Chapter 2: Ethnic and Nationalist Mobilization

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Introduction

Given the plethora of work in the field of nationalism and ethnic conflict since 1990, a review such as this can do little more than sketch some of the scholarly juggernaut's main lines of advance and try to provide a reasonably concise overview. We begin by outlining the scope of the work and the distinct European origins of the nationalism literature and American roots of the ethnic conflict field. We then move sequentially along lines laid out in figure 1, from theories of ethnicity and nationalism to a consideration of the literature on ethnic conflict and violence. This follows into a discussion of democratization and nationalism, including democracy in divided societies. Next we address domestic mobilizing actors such as ethnic fraternities, patriotic societies and ethnic parties. The analysis is capped by an examination of the role of international, transnational and globalizing forces on the nation, and the impact of nationalism on foreign policy.

To begin with, one must note the logarithmic expansion of output in this field. Whereas once *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* (founded 1973) and *Ethnic & Racial Studies* (1978) were the only journals in the field that were not area-specific, the collapse of communism ushered forth an explosion of titles. A less than exhaustive list would include *Nations & Nationalism* (1995), *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics* (1995), *Nationalities Papers* (1997), *National Identities* (1999), *Social Identities* (1995), *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (1995), *Citizenship Studies* (1997), *Global Review of Ethnopolitics* (2003, now *Ethnopolitics*), *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* (2001) or the *SEN Journal* (1991, formerly *The ASEN Bulletin*). Of course, a great deal of work in these fields is also published in mainstream political science, international relations, history, sociology, geography, area studies and anthropology journals.

What filled these journals and the concomitant expansion of book titles were, first of all, a wealth of case studies from every imaginable disciplinary perspective. All sociologists are familiar with the writing of Marx, Weber and Durkheim, and the authors of work in these fields – especially nationalism – were familiar with the nationalism canon of Anderson, Gellner,

Hobsbawm and Smith. For those studying ethnic conflict, Horowitz's magnum opus was the bible. Armed with a basic – sometimes crude – understanding of the 'modernist/instrumentalist versus primordialist' antinomy, these authors plugged their particular contexts into a broader theoretical framework. Some went on to do more sophisticated work, often with a comparative dimension. Thomas Hylland Eriksen on Mauritius and Trinidad, Rogers Brubaker on France, Germany and Eastern Europe, Ronald Grigor Suny on the post-Soviet context, Donald Akenson on Israel, Ulster and South Africa, Michael Keating on Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland, and the more historically-informed work of Adrian Hastings (Europe and Africa) and Liah Greenfeld (Europe) provide some leading examples.

These studies are frequently interdisciplinary and range beyond their core cases. For example, Eriksen (1990) considers the history and myths of descent of ethnic groups, such as the Trinidadian Muslim Indians who at one point tried to claim Arab descent. He traces group development from tribal formations through clans to *ethnies*. He asks questions about group mobilization – which groups have associations and newspapers, and which do not. The ethnic boundaries of Sino-Mauritians turn out to be the more rigid, while Creoles in Mauritius come closer to being an ethnic *category* (lacking an institutional basis) than an integrated ethnic group. Eriksen considers boundary maintenance through endogamy and assimilation to flesh out the ways in which ethnic boundaries can persist in the face of cultural communication and demographic flows across the boundary (see also Kolstø 2005).

He discusses ethnic niches in the economy, with an eye to teasing out the extent to which economic functions help to integrate or differentiate groups. Issues of politicization into parties or coalitions are considered, as well as the way groups interact with each other and the state. Complex interactions with class, race and ideology receive a hearing and Eriksen analyses the impact of globalization and migration on ethnic relations. This kind of work is spiced with examples drawn from a wider context than Mauritius/Trinidad, and this, too, is common. Thus there is often a blurring of the boundaries between comparative studies and more ambitious theoretical works like those of Hechter (2000), Lawrence (2004), Ozkirimili (2000, 2005), Wimmer (2002, 2005), Hutchinson (2005), Brown (2000) and others, which we will consider later on. Some lean toward the nationalism literature – defined by a strong historical perspective, more of a European-Asian focus and emphasis on territorialized groups. Others fall more squarely within the ethnic conflict literature: more presentist, more oriented to the post-colonial world and 'hot' spots, and more 'applied': concerned with the way diffuse sentiments translate into concrete outcomes and how conflict may be predicted.

