

4 Modernity, globalization and nationalism

The age of frenzied boundary-building

Daniele Conversi

Nationalism and modernity both indulge in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rise of new ones. Focusing on nationalism as a boundary-building practice, this chapter argues that it belongs to a broader ideological discourse, identified here as *modernism*, that began to prevail with the onset and expansion of modernity while this pushed towards the disruption of traditional boundaries and the rising of new ones. The chapter also argues that over the last decades these trends have interacted with neo-liberal globalization, processes which also corrode as well as reinforce existing boundaries. Finally, the chapter examines three cases from different modernization stages that have resulted in boundary changes or consolidation, examining the implications of these shifts.

The relationship will be unpacked in the following way: the first section expands on Ernest Gellner's vision of boundaries as associated with the notion of 'congruency'. It observes the way boundaries interact with industrial modernity by producing and reproducing expectations of regularity and homogeneity within societies. This is followed by the identification of specific 'boundary approaches' and then by a discussion of the modernity or antiquity of ethnic boundaries.

The next three sections explore the interaction between state-formed identities and cultural homogenization, first across one of the oldest existing interstate frontiers, the Franco-Spanish one. Having identified modernity as an era of boundary destruction and demarcation through nationalism and cultural homogenization, the chapter goes on to analyse the cumulative effects of cultural homogenization and the reinforced salience of interstate boundaries through the lens of Ciudad Juarez under a regime of neo-liberal globalization. The final section explores the notion of 'natural boundaries' (both ethnic and state) in East Africa, observing their ongoing collapse as a result of the highly destructive impact of climate change. These frontier areas are chosen as symptomatic of the three historical moments they represent: the legacy of the nation state, the effects of neo-liberal globalization and an anticipation of the coming era of climate change. Ethnicity is present throughout these three 'stages', yet nationalism is slowly withdrawn from the chapter's main argument as we pass from the boundaries of modernity to those of globalization and then to climate change's erosion of natural boundaries.

Industrialism, homogenization and the standardization of expectations

Ernest Gellner postulated that nationalism emerges when a standardized ‘high’ culture becomes the all-pervasive requisite of industrialism, at a time when only the state has the power to inculcate the new standard on an uprooted labour force. A scarcely noticed aspect of his explanation was the centrality of boundaries in his controversial notion of ‘congruency’ as a paradigm of modernity and the correlation between state and ethnic boundaries (Mandelbaum 2013). In fact, Gellner argued that nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy ‘requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state . . . should not separate the power-holders from the rest’ (Gellner 2006: 36). Gellner, thus, identifies a double principle of ‘congruency’: first, between state and nation, second, between culture and ethnicity. He argues that ethnic boundaries and state boundaries should overlap in the new world order ushered by the spread of industrial society:

The age of transition to industrialism was bound . . . to be an age of nationalism, a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for the first time, was making itself felt.
(Gellner 2006: 39)

But how far has industrialism, as a broader concept than industrialization and as the organizing category for modern social change, affected human relations and perceptions?

Along its trail of simplifications, industrialism and industrialization have created similar patterns of regularity. A conceptual distinction needs, thus, to be made between industrialism and industrialization: industrialization is the actual and uneven spread of industrial technology and relations of production, whereas industrialism refers to the broader mindset, attitudes and expectations created by industrialization, even in its abeyance and where industrialization did not occur. As industrialism spread and advanced, irregular, lopsided, erratic, complex patterns and multiplicity have been replaced by uniformity in a whole set of areas, from work to law, from food to custom, from leisure to politics, and so on. Each work piece produced by a pre-industrial artisan was uniquely endowed with the artisan’s special touch, which could vary according to the customer’s wishes, the availability of material, the means and the artisan’s personal inclination. An artisan’s products were never exactly the same, but always new and original in their own way. They could hardly be standardized. Likewise, the industrialization of agriculture has led to the cultivation of a limited gamut of standardized crops replacing the erstwhile richness of imperfect forms, shapes and tastes. In industrialized agriculture, field products became very much like those fabricated in a factory from industrial assembly lines of production and much less like those freshly picked up with the tools of

the soil. When visiting rural communities and organizations committed to biological and organic farming, one can find that their products are often much more variable and irregular in form, colour and flavour. This unpredictable variability of non-industrial products can be anathema, or at least an uncomfortable fact, for the industrial mindset – particularly when the ideology of extreme modernism is applied as a system which privileges homogeneity and predictability above varieties of taste and texture. This set of expectations is transmitted into the system of mass consumption. As the industrialized, ‘massified’ customer expects fruits, vegetables, eggs, seeds and other edible produce to be of a predictable form, tang and tint, his reaction to unpredictability and unexpected variety is dominated by anxiety and dislike. Many contemporary consumers find the uneven, imperfect shapes of organic products far from satisfactory.

Thus, industrialization has led to regular expectations of predictability. People born in the industrial age think, imagine, anticipate, suppose, assume and expect differently from people born in the premodern age and see things in a different way and on a different scale and within a different world vision. They experience existence through different lenses, scents, savours and sensations.

The argument here is that the refusal to perceive and tolerate the pre-industrial irregularity of patterns is a primary component of the homogenizing vision often appropriated by nationalists. Images of the nation as an organic, cohesive and homogeneous whole can, thus, be related to the impact of industrialism as a thought pattern, rather than as a technological revolution. Industrialism, as a thought pattern, triumphed first amongst the elites and then amongst the broader population. ‘Nation builders’ and nationalists expect evenness, regularity, congruence and standardization, whereas neither existed in a premodern age dominated by variety and capriciousness. Anthropologists have identified ‘homogenism’ as a prevalent feature in European nationalisms (Harrison 2002: 211–212).

However, Gellner’s grand scheme of nationalism, as an inevitable product of industrialization, seems unable to sense its ultimate consequences on the everyday life of human beings – he rarely touched upon the effects of industrialist ‘thought’ on the daily existence of ordinary people and elites alike. Moreover, Gellner did not speculate about ideology, noting that its impact on nationalism was negligible: nationalism was a self-sustaining political force derived from the uneven impact of industrialization and this did not necessarily need to be articulated by relevant intellectuals in an ideological format.¹ Gellner also failed to mention the impact of ‘supreme coercion’ on national indoctrination through mass militarization and war (Conversi 2007). Thus, both the ideological and the military dimension of modernity were largely lost to his analysis (Conversi 2012).²

Gellner is one amongst various authors who assumed an indissoluble link between industrialization and modernity. Several scholars have criticized this ‘monolithic’ vision of modernity as synonymous with industrialization (Conversi 2007, 2008; O’Leary 2004; Smith 1998, 2009; Tambini 1996). But ‘industrial modernity’ was only one form of modernity. The geographer Peter J. Taylor

identifies three types or stages of modernity: the first one, which he calls ‘mercantile modernity’, was centred in the Netherlands; ‘industrial modernity’ came just afterwards, fanning out from Lancashire to the rest of the world and was followed by ‘consumer modernity’, spearheaded by global Americanization (Taylor 1999). Rather than industrial modernization as a monocausal factor, the stress here is on the notion of ‘multiple modernities’. Such a multiplicity can be expanded geographically, not only chronologically, to encompass the rise of recent challenges to Western-centred visions of modernity in their actual cultural and political application (Kamali 2007; Schmidt 2006).

