates, Kissinger claimed that

[t]he war in Kosovo is the product of a conflict going back over centuries. It takes place at the dividing line between the Ottoman and Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity, and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The ethnic groups have lived together peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed – as under foreign empires or the Tito dictatorship.¹³

Early US policy on Bosnia was indeed influenced by what can be named the 'Kissinger–Milosevic–Bin Laden' approach to international relations. For instance, two Kissinger associates, Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, were strongly linked to Belgrade's élites, including Milosevic, as advisers on Yugoslavia to James A. Baker III, US Secretary of State and former Secretary of the Treasury (Almond 1994: 39).

The myth of innate antagonisms and perennial hatred rests on the modern vision that people following different religious creeds decimated each other for thousands of years. But this totally ignores the much longer periods of peace and mutual coexistence, as well as the endless forms of hybridization, syncretism and

métissage that took place throughout the ages and all over the world. The need to emphasize the importance of ‘fading’ ethnic conflicts, as well as of accommodation and coexistence, has been pointed out in Horowitz’s chapter.

Yet, the ‘ancient hatred’ distortion lingers on, seemingly impermeable to rational reasoning. Most historical research demonstrates that it is untenable. One of the breeding grounds of primordialist interpretations has been Bosnia, where warfare has been explained away as a result of deeply embedded primordial and age-old animosities. But we tend to forget that a rich tradition of diversity, pluralism and tolerance developed here over many centuries and flourished until quite recently, only to be shattered at the closing of the millennium by Milosevic’s war machine with US, French and British blessing (Conversi 2002; Malcolm 1994; Simms 2001). Everyday practices and traditions of consensus were echoed in the political sphere by coalition-building and a habit of pragmatic compromise (Donia and Fine 1994). Bosnia’s pluralist heritage in terms of syncretic movements and ‘religious bridge-building’ dated back at least to the late Middle Ages (Norris 1994: 263–268). Yet, recently, the media’s, the politicians’ and the scholars’ abuse of cultural determinism and vilification of reality has reached paroxysmic levels ever since Bosnia (Bennet 1994). Even in Kosovo, a long tradition of coexistence has been all but forgotten (Malcolm 1999), while many US commentators have been suddenly re-reading the Macedonian conflict as a re-enactment of ethnic or civilizational incompatibilities.

In other words, Yugoslavia’s collapse was not resulting from atavistic ethnic tensions (Bennett 1994; Ramet 1999). On the contrary, a lingering negative memory of imperfect coexistence was artfully revived by Belgrade television with technicolor effects. Sheer propaganda is essential for ethnic exclusivist regimes, from the Young Turks to the Nazis or Serbia’s ethnic cleansers. As a framework for interpreting ongoing events, cultural determinism was a clumsy but effective deceit: It simultaneously became a cause and an effect of the West’s tragic failure in the Balkans.¹⁴ It was also an effective strategy aimed at pulverizing the multiethnic fabric of Bosnia and other societies. Its greatest ‘success’ was to turn neighbours and friends into mortal enemies, almost overnight.

Historical determinism

Historical determinism is the view that the past has got a hold on the present, and that we cannot escape its grasp. Each nation is condemned by its own yore, even to the point of repeating the past itself. In analysing current ethnopolitical conflicts, historical determinists assert that there are unshakable geo-political alliances which endure over the years and these determine domestic politics as well as international relations.

Historical determinism differs from cultural determinism in that it relies on historical memories and legacies as causal factors, rather than on culture or religion. Thus, even people sharing the same religion or ‘grand civilization’ may collide simply because they have already collided in the past. Each conflict is explained as a recurring pattern of historical alliances of the type which we saw, for

instance, when Bulgaria clashed with Serbia and Greece. Accordingly, Greece has 'always' been an ally of Serbia and Russia, but has also been an antagonist of Bulgaria, despite sharing a common Orthodox faith. Accordingly, the intermittent anti-Serbian attitudes in Bulgaria are supposed to revive old time alliances dating back at least to the Second Balkan War (1913).

