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Homogenisation, nationalism and war: should we still read Ernest Gellner?*

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ABSTRACT. Is homogenising nationalism a consequence of industrialisation? This view has been most forcefully and systematically advanced by Ernest Gellner. The article contests this approach by focusing instead on militarism and militarisation. It therefore identifies the key role of the mass army as presaging the era of mass nationalism and cultural homogenisation. Drawing on a range of authors from history, sociology and political science, the relationship is found to be reciprocal and symbiotic. A preliminary exploration on the possibility of early modern (or pre-modern) forms of cultural homogenisation is preceded by a critical assessment of Gellner's interchangeable use of the terms culture, language and ethnicity.

KEYWORDS: homogenisation, militarisation, theories of nationalism.

Cultural homogeneity is often seen as the inevitable outgrowth of modernity, particularly of industrialisation. Throughout modern history, state leaders have variously endeavoured to impose different degrees of cultural standardisation upon their citizens. The rationale underpinning such attempts has usually been that these reflected both modern needs and some essential prerequisite of nationhood as an organic, indivisible entity. Yet it is surprising how little cultural homogeneity has been conceptualised and studied as a separate heading in itself, both generally in the social sciences and more specifically in nationalism studies. Most famously, Ernest Gellner (1925–95) argued that the nexus between nationalism and homogeneity is provided by industrialisation. Establishing a triadic relationship between homogeneity, nationalism and industrialisation, Gellner conceived homogeneity as the fatal precipitate of epochal changes. No particular ideology, not even agency, is

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needed. Nationalism simply happens by itself as the result of the new modernising needs brought about by industrialisation.

Homogenisation can be defined as the sociopolitical process of deliberately fostering cultural homogeneity. This is normally hetero-directed by political elites who often indulge in cultural engineering. Since it is a deliberate process, it should be distinguished from the idea of homogeneity *per se*, which is more a social and ideological construct: no society is, or has ever been, culturally homogeneous. In this context, homogenisation is an elite-driven attempt to impose socio-cultural changes leading to, or aiming at, cultural uniformity. The concept is well rendered by the French term '*massification*' and the verb '*massifier*' (literally, to 'massify', to render homogeneous by stamping out cultural specificities). According to Gellner, the main force behind this change is industrialism. For him, conscious efforts by political elites to achieve this goal are less relevant than its foreordained occurrence as a result of modernity.

The article begins by identifying Gellner's central focus on homogenisation. For Gellner, *modernity* refers to the radical process of social change brought about by *industrialisation*, which inevitably leads to nationalism. The modern state is in turn identified as the institution capable of performing the modernising task of industrialisation via compulsory education (i.e. nationalisation) and the ideology of nationalism.

After considering the pros and cons of his approach, I move towards a more critical assessment of Gellner's core theory, arguing that one key factor is missing in his vision, namely, the role of the army with its military discipline and uniformity requirements. The latter's association with modern state-building through nationalism is left unexplored since Gellner disregards the relationship between homogenisation and war.

The argument pursued in this article is that the broader relationship between nationalism, mass conscription, homogenisation and war should be reconsidered as a key feature in the historical development of nationalism, especially in the latter's assimilationist, homogenising, purity-aspiring forms. In other words, national homogenisation was not necessarily a predestined occurrence inscribed in sociotechnological evolution. On the contrary, it was often pursued for political ends by rulers and bureaucrats, who subscribed to an agenda that had scarcely anything to do with human emancipation. Indeed, as most nationalism scholars, including Gellner, have accepted, homogenisation was often unnecessarily and counter-productively pursued.

Homogenisation should also be theoretically distinguished from unification. By definition, both state-builders and nationalists aim for some sort of unification, yet most are not obsessed with enforcing full-blown homogenisation. Rae (2002) attempts to delineate a chronology of recurrent 'pathological homogenisation' as part and parcel of the West European model of state-building. She identifies a common thread dating back to early modern Spain and to Louis XIV's persecution of the Huguenots in France.[1] Homogenising patterns became prominent in specific historical periods. Rae's (ibid)

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chronology of 'national' homogenisation goes beyond the standard 1789 watershed. However, although she gives pride of place to cultural standardisation, less focus is given to the former's linkage with militarism.

An emphasis on homogenisation should not distort our broader perspective on nationalism. This might occur if homogenisation is de-contextualised from its specific historical background and territorial environment. Most nationalists did not pursue radical, systematic cultural homogenisation. Yet, the very fact that nationalising state elites have so often engaged in cultural engineering makes it a crucial field of research deserving to be analysed in its own right.

Gellner's core thesis and its continuing relevance

Why should we return to Gellner's theory over ten years after his death? Does his lasting impact still justify a critical reassessment of his thesis? Indeed, some of his basic tenets remain unchallenged to the point of being often uncritically incorporated into the existing literature. Gellner's weight has been exerted both directly and indirectly, pressing other scholars to either acknowledge his contribution or attempt alternative explanations. For instance, Anthony D. Smith (1998) devotes an entire chapter of his key textbook *Nationalism and Modernism* to Gellner's 'culture of industrialism'. David McCrone, who also dedicates an entire chapter to him, argues: 'Put simply, the modern study of nationalism began with Ernest Gellner in the mid-1960s. . . . None had the impact on modern scholarship and debate which Gellner's work has had' (1998: 64). Equally, Brendan O'Leary (1998: 40) agrees that 'all worthwhile subsequent writing and research on nationalism will benefit from Gellner's work, whether they build on his presumptions or dissent from them'. Most significant theoretical works on nationalism do not fail to mention Gellner's theory. Some go as far as questioning whether any new theorising on nationalism will be possible after Gellner (Van den Bossche 2003). In contrast, others flatly dismiss Gellner's approach as false, doubtful and even lacking in originality (see Hroch 2006: 25). Yet, Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* remains near the top of the best-selling list on the subject, even more so following the publication of a new edition with a preface by John Breuilly (2006).[2] All this summons nationalism scholars to challenge his theory more systematically.

Gellner argued that nationalism was the offspring of the marriage between state and culture, and the latter was celebrated on the altar of modernity. While industry needs cultural standardisation to operate smoothly, this can only be assured via state-sponsored mass education. As a reaction, resilient minorities spawn their own nationalism, competing to transform their vernaculars into standard 'High Cultures'.

My main critical point is that Gellner failed to relate the homogenisation – separatism dynamics with the rise of the mass army irrespective of industrialism. Historians, sociologists and political scientists of various affiliations

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have described in a variety of ways the role of the army and conscription as leading factors in the nationalisation of societies. It is beyond the scope of this article to incorporate or discuss all of their findings. The primary task is to explore such a relationship by emphasising the linkage between cultural homogenisation and militarism within the context of modern nationalism, while at the same time clarifying the conceptual conundrum at the centre of Gellner's work.