The concept of modernity is, thus, chronologically and geographically relative. It is also intensively linked to the notion of boundaries: for Jeremy Rifkin (2004), the modern era was born with the ‘enclosure acts’ emanated by the United Kingdom Parliament (c.1750–1860), which bounded open fields and shattered the rights of citizens to access common lands. From then on, the medieval sense of collective responsibility changed and the people began dissociating themselves from the land as a shared resource (indeed, the original ‘commonwealth’). Great swathes of common land were slowly reduced to private property. Enclosures marked the end of the right to land use, particularly the commons, on which a great number of peasants fully depended. That is how the modern proletariat was largely born and formed. Urbanization and the decline of rural culture were, thus, associated with this series of parliamentary acts of confiscation, more than with industrialization per se, since many impoverished and dispossessed peasants had no other option than migrating to the industrial centres. Here they provided cheap labour for a rapidly expanding, all-devouring capitalist class. The birth of early modernity was, thus, associated with a process of annexation and boundary-building. The seizure of territory remained its main scope, involving sweeping expropriation of property from its erstwhile usufructuaries. Since then, the modern era has been characterized by a frenetic rush to seize, resize, bound, enclose and classify, all of which nourished an obsession with boundary-building and, subsequently, cultural homogenization. However, the approach applied here focuses more on the political aspect of the institutionalization of modernity through both ideology and practice.³

Binding the crowd: replaceability and boundary-making

Early twentieth-century social science was obsessed with the goal of ‘binding’ the otherwise boundless crowd (Borch 2012), to truss and shape an incoherent entity into a cohesive whole. This obsession with shaping and binding the crowd informed the bellicist vocation of warmongering agitators, like the founder of futurism, Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944), and the founder of fascism, Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). Both highlighted the function of war in shaping a new militant society and as the most comprehensive tool to achieve such a binding purpose (Conversi 2009). Marinetti had studied ‘crowd psychology’ in Paris under the decisive influence of Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) and this transpires in some articles written in his youth (Conversi 2009).⁴ Incidentally, Le Bon also inspired

Mussolini and other masters of mass propaganda, including Adolf Hitler (Aumerier 2007; Welch 2002) and Edward Bernays (Bendersky 2007; Sproule 1997: 30–31). Furthermore, both Marinetti and Mussolini were directly influenced by Georges Sorel's (1847–1922) appeals to mass emotion and the need for overthrowing legitimately elected governments through the use of violence and direct action.⁵ All these trends could be fully expressed in the context of war, as military tactics were complemented by nationalist ideologies. Overcoming individualism, localism and regionalism, ordinary Italians were compelled to join the fight and seemed to merge into a malleable 'mass' ready to be moulded by conscript armies (Mosse 1975, 1980). Mass media, secular rituals, patriotic symbols and music were all used to 'nationalize the masses' by shaping 'the crowd into a disciplined mass in order to give it direction and maintain control' (Mosse 1993: 2).

All these efforts were predicated on, and resulted in, an unprecedented effort towards boundary construction, as well as boundary destruction. Nationalism was the main underpinning ideology behind all these trends, particularly behind both the cataclysm of the First World War and the advent of fascism in its various forms. The nucleus of the industry-war-nationalism linkage can be found in the concept of replaceability, the idea that, like the interchangeable parts of an assembly line, human items can be replaced as part of an already pre-homogenized whole. Replaceability should be read in contrast with individuality and distinctiveness. It is also radically opposed to concepts like uniqueness, inimitability and exceptionality. Once conceptually 'homogenized', a group or a person became *ipso facto* replaceable. In fact, replaceability was a direct consequence of the practices of cultural homogenization which Gellner attributed to industrialism, but which can be better ascribed to the elites' nationalizing efforts and their wish to 'mould' obedient citizens through militarism and education (Conversi 2008, 2012). In a mass society, great numbers count more than small individuals. Gellner used the term 'modular men' to indicate the new men spawned by industrial society, in such a way that they could be more easily replaced with one another in a mobile job market and through its sequential organization of workers.⁶ But this replaceability touched its climax at the front, where 'modular men' were championed by soldiers, that is, fully replaceable human beings who can immediately be swapped or substituted upon elimination, that is, once hit, killed or maimed by enemy bullets (Conversi 2007). In fact, replaceability as a consequence of 'modernity' was fully tested and implemented on the battlefields of the First World War and other wars, in which millions of men were 'replaced' by other millions upon falling. Unlike unique individuals, homogenized components of the nation can in principle be effortlessly and straightforwardly swapped and substituted.

Boundaries, classifications and domination: from Saïd to Bourdieu

Both nationalism and modernity engaged in practices of classification, definition and delimitation, leading to the simultaneous destruction of old boundaries and the rising of new ones. This boundary-building endeavour transcended nationalism and

belonged to the wider fulcrum of westernizing modernity as this was imposed all over the globe through war and colonialism. Edward Saïd recognized Western modernity's push to simplify, eradicate, replace, render uniform and homogenize people and things, associating the process with imperial Westernization. In Saïd's words, the latter's task was 'to divide, deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight (and out of sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of every generalization an immutable law' (Saïd 1979: 86). But Saïd's discourse-centred approach lay at the antipode of Gellner's anti-linguistic structural functionalism. Moreover, Saïd rarely conceded nationalism as a relevant force and was mostly concerned with unmasking the production and reproduction of domination discourses underpinning the unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Its focus on discourse limited greatly its analytical rigour and his diagnostic capabilities. He also overlooked the linkage between nationalism and modernism as twin, all-encompassing ideological forces, emanating from the West. The approach applied here rather sees nationalism as a supremely binding ideology and as indissociable from modernism (Conversi 2012). At the same time, modernism is understood to be indissociable from compartmentalization and classification and is a boundary-building endeavour.

A similar emphasis could be seen once we transmute from the West's global control of cultural production to the structuration of its own mechanism of inner control, from macro- or state-level mechanisms of control – to micro- or individual-level mechanisms of control. Shifting the focus from empire to class, Pierre Bourdieu observed that:

the laying down of boundaries between the classes is inspired by the strategic aim of 'counting in' or 'being counted in', 'cataloguing' or 'annexing', when it is not the simple recording of a legally guaranteed state of the power relation between the classified groups.

