

This article was downloaded by: [LSE Library]

On: 14 April 2013, At: 05:21

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954  
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,  
UK



## Democratization

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20>

## Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

Daniele Conversi <sup>a b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain

<sup>b</sup> University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Leioa, Spain

Version of record first published: 20 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: Daniele Conversi (2012): Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?, *Democratization*, 19:4, 789-811

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.626947>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

## Majoritarian democracy and globalization versus ethnic diversity?

Daniele Conversi<sup>a,b\*</sup>

<sup>a</sup>IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain; <sup>b</sup>University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Leioa, Spain

(Received March 2011; final version received August 2011)

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In *The Dark Side of Democracy*, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the 'democratic peace' and the 'failed democratization' approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states.

**Keywords:** democracy; nationalism; globalization; majoritarianism; ethnicity; diversity; neoliberalism; populism

### Introduction

During the last decade or so, the very notion and practice of democracy have changed considerably in unanticipated ways. From the early 2000s in particular, democracy as currently practised in many Western societies cannot be said to be the same it was 40 years ago. On the one hand, democratic forms of government have expanded geographically in successive 'waves' of transition. On the other hand, a qualitative deepening or improvement has not accompanied such quantitative expansion. Two main, seemingly contradictory, obstacles to a 'qualitative' expansion of democratization are addressed here: (1) the persistence of

---

\*Email: [dconversi@telefonica.net](mailto:dconversi@telefonica.net)

majoritarian notions of democracy; and (2) the subverting impact of neoliberal policies which have weakened the state's capacity to exert control over its territory – particularly vis-à-vis the power of multinational corporations. It is argued that these two independent forces can eventually reinforce each other, contributing to generate instability, while homogenizing national and cross-national cultures and eroding human rights.

Giant multinational corporations have emerged as new 'sovereign' post-national bodies having in practice worn away the sovereignty of parliaments, while their power has increasingly become difficult to challenge through normal 'checks and balances' procedures. The gargantuan budgets of the largest mega-corporations notoriously dwarf the budgets of most independent states and are certainly 'larger than the economies of many small and medium-sized countries'.<sup>1</sup> Yet, nobody has democratically elected the directors, managers and boards of these financial giants, let alone been able to control their actions, whose consequences can affect the lives of millions. Unaccountability has become the rule amongst the most powerful players of the globalization age. Most decision-making processes involving corporate elites, including those dealing with public money, are shrouded in secrecy, opacity and omissions, and sheltered from public view by lobbying and spinning.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, long-established notions of freedoms and human respect once prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon legal system have been overrun by new legislation approved in the wake of the US-led 'global war on terror' and the Guantánamo extrajudicial detention regime.<sup>3</sup> In several countries, human rights protections have been breached in the name of 'national security'. As Ashis Nandy has cogently observed, 'national security can become disjunctive with people's security and may even establish an inverse relationship with the latter'.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, the democratic credentials of many 'liberal democracies' are rarely questioned, not least because citizens are given an opportunity to 'freely' select their representatives among an array of candidates and political lists – notwithstanding the lingering suspicion that elected incumbents may turn their back on the electorate. As a consequence, scepticism towards current forms of Western democracy has begun to prevail amongst many scholars of politics, as well as the public at large. At the time of writing (Spring 2011) Spain's movement of the *indignados* (the indignant, incensed, outraged ones) became a visible manifestation of the more widespread Western malaise, which I am partly attempting to identify in this article. The clearest targets of the protesters were the unrepresentativeness of party politics and the grip of corporate control, particularly by banks, over ordinary lives.

This article concentrates on two aspects of the current democratic debate as it relates to issues of cultural and ethnic diversity: the majoritarian legacy of the nation-state and the institution-weakening impact of globalization. It first focuses on the relationship between democracy and the nation-state, placing the scholarly debate on democracy and war in this context. It then focuses on the tendency by corporate-controlled governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be particularly weak.

*Majoritarian* democracy, a form of government in which decisions are taken according to the principle of majority rule, is identified as the institutional context where the populist-patriotic drift can degenerate, pulverizing itself into self-destruction. The article argues that the interaction between these two factors, majoritarianism and globalization, contributes to make democracy, and hence democratization, precarious and vulnerable. Moreover, because the nation-state has been an instrument of persistent policies of cultural homogenization, the latter concept should be incorporated in the study of the complex relationship between democracy and diversity.

### Democracy and the nation-state

While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others clearly undermine it. For some authors a democracy firmly entrenched in liberal principles, constitutes the ideal framework in which to carry out multicultural practices.<sup>5</sup> For others, only a properly and previously defined ‘multicultural democracy’ can grant these goals,<sup>6</sup> which can in turn only be attained by ‘denationalizing the state’.<sup>7</sup> But what about those political systems that historically followed the opposite pattern by refusing to recognize internal diversity as a valuable resource? In *The Dark Side of Democracy*, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like forced expulsions, genocide and general acts of murderous ‘cleansing’ tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework.<sup>8</sup> However, Mann’s references to this type of democracy points to the limits of the Western model of the nation-state as a major problem. The nation-state model was spread to several other countries through broader processes of emulative Westernization which far transcended the colonial experience.<sup>9</sup> Citizenship itself remains intrinsically associated with the nation-state. Therefore, ‘despite globalization and the associated development of transnational communities and networks, neither transnational Islamic citizenship (the *umma*) nor regional citizenship (EU) nor any other forms of what might be called post-national citizenship have replaced *national* citizenship; nor is there any indication that such a development might occur in the near future. In other words, *individual* rights and *nation-states* are the typical fundamentals of membership rules and citizenship in individual countries’.<sup>10</sup> As for sub-national citizenships, the shape taken by the nation-state has crucial consequences at all levels of political and social life.

This section questions whether ‘majoritarian democracy’ can be identified as the overarching condition in the recurrence of mass crimes against humanity and diversity. In line with Michael Mann, it is possible to agree that majoritarian democracies, in which minorities have few possibilities of ‘voice’ and even less of ‘exit’, contain the seeds of extreme practices of ethnic discrimination, which can in turn lead to cumulative measures aimed at diversity elimination spiralling out of control. However, the blame cannot be put on democracy per se, but on the peculiar form of democracy which has historically dominated Western state-building. Some scholars have suggested that Mann’s book, ‘The dark side

of *democracy*', should be actually re-titled 'The dark side of the *nation-state*'.<sup>11</sup> That is because the main problem lies within the political framework and historical practice of the homogenizing nation-state, more than specific forms of democracy. In fact, it has long been recognized that part of the problem lies in our unfortunate habit of equating 'democracy' with modern, Western, 'representative, liberal, political democracy as practiced within nation-states'.<sup>12</sup>

The conflictive relationship between democracy and cultural diversity can be explored better by addressing the opposite logic of 'diversity denial'. *Multiculturalism* is the political and social practice based on the recognition, respect and promotion of cultural difference.<sup>13</sup> Its opposite, the concept of *cultural homogenization*, should be intended as the denial of all of the above – and needs to be historicized through its fluctuating relationship with the practices of authoritarianism and democracy. It can be considered as the unintended outcome of various historical contingencies, but it is better understood as the consequence of conscious practices of power centralization. As a refusal–denial–repudiation–negation of knowledge and skills, it initially seems to affect only some groups, but in reality affects society as a whole. It impoverishes human relationships, weakens social resistance and facilitates the consolidation of power elites.