The first section focuses on the importance of language and mass education for both industry and nation. This sheds light on Gellner's use of key concepts such as language and culture. Then I explore whether attempts at broader cultural homogenisation were actually carried out before industrialisation, into the early modern age. This prepares the ground for tackling my core thesis on the role of militarism and the army as avant-garde players in the enforcement of various forms of societal uniformity and conformism. The emphasis then shifts towards the epochal changes brought about by inter-related grand-events such as the French Revolution, the ascent of mass armies and total war.

Mass education and language as a core value

Gellner's approach cannot be understood without taking into account the central importance he attributed to language. Here, I shall start with a description of Gellner's argument and then point to some imprecisions in his use of key terminology: Gellner uses the concept of '*High Culture*' extensively. This must simultaneously 'consider itself as the model of human comportment' (1994: 39) and be 'the medium of a viable industrial system' made up of formal skills and 'articulated in a definite language' (1994: 41–2). For Gellner, a separate High Culture develops from the industrial need to promote a shared communication tool for a 'whole' society. Hence, 'culture' overlaps with communication, most notably language.

In defence of Gellner's argument, we can point to the Magyar experience as exemplifying at once most of the trends he describes. All major nationalist leaders, intellectuals, artists and, of course, poets, from Lajos Kossuth (1802–94) to Sandor Petofi (1823–49), have stressed the centrality of language as the quintessence of Hungarianness. As the nationalist creed spread to the masses, nobody could escape the constant pressures for Magyarisation (Deák 1983). Ever since, non-Hungarian speakers have been looked upon with suspicion, marginalised or eventually assimilated. This led to a situation of 'entry' versus 'exit', where 'entry' meant assimilation, without which the only other available alternative was 'exit', that is, emigration and asylum. The majority of Hungary's inhabitants were therefore Magyarised, becoming strictly monolingual. By the late nineteenth century, nearly all minorities 'began to experience pressures to assimilate, to show that they were patriotic Magyars' (Hann 2006: 5). To many of them language became the only value and vessel of nationhood. In the

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process, nationalist endeavours were indeed keen on transforming Hungary into a modern and 'proper' European nation. Budapest's tree-lined boulevards impudently mimicked the Champs Elysées, while its House of Parliament (*Országház*) was conceived as an all-too evident replica of Westminster. All this was done in the name of the true essence of the nation – which was simultaneously a modernist, ethnicist and exclusivist project. The same fate befell Berlin and many other Eastern European capitals, whose avenues and 'rational' city planning were more reminiscent of Jacobin *grandeur* than of any residual folk culture. In the East, newly 'nationalised' capitals and major cities were reconstructed on the model of Paris, London, even Vienna. Rarely, if ever, were they envisioned on the basis of indigenous Ruritanias. From Ankara to Moscow, from Helsinki to Madrid, entire quarters of ancient cities were torn down, often the more genuine, autochthonous and endogenously created, and were swept away by imported models which were labelled, 'national' and *ipso facto* assumed a 'national' character. Gellner fully recognised this falsity, stressing the fraudulent essence of nationalism (Gellner 1998), exemplified by the political leaders' romantic, but selective, endorsement of the national language as the language of the people (or 'low culture'). In fact, its very standardisation, through dictionaries, grammars, and a national literature gave it the trappings of another High Culture.[3]

Music was another field above which the nationalist-modernist creed spread its wings, particularly East of the Rhine. Many artists and scholars, like Béla Bartók (1881–1945), devoted their lives to preserve selected aspects of Hungarian culture. In fact, they were turning them into a 'proper' European form of elitist entertainment, whose long-term impact at the popular level was debatable (Bartók 1955). Bartók actually transformed popular music into chamber music, by adapting *czardas* and *horas* into orchestral pieces, string quartets, piano solos, stage works, violin sonatas, acappella choirs and an opera. This was a noteworthy attempt at translating Low Culture into High Culture, making it palatable, if not digestible, to European audiences. Bartók's intentions were unquestionably sincere, and he himself even wore the Hungarian national dress on several occasions (Bartók 1955). But linguistic modernism overtook all these dreams. Language not only prevailed over other elements of nationhood, but was virtually imposed upon the entire population by radical assimilation ordained from within (Deák 1983). At the same time, most other aspects of folk culture were removed from the map of quintessential Hungarianness.

Hence, Gellner's argument seems to be adequate in this respect. The Hungarian experience validates his model in which the national language is taken up by an existing set of dominant elites. So far, I have shared Gellner's view of the constructed, state-mandated nature of linguistic homogenisation, as well as its extension to other cultural spheres.

The only form of cultural standardisation rationally required by modern societies is linguistic. This is so because language is a tool before it becomes the object of political devotion celebrated by poets and revolutionaries. From

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a purely utilitarian viewpoint, administrative bilingualism has often been rejected on the ground of its impracticality. Exceptions to the rule include pre-nationalist Canada, where linguistic duality had been recognised as early as 1867 (British North America Act, now the Constitution Act) and fully implemented in 1969 (Official Languages Act). Bilingualism's capacity for accommodating ethnonational conflict was not recognised by Gellner, possibly because of its rare occurrence in his political environment.

In truth, language is far from being a universal value, trend and virtue: the Swiss experience, possibly with other more recent cases in Asia, Africa and the Americas, can prove that linguistic homogeneity is no prerequisite for modernity, nor for nationalism. Gellner's excuse is that 'in a sense . . . various kinds of Swiss "speak the same language" even if they do not do so in a literary sense' (Gellner 1964: 174). Moreover, Switzerland is erratically defined as 'a traditional society which has weathered down modernisation [and therefore] may subsequently tolerate linguistic pluralism' (ibid: 174).[4] But bilingualism has rarely been inimical to modernisation. It has instead tended to be a transient, impermanent and fleeting phenomenon, because bilingual individuals and communities usually gravitate towards a dominant language (Fishman 1997).[5]

Of course, the official choice of a single dominant language has been an essential tool of nation-building (top-down nationalisation) during the formation of most modern states, after the French linkage between state centralisation and language control spread East of the Rhine. Ever since, the politicisation and sentimentalisation of language turned into a peculiar modern mood.[6] Language became then a core value of nationhood.