Historical determinists are often nationalists themselves, and pretend to explain the current conflict as a *longue durée* epic battle, rooted in age-old enmities. Many contemporary nationalists simply see modern conflicts as instances of never-ending, perennial patterns of persecutions (Takei 1998): negative events are perceived as befalling in recurring cycles which escape logic and cannot sensibly be explained if not in term of atavistic idiosyncrasies. This is in contrast with most modernist approaches. Indeed, a full-blown theory of modernity would claim that things could never be the same again after the spread of industrialization, accompanied or preceded by state militarism (Gellner 1983). For instance, the Armenian genocide can be seen as the earliest avatar of a tragically novel trend that would become the hallmark of the twentieth century.¹⁵ Many Holocaust scholars describe genocide as an entirely modern occurrence with its unprecedented systematic technological aspects (Bauman 1989).¹⁶

But historical determinism can lead even further: we learn that, in case of an irredentist war pitting Hungary against Romania, France will instinctively side with Romania in virtue of their shared 'Latin' heritage. Should we equally expect that the Finns and the Estonians will enlist their armies in defence of their distant kinsmen, the Hungarians? Not to count the 'civilizational' factor that 'the French' are not part of the 'Orthodox civilization' while Rumania is. Likewise, Germany's early recognition of Croatia was allegedly dictated by historical alliances dating back to the Third Reich and even further. In the early 1990s, possibly the most influential coterie promoting this view in international fora consisted in Milosevic's own cronies. The fiction that a freshly reunited Germany in 1991 supported Croatia's independence for 'historic' reasons (that is, as a former 'ally' during World War II) percolated through the media, notably in the *New York Times*, whose lines and editorials Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have clearly identified as being 'based on major falsifications, but in keeping with their propaganda function' (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 141).¹⁷

If all this were true, we should anticipate an extremely unstable world ruled by memory and emotions mingled with sheer egotistic interests, rather than cold impartiality. Once it is conceded that each nation cannot escape its historical mission of conquest and subjugation, no nation can act as a fair, dispassionate arbiter, or as neutral, detached 'third party'. This would first and foremost apply to the USA, a country most vulnerable to both ethnic lobbying and civilizational crusades.¹⁸

Of course, alliances in the Balkans have shifted over the centuries in unpredictable ways. Some more enduring coalitions may be discernible, but there is scarcely a relationship which has been able to withstand the vicissitudes of history. For instance, the historical (rather than cultural) alliance between France and Serbia may have been radically altered by post-1999 developments.¹⁹ A parallel

tradition of Serbophilia has been hard hit and castigated in Britain, at least after 1999.²⁰ There is much to dispute even about the most discussed alliance, the supposedly quasi-mystical bond between Russia and Serbia, originally conceived in the framework of Pan-Slavism.²¹

The sudden emergence of historical determinism in Western political discourse during the 1990s recapitulated the dominant attitude prevailing in Belgrade's chanceries and environs. In the case of Serbia, the watershed date was 1389, the mythical recurrence of the defeat of 'the Serbs' at the hand of 'the Turks' in Kosovo Polje (Anzulovic 1999).²² 'History' here directly replaced culture and even ethnicity: the Albanians' distinctive origins were obliterated, their culture made irrelevant. What is central to this case of historical determinism (which is entirely able to turn history on its head) is the Albanians' and other groups' arbitrary association with the historical enemy of Serbia: 'the Turks'. Contemporary Serbian massacres against Bosnians, Sandjakis and Kosovars were often referred to as the latest chapter of an epic struggle against 'the Turks'. The effects on the ground of this dominant past-oriented discourse became immediately discernible, as recounted by many courageous reporters who engaged in high-risk investigative journalism: 'When one went into a village where fighting had taken place, it was often easier to get a history lesson than a reliable account of what had occurred earlier the same day' (Rieff 1995: 69). As casualties mounted, history came to the fore and gave major impetus and justification to an endless chain of crimes, revenge and counter-revenge.

In recent years, historical determinism has typically plagued academic endeavours, governmental rhetoric, and popular discourse, particularly over the Yugoslav conflict. There have been repeated references to a supposed tradition of endemic warfare and relentless bloodshed in the Balkans. This has served to create an aura of historical inevitability that has in turn been used to justify ongoing events.

The resurgence of historical determinism is an indication that many scholars and politicians, as well as ordinary people, are moving in an interpretive vacuum. Refusing or lacking more rational and convincing explanations, they fall back onto primordialist accounts of war and conflict. Yet, the past offers only part of the explanation. Present political developments have much more bearing on our understanding.

Institutionalism vs culturalism?

Most of the issues raised above relate to a crucial question: 'what are ethnic conflicts made of?' A second line of investigation involves the major ingredients giving rise to nationalist mobilizations: 'what are the factors triggering their formation and crystallization?' Many competing views have emerged and they have centered alternatively on economy, politics, history, culture, institutions, and so on. Economy as a significant key factor has been analysed consistently, and eventually ruled out, by Connor (1984, 2001; see also the Introduction: 6ff). Among alternative factors, we have seen various deterministic approaches putting culture or history at the

centre stage. Institutions, and in particular the state, are key variables analysed by several authors.