As a conscious and hetero-directed process, cultural homogenization has been historically associated with the development of the modern nation-states system founded on warfare and destabilizing boundary-building and boundary-destruction practices.<sup>14</sup> The modern 'nation-state' has been conventionally conceived as the preserve of a dominant ethnic group or nation, hence the very notion of a 'nation-state' distorts and simplifies a much more complex reality.<sup>15</sup> Historically, the construction of nation-states implied an effort of nation-building, which led to a parallel process of 'nation-destroying'.<sup>16</sup>

### From globalization to scepticism

Until recently, a prevailing dogma in political science was the *democratic peace theory*. It claimed that 'democracies rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war'.<sup>17</sup> The theory became popular during the Cold War, but outlasted its demise.<sup>18</sup> Armed with the slogan 'the ballot replaces the bullet', proponents of the *democratic peace theory* famously contend that liberal democracy promotes greater harmony between nations, so that peace is possible between, and within, democracies.<sup>19</sup>

For some, the whole theory smacked of ideological imperialism and its goal was to 'instil a form of corporate government that reinforces private power against human needs and rights' through 'a triumph of rhetoric over reality'.<sup>20</sup> More significantly, the theory is 'based on fixed definitions of democracy and war and a nation-state ontology of the international'.<sup>21</sup>

In general, till recently, democracy could be considered 'a sacred term, at least in the realm of public discourse, responsible only for good things ... So, anyone

who points out in public the dark side of democracy receives much flak and gets labelled a demo-skeptic'.<sup>22</sup>

However, the theory has by now produced its own backlash. The theory that democracies are never at war and rarely indulge in violence has proved to have too many exceptions. Through 'the normalization of emergency powers', 'the persuasiveness of emergency ethics depends in part on the assumption that emergency situations are rare, exceptional, and temporary, yet in reality temporary emergency measures tend to become part of the normal functioning of the state'.<sup>23</sup> This was clearly seen when most liberal democracies agreed to participate in the 'global war on terror', which gave *carte blanche* to a series of emergency measures destined to be retained as a 'normal' part of the functioning of the political system. In Latin America, the trend favoured a dramatic increase in violence as the 'state-formation process is on a perverse track, in which elites have never abandoned the violence that ultimately protects their interests and acquiesce in state security acts which violently target categories of non-citizens'.<sup>24</sup>

The current critique of democracy needs to be distinguished from previous historical anti-democratic currents intent on devaluing most notions of parliamentary democracy. For instance, at the beginning of the twentieth century Pareto's and Mosca's proto-fascist 'elitism' was overtly anti-democratic. From a conservative viewpoint, Ortega y Gasset analysed the rise of totalitarianism by arguing that 'the accession of the masses to complete social power ... means that actually Europe is suffering from the greatest crisis that can afflict peoples, nations and civilization'.<sup>25</sup> From a longer historical perspective, anti-democratic traditions can be traced back to their Jacobin roots as 'anti-democracy' has waxed and waned in accordance with corresponding notions of legitimacy, authority and representativeness.<sup>26</sup>

Contemporary scepticism about liberal democracy is rather linked to the concern that, mostly due to globalization, Westernization and corporate control of elected institutions, democracy is being perceived as an empty shell. The perception that key decisions are increasingly taken outside the democratic arena is often reflected through political disillusion, apathy and electoral abstention at the popular level. Fittingly, the notion that we are entering a post-democratic age has gained currency.<sup>27</sup> Colin Crouch argues that in a post-democracy government slips away from popular control into the hands of unaccountable corporate interests. As the power of big business and multinational corporations remains unchallenged, citizens risk being turned into mere customers. Globalizing neoliberalism has eroded the very notions of democracy and popular sovereignty, particularly through the media.<sup>28</sup>

Free elections and voting cannot provide a political panacea, as manipulative elites are ready to cynically externalize internal tensions through diversionary war and destructive developmental projects. Instead of exporting election-based forms of democracy, Snyder contends, one should privilege institution-building, a free press and other instruments that can enhance the rule of law and good administration.<sup>29</sup>

One can add that in some countries traditional liberal institutions freed from electoral constraints have proved themselves to be formidable bulwarks for the protection of individual rights: for instance, as the court of last resort until 2009, in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords had adopted a series of measures aimed at defending personal freedoms and human rights from government intrusion.<sup>30</sup> The House of Lords' recent record as a bulwark of liberal institutions is reflected in a 'general support for the ways in which the Lords perform their functions of acting as constitutional watchdogs, scrutinizing bills and draft bills, holding government to account, and providing a forum for the examination of matters of public interest'.<sup>31</sup>

Most important, hasty transitions to free market democracy can lead to destabilization, while specific countries have been required to introduce wholesale market reforms at breakneck speed.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the key prerequisite for tackling the destabilizing effects of free-market globalization is institution-building: political and economic reforms should only be introduced once pluralistic institutions are consolidated. The opening up of political spaces during transitions to democracy fosters 'elite competition, which cannot be regulated by weak political institutions and therefore may cause civil war'.<sup>33</sup> This brings us to a set of more specific considerations on how, and which type of, democracy is introduced in countries previously ruled by autocracies.

### **Failed democratization or failed democracy?**

Although Mann, like myself, builds his argument around the limitations of ethnic-majoritarian democracy, it is worth considering a more widely accepted view. This focuses on the pitfalls of *democratization*, rather than democracy per se. The 'failed democratization approach' argues that it is not democracy in general that fails to keep the peace, but rather the specific way in which a country democratizes. In fact, transitions to democracy can occur in such a way that they entrench ethno-political antagonisms. Members of the economic, intellectual and political elites, who see their position challenged, tend simultaneously to appropriate the mechanisms of formal democracy and resist democratic change. For Snyder, 'democratization produces nationalism when powerful groups within the nation not only need to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development . . . but they also want to avoid surrendering real political authority to the average citizen'.<sup>34</sup> In this way, new authoritarian figures exploit the weaknesses of the democratic system via populism, ethnic nationalism and, often, externalization or 'diversionary war'.<sup>35</sup> On an even more sombre note, Paul Collier argues that imposing Western-style elections in 'dangerous' conflict-prone areas without a prior system of checks and balances is likely to result in protracted 'civil wars, military coups, and failing economies'.<sup>36</sup> During transitions to democracy, semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian (*anocratic*) countries become 'more war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states'.<sup>37</sup> Most of these authors argue that institution-building needs to be a previous step to popular suffrage and elections.



But which institutions should be most appropriate to ensure a thriving and plural democratic environment? Very often institution-building implies the construction of a political–legal and constitutional framework in which minority rights are enshrined. In practice, this means that the principle of majority rule would often need to be discarded in order to build non-majoritarian (consociational, federal, autonomous) institutions.<sup>38</sup>

Eventually, Mansfield and Snyder stretched their argument as far as proposing withholding democracy from countries which are not ‘ripe’ for it: in a *Foreign Affairs* article, they openly argued that pushing Russia and China towards democracy may actually bring war at an early stage.<sup>39</sup> Without a critique of globalization’s weakening effects on political institutions, this sort of advice seems to echo neoliberal requests of selective anti-democratic spaces where multinational corporations allied with powerful *apparatchiki* can dictate the rules of the game. However, ‘reversing the process of democratization, once it has begun, will not reduce this risk’.<sup>40</sup> This sentence clearly indicates that the problem is with transitions in general, either in the form of democratization or de-democratization. Democratizing and de-democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than either ‘mature’ (stable) democracies or (stable) autocracies.