Gellner's approach can be defined as glotto-centric (language-centred, or language-bound) since he implicitly accepts the Herderian conceit of language as a core value. More explicitly, Gellner argues: 'Language is the tool of trade for the humanist intellectuals, but it is far more than that. Language is, as Vico saw, more than a tool of culture, it *is* culture. Who would love had he not heard of love, asked La Rochefocauld (*sic*)' (1964: 195). Thus, Gellner follows the Czech, Slavic and generally Eastern (including German) tradition of blending culture, language and nation. This might be traced back to his Czech-German-Jewish upbringing. However, a more mature and academic influence possibly comes from Gellner's student years in Oxford, when he familiarised himself with Sir Isaiah Berlin's (1909–97) re-discovery of Vico and Herder (Berlin 1976).[7] In his own way, Gellner's Oxford experience reconfirmed his ties with Eastern Europe's Herderian traditions. One could further speculate on the romantic elements in Gellner's notion of language. However, this remains a secondary feature in his approach. The primary feature is the need for a standardised and single language as the means of communication in a modern society.

To recapitulate, on the one hand, we have the efficiency-driven, utilitarian need for a common language or communication tool. On the other hand, we have an emotional appeal to extended kinship, as provided by the widespread

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use of kin-related concepts like nation and Fatherland. At this stage, practical needs merge with emotional appeals and we find ourselves in the age of homogenising nationalism – a situation in which ethnicity, language and culture overlap under the umbrella of securitising ethnonational boundaries. We shall see that this combination emerged more conspicuously during periods of mass conscription. But we need first to question whether state-led cultural homogenisation was an entirely modern occurrence.

Homogenisation before nationalism?

Gellner (2006: 8–18) argued that cultural homogenisation would have been redundant, even undesirable, in hierarchically ordered agricultural societies. If one were to conflate language with culture, as he did, this would certainly be the case. However, before the era of nationalism the idea of congruence between ruler and ruled had been considered in the domain of religion.

In one fairly exceptional case, the religious boundary overtly trespassed into ethnic terrain: in early modern Spain, ethnic descent became associated with heresy. Ethno-racial homogenisation was accordingly pursued through physical elimination. Long after the wars of the *Reconquesta* and the fall of the Kingdom of Granada (1492), the persecution of descendents of converted Jews and Moors was turned into one of the pillars of centralising state-building (Rae 2002: 55–81). As a favourite boundary-making tool for expanding Castilian elites, anti-Islamic prejudice was extended to all religious minorities, culminating with the mass expulsion of Jews in that same fateful year of 1492: '*Inimicus Crucis, Inimicus Europae*' (Cardini 2001). The Monarchs' unifying zeal hence became tinged with ethnic and racial overtones. Long before the era of mass nationalism, people were requested to demonstrate their purity of blood (*limpieza de sangre*). Thus, converted Jews (*marranos*) and Muslims (*moriscos*) were simultaneously targeted for mass persecution despite their proclaimed Christianity. References to the *conversos* and their heirs is still hard to find in historical Spanish records and archives, except as distant memory (Douglass 2004). The continuing persecutions culminated in sporadic episodes of mass rebellion, like the Revolt of the Moriscos (1568, nearly a hundred years after most of the conversions took place). The revolts followed centralist attempts at forced cultural assimilation, including bans on the Arabic language and on the wearing of traditional Islamic dress. All revolts inevitably ended in massacres and exile. By 1610, most racial Muslims had been expelled from Spain into North Africa despite their Christian faith, while others became victims of the Inquisition (Cardini 2001). Later on, Conde-Duque de Olivares' (1587–1645) centralisation attempts under Philip IV closely resembled those of his French counterpart, Cardinal de Richelieu (1585–1642).[8] They seemed indeed to be mutually inspired: both tried to enforce cultural homogeneity, although Olivares' success was more circumscribed (Elliott 1984). Assimilation and congruence

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between state and nation continued to be the traditional goal of Madrid's elites throughout the Inquisition, imperial expansion, decline and industrialisation, right up to the middle of the twentieth century. In other words, Spain provided the first arena of cultural, religious, ideological and ethnic homogenisation in modern European history. Yet it took place long before the age of nationalism. For this very reason, its impact in the mainland was far more limited than similar, but later attempts. Juan Linz (1973) famously described Spain as a case of 'early state-building' and 'late peripheral nationalism'. Forged as a crusading state, militarism, boundary-building and ideology figured prominently in the very make-up of Spain. When her quest for ceaseless military expansion turned inward, Spain's new goal was to subdue domestic minorities.

Thus, the push towards religious homogenisation became a feature in the European landscape before the age of nationalism, resulting in the persecution of religious heterodoxies. However, this was not a principle rigorously associated with state legitimacy. Rather, it tended to occur in specific countries and periods, in the intersections between the Reformation and Counter-Reformation struggles. By the sixteenth century (1555, Peace of Augsburg) the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* demanded that the religion of the ruler coincide with the religion of the ruled. While this did not necessarily entail a drive for religious homogeneity or complete ideological congruence between the Prince and his subjects,[9] members of non-dominant religions found themselves threatened by possible charges of heresy, at least until the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) endowed them with some sort of protection, while reaffirming the religious division principle.

These sociopolitical transformations were accompanied by technological and organisational changes within the army. The period of military reforms and innovations predating the French Revolution exerted a discernible impact upon domestic affairs and, through emulation, internationally. But the effects on the broader society are debatable.

Sweden provides a particularly intriguing case. As elsewhere, pertinent data about mass participation are scarcely available: we know that in various Northern Wars (1620 to 1721) the country lost approximately half a million men, but the total number of recruits to the Swedish army and navy in this period has never been calculated (Glete 2002).[10] Sweden's early introduction of conscription is a tempting precedent, but the anomalies outnumber the similarities with other cases.[11] During the same century, the integrative and centralising strength of Stockholm's Court was enhanced. Once designated as the official capital (1634), the city became a magnet for several developments: mass migration and demographic expansion, military empowerment, trade monopoly and the improvement of an educational-cultural infrastructure. Facilitated by cross-linguistic similarities and a fairly benign occupation, the conquered Eastern territories of the Danish Kingdom experienced 'soft' Swedification, particularly under Karl XI (r. 1660–97).[12] Slowly, this led to linguistic convergence: 'From almost any cultural historical point of view the

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people of Scania, Halland, and Blekinge were more Danish than those of Jutland' (Ostergard 1992: 3). Yet, the area is nowadays Swedified in its near entirety – even though regionalists claim that the dialects of Scania (*Skåneland* or *Skåne*) form a distinctive language separable from both Danish and Swedish. In other words, Sweden seems to provide a *sui generis* occurrence of early modern cultural homogenisation, although it was not precisely a model destined for export.