One of the major contemporary controversies revolves around the tension between institutionalists and culturalists (Lecours 2000). In contrast with other sets of oppositions and dichotomies, these two are clearly compatible: it is possible to focus on the centrality of culture in shaping institutions,²³ while simultaneously focusing on the opposite direction, the capacity of institutions to influence culture, and on how both fashion ethno-political mobilization.²⁴

Followers of the modernization paradigm believed in the doctrine of nation-building, the idea that institutions (usually the state) can shape and even spawn nations, while quelling impertinent ethnic cleavages. Walker Connor has recognized this extreme form of institutionalism as political-institutional determinism, and has effectively moved in the opposite direction: from ethnicity to institutions, via the nation. Nations cannot be fashioned or forged at élite's will. Rather, they are responses to modernization and increasing inter-ethnic contacts. The latter events transform previously unaware ethnic groups into fully mobilized nations, which in turn require legitimate institutions, notably the control of the state, that is, the modern institution *par excellence*.

Nor can Connor be defined as a *culturalist*, since culture belongs to the realm of tangibility and objectivity, while ethnicity is predicated upon subjective feelings and has on its side the light power of elusiveness. Connor's critique of strict culturalism (culture as a causal factor) has been well explored in Coakley's chapter. In other words, Connor is neither an institutionalist nor a culturalist.

Some authors have argued that Connor's emphasis on ethnicity is at the expenses of institutions. By radically rejecting the 'nation-building' school with all its flagrant mistakes, prejudices, elitism, Euro-centrism, and chrono-centrism, one risks succumbing to the opposite illusion, namely a disregard for the long-term influence of institutions on all aspects of material and emotional life: patterns of behaviour, attitudes, beliefs and, not to be forgotten, cultural artifacts.

Probably in no area of the ecumene can this be discerned more clearly than in one of Connor's regions of expertise, the former Communist bloc.²⁵ In particular, the deep-rooted impact of erstwhile Communist institutions is most visible in the country which first of all has re-drawn its boundaries according to the ethnic principle, namely Germany. In many respects, German unification remains a fiction in the wider socio-cultural and attitudinal sphere. The unification process has led to more problems and tensions that could have been originally predicted. Instead of boosting Germany's self-image, unification has been widely regretted from the moment Bonn had to face the hard task of dismantling a fossilized bureaucracy in the East. After the initial enthusiasm, unification has come under hefty attack among West Germans. Popular perceptions of German unity have become adverse, while negative 'ethnic' stereotypes of East Germans have emerged (Behrend M. 1995; Panzig 1995). The popular dichotomy between *Ossies* (East Germans) and *Wessies* (West Germans) has correspondingly increased (Behrend H. 1995). This gap has been institutionalized by the massive support enjoyed by the reformed Communist Party (PDS) in East Germany, in spite of the deep anti-communist

sentiment of the local population. The gap is sufficiently wide that some Germans decline to identify the *Ossies* as Germans. On the other hand, Eastern intellectuals had accused West Germany's establishment of cultural colonialism (Blankenburg 1995).²⁶ All this despite the fact that the flight of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe into Germany has emptied many areas of its German minorities, making it possible an unprecedented overlap between *Reich* and *Volk*.

The rift was evident even in Berlin, the new capital of united Germany. Data from the 1996 City Registry is straightforward, and unambiguous: only 562 of the 16,383 marriages in Berlin occurred between West and East Berliners; 22 per cent of all marriages were between Berliners and foreigners, and only 4 per cent between East and West Berliners. Typically, West 'Berliners find more in common with Slavs, Africans, Turks . . .'.²⁷

Given also the spate of racial attacks occurring in East Germany,²⁸ as compared with the anti-racist candlelight demonstrations packing West Germany's streets,²⁹ one is tempted to declare that we are confronting two entirely different societies, endowed with dissimilar cultural baggages and perceptions of reality, but dwelling under the same ethnonational roof – and, now, the same state. It is relatively common to hear that *Ossies* and *Wessies* form two distinct peoples, with not much in common except an imposed standardized high culture and a (probably misguided!) belief in common descent.

After over ten years of unification, this expanding gap tells a lot about the legacy of institutions (in particular state-sanctioned Communist institutions) on people's emotions, attitudes, perceptions and behaviour (Bunce 1999). Of course, it would be exaggerated to declare that German ethnicity and sense of common 'brotherhood' are weaker than the cultural–ideological divide, but certainly the legacy of institutions has proven to be quite impressive, profound and long-lasting.