In an attempt to address some criticism,<sup>41</sup> Snyder introduces the notion of ‘incomplete democratization’ as it relates to the outbreak of military disputes: ‘Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an *incomplete* democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or *anocratic*) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions’.<sup>42</sup> This implicitly assumes that there may be something like a *complete* ‘democratization’, or a series of really existing, in-this-world standards against which political outcomes are to be measured. And we may safely assume that these standards are supposed to reside in some Western countries, possibly Europe or the United States.<sup>43</sup>

This article argues otherwise: if democratization compels leaders to be more dependent on securing popular support, it is because the implementation of democracy itself depends on majority decisions or, at least, on sizeable popular support. During transitions, this underlying structural condition is brought to the surface and proto-nationalist elites are likely to experience a ‘security dilemma’, particularly likely to occur since ‘what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure’.<sup>44</sup> Most ‘security dilemmas’ do not emerge out of the blue, but are rather the effect of generalized patterns of governance deeply entrenched in the Western nation-state system, which incentivizes the conditions for a persisting sense of insecurity among both minorities and majorities. This can eventually persist even after the majoritarian model is firmly discarded.<sup>45</sup>

Majoritarian principles have been invoked by dominant Irish Protestants and Sri Lanka Sinhalese to denounce their Catholic and Tamil minority counterparts.<sup>46</sup> But these are not usually classified as cases of transitions to democracy or ‘incomplete democratization’. More arguably, Mann mentions the Rwandan genocide as



taking place overtly within an established Western-inspired majoritarian democracy framework.<sup>47</sup>

Mann also agrees that democratizing countries are more prone to war. Citing and perhaps oversimplifying Snyder's point, he argues that authoritarian regimes are 'better at damping down ethnic tensions than democracies unless democracies are already securely institutionalized'.<sup>48</sup> That is, the stress is again placed on democracy as a whole, rather than just democratization.

Can one read into this a defence of authoritarianism? Most probably not, but, as I have stressed, the problems lies with the prevalent notions of democracy extensively mirroring a majoritarian framework, even as liberal political institutions become increasingly fragile in a globalizing age.

In short, most of the proponents of the 'failed democratization approach' offer important insights into the causes and consequences of actual processes of transition to, and from, democracy. However, the underlying idea is that 'core democracies' can show the way by providing examples to emulate. Thus, once the necessary liberal institution-building measures have been established and successfully managed, liberal democracy is still exportable 'from the West to the rest'.<sup>49</sup>

My argument is that these structural weaknesses are exalted in a globalizing world order: neoliberal pressures to 'open up', destabilize and eventually destroy local markets rarely encourage institution-building through the adoption of consensual or consociational models. For Luis Moreno and André Lecours, the relationship between democracy and national state identities has become problematic as the latter are 'corroded by the forces of globalization' thus becoming 'subject to fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature'.<sup>50</sup> Amy Chua goes further, arguing that the adoption of free-market democracy induced by neoliberal globalization directly leads to ethnic conflict and mass murder.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, because democracy is conceived within a Western nation-states system that works as a model for incumbent elites, an exclusivist definition or re-definition of the *demos* into *ethnos* is always looming as a menace. Ethnocracy is thus associated with the Western nation-state system and, eventually, with organic, exclusionary '*nation-statism*'.<sup>52</sup>

In short, the idea of 'failed democratization' makes more sense insofar as the context where the democratic model to which one aspires has already 'failed' by lacking the necessary flexibility to accommodate ethnic and cultural diversity. Even though the classical nation-state model appears to have been discarded, this happens a time when the more powerful and unpredictable forces of globalization appear to be beyond the control of both political elites and ordinary citizens. In fact, liberal democracy rather than mitigating the recourse to political violence, can facilitate its appeal among 'those groups which construct their identities in ways incompatible with its core principles (e.g., individual egoism or free market economics)'.<sup>53</sup>

Mann also condemns the 'liberal' belief that, 'if the people's will is freely expressed, it will be pacific'<sup>54</sup> – although it is not clear why this should be seen as an aspect of liberalism. Many of the authors discussed above argue that,

coupled with neoliberal globalization, mass democracy can imperil multi-ethnic coexistence.

One possible limit is that many scholars tend to adopt a ‘condensed’ view of democracy merging democracy and *majoritarianism* as part of a single political-institutional package.<sup>55</sup> However, the latter is simply a practice of governance based on majority rule, where the dominant group is granted some form of primacy in the decision-making process, most often supported by universal suffrage.<sup>56</sup>

The recurring conceptual overlap between democracy and economic-cultural neoliberalism ignores the existing possibility that the two may be incompatible. This confusion shows that there is still a deep disagreement regarding the role played by democracy, especially when accompanied by neoliberalism.

### Votes and bullets

Mann’s stress is partly placed upon the negative role of electoral or representative democracy, while underlining the perverse effects of ‘liberal democracy’.

In general, the practice of electoral democracy needs to be distinguished from the very principle of liberalism, which centres its political appeal on the protection of individual freedoms against authoritarianism. Yet, in this vein, the critique of authoritarianism should include what Alexis de Tocqueville identified as the ‘tyranny of the majority’.<sup>57</sup> On Tocqueville’s footsteps, John Stuart Mill also feared that democracy would lead to the ‘tyranny of a majority’, to an uneducated mass taking over power from wise and educated leaders.<sup>58</sup> In the case of artificially triggered ‘communal’ conflicts, the self-hypnotizing power of lynching crowds can degenerate into ‘mob rule’ (mobocracy), *mobile vulgus* and *ochlocracy*. Many European liberals thought that the seizure of power by the masses would lead to the perversion of liberty. This is particularly the case as liberalism promotes a set of principles in defence of individual rights against encroaching state intrusion. Neither majoritarianism nor ‘free market’ democracy are exactly central to a standard ‘liberal’ line,<sup>59</sup> and this proves that the adjectives ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ can be easily divorced. Indeed, the distinction between *democratization* and *liberalization* has long been acknowledged in the ‘transitology’ literature.<sup>60</sup> A regime can ‘open up’ to market forces, while maintaining its authoritarian grip on society and even totalitarian rule – as with Franco’s Spain and contemporary China, respectively.

Representative democracy as legitimated mostly by electoral turnouts is bound to intensify ethnic cleavages, particularly in crucial times of transition from authoritarian rule.<sup>61</sup> Yet, even in such firmly established democracies as India and its neighbours ethnic violence has long been experienced in conjunction with electoral turnovers. Tambiah describes the *routinization* and *ritualization* of collective violence as consistently associated with the staging of electoral campaigns in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.<sup>62</sup>

We know that democracy can be defined by a variety of parameters, of which popular suffrage is often the most invoked. Moreover, elections, whether free or

constrained, can hardly be conceived without referring to mass manipulation, particularly in a rapidly globalizing and media-dominated world.<sup>63</sup>

Democracy as a process cannot be fulfilled by obtaining universal suffrage. It must continuously 'expand' into pluralistic deepening, by encompassing and enshrining the protection of minorities and their participation in all decision-making that affects them. For most liberals, this is a matter of quality, rather than quantity: the extension of suffrage is meaningless if the practice of individual freedom is not simultaneously expanded through individually protective institutions. For Norberto Bobbio, the main criterion for democracy is 'an increase, not in the number of those who have the right to participate in making the decisions which concern them, but in the number of contexts or spaces in which they can exercise this right'.<sup>64</sup> Thus, the electoral-voting context is simply the beginning of an expanding process of inclusion in the decision-making process at all levels.