(Bourdieu 1984: 476)

Bourdieu's notion of 'distinction' (Bourdieu 1984) implicitly refers to boundaries: a distinction is itself a boundary between something that is and something that it is not. Deeply related to notions of identity, distinction is simultaneously associated with nationalism and boundary-building endeavours in a modernizing world. A sense of putative distinctiveness lies at the core of national identity and belonging, even though distinction itself can conceal factual resemblance and similarity (Harrison 2002, 2003). Therefore, the task of classification and annexation accompanied the imposition of modernity through boundary-building within the core Western nations, between them and beyond them. Boundaries are, thus, 'artefacts of dominant discursive processes' (Agnew 2008: 175–176).

Boundary approaches across disciplines

Within nationalism studies, I have chosen to identify a broad sub-category that can be referred to as 'boundary approaches' – the term 'boundary theories' being

largely premature (Paasi 2011). These have developed across and beyond disciplinary boundaries, moving from their early anthropological niche to the study of wider social phenomena. In the study of nationalism and ethnopolitics, they have been often reframed in terms of boundary maintenance and boundary creation (Brock 1999, 2001; Conversi 1995; Kolstø 2005; Paasi 2001).

Encountering a fertile terrain in political geography (Agnew 1997; Clayton 2002; Graham 1998; Jones 2004; Paasi 2001, 2004), boundary approaches have expanded into various disciplines. In international relations theory, the 'Minnesota school' has attempted to reconceptualize the discipline's ethno-territorial epistemology through the constructivist notion of 'identities, borders, orders' (the 'IBO triad') (Albert and Brock 2001). The focus on boundaries has influenced the debate on nationalism and identities as part of a wider 'cultural' and 'sociological turn' within international relations (Brock 1999). Sociological theory has more hesitantly embraced these approaches (Shields 2006). Boundaries approaches have also been applied to cultural studies (Manzo 1996), literary critique (Corral 1996) and globalization theory (Short *et al.* 2000).

The focus on boundaries and ethnic conflict has resulted in a proliferation of studies touching on widely different topics. A most promising direction is the relationship between boundaries and violence. Two kinds of boundaries overlap, but usually do not coincide, in most ethnonational conflicts: state boundaries and ethnic boundaries. While the creation of state boundaries can be dated with some chronological precision, the origin of ethnic boundaries remains subject to much speculation. Most state boundaries are very recent, even though the nations they enclose may claim a millennial pedigree. State and ethnic boundaries may overlap, contrast and permeate each other. For instance, the boundary between Britishness and Englishness is sufficiently malleable that the difference between 'English' and 'British' becomes often imperceptible amongst the English, although it may be clearer among the Scots (Canovan 1996: cited in Brown 2000: 168). However, the issue of modernity of ethnic boundaries, as opposed to, or complementary with, state boundaries is more questionable.

Perennialists and ethno-symbolists argue that ethnic boundaries preceded the formation of modern states, either in the form of civilizational aggregates, or as premodern ethnies (Armstrong 1982; Smith 2008, 2009). Situationists, constructivists and transactionalists argue that ethnic boundaries are reinforced through ethnic transactions and interactions (Barth 1969).⁷ Instrumentalists and institutionalists argue that ethnic boundaries and identities are produced by modern elites either as tools or through the institutions they control (Jesse and Williams 2005; Lieberman and Singh 2012). Multilevel process theory sees boundaries as 'the outcome of the classificatory struggles and negotiations between actors situated in a social field' (Wimmer 2008: 970).

These approaches are not necessarily incompatible.⁸ For instance, Armstrong has blended perennial accounts of ethnicity with Barth's focus on the fluidity and situational nature of boundaries. He argued that 'ethnicity is a bundle of shifting interactions rather than a nuclear component of social organisation' (Armstrong 1982: 6).⁹

The age of modernity has been the age of boundary-building and boundary changes. In specific historic periods, boundaries have been conceived as endowed with a fixity embodied in and emboldened by nationalist mythologies and discourses. Yet, they have been under constant attack by interstate competition and, lately, by the forces of globalization. Hence, most of the time they needed to be guarded and defended by large armies of mobilized citizens. From 1816 to 1980 there have been 770 interstate boundary changes worldwide (Goertz and Diehl 1992). Many more have taken place since then, especially after the end of the Cold War. This has resulted in much geopolitical instability, civilian casualties being the precondition, as well as the result, of changed boundaries.

A few boundaries have remained unchanged for several centuries, and their persistence can reveal both the differential impact of modernization and the legacy of cultural homogenization. In the next section, one of the oldest existing interstate borders is held to exemplify the state's lengthy process of 'nation-building', where cultural homogenization has led to a sharp definition of cultural practices and contents across the border. Yet, this line is challenged by ethnic boundaries that span the frontiers and manifest themselves politically through Catalan and Basque nationalisms. By looking at this border region, the following section deals with contemporary boundaries as they partition and divide up different ideas and notions of modernity.

Staticity and contestation in the Pyrenean borderland

The Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659) established the current boundary between France and Spain and is, thus, one of the oldest and longest-standing interstate borders in the world – beside the Portuguese-Spanish border (Spanish, La Raya; Portuguese, A Raia) established in 1267. Peter Sahlins has analysed its long-term effects on popular imagination and culture, mentioning 'the dual appearance of an undisputed boundary line' and an 'accepted opposition of nationalities in the borderland' (Sahlins 1989). This is an ideal context in which to test the hypothesis of state-led agency in practices of cultural homogenization by observing the long-term effects the interstate border on such practices and norms. The relative antiquity of this specific border provides visible evidence of top-down processes of national identity formation through the power of the state over the *longue durée*. As an anthropologist, Sahlins suggests a process of politicization apart from the state, in which local communities autonomously spawn national identity, thus, turning 'the borderlanders into the architects of their own destiny, as well as catalysts in the nation-building process of both France and Spain' (Douglass 1998: 62). However, Sahlins's locally centred approach is far from exhaustive and the full picture must take into account the determining force of state-led nationalism in shaping cultural practices and a shared sense of belonging. For a while, the inhabitants of the French Cerdagne and the Roussillon claimed alternatively French and Spanish nationality in order to evade taxes and military conscription. According to travellers' accounts, people from both sides

of the border continued to share the same language and customs well into the mid-nineteenth century, while cross-border contacts remained conspicuous. However, French government officials succeeded in spreading at the popular level a contempt for both Spanish ‘nationality’ and those ‘amphibious’ characters who claimed alternate citizenship in order to gain more benefits. In the long term, a French identity gained ground being steadily opposed to the Spanish one, despite the persisting cultural similarities which united both sides of the Pyrenees. A continuity of patterns of boundary-building can be observed throughout history, both before and after the advent of the nation state.