As demonstrated by classical psychiatric investigation, Communist state terrorism had a far-reaching impact: techniques of indoctrination and interrogation used by Communist regimes often led to depressive stupor, a sense of total helplessness and uncertainty, impairment of critical capacities and disruption of mental functioning. This often ushered in a loss of personal and individual attributes by increasing dependence upon the regime (Hinkle and Wolff 1956). The end result was self-destructive conformism, a will to emulate the powerful, and contempt for the powerless. This led to unparalleled degrees of submission and torpidity, which made it subsequently easier for post-Communist societies to accept passively the unyielding power of mafias, MTV and fast-food giants, as well as nationalism. As Ernest Gellner (1994) has rightly pointed out, consumerism was much more enthusiastically endorsed than any meaningful ratio of substantial democracy.

To date, after over a decade of 'free-market' diktats, basic attitudes have only tenuously changed in many post-communist countries. In some areas they have indeed deteriorated or even vanished, notably in inter-ethnic relations and grass-roots democracy (both of which remain awfully fragile). As democratic practices stay elusive, ethnic exclusivism triumphs. Mass ideology from the Soviet era has been directly supplanted by mass consumerism as 'globalization' holds sway. In this context, globalization becomes a more subtle form of totalitarianism, accepted

passively by most people as it lands on them another salvational promise. Such a post-communist *Weltanschauung* has nothing to do with civilizational, ethnic, cultural, historical, perhaps even economic, legacies, but simply with the fresher inheritance of 40 to 70 years of Communist manipulation.

Institutions may not matter more than popularly held myths of ethnic descent, but by underscoring the latter one risks ignoring the former at the expense of accuracy.

Looking at the future: where to go from here?

Walker Connor has established some firm bases for the future study of nationalism. Once laid its conceptual grounding, nationalism studies have become a self-standing discipline. Courses of nationalism are now available in most English-language universities; only ten years ago they were still a rarity. Most of these courses use Connor's classical articles as compulsory reading – some of which are included in his textbook (Connor 1994). It will be up to the responsibility of the single author whether to consider or disregard Connor's conceptual and theoretical foundational work. In doing so they will have once more to deal with the terminological conundrum, only to begin again or to indulge in weak, or risky, scholarship.

One of the hot themes and contexts which is going to grab scholarly attention in the forthcoming years is likely to be globalization or, more meaningful still, the intellectual and popular response to it. The sudden rise of the 'no global' movement will no doubt propel a great amount of academic research (Hertz 2000; Klein 2000). This is especially impelling since 'national sovereignty', the key ingredient in the nationalism studies staple, has been seized by multinational corporations: As George Monbiot has illustrated with richness of details, corporations have taken over the function of government in many crucial areas, thereby menacing the very core of the *demos* (Monbiot 2000). However, this relatively new field still proceeds in a conceptual–terminological vacuum – more or less, as nationalism studies were moving a few years ago: there is no yet coherent or universal definition of globalization. Some definitions focus on mere economic aspects, other on financial flows, other on policy-making and the law, and so on.

At least for our purpose, cultural globalization is the most visible form of globalization, and hence perhaps the most effective one. But in its current shape, cultural globalization can be broadly understood as one-way massive import of standardized cultural items and icons from a single country, the United States of America. For large portions of the ecumene, it is hence synonymous with Westernization, or, more accurately, Americanization. 'Americanization' should be understood here in its most superficial, incoherent, fractional, and deficient sense, as aping and mimicking something one does not even grasp the value of, and as the spread of quite trivial and commercial aspects of industrialized US mass-directed products. Because the process is one-way, top-down and unidirectional, there is scarce fusion or amalgamation between nations and ethnic groups.

The main challenge for the scholar of nationalism will be first of all to define the

relationship between the two phenomena. Does nationalism reinforce globalization or can it rather represent a challenge to globalization? Is globalization reinforcing nationalism or can it in some way be channelled in the opposite direction? What kind of nationalism is most likely to emerge with, or as a response to, globalization? Is globalization a causal factor in the explosion of ethnic conflict, xenophobia and racism?

The last question is of particular importance, since most evidence seems to point to an affirmative response, namely the existence of a direct link between cultural globalization and the rise of racist and xenophobic nationalism. This follows in part from Connor's (1994) postulate, also expressed in this book's Introduction and reiterated in many of the chapters, that some forms of international contacts are bound to create more clashes than encounters, or further separation rather than fusion. But which kind of contacts? Certainly, not all forms of contacts are 'ethnogenetic' or bound to invigorate ethnic awareness and militancy. Otherwise, we could only expect a world in perpetual conflict. So, which type of international contacts are bound to generate conflict? This question points towards an entire new range of possibilities in the expansion of scholarly research. Connor would agree that those contacts leading to a sense of group *threat* are the most conflict-engendering ones. Specifically, a threat to the group's culture, way of life and sense of continuity is likely to lead to increasing group mobilization. But this rules out the possibility that a sense of threat can be also artfully fabricated by political élites (Zulaika and Douglass 1998). Similarly, I would add, a real threat can be easily hidden to public opinion by media and political manipulation. Therefore the focus needs to be, again and again, on political élites – which does not rule out Connor's overall critique of elitism in academia.