New forms of efficiency in the modern army had a broader pan-European impact. In part, they predated the era of nationalism and can be traced back to the centralisation plans of absolutist states. France had its early emulators: in 1703 Tsar Peter I founded St Petersburg to break Russia's isolation and establish a trading route with Europe. In truth, the new imperial capital was a wholly un-Russian baroque fortress designed by an Italian architect, Domenico Trezzini, overflowing with huge buildings, broad avenues, and ornate palaces. Figes (2002) effectively described this as simultaneous Westernisation cum militarisation:

> Nothing in his dragooned capital was left to chance. The obsessive regulation gave St Petersburg the image of a hostile and oppressive place . . . defined by the notion of its *regimentation*. De Custine remarked that Petersburg was more like 'the general staff of an army than a capital of a nation'. And Herzen said that its uniformity reminded him of a 'military barracks'. This was a city of inhuman proportions, a city ordered by the abstract symmetry of its architectural shapes rather than by the lives of its inhabitants. Indeed, the very purpose of these shapes was to *regiment* the Russians, *like soldiers*, into line (Figes 2002: 13; my emphasis).

The Tsar's pro-Western obsession was also founded on an obstinate craving and urge to emulate the power of nascent European armies. It is essential here to stress that in places like pre-modern Russia and France, most efforts to eliminate the traditional character of popular culture were per force limited to the elites. As Perry Anderson (1974) has noted, absolutist states were hybrid creatures, no longer traditional, yet not fully modern. Their pre-modernity was visible in the lack of a popular mandate, as well as in their rather unsystematic and haphazard efforts to regiment the population.[13] It was only after the European-wide triumph of nationalism as the dominant ideology that both the drift towards total war and the annihilation of traditional Russian culture could be attempted more systematically (Sanborn 2002).

Therefore, great changes had begun to take place within European armies and state administration before 1789, leading to an 'administrative and military revolution' (Smith 1986: 132). During the Wars of Religion (1560–1715) and even before, strong professional armies fought ideological wars for unification or independence, like the Anglo–Scottish Wars (1514–23) and the Dutch Revolt (1566 and 1579–1648). For some scholars, these wars already stemmed from embryonic nationalising projects.[14] But it is doubtful whether the armies acted primarily in the name of the nation, as they certainly did not share a coherent vocabulary to draft ordinary citizens in the name of ethnic brotherhood.

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As a result of the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), in which Central Europe's population was decimated, France emerged as Europe's leading military power.[15] Yet, its standing army was rigorously professional, and thus neatly divided from the rest of the civilian population, remarkably so under Louis XIV. It was during his reign that the Huguenot massacres took place as spasmodic acts of early modern state-building (Rae 2002: 83–120). Militarisation was thus accompanied by increasing homogenising and centralising pressures. In this guise, France's army became the model for its European rivals, particularly Frederick II of Prussia. But, although wars were already mobilising increasing numbers of citizens, armies could hardly provide models of national homogenisation until the post-revolutionary nationalist upheavals.[16]

Can the timing of military development therefore provide a plausible alternative to Gellner's chronology? The answer cannot be straightforward, since the data we posses are still too fragmentary. The sequential progression of military-inspired homogenisation remains nebulous and imprecise following an uneven pattern until the French Revolution, customarily recognised as *fons et origo* of nationalism.

To recapitulate, early modern patterns of centralising state-building and minority persecution acquired an ideological-religious dimension, while broadly differing from the anti-conversos discrimination of post-1942 Spain. As we shall see, only after the French Revolution did the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* begin to be transformed into that of *cuius regio, eius lingua* and by extension sanctioned into that of *cuius regio, eius nation* – otherwise known as the principle of national self-determination.

Militarism as homogenisation

Earlier I explored how language became the core value and key tool of national homogenisation. This section will relate the demand for linguistic homogeneity to more mundane and pragmatic needs, arguing that such a demand was first and most cogently felt by emerging modern armies. Rather than studying the role of the army and conscription in the 'nationalisation of the masses' (Hutchinson 2006, Mosse 1975), our more limited scope will be to use this fact to critique Gellner's view of nationalism as a product of industrialisation's aspiration of homogeneity. Indeed, Gellner failed to recognise how in many cases the army became the very forge where homogenisation was first envisioned.

A mass army can be defined in a variety of ways.[17] In the modern context, it is usually formed by citizens enlisted to defend national security from foreign threats under the pretext of protecting a clearly bounded homeland inhabited by intimately, closely related kin.[18] This represents a departure from previous professional armies formally separated from the citizenry.[19] Even more important, the new mass army 'makes land powers much more capable

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of aggression. It is difficult to oppose a mass army without a mass army' (Posen 1993: 124).

How does this relate to Gellner's vision of uprootedness, mobility and uniformity? For Gellner, mass mobility and the uprooting of peasants from the countryside produced a new cultural freak, the perfectly replaceable modular man. The latter is a human item 'capable of performing highly diverse tasks in the same general cultural idiom' (Gellner 1994: 102). The modular man is, therefore, the end product of industrialisation. His capacity to perform a variety of assignments and duties by obeying the same set of rules and sharing a common idiom makes him ready to become part of the emerging conscript armies of industrialism. This form of conscription is more than metaphorical, as men are constrained into the industrialising world order without the possibility of opposing it. Yet coercion needs a minimum of consensus to successfully meet its goals. Such a consensus is provided by the most powerful ideological invention of modernity, the nation. Nationalism does not only accompany modernity and uprooting, it also provides its ultimate rationale, its pre-eminent legitimising principle (Connor 2004).

But doesn't this description of the serially produced *homunculi* remind us of the perfect soldier? In the age of industrialisation, there was nothing as standardised and uniform as a conscript army. Some of Gellner's critics acknowledge this sequence: O'Leary argues that 'the education and cultural standardisation of troops in the European *ancien régime* preceded that of the general citizenry' (O'Leary 1998: 66). Moreover, the new modern elites 'deliberately used proto-nationalism for military purposes that operated autonomously from the logic of industrial society' (ibid: 66). According to Nicos Mouzelis, 'it is military rather than economic technologies that primarily explain the spectacular development of state bureaucracies and their unprecedented penetration of the societal periphery' (1998: 159). Both O'Leary and Mouzelis share Michael Mann's (1993, 1996) view that nations only emerged with deepening fiscal crises brought about by – and in turn leading to – increasing rates of military drafting, massive war taxation and unprecedented expansion of state powers, even before the French Revolution. It was intra-state competition which led to the deepening of conscription, the expansion of military technologies, and an enormous increase in the tax-gathering power of the state, all of which spelled the doom of local communities and generally took place before the age of nationalism, paving the way for its ascent. This was certainly a gradual process, yet the post-1789 *Zeitgeist* added an essential emotional ingredient to the centralising momentum:

For three hundred years nonstate violence was a legitimate practice in the European state system. In the course of the nineteenth century nonstate violence was delegitimated and eliminated. The evolution of sovereignty in the realm of extraterritorial violence was toward a state monopoly on authority over its use . . . Decision-making authority was taken from nonstate actors and monopolized by the state. Ownership of the means of violence, at least the labor component, was shifted from the nonstate to

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the state realm. Market allocation was replaced by the state's authoritative allocation of violence (Thomson 1994: 143).