Curiously, in a scholarly world dominated by the United States, many of the authors in the 'nationalism' literature are European or occasionally Asian, irrespective of where they ply their trade. The reason is situational rather than

theoretical. The American 'blind spot' for nationalism has been heavily criticized by some American scholars. Though one need not go as far as John Mearsheimer at the 2005 APSA meetings who quipped with reference to Iraq that Americans only comprehend democracy and don't understand nationalism, there is clearly a difference in the consciousness produced by a continent which is subdivided by territorialized ethnicity and one which is not. Ethnicity in the United States is largely what E.K. Francis (1976) termed 'secondary': de-territorialized and hence lacking in secessionist potential. In Europe, by contrast, many ethnic groups are 'primary' communities, with an indigenous attachment to a 'homeland' territory. Myths and memories of ethno-territorial conflicts are fresher and more pungent than is the case in the United States. This produces different theoretical priorities.

Other possible reasons for this Euro-(and British-) American divide include: 1) The differing impact of race relations, with a parallel academic overlap between the concepts of *race* and *ethnic group*; 2) The somewhat greater impact of 'political correctness' in American Ethnic Studies discourse; 3) Less emphasis in Europe on quantitative data; 4) More interdisciplinarity in Europe; 5) The greater political influence of ethnic diasporas in the US, with a subsequent focus on ethnicity as a geopolitical resource. Only a few American authors, most notably Walker Connor (1994), seem to have been able to bridge the gap between ethnic studies and nationalism and combine findings, theoretical insights and concepts from both academic traditions. In addition to a geographic division of labor is an academic one: nationalism theory has a strong historical bent, and often looks to explain the 'when' of ethnic and national identity, which is less of a concern for ethnic conflict studies. This chapter will focus on advances in the study of ethnic and nationalist mobilization. In so doing, it will move from the microsociological to the macropolitical, and shift from the distant past to the more recent period (Figure 1). Thus, we begin with an examination of indigenous, territorialized 'primary' ethnicity, and proceed to watch the ethnic phenomenon become transformed into political reality. Each stage of this process is analytically discrete and home to a distinct literature. We shall review each in turn.

Figure 1. The Separatist Route to Nation-State-Formation



Source: Kaufmann, Eric and Daniele Conversi.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity may be defined as thought and action stemming from identification with a community of putatively shared ancestry that exceeds the scale of face-to-face *gemeinschaft*. Cultural markers like language, religion, customs and phenotype (or 'race') are *used* by ethnies to demarcate their boundaries, thus ethnic groups need to possess at least one (but no more than one) differ-

entiating marker. Meanwhile, *nations* are integrated communities of compact territory and history which have political aspirations. Modern s*tates*, by contrast, are political units which have a monopoly on the use of force within a well-demarcated territory (Francis 1976; Weber 1978; Smith 1991). Here we begin with primary-group ethnogenesis – which is treated in the classic historical-sociological treatises by Armstrong (1982), Smith (1986) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983).

More recently, *instrumentalist* writers – who emphasize the role of elite self-interest in constructing identities – have emphasized the shifting and politically contingent nature of ethnic identity formation (Laitin and Fearon 1996; Laitin 1998; Brass 1996; Brubaker 2004). On the other side of the theoretical ledger, *primordialist* writers point to the high degree of correspondence between cultural and genetic markers worldwide – with average coefficients of relatedness between co-ethnics as strong as that between half-siblings – as evidence for an evolutionary psychological basis to ethnicity which resists political manipulation. Work in genetic anthropology – such as that showing the distinct genetic inheritance of the Welsh as against the English – reinforces the primordialist paradigm (Salter 2003; Cavalli-Sforza 2001; Welsh 2001). Similar findings have focused on the Basques, Sardinians, and Berbers. However, this argument is contested within biology and immunology, with one particular study questioning the degree of Palestinian-Jewish genetic difference (Arnaiz-Villena et al. 2001). Social psychologists have moved in the opposite direction, focusing on the manipulative power of elites, as also indicated by Horowitz (1985) and Conversi (1995). The most influential work emerging from within this academic discipline is Michael Billig's '*Banal Nationalism*' (1995), which has become a standard reference, defining a whole new way of interpreting nationalism. Stressing routines, flagging and 'creating the unconscious', Billig explores how nationalist ideology is incorporated into daily activities and rituals to the point of becoming tacitly accepted. Because nationalism is "the most successful ideology in human history" (Billig 1995: 22), we remain deeply steeped in a nationalized world vision, becoming unconscious carriers and replicators of nationalist ideology, whether we accept or reject nationalism in principle. Moreover, Billig is amongst the few scholars to appreciate the radical difference between the nationalism of nation-states, on which his theory is based, and the nationalism of stateless nations.