But 'people's power', the idea that people ought to 'rule themselves', will remain an empty concept in a cultural environment which does not favour or prize diversity and cultural encounter. Such a limited notion of democracy has led to endless boundary-building practices legitimated by the principle of 'popular sovereignty', according to which 'people' should be governed by laws and rules set by themselves, or by the leaders they have chosen.

This limited, homogeneous form of democracy is 'majoritarian democracy'. It is different from a deep-reaching democracy enshrining multiculturalism and the protection of minority rights. Moreover, the homogenizing pattern, originating in continental Europe, has expanded across frontiers in successive waves.<sup>65</sup> Comparative studies of ethnic cleansing show how perpetrators have undergone various degrees of Westernization, absorbing strictly majoritarian, indeed plebiscitarian approaches to politics: from Pol Pot's Parisian upbringing to Kemal Ataturk's infatuation with the West. Most extremist leaders aspired to attain Western-style 'modernity' within a very short time span, certainly less than a generation. But it was the Eastward spread of the 'nation-state' model, rather than 'democracy', which endowed new elites with an unprecedented power to exterminate their rivals, competitors and innocent bystanders alike. For instance, in the pursuit of nation-building and fast-track Westernization, during the First World War Turkish nationalist elites exterminated over a million Christian citizens,<sup>66</sup> who had been hitherto protected by the more pluralist *millet* system inspired by Islamic principles.<sup>67</sup>

My goal is rather to express a deeper perplexity about many inherited forms of majority rule, relating them both to the historical emulative legacy of the Western nation-state and to the current weakening of this system by the overwhelming forces of neoliberal globalization. On the other hand, stateless nations can assert their power vis-à-vis their 'host' nation-states insofar as the latter's majoritarian shape keeps casting its long shadow.

So far, I have explored the legacy of the majoritarian nation-state framework and its influence upon current perceptions of security, which inevitably surface during times of transition. Next I analyse a new set of challenges, which paradoxically derive from the slow demise of that previous homogenizing model.

### From globalization to populism

In several respects, corporate globalization and neoliberalism have led to the weakening of the existing post-Westphalian international system and the de-legitimation of the modern nation-state.<sup>68</sup> Many European countries have been deeply shaken by corporate globalization, but their governments' reactions have been divergent. Some state elites have aggressively promoted neoliberal globalization, yet found themselves under threat and reacted by engaging in 'compensatory' patriotic rhetoric. Elsewhere, as in South Africa, 'neo-liberal restructuring of the economy is combined with an increasing willingness by government to assert its authority [and] to marginalize and delegitimize those critical of its abandonment of inclusive governance'.<sup>69</sup> More limited forms of democracy do not need to suppress political activity insofar as they can transform it 'into a set of technocratic processes and ideologies intended to narrow the scope and nature of contestation'.<sup>70</sup> A few 'strong' leaders, like Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, France's Nicolas Sarkozy and Hungary's Viktor Orbán,<sup>71</sup> personify a recurrent contradictory relationship with neoliberal globalization. They have been able to display a democratic façade through *populism* while viewing electoral turnouts as a green light to treat the state as their own private asset.<sup>72</sup> Berlusconi and Sarkozy have adopted different degrees of semi-authoritarian rule underpinned by electorally confirmed populist patriotism to 'fence' the state against the manufactured threat of diverse others – Gypsies, Muslims, East Europeans, Africans, refugees, and so on – chosen as scapegoats after neoliberal policies had weakened the state and the local economy.<sup>73</sup>

By selling state assets and empowering his private empire, the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi has emphasized a sort of neoliberal populism and Italian 'plastic' patriotism while engaging with Northern ethnic separatism – although the two are largely incompatible. The term *videocracy*<sup>74</sup> best illustrates a cultural–political system which allows an overall control of nearly 90% of Italian media,<sup>75</sup> with repeated attempts to introduce broader censorship practices.

Through media control a few tycoons have acted as vectors of far-reaching changes, contributing to the demise of democracy as we know it.<sup>76</sup> The advent of television is crucial in explaining the deterioration of democracy, as it has often transformed a reading public into a watching public within the time span of a generation: 'Robust democracy requires strong literacy' which is 'far superior to television as a means of acquiring information for successful citizenship'.<sup>77</sup>

In Italy, 'rule by the screen' has easily enabled playing the card of xenophobic patriotism just as the premiership was engulfed by massive scandals. Berlusconi remarked that 'there is something divine in having been chosen by the people'.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, France's Nicolas Sarkozy, often referred to as 'the most pro-American president in French history',<sup>79</sup> has used his 'divine mandate' to engage in populist measures through xenophobic outbursts and media manipulation. Both leaders share an enviable 'expertise in political marketing and news management'.<sup>80</sup>

In many countries, as in Latin America, populists typically expanded the franchise while technically working within representative democracy, yet they did so

by devaluing civil rights and liberal notions of pluralism.<sup>81</sup> With its emphasis on homogeneous, organic communities led and represented by a charismatic leader, populism becomes particularly inimical to cultural diversity and, generally, culture. A clash between cultural diversity and populist forms of democracy is therefore inevitable. In fact, populism should be interpreted as a particular insidious variety of majoritarian democracy for its reliance on the *vox populi vox dei* principle. Majoritarian democracy is ‘directly associated with an “unchecked majority”, that is, a “populist” regime – in the end, the breakdown of the rule of law’.<sup>82</sup> On the other hand, some forms of ‘plebiscitary democracy’ emphasizing local referendums, initiatives and recalls, *may* combine with respect for cultural and ethnic diversity. ‘Direct democracy’, often associated with plebiscitary and populist democracy, is not in itself inimical to diversity. It can combine in alliances with various ethnically and culturally motivated groups and movements.<sup>83</sup> It can even contribute to enhance previously recognized linguistic pluralism, as in Switzerland.<sup>84</sup> However, in more homogenizing socio-political systems, such as the United States, cultural diversity can hardly benefit from a political discourse which treats the nation as an organic community.<sup>85</sup>

In a world highly influenced by the corporate media, democracy as based on free elections increasingly results in the establishment of populist rule and authoritarian governments. Paradoxically, governments have simultaneously more technological capacity to intrude into their citizens’ private lives and less capacity to legitimately rule over their subjects, unless they fully ‘rein in’ the media. In particular, governments are utterly unable to check the invisible power of corporate forces from which they often depend for their political survival. By the end of the millennium, it was clear that ‘governments . . . have been losing their capacity to control the economic and cultural life of the territories vulnerable to their authority, but additionally now often seem eager to shed some of their traditional responsibilities in the name of the allegedly superior efficiencies of the globalizing marketplace’.<sup>86</sup> After 2000–2001, the process of neoliberal globalization deepened through financialization, that is, the reduction of exchanged value into a mere financial instrument.<sup>87</sup>