Or, is it rather the case that cultural globalization does *not* really represent a genuine increase in inter-personal, inter-ethnic and inter-cultural contacts? In fact, in most areas of public life there is no cultural globalization at all in the real sense. The process is rather pyramidal, top-down, with a few individuals and groups, nearly all in the USA, establishing the patterns to be followed by the rest of mankind. If this 'brave new global world' had its own capital, this would likely be Hollywood, rather than Washington. Political globalization may still seem remote to some vintage scholars of nationalism so sentimentally attached to their object of study, but 'Hollywoodization' has become a daily routine for millions of peoples all over the world. Indeed, for increasing numbers it is the only known reality. The most primary tools of socialization, erstwhile in the firm hands of the family (nuclear or extended), then assumed by the state in the industrialization 'phase' of compulsory schooling, have become, with post-modernity, at the mercy of uncontrollable cash-driven corporate powers and media tycoons. If a group can no longer socialize its children according to its culture and traditions, then the very basis of nationhood is visibly at stake – although nationalism itself may not only persist and resist, but be perceived as a response to the onslaught.

By relying on Hollywood *et similia* as unique conveyors of 'globalization', inter-ethnic communication automatically drains away. There are instances where communication has virtually vanished: in many post-communist societies, the

explosion of chauvinism, racism, neo-fascism and xenophobia goes hand in hand with a blind faith in mass consumerism. As diagnosed by LSE political philosopher John Gray (1998), free market dogmas have already heralded the triumph of ‘anarcho-capitalism’ and its atomic mafias in the MacDonaldised East. But there is a more important factor: the collapse of real, effective inter-ethnic and international communication as a direct consequence of superficial Americanization. Let’s take an example: until 1989, it was relatively easy to see on Hungarian television and in many of Budapest’s cinemas, movie masterpieces from France, Russia, Italy, Britain and many other countries. This is no longer possible. Only the worst (and the best) of Hollywood can now be seen every day on every Hungarian channel and cinema screen. Data on this ‘cultural suicide’ or ‘self-genocide’ begins now to be available – albeit largely undebated in Hungary itself.³⁰

Rather than representing a bridge between cultures, such an unilateral planetary drive has eroded the basis for mutual understanding, hampering inter-ethnic and international communication. This has been facilitated by the persisting legacy of totalitarianism which had already turned communist societies into a cultural *tabula rasa* (Conversi 2001). But in Hungary (and the entire East) ‘Americanization’ has not simply meant the eradication of Hungarian (and other) cultures in all possible aspects bar language (in the former case semantically and philologically impenetrable, hence unavailable to non-Hungarian speakers). It has also meant the effacement and undoing of neighbouring cultures. And two self-destructions add up to each other in incremental ways: from no culture and no inter-communication, through a twofold negative relationship, to likely conflict.

Yet, if cultural globalization can be simply identified as naked ‘Americanization’, then the equation is simpler and scholars of nationalism *may* find something new to ponder about and begin theorizing anew. In this case, globalization would be automatically associated with colonialism and/or imperialism (depending on ideological inclination). *Il re’ e’ nudo*. It would follow that nationalism and ethnicity could potentially become vehicles of resistance to US-led globalization. But this has mostly not yet been the case. On the contrary, nationalism has often reinforced globalization, and vice versa. Therefore their relationship needs to be scrutinized more in depth, knowing that an apparent acceptance of US iconography is no proof that either the surface or the substance will be passively accepted in the long term.

Three lines of research on this relationship can be tentatively proposed. A first line of interpretation may focus on the long-term political effects of socio-cultural change: Benjamin Barber’s (1985) pioneering view that ‘McWorld’ harbors in itself the seeds of a planetary ‘Jihad’ belongs to a wider tradition which sees massive social uprooting as leading to widespread social unrest, and cultural destruction as ushering social disintegration. This approach can be associated with a classical ‘cause-effect’ model or, borrowing from medicine and chemistry, an *homeostatic* view of social change (Conversi 1995). For instance, Ernest Gellner (1983) saw nationalism as an inevitable consequence of, and reaction to, industrialization – although within functionalist parameters and in a different socio-historical context. But it was particularly Walker Connor (1994) who emphasized the underlying,

persistent and pervasive force of oppositional ethnicity against the 'grand' projects of nation-builders.