Finally, *ethnosymbolists***,** who eschew both biology and instrumentalism, accept the constructed nature of ethnicity, but refuse to confine it to the modern period and suggest that once formed, ethnic identity is strongly path-dependent (i.e. reproduces itself over time). Ethnosymbolists thus prioritize Durkheimian 'social facts' like traditions of territoriality, myths of genealogical origin and symbolic boundary markers which pass through the generations and set limits to new 'inventions' by ethnic entrepreneurs (Smith

2009). Religious institutions and rituals are viewed as especially important in crystallizing pre-modern ethnic sentiment (Hastings 1997). In the IR-related ethnic conflict literature, the cognate position is known as *symbolism*. Here Stuart J. Kaufman (2001) has been the pioneer and is one of the very few in the US-based literature to take this position, claiming that the content of myths matters for political violence. This has, however, also been recognized by more instrumentalist writers such as Saideman and Ayres (2008). The next section considers the theoretical disputes between primordialists, ethnosymbolists and instrumentalists in greater detail.

Theories of Nationalism

The study of nationalism remains inter-disciplinary at heart, because it needs to take into account a vast range of factors simultaneously. For instance, access to historical material is essential, together with an understanding of how political mechanisms and institutions work. Thus, political scientists have to share their findings and confront their ideas with adjacent disciplines. Some of these, like contemporary history, have always been concerned with nationalism. Others are relative newcomers. For instance, the study of nationalism has expanded into sociology fairly recently (McCrone 1998; Pollock 2001; Ruzza 2004; Whitmeyer 2002). More specific cases, like political geography and international relations will be discussed later on.

However, inter-disciplinarity has some drawbacks. One key problem, mostly derived from the inter-disciplinary nature of the field, is the difficulty of agreeing on a common terminology. Walker Connor (1994; 2002) is probably the author who most strove to clarify the terminological conundrum. A parallel effort of conceptual clarification has recently taken place in the contiguous discipline of ethnic and racial studies, among race relations practitioners like Steve Fenton, Stephen May, John Rex and John Stone (Fenton and May 2002: 1-20; Fenton 2003), while the necessity of incorporating nationalism within ethnic and racial studies has been highlighted (Stone 1998; 2003).

'Theories of nationalism' has emerged as an academic theme since the mid-1980s thanks to the groundbreaking work of Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Kedourie, Hobsbawm and several others. Most of these authors were London-based, or had special connections with London, tending to gravitate particularly around the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). In 1990, the founding of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) at LSE by graduate students, offered a chance to transform a series of idiosyncratic attempts into the embryo of an independent scholarly research network. 1990 was also a watershed year in international politics, as we began to witness the breakup of multinational

socialist states into their ethnic components (see Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot 2005).

Two binary oppositions stand at the core of the original debate within theories of nationalism: 1) Instrumentalism vs. Primordialism; and 2) Modernism vs. Perennialism. On the one hand, *primordialists* appeal to emotions and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations, whereas *instrumentalists* (or *constructivists*), conceive of ethnicity as a dependent variable, explained by other factors. In other words, ethnicity is a byproduct of economic and political forces. It is constructed for its strategic utility in achieving material or political goods, formally in the name of the group, but in fact solely to the elites' advantage. On the other hand, *modernists* date the formation of nations to the rise of modernity (however the latter is defined), whereas *perennialists* see them as enduring, inveterate, century-long, even millennial phenomena, certainly predating modernity.

One could note that both these oppositions are partly fictitious, since one of the poles is too weak to form a credible scholarly contrast. For instance, primordialism is barely present in the scholarly literature. In contrast, instrumentalism, or "the claim that ethnic group boundaries are not primordial, but socially constructed, is now the dominant view" (Hechter and Okamoto 2001: 193). For Donald Horowitz, primordialism has become "the straw man of ethnic studies…the most maligned for their naiveté in supposing that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen, immutable rather than malleable, and inevitably productive of conflict" (Horowitz 2004: 72-73). This "reluctance to analyse ethnonationalism as a relevant phenomenon in its own right" would automatically exclude people working within theories of nationalism. Thus, the second pole of this binary opposition is conspicuous only for its scholarly absence. The key text examining the theoretical complexities of these contrasting approaches remains Smith's (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism*.