The financial crisis, arguably caused by the excesses of economic globalization, has led to further neoliberal globalization and revealed more and more the state’s impotence to regulate financial markets and challenge corporate perversion of democracy.<sup>88</sup> Thus, many who ‘had great hope that the major economic and financial crisis would lead to profound changes in the system, . . . were soon disillusioned’.<sup>89</sup>

Before the age of neoliberalism, in 1974, it was still possible to assert: ‘There is little to suggest that governments have been unable to control corporations whenever politically they have wished to do so’.<sup>90</sup> Today such a statement would look utterly incomprehensible. Banks and other corporate agencies, which have both fostered globalization<sup>91</sup> and then played a key role in the collapse of the global economy, have been generously supported and re-financed by various governments.<sup>92</sup> Common citizens, particularly the rapidly expanding poor, bore the

brunt of these massive transfers of money from the state to private enterprises.<sup>93</sup> I have linked these dramatic changes, whose full destructive impact is still indiscernible from the promontory of the present time, to the simultaneous legacy of globalization and of past notions of democracy as materialized in the nation-state and its majoritarian shape.

### Conclusion

Two forms of democracy are particularly adverse and inimical to cultural diversity: majoritarian democracy, as derived from the erstwhile European nation-state models, and neoliberal democracy, as derived from US-led globalization. Whereas the modern nation-state provided the matrix for extreme policies of diversity destruction legitimated by majority rule, neoliberal democracy is unable to defend citizens from being turned into rightless consumers. The two can, of course, intermingle, generating even greater forms of instability and homogenization.

In this article, I have taken into account the growing literature on democratization and war/ethnic violence, while developing my own argument on the weaknesses of the majoritarian system, particularly evinced in an age of globalization. Although the argument about the necessity to reinforce institution-building is a valid one, I have highlighted broader systemic problems, partly inherited by the past, partly stemming from present circumstances.

Private corporations are now able to control the life of citizens of entire nations, either directly (through food, entertainment industry, and so on) or indirectly (by corrupting elected governments, acting through lobbies, changing the law and influencing legislation). The result can be the de-legitimation of existing institutions, not merely the incumbent political elites. In order to compensate for the loss of inherent authority, the latter often recur to populism, nationalism and xenophobia, just at a time when cultural diversity becomes again under threat. Moreover, at least in the West, globalization has begun to corrode the very basis of civil society, as evinced by such disparate phenomena as the 2011 London riots or the advent of 'videocracy' in Italy. Growing mistrust, political negativity, unhappiness and mounting depression have become the hallmark of the most affluent neoliberal democracies, leading to a 'declining marginal utility of income to produce happiness'.<sup>94</sup>

The idea of 'incomplete democratization' is more problematic as it assumes Western democracies are 'complete' or fully working. This view fails to take into account the shifting nature of 'core' democracies, to which nevertheless one implicitly or explicitly refers.

Indigenous democratic institutions are continuously being reshaped by new challenges and are often unable to respond to existing needs, apparently defenceless when faced by the onslaught of corporate power.

The heyday of the centralizing nation-state was characterized by persistent policies aimed at homogenizing and streamlining its internal space. Therefore, the concept of 'cultural homogenization' needs to be incorporated into the study of



the relationship between democracy and ethnic diversity.<sup>95</sup> Although the time of the homogenizing nation-state may have passed, its memory tends to last just until new trends towards cultural homogenization operate at a global level, at a time when the very practice of democracy has undergone important changes. Thus, cultural homogenization, previously tied to Western processes of state building, has become a problem beyond the nation-state, as it is increasingly linked to globalization.

It is also apparent that, when unrestrained neoliberal globalization meets with ultra-nationalism, the conditions become ripe for wider waves of mass violence, human suffering, insecurity and instability.<sup>96</sup> In my view, globalization and nationalism are the two broader forces which need to be simultaneously tackled and tamed through the reinforcement of civic and secular supra-ethnic institutions. These need to be able to rein in the power of mega-corporations and secure the maintenance of truly free mass media, beyond the Internet. The two forces, globalization and nationalism, become particularly pernicious when they act in symbiosis, mutually reinforcing each other.

In particular, the article has argued that not all forms of democracy are conducive to a respect for cultural diversity. Therefore, to assume that democracy automatically entails the glorification of diversity can lead to self-delusion. This engages with Michael Mann's work, arguing that the relationship between democracy and cultural diversity needs to be explored through the opposite logic of 'diversity denial'. The distant goal is to historicize the concept of cultural homogenization in relation to the practices of authoritarianism and democracy during the age of the nation-state. In line with Mann's argument, I have shown that majoritarian democracy is not an ideal condition for the respect of ethnic minorities and cultural diversity. Rather the contrary, it can be a container and stimulant of undesired eliminationist practices, including genocide and various crimes against humanity. However, rather than adopting a fully-fledged 'demo-skeptic' approach,<sup>97</sup> the article has focused on the patterns inherited by the Western nation-state model, which the West has exported throughout the *ecumene* thanks to colonialism, modernism and globalization. In line with Mann's argument, extremist patriotism and ethnic cleansing can arguably find their roots in the way the modern state is still conceived.

Sustaining cultural diversity would normally encourage national integrity by rendering institutions more flexible and responsive, unless 'integrity' is conceived in highly rigid, monistic terms. However, the article also argues that majoritarian forms of democracy present a great obstacle to this pluralist vision as they can too easily turn into populist rule, which is in itself an intrinsic threat to vulnerable ethnic, class and cultural minorities.

### Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Professors Stuart J. Kaufman (University of Delaware) and John K. Walton (University of the Basque Country) for providing much valuable advice and helpful



discussions, as well as the anonymous referees who have inspired several paragraphs of this article. Work partly supported by Grant no. AE-2010-1-23 (*Convocatoria 2010 de ayudas para Acciones Especiales de investigación, Dpto. de Educación, Universidades e Investigación del Gobierno Vasco*).

## Notes

1. Miller, *International Political Economy*, 145–9.
2. Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World*.
3. Bowring, *The Degradation of the International Legal Order?*; Brooke, *The Silent State*; McEldowney, 'Political Security and Democratic Rights'.
4. Nandy, 'Culture, State, and the Rediscovery of Indian Politics', 265.
5. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.
6. Van den Berghe, 'Multicultural Democracy'.
7. Van den Berghe, 'Denationalizing the State'.
8. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*.
9. Badie, *The Imported State*; La Branche, 'Abuse and Westernization'.
10. Haynes, 'Conclusion', 1286, italics in the original.
11. Semelin, 'Taking Mann Seriously?'.
12. Schmitter, 'Democracy's Future', 15–16.
13. The multicultural school has successfully explored the implications of minority rights denial from a perspective of political philosophy. See Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.
14. Goetze and Guzina, 'Statebuilding and Nationbuilding'; Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.
15. Connor, *Ethnonationalism*; Nimni, 'Stateless Nations in a World of Nation States'; Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*.
16. Connor, *Ethnonationalism*; Van den Berghe, *State Violence and Ethnicity*; Van den Berghe, 'The Modern State'.
17. Rosato, 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory', 585.
18. See Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets*. This has elsewhere been identified as 'the most powerful liberal contribution to the debate on the causes of war and peace' (Rosato, 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory', 585).
19. In genocide studies, a similar consensus claimed that genocides can only occur under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, hence their emergence in democratic states is excluded. For Rummel, probably the most 'hard-line' neoliberal scholar within the field of genocide studies, democracies are the antithesis of genocide; Rummel, 'Death by Government'. However, how to explain various historical cases in which democracy turned to authoritarianism, totalitarianism and even genocide, from the rise of Nazism to the Rwanda and Bosnia genocide? These disprove the very notion of 'democratic peace', particularly if applied within the field of genocide studies. There is also a clear danger that proponents of this theory will adopt a definition of 'democracy' that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy by excluding all the inconvenient cases (my thanks to John K. Walton for this observation).
20. Wilkin, 'Revising the Democratic Revolution', 655, 657.
21. Barkawi and Laffey, *Democracy, Liberalism, and War*, 2.
22. Mann, 'Reply', 292.
23. Ramsay, 'Liberal Democratic Politics as a Form of Violence', 244.
24. Pearce, 'Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America', 301.
25. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 11 (cited in Dobson, *An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset*).
26. Femia, *Against the Masses*.