The bellicist school of state formation emphasises precisely how warfare was central to the moulding of state identities and the strengthening of nationalist sentiments.[20] In particular, Charles Tilly (1985) illustrates the constitutive role of violence in the emergence of the nation-state as 'built on foundations of recurrent warfare', making the state analogous to 'protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy'. After 1789, this legitimacy derived increasingly from the state's configuration along ethnonational boundary lines (Connor 2004).

The role of military violence can also be related to the centrality of (para)-militarism in the rise and consolidation of Fascism. This process culminated in the advent of what in the 1930s Harold Dwight Lasswell (1962) feared and anticipated as the rise of the garrison state, due to the explosive growth of technology and science combined with the capacity of military-police control.[21]

Yet, all these procedures implied cultural homogenisation and standardisation at the level of the army *before* they could reach the masses. In turn, as conscription expanded and the army gained more social prestige, military homogenisation became the prototype for the wider organisation of society and government–society relations. Obedience and conformism needed to be turned into supreme values for the whole society. Stanley Cohen (2001: 89–91) describes obedience as an ideological framework enabling ordinary individuals to carry out atrocities, which would be inconceivable without a cult of conformity which they had previously imbued from their organisational and political culture.

Within both the army and the bureaucracy, the goal of homogenisation has traditionally been to maximise social and individual control through persistent and reiterated efforts to suppress, contain and dominate the recruit or the clerk. Deviants, dissidents and unruly elements are thus either brought into line or removed from the scene (Foucault 1979).[22] Both within and outside the army, state-led cultural homogenisation consisted of the top-down imposition of a single distilled, purified culture, ushered in by technological advance. It did not materialise as a spontaneous and inevitable outgrowth of modernity.

The myth of industrial efficiency was linked to both army and schooling, specifically to military expansion and compulsory monolingualism. Even before industrialisation could reach the social fabric, the industrialisation of warfare led to a need to learn how to adjust to the new technology, including the use of training manuals which had to be read in a single standardised language. The soldier's initiation into army life and his new socialisation included the inflexible acquisition of homogeneous behaviour and practice as a foremost requirement. Especially if they were thought to affect internal discipline and challenge state loyalty, substantial cultural differences could not be tolerated.[23] Yet, a more practical and individualistic variable should be

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added: a technically adaptive army increased the possibilities for career advancement and promotion.[24]

Mass violence: from revolution to war

The genesis of this transformation can be traced back to August 1793, with the French Revolutionary *levée en masse*. General conscription was 'an attempt to mobilise not just a mass army in a hurry but, behind it, a whole politicised population' (Best 1982: 86). The context was the Reign of Terror (June 1793–July 1794) during which local haranguers, agit-props, intimidators and protection rackets became essential in obliging peacefully inclined populations to comply. The *sans-culotte* paramilitary, created by the Convention on 9 September (that is, shortly after it voted for the *levée* on 17 August), ruthlessly forced poor peasants to join and rich farmers to surrender grain and other provisions for the war effort. The terror's basic role was expropriation by and for the state through the solidification of military nationalism. Martin Shaw (1988: 29–30) agrees that the French Revolution provided the key symbols and *foci* for 'mass participation, citizenship, and nationalist fervour'. And John A. Lynn (1996: 119–162) describes how the combination of patriotic defence and revolutionary expectations was enhanced by media manipulation through songbooks, revolutionary newspapers and public sermons. Selected agitators and rabble rousers imbued ordinary citizens with a superior *esprit de corp*, with a group morale that could mould them into a highly motivated, disciplined and tactically unmatched army. But it is even more crucial to understand the conditions under which this became possible. We need to explore how two apparently antithetical principles, those of culture and militarism, became somehow interwoven. Its roots are to be found in the previous age of centralist absolutism in its peculiar French variant.

Even before the Revolution, France had attempted to create a centralised polity through a form of low-level cultural engineering. The establishment of the *Academie Française* by Cardinal Richelieu (1635) set the basis for a thin attempt at linguistic homogenisation by enacting firm control over the written idiom. Pressures to conform were initially limited to the literate elites, but with the French Revolution and the subsequent explosion of nationalist fervour, the missionary zeal to extirpate all vestiges of the vernacular became part of a larger purifying crusade against *la difference*, fully legitimised by Revolutionary ideology.[25] It is debatable whether this had any immediate homogenising effect. Eugene Weber (1979) argues that a widespread sense of Frenchness could only be discerned after World War I. Yet, soon after the Revolution most provincial elites became imbued with patriotic zeal. The school system became staffed with willing executioners whose work was informed by nationalist fervour. Local bureaucrats and state functionaries firmly believed that unity, fraternity and equality were indissociable principles and were imperiled by the persistence of quaint local archaisms. Abbé

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Baptiste-Henri Grégoire (1750–1831), bishop and deputy of the National Assembly, presented to the Convention his report about the 'necessity to annihilate the dialects and to universalise the use of the French language' (Certeau *et al.* 1975). Declaring French as a superior language, another revolutionary, the *montagnard* deputy Bertrand Barère (1755–1841), famously stated at the *Comité de Salut Public* in 1794: 'Federalism and superstition speak Breton, emigration and hatred of the republic speak German, counter-revolution speaks Italian, and fanaticism speaks Basque' (cited in Certeau *et al.* 1975: 10–11; Hagège 1996: 83–4; Higonnet 1980: 57). Benjamin Constant revealed the totalitarian penchant of the new *étatisme*: 'the same code, the same measures, the same rules, and if possible to achieve gradually the same language, this is what one proclaims to be the perfection of all social organization' (Dieckhoff 2005: 68). Cultural homogenisation hence became a primary task for Jacobin elites, long outliving their demise. In fact, the process carried on afterwards, from the Restoration to Napoleon III and later on, peaking during the Dreyfus Affair (Birnbaum 1992; Gentile 2003: 11–26, Gildea 1994: 252, 308; Kates 1989; Smith 1999: 17). In particular, language manuals, handbooks and compendia became increasingly widespread and French slowly turned into the *langue du peuple*. But top-down cultural engineering was not sufficient, as in 1882 the nationalist philosopher Ernest Renan (1823–92) had to entice voluntary assimilation by default: 'Language invites unity; it does not force it'. While state-builders used cultural nationalism to slowly erode minority cultures, the destruction of localism was usually accelerated by mega-events like *la Révolution*, colonial expansion and international wars.