In the second theoretical debate, we find a similar imbalance. *Modernism* is overwhelmingly embraced by most scholars, who associate the nation and nationalism with modernity. The opposition is about the timing of nations ('when is a nation?') as well as about the timing of nationalism ('when did nationalism become an influential force?'). Armstrong (2004: 9) argues that, whereas primordialism has been discarded by most scholars, perennialism retains some form of support. *Perennialism* refers to nations and is opposed to modernism, while primordialism refers to ethnic groups and is opposed to instrumentalism. Perennialism is the belief that a few nations existed from time immemorial (the Middle Ages or even antiquity), and were subsequently revived. Primordialism is the belief that nationalism and ethnic conflict are emotional givens. Even fewer authors would categorize themselves, or be categorized as primordialists than as perennialists. The overwhelming trend remains both modernist and instrumentalist. Even primordialists may see nationalism as the modern re-enactment of a pre-modern idea.

Returning to the first opposition, *primordialists* appeal to emotional and instinctive constraints as ultimate explanations for national mobilization. They typically date the origin of nationhood back to remote epochs, treating them as emotional givens. Their approach is often associated with nationalist discourse, which occasionally reverberates in the academia. As Smith notes, these visions were "heavily influenced by an organic nationalism which posited the 'rebirth' of nations after centuries of somnolence, amnesia and silent invisibility" (Smith 2004: 53). Donald Horowitz (2004) postulates the existence of a broader category called '*the primordialists*'. By accentuating the explosive and unpredictable nature of ethnic bonds, primordialists seem to discourage further scholarly enquiry, particularly into the causes of, and possible solutions to, ethnic conflict.

Another approach, which Smith (1998) describes as a radical variety of primordialism, is *sociobiology*. In fact, Pierre Van den Berghe considers ethnic and racial sentiments as an extension of kinship ties (1981: 80). Sociobiological and 'kinship' perspectives bring forth the centrality of descent in defining ethnic groups. However, Van den Berghe's idea of *kin selection* can also be read as an extreme form of 'individual instrumentalism': if the overriding criterion is the reproduction of one's own genes, everything else becomes a tool geared toward this end, the epiphenomenon of a larger biological drive for group survival. The idea of ethnic ties as 'kinship' ties is also embraced by Donald Horowitz (1985), who defines ethnic groups as '*super-families*'. Indeed, nationalism conveys the idea that the members of the nation are somehow related by birth. But no real biological relationship is needed. A mere unproven belief could turn nationalism into a *placebo*, a potion with no chemically active ingredients but miraculous effects.

On the other hand, instrumentalists see ethnicity as a dependent variable. Therefore, elites can distort and dramatically alter existing myths. For radical instrumentalists, the category 'nation' does not correspond to any objective reality. In his typical lapidary and terse style, Ernest Gellner pushes the 'invention' argument to its logical consequences: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist" (Gellner 1964: 168). Gellner highlights the impatience of an entire generation of scholars to demonstrate nationalism's fallacy. Classical instrumentalists postulate a sharp fracture between political-economic élites and their followers, seeing the latter as passively manipulated by the former.

For Eric Hobsbawm (1990), nationalists are ambitious '*social engineers*' deliberately stirring up the atavist emotions of the masses. Elie Kedourie (1993) rather saw nationalism as a conspiracy devised by German Romantic intellectuals. In short, instrumentalists try to single out the 'manufacturers' of nations among those social groups which have more to gain from it. Hobsbawm's term '*invention of tradition*' has acquired a nearly iconic meaning (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; For a critique, see Smith 1998: 117-124). For

this line of thought, it is rather irrelevant whether or not the repository of ethnic symbols from which elites attain power persists through the ages (Whitmeyer 2002). They reject the claim that nations are fixed, pre-determined, natural entities, and identify nationalism as deriving from discursive and political practices (Brown 2000, 2004). Unscrupulous leaders can engage in an unprincipled, deceitful, devious use of patriotism, deforming it into annexation, conquest, subjugation, imperialism, war and genocide. Accordingly, they manipulate public feelings for the only purpose of holding on to power.

Yet it is questionable whether, and how far, elites can instantly 'invent' the symbolic material from which to draw their mobilizing power (Brown 2004). In their pristine version, instrumentalists also failed to recognize that key activists in the mobilized groups may simply be interested in the maintenance of their cultural heritage, rather than gaining material goals. There may well be no cynical aspirations there, but a sincere desire to preserve something from the past, if not merely a positive self-image. On the other hand, it is hardly disputable that ethnonational mobilizations do often result from the conscious efforts by elites to obtain access to specific social, political and material resources. Such goals are more easily pursued in the name of 'alleged' common interests. Socio-political elites are particularly efficient in deploying the ethnosymbolic complex to its best performance.