A second interpretive framework might come from what can be called 'failed communication' view expressed in the preceding sections. The key argument is that the current 'world order' has a vertical, indeed pyramidal, structure, where groups have less and less opportunities to inter-communicate or interact in a meaningful way and know each other's traditions. For increasing numbers of individuals, a US-manufactured mass consumerist culture remains the only 'window on the world'. Consequently, to know and appreciate one's own neighbours has become an ever arduous task. 'Free-market fundamentalism', spearheaded by cultural Americanization has led not only to environmental catastrophe, but also to an incremental rise in nationalism and xenophobia.

A third line of analysis should focus on a more concrete and actual form of globalization, which can work independently from Americanization: the expanding role of *diaspora* in international politics and the rise of 'e-mail nationalism' – a term coined by Benedict Anderson (1992). In an increasingly uniform world, ethnic identities have not only resisted, but are being unremittingly emphasized. The expansion of the Internet has prompted the creation of global ethnopolitical networks which can be constricted by state boundaries only at the price of curtailing fundamental human rights.³¹ Although increasingly monitored by state agencies, mobile phones have at the same time reinforced ethnic exclusivism, family ties and parental control by increasing communal contacts and decreasing the chance of new inter-personal encounters.

Conclusions

None of the above *-isms* or trends listed in this epilogue can be ascribed to Walker Connor. Even though Connor has not directly confronted them, his prose has carefully eschewed any of the above traps, eluding most forms of determinism. Yet, the latter are pervading the literature at large and have even emerged in some of this volume's contributions.

It is generally difficult to situate a particular scholar within any of these fields, unless s/he is a self-declared nationalist. In particular, most primordialists themselves resist any definition of primordialism, as they thrive on indefiniteness and ambiguity. On the other hand, name-calling is recurrent in academia and some of the contributions do indulge in this practice. This editor has deliberately chosen not to be immune from it. And Smith's chapter defines Connor as a 'late modernist', while referring to his own approach as 'ethnosymbolist'. Although this epilogue's many *-isms* may lead some readers to raise their eyebrows, labelling and categorization are built-in in scientific, humanistic, even artistic, enterprise. Taxonomies are not tedious reorderings of disciplinary knowledge, but can be creative and syncretic endeavours needed for the very advancement of human learning and scholarship. In this respect, they may serve to identify underlying, even emerging, trends in the social science.

The most recurrent theme in this volume has been that of ethnic persistence and

continuity. The emphasis on the unfathomable and elusive character of ethnicity should hence be part of a wider sociology and history of human unpredictability. As with other social movements, ethnic mobilizations and conflicts have frequently surprised scholars and journalists for their sudden, ‘unexpected’ appearance. As a recent example, a (truly global) anti-global movement has unanticipatedly emerged in dispersed locations of the ecumene, from Seattle to Prague, from Quebec City to Gothenborg and Genoa, ostensibly without announcing itself. Yet, a popular reaction against the excesses of globalization, perceived by many as all-pervasive US colonialism, was fully predictable – and some have anticipated both its emergence and its initially contradictory, disorganized, ‘anarchical’ modalities (Barber 1995).

Likewise, the evidence accumulated from many case studies over the past thirty years point to the possibility of predicting or at least expecting, the explosion of ethnic conflicts in specific situations. There is, for instance, ample evidence to say that the role of the state is essential in prefiguring ethnic conflict, which largely depends on the state’s (either conflictive or tolerant) response to, and relationships with, multiculturalism, religious pluralism, and ethnic dissent (Williams 1994).

Of course, primordialism and essentialism can be identified as part of a political agenda or as a weapon at the disposal of both nationalists and empire-builders. In particular, the ‘fiction’ of pure irrationality dissimulates a political goal: once a group or person is described as totally irrational, unmanageable to reason, therefore unreasonable, it/s/he is automatically pushed at the fringes of humanity. Authoritarian regimes and anti-terrorist ‘experts’ refer extensively to the reasonless, illogical ‘essence’ of their foes.³² Unreason implies fallacy and error, thus untruth and falsehood, eventually leading to insanity and aberration. The results are ostracism, exile and banishment for entire peoples, as well as for individual ideologically or ethnically associated with non-governmental views.

Yet, ethnic sentiments have an inarguably non-rational (perhaps even ‘irrational’) bent and the actors involved in ethnic disputes seem often impermeable to reason, at least universal reason. This remains the core of the dilemma and makes a radical rejection of primordialism difficult (Grosby 1994). In general, it is easier to reject the other, above described, forms of determinism on both scholarly and ethical grounds. Primordialism can be more easily rejected on purely methodological grounds. It fails because of its unreliability, since it is prevalently based on unproven assumptions. This book has collected fellow travellers on Connor’s pioneering road, a good scholarly generation, plus a few new voices, advancing possible new directions of research.