But an even more powerful linkage between post-revolutionary military service and homogenisation can be found in state-led mass education. The reform policies launched by the French education minister Jules Ferry at the onset of the French Third Republic (1871–1940) provided the watershed: rural France's illiteracy rate was still around 33 per cent in 1870. By the eve of World War I almost all peasants could read and understand French (Weber 1979: 271). In true Jacobin spirit, Paris' goal was *l'anéantissement* (the annihilation) of the vernacular *patois*, as part and parcel of increasing centralising political control. The countryside's incorporation and politicisation developed into a prelude to mass war: 'The Republic won peasant support in the 1870s on a purely political level, with no reference to socio-economic measures or state aid' (Weber 1979: 274). Within the framework of Franco–German rivalry, the Jacobins' task needed to be completed: 'extreme diversity was a flagrant contradiction of the credo of republican unity, making it imperative to turn the credo into social reality . . . Caught up by more urgent tasks, the revolutionaries did not have the time to impose the French language in Corsica and the Basque region. The Third republic proved to be more effective in that matter' (Dieckhoff 2005: 68). The reforms' goal was nothing less than the transformation of hot nationalism into banal nationalism (Hutchinson 2004, 2006), the renewal of the nation into an everyday experience, that is, the 'daily plebiscite' famously envisioned by Ernest Renan.

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This seems to confirm that French nation-formation in the late nineteenth century also prepared the broader public to comply with disciplinary measures and obey war orders.[26] In this respect, Foucault's (1979) magnum opus on the modern prison system is often invoked. The relationship between mass conformism and the policing of modern society is certainly an area which deserves careful attention. However, the focus is here limited to the militarisation–education linkage during the age of nationalism. The homogenisation–militarism nexus was shared by Ferry's France and Bismarck's Prussia – both were 'built on two pillars of vertical integration: compulsory education and compulsory military service, which together constituted an alliance of "light and power" or "the mark of true civilization"' (Ferry 2005: 228).

While secular nationalism began to permeate public education, France embarked on colonial expansion. Subsequently appointed minister of foreign affairs, Ferry stated in 1885: 'The superior races have a right because they have a duty: it is their duty to civilize [sic] the inferior races'.[27] Whereas primary education was made compulsory and non-clerical (*laïque*), racial supremacy was concurrently imposed upon large expanses of Asia and Africa. Enhanced by republican schooling laws, persecution of minorities at home was accompanied by racial domination and imperial aggrandisement abroad. In fact, these reforms played exactly the part that Gellner's theory requires: a mass education system spreading a homogenised High Culture. However, to reiterate my core argument, Gellner failed to connect these reforms to the broader militarisation of society in an age of colonial expansion and intra-state competition which eventually ushered in World War I.

In short, the mutually reinforcing marriage between war-making and cultural homogenisation antedated these epochal changes, but was further strengthened by nationalism as a steam-rolling world vision. Nationalism provided the myths to justify the state's homogenising and uprooting practices through military conscription:

> The essence of the mass army is its ability to maintain its size in the face of the rigors of war. . . . Thus the recruits must arrive with a certain willingness to become soldiers, a certain *educability*, and a certain commitment to the outcome of the battle. This makes political motivation, and ultimately literacy, key elements of the mass army . . . . The problem becomes how to keep these dispersed, scared, and lonely men risking their own lives, and cooperating to take the lives of others (Posen 1993: 83–84; my emphasis).

National myths thus become key elements of military discipline, since they enhance 'the commitment of the troops to the purposes of the war, increase their willingness to sacrifice their lives, and improve their solidarity with one another' (Posen 1993: 84–5). In other words, a common vocabulary accompanied by shared ethnic myths serves the goal of building support for military actions. The enormous influence of Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) in military affairs testifies to the success of this strategic thinking. Among European leaders, Mussolini and the fascists were perhaps the most militantly aware in promoting war as a 'national rite of passage' (Gentile 2003: 58–9). Returning to the Russian example, Joshua Sanborn (2002) shows how the new

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fraternal propaganda projected Russia as a large paternal family made up of diverse classes, territories and origins. These myths were sternly resisted among outlying nationalities, notably in Central Asia. But only with World War I did this new state-moulded sense of masculine brotherhood begin to expand and permeate society. Nationalisation spread across the social spectrum after it had proved successful in disciplining the army.

Resistance to conscription is a good terrain upon which to test nationalism's homogenising impact. In times of war, patriotic leaders underscore the egalitarian duties of the extended family (the Fatherland). For Margaret Levi (1997: 105–106), the idea of 'equality of sacrifice' among brothers in arms was key in securing the obedience of the potentially recalcitrant soldier. Loyalty was secured by a sense of boot camp egalitarianism and comradeship, since the egalitarian illusion served simply to conceal the army's rigid, inflexible and hierarchical disciplinary structure. This brings us to the argument that nationalism provided the consensus necessary for conscription. But this again depended on how the state could effectively manage to turn citizens into soldiers, which in turn required a centralist administration capable and willing to make its subjects uniform through mass education.[28]

However, the most important matter here is to establish how the merging of nationalism and militarism led to politics of cultural homogenisation. Taken separately, these might not have had such an impact: only their mutual combination could bring about tragic and ever-changing social repercussions.