Combining perennialism and a limited version of modernism, *ethnosymbolism* focuses on the centrality of myths of descent in ethnic persistence (Smith 1998; 1999; 2001; 2004). Therefore, it underlines the continuity between pre-modern and modern forms of social cohesion, without overlooking the changes brought about by modernity. The persisting feature in the formation and continuity of national identities are myths, memories, values, traditions and symbols. Myths of ethnic descent, particularly myths of 'ethnic choseness', lie at its core. Of all these myths, the myth of a 'golden age' of past splendor is perhaps the most important. The foundations of modern nations are earlier ethnic communities, or *ethnies*. Ethnies are formed by coalescence and division, but are durable. The first nations were formed around *ethnic cores*. Smith's choice of the term *ethnie* (or ethnic community) indicates emphasis on a sense of collective identity predating the rise of the modern nation-state. Thus the latter is dissociated from nationalism *per se*.

At least two kinds of critiques have recently been made of ethnosymbolism: 1. a conceptual issue, with a too inclusive and unclear definition of the nation (Connor 2004); and 2. a lack of engagement with the problem of distortion of ethnic myths by political elites (see Özkirimli 2000. For a general overview, see Delanty and Kumar (2006). Another possible critique concerns whether there can be forms of nationalism which do not emphasize the past, particularly not the traditional past with its accompanying ethnosymbolic myths, such as forms of *hybrid nationalism* which may invent new myths, or select from pre-existing ones some very limited and fractional as-

pects. One should remember the iconoclastic fervor of nationalist Futurism in Italy, with its vehement attack on all traditional aspects of Italian culture (Conversi 2009). There is also an *institutionalist* critique that pre-modern entities lacked legal, economic and political identity – fundamental characteristics of modern nations (O'Leary1997). Smith (2009) responds to these critiques in various ways, for instance arguing that there were plenty of alternative avenues for identity formation: schools, temples and legal and political institutions, a point also reiterated by Adrian Hastings (1997).

The lack of attention to the role of mass media remains a major problem. For instance, the legend of William Wallace (c. 1274-1305) as a champion of Scottish independence reveals a remarkable continuity from the day he was hung, drawn and quartered in the streets of London to the present day (Morton 2004). But how far has Hollywood contributed to the re-enactment of this myth? Are the media responding to public demands, or vice versa? Can this be seen as the first dart in a larger Hollywood crusade against England, epitomized in a wave of anti-English movies peaking in the mid-1990s? The failure to address the role of the media remains a major stumbling block in the development of nationalism studies in general.

On the other hand, anti-instrumentalist primordialism may combine with modernism in surprising ways. Walker Connor (1994, 2002) adopts a critique of instrumentalism while pursuing a robust modernist agenda. The Connor-Smith debate is highly representative of this contrast. Smith (2004) argues that it is possible to date an embryonic development of modern nations back to ancestral times. Connor (2004) retorts that such a task is purely speculative and he rejects sweeping *longue durée* explanations. If nationalism is a mass – not an elite – phenomenon, then it can only occur at a quite advanced stage of modernity, that is, when the development of modern mass communication makes it possible for an elite to spread national identification amongst larger and larger sectors of the population.

Gellner and his critics

Modernity can be defined in a variety of ways. Gellner (1983) associates it with' the spread of industrialization. The latter led to unprecedented, all-pervasive change which disrupted the traditional balance of society, creating new constellations of shared interests. For Gellner, nationalism was the offspring of the marriage between state and culture, and the latter was celebrated on the altar of modernity. With the passage from agricultural to industrial society, a standardized 'high' culture becomes an all-pervasive requisite. However, only the state has the power to inculcate the new standard on an uprooted labor force. A nation is hence defined as common membership in a shared High Culture. In turn, nationalism is defined as 'primarily a principle

which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1). With typical lucidity, Gellner (1983) argued that state-enforced homogenization, metaphorically identified as the Empire of '*Megalomania*', provokes the reactions of those who have been either excluded, or opted out on their own choice in order to protect their own culture. These latter are bound to form their own national movements, in which a low culture is promoted and transformed into a High Culture. Their political project is the establishment of a new '*Ruritania*', the prototypical nationalist homeland (reminiscent of historical occurrences in Eastern Europe, including Gellner's native Czecho-Slovakia). In the homogenizing world of nation-states, human societies find themselves at a radical crossroads: either to organize themselves on the basis of the nation-state model or to succumb (Conversi 2007; 2008a; 2008b). Anthony D. Smith (1998) counter-argues that industrialization is not a prerequisite for nationalism, as many nationalist movements emerged well before its advent. He mentions the cases of Finland, Serbia, Ireland, Mexico, Japan and many others, including post-revolutionary France and pre-Bismarckian Germany (Smith 1998: 36-ff.). Most scholars commonly accept this critique. Both modernists and non-modernists shared a critique of the industrialization-nationalism linkage. The modernists see nationalism as a result of modernity, but most often locate the core of modernity in something other than industrialism, e.g. the modern state (Breuilly 1994), printing (Anderson 1983), or modern communications (Connor 1994; 2002). On the other hand, the non-modernists insist more broadly on the pre-modern reality of nations (Horowitz 2004; Smith 2004). Gellner postulates a view of mankind as advancing through a series of progressive stages leading to socio-political paradigm shifts. This grand theory is too deterministic and associated with overly ambitious neo-positivist paradigms, mostly derived from an already passé structural-functionalist approach (see Smith 2004: 65).