Notes

- 1 Following Clifford Geertz’s lead, Eller and Coughlan (1993) identify primordialism’s three main attributes: *apriority* (the anti-sociological idea that primordial attachments are ‘given’ and ‘prior to all experience of interaction’), *ineffability* (the idea that primordial attachments are overpowering and ‘ineffable’, and therefore escape sociological scrutiny), and *affectivity* (the idea that primordial attachments are quintessentially emotional and predicated on affective bonds, which again makes them quite impermeable

to social research, given the poor advancement in the study of emotions). Each of these three dimensions relate to my second definition of primordialism, insofar as they all advocate a renunciation of scholarly sociological analysis in front of the overpowering irrationality and elusive emotionality of the phenomenon. For a critique to this position, see Grosby (1994).

- 2 Essentialism is sometimes opposed to *constructivism* (more than instrumentalism). Whereas essentialists reify the nation as an organic whole, constructivists see it as constructed by *fiat* of man, rather than God. Hence constructivists include prototypical *instrumentalists*, such as *élite-manipulation theorists* (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), who see nations as the top-down creation of political leaders either élites or proto-élites.
- 3 A cautionary note: I have generally avoided this use – bar in the book's title, *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain*, chosen by the publisher (Conversi 1997).
- 4 US media commentators and the public at large do often engage in the belief that, outside the US, entire groups are naturally inclined to rehearse atavistic battles, scrimmages and civil or civilizational wars.
- 5 For a typology of these formulas, see Coakley (1992).
- 6 Secession has been the most popular option in the wake of post-communist disintegration and social chaos, notably in the former Yugoslavia (Conversi 2000a).
- 7 Louis Kriesberg's (1998) book on 'creative' conflict resolution may provide an antidote to Safran's chapter.
- 8 On this see the chapter on 'Adopting conflict strategies' in Kriesberg (1998).
- 9 One can obviously dispute whether is there such a thing as 'culture'. What we can tangibly identify are only cultural artifacts whose reproduction is depending on inter-generational transmission – although we tend to interpret and classify them according to our notions of the moment.
- 10 Many nowadays 'religious' wars can paradoxically be described as 'atheist' wars (Conversi 1999).
- 11 Among the earliest critics, see Ajami (1993: 2ff). Ajami rebuts, more convincingly, that 'civilizations do not control states, states control civilizations'. See also the dedicated issue of *The New Republic*, whose front cover is devoted to 'Europe's long, vicious war against Islam in the Balkans' (Ajami 1994: 29–37). See also Edward W. Said, 'The Clash of Ignorance', *The Nation*, 22 October 2001.
- 12 A 1932 quote by the official Belgrade 'propagandist', Dr Radovanovitch, director of the Press Bureau of Belgrade's Presidency of the Council, can clarify this point:

[Thessaloniki] has never been Greek; it has a Serb city peopled with Southern Serbs. Its affiliation to Greece has been its death sentence! It will not revive, it will not find again its lost prosperity, until it becomes again the great commercial port of the Balkans towards the Mediterranean and the Orient. And it cannot become this great port unless it returns to Yugoslavia, of which it is a natural and historical dependency. It is the same with Drama, Seres, Janina, Kastoria, which have been of no importance since they were delivered to the degenerate Greek nation.

(Radovanovitch, cited in Pozzi, 1935: 101)

At that time, Serbian expansionism identified the entire Macedonian region up to Thessaloniki as 'Southern Serbia' (Michas 2002).

- 13 Henry A. Kissinger, 'Doing Injury to History' *Newsweek International*, 5 April 1999. See also the milestone investigative work by Hitchins (2001).
- 14 In particular, by underpinning governments and politicians opposing intervention in Bosnia, cultural determinism initially served the interests of non-interventionists, but was used consequently to champion Western military intervention in 1999.
- 15 There is hence a gulf between the 1914–16 mass extermination campaigns and the massacres of 1894–96. But, even by 1894, nationalism was already an influential force in Turkey as it came entirely from the West (Melson 1996). From an Anatolian perspective, the Balkans are indeed 'the West'. And the Young Turks' nationalist movement