After the French Revolution, mass conscription was gradually introduced in most Westernising societies, from Prussia to Russia and Japan. Initially it was presented as a necessary defence against the very revolution which first introduced it, then against various foes. The *Belle Époque* (1895–1914), the long age of deceptive peace antedating World War I, was also the age of triumphant nationalism (Hobsbawm 1990). Sir Michael Howard notes how the Russo–Japanese War (1905) embodied the model of manpower versus firepower, of human will and motivation against sheer technology. Western military strategists, political elites and the intelligentsia firmly believed that patriotic fervour could shape well-disciplined and well-led troops, in practice steering them towards mass suicide (Howard 1984). Conscription's litmus test was finally provided by World War I. The subsequent inter-war period dispensed an even shorter interlude, immediately thwarted by the rise of Fascism and its alliance with militarism (Gentile 2003; Mondini 2006). The Third Reich's reintroduction of conscription in March 1935 was a further radical step in this direction. This could only be conceived within a wider context emphasising the unity of blood, language and destiny of a single kin-related homogenising *Volk* (Mosse 1975).[29] In the post-war period, there again emerged a few countries where war, war-making and near-permanent military training became essential tools of cultural homogenisation, over riding language, religion and even ethnicity.[30]

The army provided the mould and template for the inculcation of homogenising values among ever larger sections of the population. For example,

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many features of mass schooling were either modelled on the army or were introduced because of military anxieties.[31] The rising of pupils at the teacher's entrance, the singing of anthems, the introduction of physical education into the school curriculum and, of course, the all-pervasive cult of the Fatherland, occurred in a homogenising context which admitted no objections: disciplinary sanctions were thoroughly applied against dissenters.[32]

In pre-modern times, homogenisation and militarisation were not strictly associated: Spartan education was basically military, with a stress on training the *hoplites*, or heavy infantry. For a while, even the more sophisticated Athenian polity organised youth military schools (*ephebia*) (Marrou 1956: 37). But these institutions were never permeated by an obsession with homogenising the citizen, as this was simply unthinkable before the era of nationalism. It is only on the modern stage that the play had to be performed according to an all-pervasive script demanding sameness, homogeneity and oneness. In more than one sense, the military provided the pattern for the homogenisation drive, from the school to the health system.

This relationship can also be reversed, going in the opposite direction: from the school to the army. For Van Doorn, 'the basis of military discipline was laid not in the barracks, but in the school – the Prussians already knew this and the National Socialists profited from this knowledge. Even further back one also used the family sphere, the youth movement, the Church and the workers' *milieu* for this purpose' (1956: 202, cited by Van Krieken 1996: 209). Accordingly, the school prepared the way for the barracks and its shaping influence seemed to promise that the pupil would be turned into an amenable, obedient, docile soldier.

But, as I argue, the relationship was mutual: ultimately the monolingual homogenising school had a model in the army and, in turn, churned out likely, willing soldiers, even before it could shape loyal citizens. The mass army and the school also complemented each other: whereas armies excluded young children, the latter found in the nationalising school a suitable institution from which to absorb patriotic sentiments and uniform cultural patterns. Slowly, women also became beneficiaries of mass schooling. In contrast, the elderly were rarely targeted by nationalising projects, except under genocidal regimes.

This last section has explored the mutual relationship between the mass army and the school via the state, while the ideology of nationalism provided the glue and direct linkage between all these spheres.

Conclusions

The relationship between cultural homogenisation, nationalism and militarisation has rarely been at the centre of scholarly research. In general, cultural homogenisation has not received the attention it deserves in either the social sciences or the humanities at large. Yet, it has played a central role in many nationalist-inspired forms of state-building.[33] Ernest Gellner was among the

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first scholars to theorise its linkage with nationalism as a consequence of industrialisation.

This article is primarily about state-led cultural homogenisation in the age of nationalism. It is not about militarism, nor about the army's disciplinary standardisation, except in their triadic relationship with homogenisation and nationalism. As there is already a vast literature on militarism and state-building, this article has refrained from merely replicating it. After restating Gellner's enduring relevance, the article outlined Gellner's key views and limits, in particular his language-centredness. The emphasis on cultural standardisation also implies a preliminary effort to identify those aspects of culture which lend themselves to be more easily standardised.

I began by looking at selected instances of broader homogenising processes occurring in the early modern age, before the French Revolution. I then advanced an alternative interpretation by focusing on the role of the military. Gellner fully grasped the power of nationalism, yet failed to relate it to the broader militarisation of society. He assumed that this homogenising impetus was the hallmark of modernity and industrialism. But pressures towards homogenisation have been cognate with a broader militarising process. On the whole, homogeneity was sought in a context of war and mass conscription. War was the key simply because the massive uprooting that inevitably occurred in its wake provided the ideal catalyst for the mobilisation of nationalist propaganda. The relationship was, of course, mutual: the more the population became uprooted, the more it turned to nationalism. The more nationalism became extreme, the more uprooted the masses became. War and war-making became the final corollary and end-product of such a homogenising trend. More importantly, wars simultaneously provided the most common vehicles for cultural homogenisation. The two trends reinforced each other in a deepening spiral cycle. I have argued that the main connection between nationalism and war is to be found in the process of cultural, and eventually ethnic, homogenisation. Cultural homogenisation is largely a subtractive process, involving the negation of the existence of separate groups, cultures, beliefs, languages, traditions and ideas within the same polity. As such, it is a process deeply linked to war, instability and massive human destruction.

Notes

1 Rae uses the term 'pathological homogenisation' to 'designate a number of different strategies that state-builders have employed to signify the *unity* of their state and the legitimacy of their authority through the creation of an ostensibly *unified* population. These strategies range from attempts to legally exclude minority groups from citizenship rights, to strategies of forced conversion or assimilation, expulsion and extermination' (Rae 2002: 5).

2 A ranking of best-selling books by topic can be easily obtained via both Amazon.com and Amazon.co.uk. In the list of best-sellers on nationalism, Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* has remained firmly at second place after Anderson's (1983) *Imagined Communities* since this ranking was instituted approximately a decade ago.