The intellectuals and the intelligentsia

Many authors have pointed to the pivotal role played by intellectuals in the development of ethnicity and nationalism. The milestone work on the intellectuals and the intelligentsia remains that of Miroslav Hroch (1985). With his three-stage model, Hroch shows how an incipient proto-elite of 'dreamers' can transform into a mass movement: *phase A* is the period of scholarly research, when poets, philologists, archeologists, historians, artists all contribute to the 'discovery', creation and formalization of the national culture. *Phase B* is the period of patriotic agitation. Finally, *phase C* corresponds to the rise of a mass national movement.

For Smith, the *intellectuals* play a pivotal role as the creators, inventors, producers and analysts of ideas (Smith 1981: 109). They act as 'chroniclers' of the ethnic past, elaborating those memories which can link the modern nation back to its 'golden age'. Philologists, archeologists, poets, literati, visual artists and, most of all, historians are the key players in the game (Conversi 1995). They help a modernizing nation to draw sustenance from a re-lived ancient past, providing the linkage with earlier *ethnies* or ethnic communities. Elie Kedourie also places the intellectuals at the core of his Euro-centric approach (1993): nationalism spread via a mechanism of emulation touching first the local intellectuals and, subsequently, other élites. Its source is the appeal of the modern principle of self-determination as derived by the philosophical visions of German Kantianism (sic) and Herderian Romanticism (sic), allied with the political praxis of the French Revolution. Intellectuals of one country imitate those from another country, and the epicenter of everything lies in the midst of Europe (France and Germany).

'Intellectuals' should not necessarily be understood as individuals belonging to a particular class and sharing a specific high culture. As initiators of nationalism, they first envisage, identify, codify, delimit, bound and describe the nation. Nationalist 'intellectuals' do not need particular *finesse* or sophistication. What matters is their capacity to express and combine a credible national identity. This includes an innate ability, not simply to speak the language of their core constituencies, but to reinterpret and re-live their ancestral myths. For instance, the founder of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana y Goiri (1865-1903), could scarcely articulate his thoughts in a coherent, let alone pleasant, way. His *Obras Completas* (Complete Work) is punctuated by the repetitions of vehement interjections, caustic tirades and ranting sermons interspersed with slang and epithets. As William A. Douglass notes, Arana's attitude was part of a broader defense against state intrusion: at that time, "the Basques were in grave danger of being denatured politically and exploited economically by the centrist Spanish and French states, as well as diluted demographically (assimilated) within their far larger populations" (Douglass 2004: 95). Yet, this is relatively unimportant for determining the success of a nationalist movement, although it is bound to have repercussions on its subsequent evolution (Conversi 1997). What matters is the founding intellectual(s)' organizational capacity. In spite of his limited vocabulary and incapacity to enunciate in-depth observations, Arana was certainly a good agit-prop, an excellent orator and haranguer, perfectly able of perorating the Basque cause amongst a small *coterie* for whom he became the charismatic catalyst. Such managerial ability derived both from his ability to communicate in the language of the people (Nairn 1977) and from his ability to identify and mobilize the founding myths of Basque nationalism (Douglass 2004). In spite of his hidebound and paltry educational qualifications, Arana

could be described as an 'intellectual' because he was able to articulate and marshal the national aspirations of his people.