- was inspired by, if not mimicking, its modern post-1789 Western archetypes. Young Turks army officials fought against victorious nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and ended up imitating them while forging links with German nationalism (Dadrian 1996).
- 16 One exception may be Spain, further to Léon Poliakov's *The Aryan Myth* and as shown by Douglass' chapter, which deals precisely with the 'conversos', for whom mere conversion was no longer sufficient to avoid persecution and had to demonstrate their purity of blood in order to get a fair trial. In more than one sense, Spain was prototypically modern, but it was so ahead of the time, that is, before mass industrialization.
 - 17 For a detailed critique of this view, see Conversi (1998a, 2000b) which traces its genesis and trajectories from Slobodan Milosevic to Lord Carrington, then on to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and down to Anglo-Saxon academia and public opinion. See also Conversi (1998a), Cordell (2000), Deckers (2000), and Jeffery and Paterson (2000). In general, there is a propensity to stress conflict between European countries and regions, rather than cooperation. More recently the US administration has tried to sabotage the International Court of Justice (ICC) in The Hague.
 - 18 Incidentally, an essentialist approach informs several anti-European trends in the Bush administration, devoted to break apart any further move towards European unification. This notably involves an emphasis on all sorts of ethnic 'hatred', notably in the Balkans. For instance, Macedonian and Greek media and scholars have denounced the US administration connivance with Greater Albanian aspirations in Macedonia, while the flow of weapons and cash between the USA and the major guerrilla group in Macedonia has been well documented (see Joanna Coles 'I will fight for my people', *The Times*, Wednesday, 28 March 2001; and Chris Hedges, 'Albanian War Cry Rises Half a World Away, in Staten Island', *The New York Times*, 19 March 2001). Macedonian public opinion is convinced that the USA are behind homegrown terrorism. In general, there is a US propensity to stress conflict between European countries and regions, rather than cooperation.
 - 19 For France's historical ties with Serbia, see Birke (1960).
 - 20 On Britain's pro-Serbian role, see Conversi (1998b, 2000b) and Simms (2001).
 - 21 As for pro-Russian sentiments in Serbia, Stephen Clissold defined it as *ignorant admiration*. He recalls that during World War II 'Moscow did not . . . lift a finger to help her new ally [Serbia] during the latter's ensuing ordeal [the German invasion], and withdrew recognition from the government of the dismembered state with cynical promptness. Yet when, on 22 June 1941, the Soviet Union was invaded, these things were forgotten in Serbia in an upsurge of popular emotion' (Clissold 1966: 212). On Russian-Serbian relationships, see Mendeloff (1999).
 - 22 Anzulovic's (1999) approach also moves within the parameters of cultural determinism: accordingly, myths of war and revenge (especially the Kosovo myth) have shaped perceptions of interethnic encounters to the extent of influencing political developments and determining the very rise of Milosevic. In other words, Milosevic did not make the myths, rather the myths made Milosevic.
 - 23 On the influence of language maintenance on political choices, see Conversi (1997), Cormack (2000) and Wright (1999). On the relationship between cultural nationalism and political tolerance, see Guerin and Pelletier (2000).
 - 24 This author has followed simultaneously an institutionalist and a culturalist approach, although with a more considerable focus on cultural factors (Conversi 1997). A prominent attempt to emphasize the mutual relationship between institutions and culture in a balanced way, although with no emphasis on ethnicity, is Robert Putnam's work on civic traditions in Italy (see Putnam 1993, particularly Chapter 2 on 'Changing the rules' and Chapter 5 on 'Tracing the roots of the civic community').
 - 25 The term 'bloc' should be intended here in its fully-fledged totalitarian significance, as an Orwellian steam-rolling machine devoted to homogenize culture, freezing it for posterity.
 - 26 Allen Buchanan (1991: 51) points out that German unification can only succeed if

West Germans perceive the enormous transfer of wealth to the Eastern part as redistribution among one people, rather than redistribution to another people: 'The greater the identification of the benefactors with the recipients, the less likely the benefactors are to see themselves as suffering the injustice of discriminatory redistribution.'

- 27 See *The Guardian*, 22 July 1996: 7.
- 28 On the rise of neo-racism in unified Germany, see Ramet (1994).
- 29 On the candlelight demonstrations against xenophobic violence which gradually changed the public mood, see Kinzer (1994).
- 30 For a synthesis, see Barber (1995: 90ff.).
- 31 This has been attempted only in totalitarian regimes such as Iraq, North Korea and China. See Bobson Wong 'China closes 17,000 internet cafes', *Digital Freedom Network*. 21 November 2001. [<http://dfn.org/focus/china/internetcafes-closed.htm>].
- 32 On the political use of the anti-terrorism 'industry', see the landmark study by Zulaika and Douglass (1996).
- 33 A fresh example is Silvio Berlusconi's far-right regime in Italy, supported by US President Bush, which in July 2001 referred to the suppressed anti-globalization demonstrations as backward-looking, acting outside the bonds of rationality, and adverse to the inevitable advance of globalization which would lead the nation to progress – and simultaneously hinted at a 'red' conspiracy to subvert social order and the country's government.

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