For more than a century, state and sub-state nationalisms have competed in the Franco-Spanish borderland, through ‘contested imaginations’ by Basque and Catalan nationalism and despite cross-border cooperation and intrastate integration at the European level (Itçaina 2010). In 1971, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote: ‘How could it be admitted that the Basque nation existed on the other side of the Pyrenees without recognizing the right of “our” (French) Basques to become part of it?’ (Sartre 1971). The opening-up of the Franco-Spanish border in particular after Spain’s entrance into the EU (1986) has had mixed effects (Bray and Keating 2013). The old interstate border has acted as a barrier against the diffusion of sub-state ethnonationalism, but the internal administrative borders of Spain’s Autonomous Communities have also acted in a similar way.

According to most Basque and Catalan nationalists, the interstate boundary cuts across two ‘communities’ sharply separating their homelands: both the *Països Catalans* (lands where the Catalan language is spoken) and *Euskal Herria* (lands where the Basque language is spoken) are divided between the French and Spanish administration. North of the boundary lies Iparralde (Northern Basque Country), corresponding to the Basque portion of the French region of Aquitaine, while Catalunya Nord (Northern Catalonia), also lies in the French area of Roussillon.¹⁰ South of the border lies Hegoalde (Southern Basque Country), including the ‘Foral’ Community of Navarre and the three Provinces of Alava/Araba, Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa and Bizkaia/Vizcaya, forming the Autonomous Community of Euskadi or Basque Autonomous Community (BAC/CAV). Also within Spain lie the rest of the *Països Catalans*, including Catalonia proper (‘the Principat’), the Valencian country (País Valencià), the Balearic Islands (Mallorca/Majorca, Menorca/Minorca, Eivissa/Ibiza, with Formentera) and the Western ‘strip’ of Aragon (la Franja de Ponent or Franja d’Aragó).

The Basque Autonomous Community and Catalonia (‘the Principat’) constitute the bulk of their respective homelands. That is, Basque and Catalan nationalisms mobilize their constituencies overwhelmingly within Spain’s boundaries. The project of bridging the boundary and unifying the two portions of each homeland relies mostly on the vision of nationalist leaders and followers. In practice, the boundary is visibly existent and hard to deny, but there have been a host of initiatives to promote cross-boundary cooperation in a whole set of areas, including higher education and research.

Has the Basque borderland, thus, become ‘more Basque’ after the opening of the Franco-Spanish border with Spain’s entrance into the EU (1986)? Beck

points to the fact that ‘nationalist rhetoric substantially differs from daily cultural experiences and political practice’ and that both the old interstate borders ‘have acted as strong barriers against the diffusion of ethnonationalism’, so that since the opening-up of the border and the rise of cross-border cooperation Basque national integration has been largely confined to the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country in Spain (Mansvelt Beck 2008). However, new forms of local public policy interact with new social movements and the very process of European integration to implement new patterns of transborder cooperation in defence of sub-state languages like Basque and Catalan (Amado-Borthayre 2012).

Arguably, the legacy of state-building and cultural homogenization is more visible than the largely imaginary sub-state nationalist landscapes. Nearly four centuries of state-building on both sides of the Pyrenean frontier have resulted in sharp contrasts and differences in various aspects of social life, culture and the environment. Moving across the borders from and to Spain and France entails a series of eye-striking experiences: from France’s immaculate and ordered town planning to Spain’s urban chaos with its *culto al hormigón* (worship of concrete). The relationship between boundaries, nationhood, institutions and respect for the territory unfolds openly while crossing the border and poses a set of questions that directly bear on the visible continuity of a durable cultural past. The power of the state in moulding the territory’s physical space seems to triumph over the imagination of stateless nationalism. While in France regional towns, villages and cities have been largely preserved in their pristine aspect, within Spain old town centres have been rapidly demolished down to the last popular house in order to make space for politically expedient and bank-financed anonymous, standardized high-rise flats and blocks. Thus, the cultural heritage of entire cities has been shattered by politically maneuvered speculation without encountering visible resistance. The wreckage of a host of smaller urban centres recalls a warlike legacy: as indicative of the reckless devastation, nothing remains of Albacete’s old town centre, except the Cathedral of San Juan, with a fake lateral facade in Romanesque revival style; with its indicative lack of tourism, Albacete has assumed a derogatory status in Spain’s collective unconscious. A character in Manuel Vázquez Montalbán’s novel, *La Rosa de Alejandra*, clearly expresses this feeling as associated with a perverse and destructive notion of progress and modernity:

If you had ever seen the old neighbourhood, there in the upper part, the happy life it had. But nothing is left and you can now see it, that’s progress, Albacete is the New York of La Mancha, or something like that.

(Vázquez Montalbán 1984: 135)¹¹

The nickname ‘New York of La Mancha’ was coined, with a hint of sarcasm, by the novelist and literary critic Azorín (1873–1967).

For centuries, Spanish elites have been obsessed with international rumours about the ‘Black Legend’ (*Leyenda Negra*) portraying a terminally decadent

nation. This obsession often verged on a persecution mania (Villanueva 2011), yet the myth of Spain's destructiveness revives in the forms of self-inflicted devastation brought upon the Spanish territory without discernible opposition. For instance, like many other urban centres in Spain, the ancient city of Zaragoza was subjected to a savage urbanization process which devastated vernacular architecture, leaving intact only a few ancient elites and religious buildings, like the cathedral, the Aljafería Palace (seat of the Cortes, Aragon's regional parliament), the Basilica of Our Lady of the Pillar and its monumental complex along the Ebro River.

This pattern has been replicated with greater or lesser intensity throughout Spain, despite local claims that one's own regional territory has been spared the worst excesses of speculation. In the Basque Country and Navarre, where the impact of mass tourism is limited, town centres appear in slightly better shape, particularly because the inclement weather has dissuaded mass tourism in the area, while the autonomous statutes allowed for some regional control over the territory and its resources without strictly replicating Spain's pattern of wanton destruction. Yet, the legal framework remains the same. This trend has continued unabated and has only been restrained at the interstate boundary. Hence, the panorama is quite different depending on whether one finds oneself on one or the other side of the border.

On the Spanish side of the border, political bribery reaches its peak in the construction and town-planning sectors with town councils rating amongst the most corrupt:

Urban development has been a major source of political corruption in Spain for the last several years. Town council scandals reached news headlines on an almost continuous basis and an ongoing stream of complaints have been filed, not only before the courts of justice, but also the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament and the Ombudsman.