27. Balakrishnan, 'The Oracle of Post-Democracy'; Burton-Cartledge, 'Post-Democracy'; Crouch, *Post-Democracy*.
28. Conversi, 'The Limits of Cultural Globalisation?'.
29. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*.
30. Clapham, *Human Rights in the Private Sphere*, 61–2; Wilson, *Human Rights in the 'War on Terror'*, 5, 301.
31. Oliver, 'The "Modernization" of the United Kingdom Parliament?', 256. However, these functions ceased to exist in 2009, following the adoption of a US-style Supreme Court as part of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 passed under Tony Blair's rule without any form of popular consultation. Part of a wave of sweeping Americanization under New Labour, this debacle has often been considered an unprecedented historical setback for British sovereignty. See Frances Gibb, 'Supreme Court Opens as Fears Raised of US-style Selection of Judges', *The Times*, October 1, 2009, <http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/articleK6855925.ece#>.
32. Paris, *At War's End*.
33. Cederman et al., 'Democratization and War in Political Science'.
34. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence*, 32.
35. Gleditsch et al., 'Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad'.
36. Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes*. However, neoliberal policies also tend to promote further corruption in vulnerable countries. Neoliberal globalization does not usually provide a context conducive to observing the rule of law while building trust and functioning institutions. On the other hand, focusing on extreme cases of unstable, development-thirsty countries cannot offer a complete picture of the more global crisis of the democratic process in several established democracies.
37. Mansfield and Snyder, 'Democratization and War', 79.
38. This discussion would be incomplete without a few references to consociationalism, which entails a clear rejection of majoritarian democracy. Following the milestone work of Arend Lijphart (see Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* and 'Non-Majoritarian Democracy'), there is an extensive body of literature extolling the virtue of 'consociational democracy' in clear opposition to majoritarian democracy. Long-term stability in deeply divided societies characterized by ethnic segmentation is seen as a consequence of non-majoritarian institution-building endowed with non-majoritarian mechanisms for conflict resolution. Moreover, among many examples, Switzerland seems to indicate that direct democracy may be conducive to consociational decision-making within a highly socio-economically and politically differentiated context (see Lehner, 'Consociational Democracy in Switzerland'). However, Elazar argues that consociationalism, like federalism, is founded on 'compound majoritarianism' as an attempt to accommodate pluralism in a democratic setting (Elazar, 'Federalism and Consociational Regimes'), while for Lijphart both consociationalism and federalism are non-majoritarian in nature (Lijphart, 'Non-Majoritarian Democracy'). This debate has produced a wealth of data, controversies and widely respected policy recommendations (see Wolff, 'Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center'). However, while consociational approaches are essential to a well-informed critique of majoritarian democracy, they are far too focused on inductive operationalization and less on broader principles and abstraction (see Andeweg, 'Consociational Democracy'). Policy recommendations are central to this approach, highlighting the need for consociational engineering as the most promising way to achieve stable democracy, despite the risk of gridlock like in Belgium. Particularly important here is John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary's comparative work on power-sharing in Northern Ireland as an ethnically divided society (see McGarry, 'Introduction'; and McGarry and O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*).

39. Mansfield and Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', 36. 'States like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization—from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies'; Mansfield and Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', 6.
40. Mansfield and Snyder, 'Democratization and the Danger of War', 6.
41. For instance, see Thompson and Tucker, 'A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques'. For an insightful overview, see Cederman et al., 'Democratization and War in Political Science'. For some more recent methodological criticism of Mansfield and Snyder's findings, see Bogaards, 'Measures of Democratization'.
42. Mansfield and Snyder, 'Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes', 529, my italics. From a comparative politics approach, Linz and Stepan's use the more neutral term *consolidation*, as in 'consolidated transitions to democracy', to indicate a stage in which democracy is considered by existing elites as 'the only game worth playing in town' (see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 5, 109, 133, 144, 197–200). This term is usually preferred in comparative politics, where some authors argue that either a too strong state or a too weak one can pose an obstacle to full democratization, which requires a harmonious relationship between the state and civil society and a political environment where responsible leadership is balanced by popular participation (see Heper, 'The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy').
43. Most research on failed democratization is based on the *Correlates of War (COW) Project*, particularly the sub-set of data relating to intra-state and civil wars; Singer and Diehl, *Measuring the Correlates of War*; Singer and Small, *Correlates of War Project*, pt. 2: 'Civil Wars Raw Data'. But the same data set has been previously used to support theories of democratic peace; Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*; Singer, *Explaining War*.
44. Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict', 28.
45. Even when outright separation and independent statehood is achieved, there is no guarantee that the elites may not invoke security threats. For instance, the rather pointless Eritrean–Ethiopian war (1998–2000), which exploded after Eritrea gained independence (1993), demonstrated that the 'security dilemma' can be invoked by state elites well after separation from erstwhile enemies has been obtained. However, this war, possibly part of a boundary-reinforcing 'diversionary strategy' to avoid tackling the issue of internal fragmentation (see Tronvoll, 'Borders of Violence'), occurred in a highly non-democratic context.
46. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 22.
47. *Ibid.*, chs. 14 and 15.
48. *Ibid.*, 22.
49. Although some of the more quantitative works on 'failed democratization' share a philosophical, conceptual and historical shallowness, there are interesting exceptions. For instance, Cederman, 'Back to Kant', has provided a well-informed Kantian reading of democratic peace.
50. Moreno and Lecours, 'Introduction'.
51. Chua, *World on Fire*.
52. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 68–9.
53. Hughes, 'The Paradox of Identity Security in Liberal Democracy', 73.
54. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 22.
55. Conversi, 'Democracy, Nationalism and Culture'.
56. In electoral politics, the same term often describes a *majoritarian electoral system* in which most seats are allocated to the party gaining the elections – hence the concept of 'majoritarian parliament'.

57. Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 247–51. Similar concerns with the corruption of democracy were expressed by Plato, Aristotle and other classical philosophers, while James Madison famously argued that ‘If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure’ (in Taylor, *The Essential Federalist*, 100), but I believe Tocqueville’s formulation remains unequalled.
58. Schwarzmantel, *The State in Contemporary Society*, 31. In contrast with these famous warnings, Mill’s writings on nationality and representative democracy partially contradicted his own liberal principles, contributing to a gradual drift towards majoritarianism (Connor, *Ethnonationalism*, 3–27). Later on, these ideas joined into the wider Western mainstream encapsulated in the principle of national ‘self-determination’. The application of this principle to Europe after the First World War ushered in the end of the Central European and Ottoman dynastic empires and the entrance of the United States into the global stage in a dominant position.
59. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.
60. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3–4 and 100.
61. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 22.
62. Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds*, 224–30; Gowa examines whether independent legislatures and elections influence the use of force abroad within core democracies; Gowa, *Ballots and Bullets*, ch. 3.
63. Ken Livingstone’s witticism encapsulated a long anarchist tradition when he remarked: ‘if voting changed anything, they’d abolish it’; Livingstone, *If Voting Changed Anything*.
64. Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy*, 37.
65. Conversi, ‘Homogenisation, Nationalism and War’; Conversi, “‘We are All Equals!’”.
66. Carmichael, *Genocide before the Holocaust*; Ungor, *The Making of Modern Turkey*.
67. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, 113–9; Ra’anan, *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies*. Later on, under Atatürk’s iron rule, more Christians were killed and expelled; Jones, *Genocide*, 166–8. In particular, hundreds of thousands were removed from their ancestral homelands with the complicity of the Greek and other Western governments, as thousands died during these operations. For an outstanding and illuminating *longue-durée* study of the entire process, see Ungor, *The Making of Modern Turkey*.
68. Conversi, ‘Globalization, Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism’.
69. Andreasson, ‘The African National Congress and its Critics’, 303.
70. Rodan and Jayasuriya, ‘The Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation’, 795.
71. Berlusconi and Sarkozy are regarded as political role models for Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán; Peter Schwarz, ‘The European Union and Freedom of the press’, World Socialist Web Site, January 6, 2011, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/jan2011/pers-j06.shtml>.
72. Ruzza and Fella, *Re-inventing the Italian Right*.
73. Ruzza, ‘Italy’.
74. Mazzoleni, ‘Towards a “Videocracy”?’.
75. Ginsborg, *Silvio Berlusconi*.
76. McChesney, *Rich Media, Poor Democracy*.
77. Dawson, *The Consumer Trap*, 150.
78. Stille, ‘Italy’.
79. ‘A Survey of America and the World: Wooing the World’, *The Economist*, March 27, 2008.
80. Campus, ‘Mediatization and Personalization of Politics in Italy and France’.
81. Torre, *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, ix.

82. Gargarella, 'The Majoritarian Reading of the Rule of Law', 148.
83. Auer and Bützer, *Direct Democracy*.
84. Fossedal, *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*.
85. Cronin, *Direct Democracy*.
86. Markoff, 'Globalization and the Future of Democracy', 285.
87. Part 4 of Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy's important book on the crisis of neo-liberalism is significantly called 'Financialization and Globalization: Lifting Barriers – Losing Control'; Duménil and Lévy, *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*, 99ff. The idea that governments are at the mercy of corporate forces makes redundant any appeal to democratization through 'free' elections.
88. The well-known documentary *Inside Job* by Charles Ferguson (2010) has highlighted the role of banks and the banking system in initiating the post-2008 financial crisis.
89. Pleyers, *Alter-Globalization*, 238.
90. Bradley and McAuslan, cited by Carey Jones et al., *Politics, Public Enterprise, and the Industrial Development Agency*, 53.
91. Gray and Dilyard, *Globalization and Economic and Financial Instability*.
92. McNally, *Global Slump*.
93. Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor*.
94. Lane, *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies*, 284.
95. Conversi, 'Homogenisation, Nationalism and War?'; Conversi, "'We are All Equals!'"; Conversi, 'Cultural Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide'.
96. Conversi, 'Cultural Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide'.
97. Conversi, 'Demo-skepticism and Genocide'.

## Bibliography

- Andeweg, Rudy B. 'Consociational Democracy'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (2000): 509–36.
- Andreasson, Stefan. 'The African National Congress and its Critics: "Predatory Liberalism", Black Empowerment and Intra-alliance Tensions in Post-apartheid South Africa'. *Democratization* 13, no. 2 (2006): 303–22.
- Auer, Andreas, and Michael Bützer, eds. *Direct Democracy: The Eastern and Central European Experience*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.
- Badie, Bertrand. *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- Balakrishnan, Gopal. 'The Oracle of Post-Democracy'. *New Left Review* 1, no. 13 (January–February 2002): 152–60.
- Barkawi, Tarak, and Mark Laffey, eds. *Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
- Bobbio, Norberto. *The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game*, ed. Richard Bellamy. Trans. Roger Griffin. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
- Bogaards, Matthijs. 'Measures of Democratization: From Degree to Type to War'. *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 2 (2010): 475–88.
- Bowring, Bill. *The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics*. Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008.
- Brooke, Heather. *The Silent State: Secrets, Surveillance and the Myth of British Democracy*. London: William Heinemann, 2010.
- Burton-Cartledge, Phil. 'Post-Democracy'. *The Sociological Review* 53, no. 2 (2005): 370–3.
- Campus, Donatella. 'Mediatization and Personalization of Politics in Italy and France: The Cases of Berlusconi and Sarkozy'. *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 15, no. 2 (2010): 219–35.

- Carey Jones, N.S., S.M. Patankar and Martin J. Boodhoo. *Politics, Public Enterprise, and the Industrial Development Agency: Industrialisation Policies and Practice*. London: Croom Helm, 1974.
- Carmichael, Cathie. *Genocide Before the Holocaust*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 'Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process'. *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001): 15–31.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Simon Hug and Andreas Wenger. 'Democratization and War in Political Science'. *Democratization* 15, no. 3 (2008): 509–24.
- Chua, Amy. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, 1st ed. New York: Doubleday, 2003.
- Clapham, Andrew. *Human Rights in the Private Sphere*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Collier, Paul. *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper, 2009.
- Connor, Walker. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'Cultural Homogenization, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide'. In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 719–42. Oxford/Boston, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'Demo-skepticism and Genocide'. *Political Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2006): 247–62.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'Democracy, Nationalism and Culture: A Social Critique of Liberal Monoculturalism'. *Sociology Compass* 2, no. 1 (2008): 156–82.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'Globalization, Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism'. In *Handbook of Globalization Studies*, ed. Bryan Turner, 346–66. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2009.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'Homogenisation, Nationalism and War: Should we still Read Ernest Gellner?'. *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 3 (2007): 371–94.
- Conversi, Daniele. 'The Limits of Cultural Globalisation?'. *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*, no. 3 (2010): 36–59.
- Conversi, Daniele. "'We are All Equals!'" Militarism, Homogenization and "Egalitarianism" in Nationalist State-building (1789–1945)'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31, no. 7 (2008): 1286–314.
- Cronin, Thomas E. *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Crouch, Colin. *Post-Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.
- Dawson, Michael. *The Consumer Trap. Big Business Marketing in American Life*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003.
- Dobson, Andrew. *An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Duménil, Gérard, and Dominique Lévy. *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
- Elazar, Daniel J. 'Federalism and Consociational Regimes'. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 15, no. 2 (1985): 17–34.
- Femia, Joseph V. *Against the Masses: Varieties of Anti-Democratic Thought since the French Revolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Fossedal, Gregory A. *Direct Democracy in Switzerland*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
- Gargarella, Roberto. 'The Majoritarian Reading of the Rule of Law'. In *Democracy and the Rule of Law*, ed. José María Maravall and Adam Przeworski, 147–66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.