3 John Breuilly, private correspondence.

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4 For a critique of this position, see O'Leary (1998: 44–5 and 65).
5 Bilingualism is intrinsically unbalanced, because it does not possess the self-sustaining force necessary for inter-generational transmission. All forms of bilingualism involve a conflict between two codes where the balance will eventually tip on one side, rather than the other. The winning side is normally the dominant language, the one associated with the dominant group or titular nation.
6 For a different picture of the relationship between language and identity, see Fishman (1997).
7 Yet, Gellner (1964: 47–9) openly disagreed with Berlin's wider philosophical approach.
8 He wrote to the King in 1624: 'The most important thing in your Monarchy is to make yourself King of Spain: by which I mean that your Majesty should not be content with being King of Portugal, of Aragon, of Valencia, and Count of Barcelona, but should *secretly* work and plan to reduce these kingdoms of which Spain is composed to the style and laws of Castile' (Elliott 1963: 200; my emphasis).
9 Its roots can eventually be found in pre-medieval times: after converting to Christianity, Emperor Constantine envisioned a wholly Christian Roman Empire. But this did not entail the removal, marginalisation and persecution of minorities. Among non-imperial realms, Armenia was a more ancient precursor of the non-secular principle. However, its existence was not sanctioned by an international system of states founded on religious distinction.
10 Glete (2002) also notes that native soldiers were raised within local society, while training originally took place in large agricultural estates during periods of low intensity agricultural work. The rise of Sweden's fiscal-military state implied that local societies had partly to pay for the maintenance of the military even during peace times.
11 Conscription in Sweden was facilitated by the combination of several factors, chiefly the peasants' rising living standards before the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) and their representation as common people within the *Riksdag* (Diet) where they could express their opinions, including on conscription. However, by the end of the war foreign mercenaries amounted to over 80 per cent of Sweden's troops (Glete 2002).
12 Reforms and patronage by the war-prone Swedish monarch encompassed not only the army and navy, but also the arts and sciences, education, music, judicial procedure and religious affairs, as well as finances and commerce. After the Battle of Lund (1676), in which half the combatants perished, court artists celebrated the King's heroic status and the costly victory was successfully marketed as a milestone episode of Swedish pride and grandeur.
13 Figes (2002) portrays the heroic resistance of ordinary Russians, even from within the army, to preserve the most lively popular aspects of their culture and their recalcitrance to the new Tzars' Westernising zeal.
14 There is still controversy over whether the Netherlands' war effort could be seen as part of a primeval nationalising process. For some historians, the Dutch nation was shaped by the process of war-making against Spain's occupying armies (Israel 1995; Schama 1977). For others, a sense of Dutch (as well as English) nationhood had already crystallised by then (Gorski 2006). The seven United Provinces spoke a form of High German which only later became distinguished as an autonomous language, Dutch. In Gellner's paradigm this set of Ruritanian dialects developed its own 'High Culture' in the process of state-formation, which then became associated with a state. Certainly the armies led by Maurice of Nassau were not wholly Dutch. On the other hand one of the key offensives by the Spanish army was led by the Italian commander Alessandro Farnese.
15 Given the religious wars' ideological character, the principalities' boundaries remained relatively irrelevant. Who was in charge was less important than the constitutional order shaping society, while territorial conquest remained secondary. However, violence reached unprecedented levels by Europen standards, including mass population transfers on a scale foreshadowing those of the twentieth century.
16 For instance, in the eighteenth century (and until the early ninteenth century) the British Royal Navy adopted the practice of impressment by forcibly seizing men for imperial purposes. Impressment, or 'press-ganging', could hardly overcome the problem of desertion, since these military units usually lacked *esprit de corp*, let alone a sense of defending the nation.
17 Among several competing definitions of a mass army, I have found Karl Haltiner's (1988) stress on size, social mobilisation and homogenisation to be partly appropriate: first, recruitment

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must be conscription-based, hence extensive. Second, both regulars and reserves represent a large part of the citizens, whose percentage can be measured by a military participation rate. Third, uniformly trained age cohorts are liable for military service and the majority of them actually end up being drafted (Haltiner 1988).

18 A mass army must not necessarily be draft-based: Britain's Kitchener's Army (or 'New Army') was an impromptu all-volunteer force put together at the outbreak of World War I. Fervent patriotism inspired by jingoist media propaganda was a sufficiently powerful recruiting factor (Chalaby 1994).

19 For example, the Roman Army was an elitist and professional army, whose landowner recruits could afford the possession of their own weapons and equipment. Not even after the reforms of Gaius Marius' (157–86 BC) could it be called a mass army, despite recruiting from the *capite censi*, landless peasants and urban proletariat who were henceforth offered a chance to enter an enviable career (Campbell 2002: 24).

20 For an interesting account of the 'bellicist school' as compared with other theoretical models of state formation (Foucault, Oestreich, Wallerstein, Weber), see Gorski (2003: ch. 1). The 'bellicist school' often adopts a pre-1789 timeline: conscription was not suddenly invented in revolutionary France, but rather logically followed from the mercenaries' poor performance in the late Renaissance.

21 Most of the above authors implicitly adopt Weber's definition of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1991: 77–8). Gellner himself was clearly Weberian in his approach to nations and ethnicity, and considered their relation with the modern state mostly through the principle of legitimacy.

22 One might point out that, while in this way elites could more efficiently exercise their control over conscripts, the sharing of a common vocabulary could also make mutinies easier (John Breuilly, personal comment). But it is precisely at this point that the glue provided by nationalism became more indispensable. Of course, it was supplied by a robust dose of coercion, since the 'discipline and punish' apparatus made mutinies unappealing and risky.

23 Of course, such requirements varied enormously even among units of the same army and they were even dropped in critical times. Regiments performed a regional identity task, while imperial armies incorporated ethnic minorities instilling a special sense of loyalty (see Barkawi 2004; Kiernan 1998: 17–36).

24 Such career advantages became even more widely attainable within the Navy and, later on, the Air Force.

25 Although the *Académie* was suppressed in 1793 during the French Revolution as a vestige of the ancient regime, its goals were actually expanded into a general proselytising drive until it was actually restored in 1803 by Napoleon Bonaparte.

26 Conservatives and traditionalists, such as Gustave Le Bon, claimed instead that the expansion of public instruction and the number of teachers would redouble subversion and anarchism (Dieckhoff 2005).

27 From Jules François Camille Ferry, 'Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies, March 28, 1884', in Paul Robiquet (ed.), *Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry*. Paris: Armand Colin & Cie., 1897, pp. 199–201. Online URL: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1884ferry.html (accessed 15 November 2006).

28 Hence, Gellner and Levi would agree that the effectiveness of conscription partly depended on the prior establishment of a uniform state administration.

29 Of course, imperial armies also engaged in mass killing and extermination, most notably the American and British armies. In the age of empire, atrocities were commonplace and entire populations were annihilated as an indirect consequence of imperial policies and a direct consequence of settlers' expansion.

30 This is most notably the case of Israel after the massive inflow of Russian immigrants who barely share any cultural traits with earlier residents. Nationalism is known to be more extreme among uprooted newcomers who need to boost their sense of belonging as *primi inter pares*.

31 John Breuilly, personal suggestion.

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32 Still today, the Tokyo board of education requires all metropolitan schools to place the Japanese flag (*Hinomaru*) at the front of the graduation stage. All teachers must stand and sing the national anthem (*Kimigayo*) while facing the flag. In 2004, over 180 teachers were reprimanded for disobeying these orders (*The Asahi Shimbun*, 31 March 2004; IHT/Asahi: 1 April 2004). For a similar cult of the US flag, see Marvin and Ingle (1999).

33 The historical process of modern nation-formation is better described as a boundary-shaping effort through which cultural homogenisation works in tandem with mass militarism (Conversi 1999), and where boundaries operate as tools of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion (Wimmer 2005, 2006).

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