(Mendilow 2012: 122)

Urban deregulation has transformed Spain into a 'criminal hub' with potential global ramifications (Gómez-Céspedes 2012), its roots dating back to the Francoist dictatorship (Heywood 1997) and continuing boldly under the present neo-conservative Popular Party (*Partido Popular*) regime. In the past two decades, the Spanish coast has lost an area equivalent to eight football fields a day (San Román *et al.* 2013). Building-related white-collar crime is so rife that 'the universality of corruption has even opportunistically led rival political parties to buy one another off' (Pradera 2006: 12, cited in Agranoff 2010: 176).

While most Western Europeans have become quite aware about urban speculation, popular attitudes in Spain from north to south, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, have been generally oblivious to the more stringent urban planning rules appropriate for decent housing standards and prevailing in more advanced urban societies (Agranoff 2010: 174–176). As we shall see, popular complacency over urban destruction derives largely from the peculiar way 'modernity'

has been experienced in Spain, at least since the years of fast-lane development under Franco.

The absence, apathy and relative powerlessness of civic society vis-à-vis housing, town planning and the environment is clearly shown by the belated emergence of ‘non-profit’ campaigning organizations for the protection of territory and its historical heritage, similar to the National Trust in the UK (f. 1894), *Italia Nostra* (Our Italy, f. 1955), *Maisons Paysannes de France* (f. 1965) or *Les Vieilles Maisons Françaises* (f. 1958). Their approximate correspondent, *Hispania Nostra*, was only formed in 1976 (Stubbs and Makaš 2011: 97–99) and has shown much less impact over the defence of territory and environment than its European counterparts. Such tardiness can also be seen in the belated development of disciplines like ‘cultural heritage management’ (CHM) and ‘cultural resources management’ (CRM) in Spain. Moreover, Spain only joined UNESCO in 1982, that is, at a very late date in respect to all its European partners, although it has worked hard to catch up by producing its own heritage list in a few years (Stubbs and Makaš 2011: 97). All these delays are clearly visible and strike the eye when crossing the interstate boundary.

The failure to adhere to plain legal and civic norms whenever buying or selling recent constructions contrasts sharply with the normative and esthetical standards prevailing across the Pyrenean border: basic norms like acoustic insulation, safety and energy performance have been routinely ignored during the boom years leaving a legacy of unsuitable buildings endowed with mediocre housing standards, while ordinary Spaniards have been more interested in glamorous kitchens and bathrooms. For a long time, Spain’s estate agents (*inmobiliarias*) have been unwilling to provide regular Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) like those used beyond the Pyrenees since the European Union Directive 2002/91/EC made it mandatory to produce the appropriate certificate before the sale and even the rental of a building. While these certificates are usually displayed in most Western European estate agents’ windows, in Spain a culture imbued with short-termism and inattention to this aspect of the quality of life prevails in the housing sector and is clearly visible in terms of the contrasting aesthetics of the two sides of the Pyrenean borderland.

An estate agent operating on the Spanish side of the border and one on the French side can work with sharply different ethical codes, despite supposedly sharing a common European legal framework. The origins lie in the peculiar way modernity was conceived and imposed upon Spain’s territory at least since the dictatorship, with an apparently unstoppable rush towards ‘non-creative’ destruction of the habitat.¹² Franco’s Spain was amongst the first countries to develop mass tourism as an avenue to quick economic growth through ‘new beach-based, sun-worshipping international package holidays, first by coach, then by air’ (Walton 2013: 483). The regime established, thus, a robust connection between tourism and dictatorship (Pack 2006). During the second phase of Franco’s regime (1959–1975), modernity was broadly associated with concrete-based urban sprawl and estate development. After 1959, the Franco regime decided to concentrate most of its efforts towards mass tourism as a

‘development’ strategy, neglecting other forms of infrastructure like public transport, particularly railways (Bel i Queralt 2010). Facing international ostracism, it focused on tourism as a ‘form of international relations’ and on the construction and built environment industry as the chosen avenue for modernizing Spain – a trend which continued by force of inertia well after over-building and corruption spelled the end of the ‘tourism miracle’ (Pack 2008).

The notion of *desarrollismo*, or ‘developmentalism’, has been used apropos to underline the distortions produced by the Francoist vision of modernity (Black 2010; Saz Campos 2004). This has endured into the new millennium turning into the most serious endogenous factor in plunging Spain’s economy into deep recession. In many cities, like Madrid’s metropolitan area, *desarrollismo* is often linked to social exclusion, establishing unenviable patterns of demographic concentration that still differentiate Spain from the rest of Europe (Palacios 2011).

On each side of the border, a different notion of modernity prevails, revealing a diverging relationship with the territory, the environment, historical heritage and the nation. For most Spaniards, modern housing and living standards are associated with high-rise and concrete flats with scarce consideration for the environmental impact, which is not exactly the case across the border. Decades of cultural homogenization have turned the entire territory under Spanish sovereignty into one of the most urbanistically unregulated in the developed West. These habits are so deeply ingrained that they continue to be condoned in spite of the economic crisis. Although the border has been contested by multiple forces, amongst which sub-state nationalism has emerged with particular strength, this section has underlined the persisting legacy of decades of cultural homogenization leading to shared practices which are only restrained by the interstate border.

Boundaries of globalization: the assault on cosmopolitanism in the neo-liberal city of Ciudad Juárez

The mainstream ‘cosmopolitan globalization’ thesis shared by authors like Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, David Held and Mary Kaldor (Beck and Sznajder 2009) holds that globalization is conceptually contiguous with cosmopolitanism. This thesis has been contested by various approaches, including those associating globalization with Americanization or ‘McDonaldization’ (Ritzer 1996, 2008, 2009). Contrary to the ‘cosmopolitan globalization’ thesis, this chapter considers globalization as the global extension of westernizing modernity, thus, sharply dissociating it from cosmopolitanism (Conversi 2010). Both modernity and globalization bring about simultaneous boundary-rising and boundary deconstruction. For Stephen Castles, the ‘neoliberal dream is dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites; a world of barriers, exploitation, and security controls for the rest’ (Castles 2011b: 311). Neo-liberal globalization is conveyed through the ideology of globalism (Steger 2002, 2005).¹³ This market-oriented ideology can be situated at the opposite spectrum of the cosmopolitan vision, also because it tends to favour competition over cooperation at all levels

of society, politics and culture. Globalism can, thus, be identified as a particular form and aspect of modernism (Conversi 2012).