- Ginsborg, Paul. *Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony*. London: Verso, 2004.
- Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz. 'Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 4 (2008): 479–506.
- Goetze, Catherine, and Dejan Guzina. 'Statebuilding and Nationbuilding'. In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert Allen Denmark, vol. 10, 6592–614. Oxford/Boston-Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- Gowa, Joanne S. *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Gray, H. Peter, and John R. Dilyard, eds. *Globalization and Economic and Financial Instability*. Cheltenham/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005.
- Haynes, Jeffrey. 'Conclusion: Religion, Democratization and Secularization'. *Democratization* 16, no. 6 (2009): 1282–91.
- Heper, Metin. 'The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy'. *Comparative Political Studies* 25, no. 2 (1992): 169–94.
- Hughes, Bryn. 'The Paradox of Identity Security in Liberal Democracy: The Mitigation and Facilitation of Recourse to Political Violence'. *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (2008): 73–92.
- Jones, Adam. *Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction*, 2nd ed. London: Taylor and Francis, 2010.
- Korten, David C. *When Corporations Rule the World*. 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers/Kumarian Press, 2001.
- Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- La Branche, Stéphane. 'Abuse and Westernization: Reflections on Strategies of Power'. *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 2 (2005): 219–35.
- Lane, Robert Edwards. *The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Lehner, Franz. 'Consociational Democracy in Switzerland: A Political-Economic Explanation and Some Empirical Evidence'. *European Journal of Political Research* 12, no. 1 (1984): 25–42.
- Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Lijphart, Arend. 'Non-Majoritarian Democracy: A Comparison of Federal and Consociational Theories'. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 15, no. 2 (1985): 3–15.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Livingstone, Ken. *If Voting Changed Anything, They'd Abolish It*. London: Collins, 1987.
- Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Mann, Michael. 'Reply: Is Democracy, and Was Fascism, Sacred?'. *Political Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2006): 290–97.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 'Democratization and the Danger of War'. *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 5–38.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 'Democratization and War'. *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (1995): 79–97.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 'Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes'. *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 4 (2002): 529–49.
- Markoff, John. 'Globalization and the Future of Democracy'. *Journal of World-Systems Research* 5, no. 2 (1999): 277–309.
- Mazzoleni, Gianpietro. 'Towards a "Videocracy"?'. *European Journal of Communication* 10, no. 3 (1995): 291–319.



- McChesney, Robert Waterman. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999.
- McEldowney, John F. 'Political Security and Democratic Rights'. *Democratization* 12, no. 5 (2005): 766–82.
- McGarry, John. 'Introduction: The Comparable Northern Ireland'. In *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective*, ed. John McGarry, 1–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. *The Northern Ireland Conflict. Consociational Engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- McNally, David. *Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance*. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2011.
- Miller, Raymond C. *International Political Economy: Contrasting World Views*. London: Routledge, 2008.
- Moreno, Luis, and André Lecours. 'Introduction: Tensions and Paradoxes of a Multi-faceted Relationship'. In *Nationalism and Democracy. Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions*, ed. Luis Moreno and André Lecours, 3–15. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Nandy, Ashis. 'Culture, State, and the Rediscovery of Indian Politics'. In *Literary India: Comparative Studies in Aesthetics, Colonialism, and Culture*, ed. Patrick Colm Hogan and Lalita Pandit, 255–73. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Nimni, Ephraim. 'Stateless Nations in a World of Nation States'. In *Handbook of Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff, 55–66. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Oliver, Dawn. 'The "Modernization" of the United Kingdom Parliament?'. In *The Changing Constitution*, ed. Jeffrey L. Jowell and Dawn Oliver, 6th ed., 256–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Ortega y Gasset, José. *The Revolt of the Masses*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.
- Paris, Roland. *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Pearce, Jenny. 'Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America'. *Democratization* 17, no. 2 (2010): 286–306.
- Pleyers, Geoffrey. *Alter-Globalization: Becoming Actors in the Global Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.
- Posen, Barry. 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict'. *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47.
- Ra'anani, Uri, ed. *State and Nation in Multi-Ethnic Societies. The Break-Up of Multinational States*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
- Ramsay, Maureen. 'Liberal Democratic Politics as a Form of Violence'. *Democratization* 17, no. 2 (2010): 235–50.
- Rodan, Garry, and Kanishka Jayasuriya. 'The Technocratic Politics of Administrative Participation: Case Studies of Singapore and Vietnam'. *Democratization* 14, no. 5 (2007): 795–815.
- Rosato, Sebastian. 'The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory'. *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003): 585–602.
- Rummel, R.J. *Death by Government*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
- Ruzza, Carlo. 'Italy: The Political Right and Concepts of Civil Society'. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 259–71.
- Ruzza, Carlo, and Stefano Fella. *Re-inventing the Italian Right. Territorial Politics, Populism and 'Post-fascism'*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Sarkees, Meredith R., and Frank Whelon Wayman. *Resort to War (Correlates of War). A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-state, and Non-State Wars, 1816–2007*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010.

- Schmitter, Philippe C. 'Democracy's Future: II. More Liberal, Preliberal, or Postliberal?'. *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 15–22.
- Schwarzmantel, John J. *The State in Contemporary Society: An Introduction*. New York/London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994.
- Semelin, Jacques. 'Taking Mann Seriously?'. *Political Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2006): 279–89.
- Singer, J. David. *Explaining War: Correlates of War Project: Selected Papers from the Correlates of War Projects*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979.
- Singer, J. David, and Paul F. Diehl, eds. *Measuring the Correlates of War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. *Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816–1992*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1994.
- Smith, Anthony D. *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
- Snyder, Jack L. *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000.
- Stille, Alexander. 'Italy: The Family Business'. *The New York Review of Books*. October 9, 2003.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996.
- Taylor, Quentin P., ed., *The Essential Federalist: A New Reading of The Federalist Papers*. Madison, WI: Madison House, 1998.
- Thompson, William R., and Richard Tucker. 'A Tale of Two Democratic Peace Critiques'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 3 (1997): 428–54.
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA/Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*, 3rd ed. London: Saunders and Otley, 1838.
- Torre, Carlos de la. *Populist Seduction in Latin America*, 2nd ed. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010.
- Tronvoll, Kjetil. 'Borders of Violence – Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation-state'. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 6 (1999): 1037–60.
- Ungor, Ugur Umit. *The Making of Modern Turkey. Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–50*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 'Denationalizing the State'. *Society* 33, no. 2 (1996): 64.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 'The Modern State: Nation Builder or Nation Killer?'. *International Journal of Group Tensions* 22, no. 3 (1992): 191–208.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre L. ed. *State Violence and Ethnicity*. Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1990.
- Van den Berghe, Pierre L. 'Multicultural Democracy: Can It Work?'. *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 4 (2002): 433–49.
- Wacquant, Loïc. *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Wilkin, Peter. 'Revising the Democratic Revolution: Into the Americas'. *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2003): 655–69.
- Wilson, Richard, ed. *Human Rights in the 'War on Terror'*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wolff, Stefan. 'Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Center'. In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert Allen Denmark, 535–56. Oxford/Boston-Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.