This leads us on to ask how far the intellectuals can influence, mobilize and 'instrumentalize' public opinion. How can relatively lonely, isolated individuals reach such a wider appeal? How is it possible to convince people to believe in the immemorial, perennial essence of the nation? The answer is to be found in a second social category, the *intelligentsia* or the *professionals*. In the social sciences there is no agreement over their definition. Smith (1998) identifies them as a group of individuals exposed to some form of superior education. It is not strictly a class but rather a social category, since in theory individuals from all classes can belong to it. They have not merely the will and inclination, but especially the power and capacity to apply and disseminate the ideas produced by the intellectuals. Therefore this stratum plays an even more crucial role in the success of nationalist movements. Once the intelligentsia begins to challenge officialdom by exploiting its strategic position, it becomes a key protagonist of emerging mass movements. Nowadays, the 'intelligentsia' would certainly be centered on media operatives. Does this mean that nationalism can today subsist without intellectuals? Ethnosymbolists obstinately believe that globalization has not changed anything, thus providing no in-depth answer to this question. The intellectuals' role is seen as being still relevant as a skeleton upon which to build a larger movement: 'bridges' must be built between the past and the present, between ethnic myths and their modern translation into viable identities and political programs. Yet, nationalism can and does exist without them. Indeed, the worst nationalist excesses are often carried out in a wholly militarized environment, in which intellectuals may be routinely murdered. Under such polarization, their role – and the fate of culture in general – will be inevitably limited.

Boundary theories

First emerging in anthropology as an analytical tool for studying ethnic group interaction (Barth 1969), boundary theories have inevitably moved towards a focus on nationalism as a process of boundary-creation, stressing the latter's oppositional character (Brock 1999; 2001; Kolstø 2005; Paasi 2001; Wimmer 2003-4). Although one can discern a constructivist predisposition in them, boundary approaches cannot be reduced to instrumentalism or modernism. Indeed, perennialist authors have adopted them at a very early stage (Armstrong 1982). Boundary theories can also incorporate ethnosymbolism while adopting a more instrumentalist viewpoint (Conversi 1995). They have developed in several disciplines and, for obvious reasons, have encountered a particularly fertile terrain within *political geography* (Agnew 1997; Clayton 2002; Graham 1998; Jones 2004; Paasi 2001; 2004).

The trend has simultaneously expanded into *international relations theory*, where the 'Minnesota school' of Identities, Borders, Orders (the 'IBO triad') has attempted to re-conceptualize the discipline's ethno-territorial epistemology within a constructivist methodology (Albert and Brock 2001). Authors of the 'Minnesota school' argue that the interactions between the three variables can re-energize and re-orient IR research. They have influenced the debate on nationalism and identities as part of a wider 'cultural' and 'sociological turn' of international relations (Brock 1999). More recently, sociological theory has also begun to embrace these approaches (Shields 2006), with the promising adoption of a processual and interactionist approach in the study of ethnic violence (Wimmer 2003-4). Other cases have concerned the anthropology of sub-state nationalism, with comparative case studies of New-Zealand, Spain and Québec (Schwimmer 2003).

The focus on boundaries and ethnic conflict has resulted in a proliferation of studies touching on widely different topics, such as the interplay between violence and multiparty democracy in Africa (Broch-Due 2004), the remaking of the U.S.-Mexico boundary ensuing the rise of the 'illegal alien' (Nevins and Davis 2001), governmental policies among refugees in Tanzania (Landau 2003), the reproduction of Welsh nationalism (Jones and Desforges 2003), nationalism and broadcasting in Welsh and Irish Gaelic (Cormack 2000), civil society theory and European identity (Pollock 2001, Ruzza 2004), the shaping of Eritrean nationhood through war (Tronvoll 1999), and the collapse of myths of ethnic integration in Maluku/Ambon (Turner 2003). Boundaries approaches have been applied to cultural studies (Manzo 1997), literary critique (Corral 1996), and globalization theory (Short, Breitbach, Buckman and Essex 2000).

Some authors have reached quite innovative conclusions, emphasizing how a stress on boundaries and violence can thrive on the lack of actual cultural differences, while the latter could be better interpreted as 'denied resemblance' (Harrison 2002; 2003). In other words, and against common sense misinterpretations, inter-group similarity and cultural assimilation are *not* conductive to stability or peaceful coexistence (Harrison 2002). This version of the boundary approach has been applied most fruitfully to the breakup of Yugoslavia (Carmichael 2005; Cross and Komnenich 2005; Cushman 2004; Kostovicova 2004). The argument for nationalism as a binding enterprise can be confirmed in the Basque case, where Arana's chief goal was to create, re-create, and reinforce the boundary between Basques and non-Basques (Conversi 1997). More generally, a focus on boundaries can be applied to all forms of nationalism, which remain at heart processes of boundary-building and inclusion/exclusion, even though the rhetoric may be one of boundary-maintenance or 'national security' (rather than boundary-construction). For this reason, the role of boundaries needs to be stressed as at least complementary to that of ethnic myths