The iconoclastic effects of modernity and its simultaneous reliance on uniform, standardized visions of society have been described above. Many authors have linked globalization to hybridism, melange, permeability (Croucher 2004: 38–40 and 112–114), openness and other positive features. Yet, globalization deepens and radicalizes previous patterns of replicability and predictability across the whole globe, either in specific forms like McDonaldization's 'iron cage' (Ritzer 1996; Smart 1999),¹⁴ or in more generalized ideological forms like globalism and its 'subsidiary' ideologies (Steger 2002, 2005). Like modernity, globalization both destroys and reinforces existing boundaries. This section explores the dynamics between globalization and recalcitrant neo-statism in the Mexican border city of Ciudad Juárez, where the residual centrality of the nation state interacts with, and has been fragmented by, the forces of neo-liberal globalization.

On 19 September 1993 at midnight, 450 United States Border Patrol agents (USBP) under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), swept along the banks of the Rio Grande River to seal the US–Mexican border from the infiltration of illegal immigrants (Ackleson 1999; Nevins 2010). This act was a prelude to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the USA and Canada (1 January 1994). It highlighted a seeming contradiction between 'free trade' for tax-avoiding megacorporations and blocked mobility for the destitute majorities coming largely from the deruralized south. The booming economy of the *maquiladoras* of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, across the border from El Paso, Texas, testifies to the violent interaction between neo-liberalism and neo-statism, and the contradictions unleashed by the neo-liberal securitization of interstate border areas (Ackleson 1999: 155; Nevins 2010). The *maquiladoras* are assembly plants that process imported raw materials to produce goods for export. These factories and companies largely moved from the USA after 'downsizing' and closing down their original 'mother' plants and branches located in various US states – and sacking thousands of American employees. They catalysed the rapid growth of large metropolitan areas south of the border. While decimating employment north of the boundary (Botz 1992: 172–176), the *maquiladoras* allowed megacorporations the fiscal incentive of a legally protected low-tax, even tax-free, environment. Prosperous, affluent and highly developed, Ciudad Juárez stands out as the quintessential example of the fracture and fissiparousness induced by neo-liberalism. The city became a demographic magnet, turning into 'perhaps the fastest-growing major city in Mexico' (Martínez 2011: 4). The assumed annual growth rate places it amongst the world's top 100 fastest growing urban areas between 2006 and 2020.¹⁵

This economic boom came at a terrible human cost. With over 600 unpunished murders of women and 3,000 missing women since the early 1990s, Ciudad Juárez has witnessed one of the highest rates of female homicides per capita in the world, with the aggravating dimension of extensive use of torture on the bodies of the

victims, mostly workers at the *maquiladoras* (Ganster and Lorey 2008: 180–181). The unpunished murders were accompanied by a binational conspiracy of silence, a near ban by the local and national media oscillating between denial and censorship (De Alba and Guzmán 2010: 5–8). With a few exceptions, this silence was shared by both US and Mexican mass media. According to some authors, the denial indicates an alignment between neo-liberal media and politicians and perhaps a tacit complicity at the local, national and international levels: thus, an ‘alliance of silence’ with Mexico’s ruling elites made possible a cover-up, possibly to deflect the murders’ feared discouraging effects on economic investments (Rodríguez *et al.* 2007: 158–159). Because the victims were lower class women, their elimination could be tacitly tolerated, since the elite of, mostly male, super-rich saw the flow of international capital as a superior value. Replaceability seems to be a factor here, as working women seemed to be easily dispensable, replaceable and deprived of their individuality.

Impressionistic accounts attribute this extreme violence to Mexico’s descent into a feudal narco-state dominated by death squads and criminal cartels, with some speaking of ‘femicide’ as simply stemming from fanaticism (Powell 2012). However, the roots of much of this violence can be found in the cultural and economic disruption brought about by ‘free trade’ and its rigid tenets upheld by a massive security apparatus along the border line (Bowden 2010; Staudt 2011; Swanger 2008). Ciudad Juárez has been identified as ‘the definitive neoliberal city’, postulating a linkage between neo-liberalism and ‘femicide’ (*feminicidio*).¹⁶

The murders took place near the boundary between two of the world’s most neo-liberal countries, the USA and Mexico. Ciudad Juárez also lies at the touching point between two cultural areas undergoing rapid change. In a way, the boundary separates not just two countries, but two continents, as if ‘North America’ could be opposed to Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin America: Samuel P. Huntington went as far as describing Latin America either as a separate civilization or a ‘sub-civilization’ of the West (Huntington 1996: 46–47) and, in his latest book, he precisely advocated the reinforcement of barriers and boundaries between these two cultural areas, lest the tide of cultural hybridization dilute the dominant position of the English-speaking majority in the USA (Huntington 2004).¹⁷ In a further generalization, we can speak of a boundary between two deeply different regions in which only mass consumerism and neo-liberal ideology span the border. In fact, the ‘conspiracy of silence’ about femicide was shared across the border by both US and Mexican mainstream media.

This section has shown a case in which the boundaries between two states reconstituted by neo-liberal globalization have been simultaneously reinforced and debilitated at a severe human cost, highlighted by the torture, rape, mutilation, maiming and murder of hundreds of women. The next section goes beyond the nationalism-globalization dichotomy and takes a cursory look at an area in which ‘natural boundaries’, which have long provided the frontier between both states and ethnic groups, may eventually collapse, after being eroded by the potentially cataclysmic and unpredictable force of climate change – itself a consequence of the extreme exploitation of the environment induced by neo-liberal globalization.

Climate change, boundaries and ethnonational security in East Africa

For a long time before the advent of the modern state, natural obstacles like rivers, streams, deserts, lakes, seas, mountain ranges and other landscape features provided the most commonly accepted and expected nature-given frontiers between communities and polities. Amongst all of them, rivers have constituted perhaps the most popular choice for boundary-makers and enforcers (Donaldson 2009).

The distinction between artificial and ‘natural’ boundaries is not a modern one and has been widely used amongst the ancients. Herodotus maintained that ‘artificial’ (i.e. man-made) boundaries ‘seem less likely to provide a secure basis for lasting, peaceful intercourse’ than natural boundaries, while the latter’s transgression ‘carries undesirable consequences’ (Lateiner 1989: 130). But a proper theory of ‘natural boundaries’ only developed after the Enlightenment (Pounds 1951) slowly merging with French nationalism to justify both nationalist wars and imperial aggrandizement (Pounds 1954). Several natural frontiers were seized and politicized by states, either in core European nations, or in colonial and postcolonial settings. Thus, the flow of the Rhine still demarcates the official frontier between Liechtenstein, Austria, Switzerland, France, Luxembourg and Germany. Colonial and postcolonial boundaries may also rely on rivers, like the Komadugu Yobe between Niger and Nigeria. In many instances, these frontiers have been reinforced by ‘nation-building’ violence, as in the case of the Endeli River between Eritrea and Ethiopia.¹⁸ These are classical cases of ‘riparian boundaries’, largely banks of rivers and streams (from the Latin *ripa*, riverbank).¹⁹ Some of these physiographic features are more stable than others, like the Alps separating Italy from its northern neighbours; the Pyrenees separating Spain from France; or the Caucasus Mountains separating diverse nations and communities.²⁰ Throughout the world, rivers, as well as mountains and seas, still provide the natural frontiers and signposts between communities. Natural boundaries seem to be eternal, yet they are clearly not so, particularly when nature is under attack by the forces of unrestrained, human-made development.

In fact, climate change has begun to affect natural boundaries, including rivers and river basins. For instance, the effect of mass consumption-induced drought can be potentially catastrophic, not only for local economies, but for war and peace at the global level. If a river providing a boundary disappears or changes course, conflict is likely to erupt. In Ethiopia, leaders of the pastoralist Mursi (Mun) Nilotic tribe claim that:

we use the river to communicate with our ancestors. It is our lifeblood. And now it’s disappearing. The river is like a fence for us. If the Omo [River] lowers, the Nyangatom will cross the river into our land. They will fight with us, other tribes too.

(Abramson 2010)²¹

African observers, NGOs, commentators and social scientists point to the foreseeable degeneration of entire regions into ethnic and international warfare (Davis 2010; Exenberger and Pondorfer 2014), which in turn can add up to the flow of refugees accompanying the advancement of global warming and climate instability (Parenti 2011).

A continuous stream of scholarly research has been published on specific aspects of climate change, suggesting ever more pessimistic scenarios. A global consensus has consequently emerged in the scientific community with 97 per cent of world scientists across disciplines now fully agreeing over the man-made origins of global warming and climate change as deriving largely from an unprecedented expansion of human consumption (Cook *et al.* 2013). One effect of climate change identified in the literature includes resource depletion and land encroachment into pastoral zones. For instance, the drainage of the Lula River in the Dolcha Valley, Ethiopia, has led to the emergence of conflict between pastoral and agricultural groups, like the Guji and Burji, turning the river into a site of contention. While the Burji's agricultural economy relies on regular crop cultivation, the pastoral economy heavily depends on how pasture or water resources are managed for the livestock and their seasonal migration (Debelo 2012: 517), clashing with both state officials and agrarian communities over the 'utilisation of pastoral lands'. It is hard to define or trace historical records of priority in settlement or utilisation due to the historical porosity and indefiniteness of administrative borders while 'oral traditions' of each group offer different interpretations of them (Debelo 2012: 530). Competing interests over resources fuel conflicts, which often assume an ethnic dimension.

The effects of climate change cannot stop at any specific boundary as climate change is wholly global and boundless, so its unpredictable effects need to affect every nation, although there are different levels of vulnerability, at least initially. As Jared Diamond envisaged, the ensuing civilizational collapse might hardly be comparable to any historical cataclysm which has ever affected human societies throughout recorded history (Diamond 2005). Among a potentially endless list of irresolvable or hard-to-resolve problems, scholars, observers and policy-makers have indicated the extensive likelihood of ethnic conflict and international war. More recently, genocide scholars have begun to plot the genocidal consequences of climate change (Cromwell *et al.* 2007; Levene *et al.* 2010; Levene and Conversi 2014; Zimmerer 2014). In 2007, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, wrote about the impact of climate change on Darfur's genocidal crisis.²² A report on Sudan by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) indicated the strong relationship between desertification and regional climate change (UNEP 2007). The economist Jeffrey Sachs observed how climate change and drought are exasperating conflicts in war-torn countries like Somalia and Afghanistan.²³ Once boundaries and borders can no longer hold millions of displaced, the fate of entire communities is at stake.

However, the refugees are not causing global warming. On the contrary, those who are closing the gates are almost invariably the perpetrators, rather than the victims. As the problem is largely caused by the most developed nations, one

could expect enormous human pressure towards opening the boundaries sealed by the polluting rich. In fact, the latter have already engineered new strategies to justify the closure of borders. The post-9/11 securitization of space has been used ‘profitably’ to stem the tide of asylum seekers and refugees (Castles 2011a). But the most usual and likely justification has been provided by nationalism, which normally underpins and subsumes the whole notion of ‘national security’ and the securitization of space though continually reinforced boundaries. Xenophobic nationalism can find a fertile terrain particularly in the current vacuum of information. As climate change knows no frontiers and is likely to affect every living being on the planet, it would seem incongruous that inter-group and inter-state boundaries are reinforced, or even maintained. Yet, the principle of territoriality’s endurance is such that it is premature to identify the advent of a new cosmopolitan age. Both ethnic and state boundaries provide a formidable obstacle to the implementation of policies to effectively tackle climate change: indeed, the territoriality of the national state has so far acted as a major obstacle in global climate negotiations (Kythreotis 2012).

Conclusions

I have identified modernity as the age of hectic, ‘frenzied’ boundary-building, because the sea changes brought about by various forces linked to modernity, including industrialization and state centralization, carried with them unprecedented forms of instability. Such volatility broke up and obliterated existing boundaries between communities, classes and states, while continuously demanding the creation of new ones. As a process of simultaneous boundary creation and destruction, modernity was conveyed by the twin ideologies of modernism and nationalism (Conversi 2012): while modernism can be identified as the all-encompassing ideology of modernity, nationalism can in turn be redefined as the avenue through which modernity-seizing elites could mould and shape the contemporary political subject. Nationalism as the ‘carrier’ of westernizing modernity can, thus, be reconceptualized as the most popular and influential form of modernism. Through it, the ideology of modernity could assert itself at the mass level while emerging elites longed for internal legitimacy in a world of aspiring nation states. This chapter has analysed the way boundaries can be conceptualized in relation to modernity and its aftermath, including globalization and the impending climate change crisis.

Distinct sections explore the interaction between state-formed identities, cultural homogenization and modernities along and across boundaries, beginning from one of the oldest existing boundaries, the Franco-Spanish one. The Pyrenean borderland highlights the establishment of two contrasting patterns of modernity spanning the frontier. The chapter expands further on this relationship by addressing the case of the Mexican–US borderland as a quintessential example of the effects of neo-liberal globalization on official state boundaries in the fast developing city of Ciudad Juárez. Finally, the chapter considers climate change’s erosion of nature-giving boundaries and its far-reaching effects on

interethnic relations. Beside modernism, state-building and globalization, climate change will also need to be taken into account for its devastating impact on global instability and conflict through boundary demolition and reinforcement.

All these are linked to the emergence of boundary approaches across disciplines. In all, the centrality of boundaries in processes of radical social, political and environmental change is assessed through three historical crises chosen for their iconic evocation and powerful representativeness of the processes described. These include a terminal crisis of boundaries, which may well turn out to be a terminal crisis for all national communities – and indeed for mankind as a whole.

Notes

- 1 Ellie Kedourie adopted an opposite approach, arguing that nationalism derived from a process of ideological diffusion. However, he partly failed to identify its Jacobin roots and preferred instead to focus on its German origins, as fashionable in the post-war period. Paradoxically, his German-centred vision went as far as absorbing Immanuel Kant's vision of personal self-determination into its aetiology of nationalism (Kedourie 1993).
- 2 This is surprising, considering the work of Eugene Weber and other authors on the centrality of schooling and the military experience (Weber 1976).
- 3 Elsewhere, I have identified the institutionalization of modernity through ideology and practice with the French Revolution and its war-ridden aftermath (Conversi 2012).
- 4 In the wake of the Great Depression, Roosevelt, Mussolini and Hitler unleashed their propaganda armour to impose 'high modernist' solutions to economic stagnation, civilian unrest and unemployment (Schivelbusch 2007: 61, 81). Le Bon's *La psychologie des foules* (1895; English trans. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, 1896) is considered the founding stone of *Massenpsychologie* ('Group Psychology') – and a major influence in Sigmund Freud's work (Le Bon 2006). Le Bon attempted a scientific approach to the problems of mass society and did not obviously recommend mass manipulation; nor could he anticipate the totalitarian appropriation/abuse of his work. His concern for the authoritarian effects of 'massification' included an awareness that compulsory schooling could accelerate both. However, his fatalism led many readers to consider the inevitability of authoritarianism, while he naively offered the detailed descriptions of the tools through which mass manipulation could be achieved.
- 5 In his book on Sorel, Irving Louis Horowitz claims that 'the predominant theme of Italian political realism had always been the psychological power factors in politics and history' (Horowitz 2009).
- 6 Gellner mentioned replaceability within the school system:

the replaceability of individuals within the system by others applies to the educational machine at least as much as to any other segment of society, and perhaps more so. Some very great teachers and researchers may perhaps be unique and irreplaceable, but the average professor and schoolmaster can be replaced from outside the teaching profession with the greatest of ease and often with little, if any, loss.

(Gellner 2006: 35)

- 7 In Smith's description of Barth's work, 'transactions between ascriptive categories, far from fragmenting and dissolving them, reinforce the social boundary between them' (Smith 1998: 186).
- 8 Indeed, perennialist authors have adopted boundary approaches at a very early stage (Armstrong 1982). Boundary theories can also incorporate ethno-symbolism while

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adopting a more instrumentalist viewpoint (Conversi 1995). And, although one can discern a constructivist predisposition in them, boundary approaches cannot be reduced to instrumentalism or modernism.

- 9 For Armstrong, myths are crucial to generate awareness of a 'common fate', by arousing 'intense affect by stressing individuals' solidarity against an alien force, that is, by enhancing the salience of boundary perceptions' (Armstrong 1982: 9). However, ethnicity is subordinated to religion as a boundary-builder and major source of value differentiation, since religion provided the main mythomoteurs (myth-symbol complexes or legitimising constitutive political myths) of ethnic identities (Armstrong 1982: 291). For instance, the Egyptian conquest of Nubia in the second millennium BC led to the construction of otherness beyond and along Egypt's southern frontier through rising ethnic boundaries between 'civilized Egyptians and barbaric foreigners'. However, while texts, monumental art and other sources describe the ethnic 'Other', archaeological evidence shows how intermarriage and mutual cultural influences transcended ethnic boundaries (Smith 2003).
- 10 Moreover, the *Països Catalans* include the Principality of Andorra and the town of *Alghero/L'Alguer* in Sardinia, Italy, where Catalan is also traditionally spoken.
- 11 '*Si usted hubiera visto el barrio antiguo, allí en el Alto de la Villa, la vida alegre que había. Pero no dejaron nada y ahora ya lo ve usted, el progreso, Albacete es el Nueva York de La Mancha, o algo así.*'
- 12 The development began, in less toxic ways, under Primo de Rivera and the Second Republic (Walton 2011).
- 13 Manfred Steger identifies three major forms of globalization: *neo-liberal* globalization, which is by far the hegemonic form, *alter-globalization* (the *No Logo* movement) and *pan-Islamic* globalization (Steger 2005).
- 14 In his celebrated work on *The McDonaldization of Society*, George Ritzer adapted Weber's description of the 'iron cage' of bureaucratization to the standardized, uniform and control-freak spread of new Americanizing models of global retailing, beyond the fast-food industry (Ritzer 1996). More authors have expanded the application of this model to a host of other areas (see Smart 1999).
- 15 'The world's fastest growing cities and urban areas from 2006 to 2020': www.citymayors.com/statistics/urban_growth1.html (accessed 16 June 2014). It ranks third in Mexico after Toluca de Lerdo and Tijuana, another border town affected by similarly grim crime statistics.
- 16 www.stanford.edu/group/MEChA/blog/2010/10/ciudad-juarez-the-definitive-n.html (accessed 16 June 2014).
- 17 Not surprisingly, Huntington advocates the reinforcement of barriers and borders as a means to 're-nationalize' the USA (Huntington 2004).
- 18 An Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was specifically set up to supervise the boundary by reinterpreting Stephen B. Jones's notion of boundary 'demarcation' (Donaldson and Williams 2008).
- 19 Seas, lakes and coastlines can establish broader boundaries, the so-called *littoral boundaries* (from the Italian *litorale*, in turn derived from Latin *littoralis*, 'of, or belonging to, the seashore' from *litus* = 'seashore', as in *Lido*).
- 20 The issue becomes particularly sensitive in the realm of trans-boundary water management, as documented by the International River Boundaries Database's (IRBD) comprehensive datasets about river boundaries and disputes (Donaldson 2009).
- 21 See 'When The Water Ends: Africa's Climate Conflicts', *Yale Environment* 360: http://e360.yale.edu/feature/when_the_water_ends_africas_climate_conflicts/2331/. See transcripts in 'When the Water Ends', *Yale Environment* 360, MediaStorm: <http://mediastorm.com/clients/when-the-water-ends-for-yale360> (accessed March 2013).
- 22 Ban Ki-moon, 'A Climate Culprit In Darfur', *The Washington Post*, 16 June 2007. See also Satti and Castro 2012.

- 23 Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'Land, Water and Conflict. As dry-lands get drier and violence grows, new crises resembling Darfur will arise', *Newsweek*, 7–14 July 2008. Published also under: 'Climate Change and Genocide': www.newsweek.com/climate-change-and-genocide-91185?tid=relatedcl (accessed 27 February 2014). See 'Drugs, Drought and Jihad: Environmental History of the Afghan War' (Parenti 2011: Ch. 9).

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