Ethnic Conflict Studies

Whereas small-N case study and comparative research dominated in Europe, American work often gravitated to large-N quantitative scholarship, maintaining a focus on peace or strategic studies. Literature on ethnic conflict has a more American flavor than is the case for nationalism studies. This is linked to several strands of the American academic ecosystem. First, less concern with the ethnic roots of national identity due to the lack of serious territorial competitors to the Anglo-Protestant dominant group; second, a century-old tradition beginning with John Dewey and the Liberal-Progressives of downplaying or repressing Anglo-Protestant ethnic myths and culture (Kaufmann 2004b); third, the hegemonic status of America as a foreign policy actor which may need to intervene to manage conflicts, as well as to protect specific interests, and hence requires a strategic, large-N view of the world; fourth, a Wilsonian idealism with roots that reach back as far as the nineteenth century peace movement and the turn-of-the-century Progressives – with their belief in the United States's mission to serve as a beacon of interethnic comity for the strife-torn Old World. Finally, there is the emphasis on abstraction, individual rationality and self-ascribed universality in American thought as opposed to the particularism which, at least in the past, many Europeans experienced as part of their mytho-symbolic birthright. As a result, the preponderance of quantitative studies within International Relations and Political Science in the US is unmatched in Europe.

From this milieu came some of the first attempts to amass datasets for large-scale generalization about the sources of ethnic peace and conflict. In 1993, Ted Gurr published two key works, *Why Minorities Rebel* and *Minorities at Risk* (Gurr 1993a, 1993b). These were based on the new Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, founded in 1986 at the University of Maryland. This dataset, which has been updated in four waves up to 2005, attempts to catalogue a list of the world's minority ethnic groups and the states they inhabit. Hundreds of variables relating to group characteristics like size, degree of mobilization and distinctiveness, as well as measures of state discrimination and repression, have been coded. Violence, the dependent variable in many studies, is coded for both minorities (i.e. violent ethnic rebellion) and states (i.e. violent state action). Since 1993, a steady stream of published research has flowed from this important venture, and the data has been made available to the scholarly community. Others have sought to augment the MAR dataset with their own data, producing a distinct brand of scholarship with an ever more institutionalized status within the American political science community. Ted Gurr, often with collaborators such as Barbara Harff or Monty Marshall, has produced a consistently updated set of findings which evolves with the growing sophistication and breadth of the dataset as well as changing international dynamics.

Multiple linear and logistic regression based on the MAR has yielded a series of important findings. First of all, primary ethnic groups with a territorial base that have suffered a loss of autonomy in their past are much more likely to initiate a secessionist movement (Marshall and Gurr 2003). The first part of this statement may strike case-based researchers as self-evident, and highlights some of the pitfalls of a US-based approach to ethnicity which views territorialized groups like the Kurds and non-territorialized immigrant groups like the Turks in Germany or Chinese in Malaysia as analytically similar (Gurr and Harff [1994] 2003). On the other hand, the finding that groups with a memory of lost autonomy – especially if lost recently – are more likely to secede is a theoretically important finding. Ethnosymbolists would interpret it as reinforcing their view that collective memory is a necessary ingredient for nationalism, while modernists would claim that this finding suggests that modern institutional templates are a prerequisite for nationalism and that a mere sense of ethnic history is insufficient.

In Gurr's work, ethnic rebellions are presumed to stem from a combination of three factors: grievances – such as repression or discrimination; capacity for rebellion – related to group unity, mobilization and resources; and opportunities to rebel – which are the product of a favorable international and domestic environment – i.e. regime change, kin support and international recognition or sponsorship. Whereas Horowitz's seminal work (1985) identified many of the regularities to be found in global secessionist movements, Gurr went further by attempting to weigh and quantify the strength of the various effects of incentives, mobilization and opportunities. Mobilization is often a weak spot in nationalism and ethnic conflict case study research, where the focus is on either cultural discourse or state-structural and class factors. Gurr's work showed how important in-group mobilization can be. For instance, Gurr and Marshall found that a group's likelihood of seeking self-determination during 1998-2000 jumped 85 percent if it possessed a cohesive organizational network. Landline telephone network growth during 1995-2000 was also strongly related to a group's likelihood of seeking self-determination. These are not all intuitive results, but they echo earlier comparative work of Miroslav Hroch' which showed that nationalist movements in Europe flourished in centers of expanding communication networks rather than in the multi-ethnic boundary zones where one might expect to find them (Hroch [1985] 2000).

Those who study secession using a case study or small-N method lack the precision of quantitative studies, but can often paint a more nuanced picture based on a wider range of factors than those considered by quantitative researchers. This is because quantitative research is currently limited by the availability of reliable statistical data as well as by the degree of error which accumulates with large numbers of dummy and categorical variables. A good example of fruitful comparative work is Horowitz', which developed a model

of secession that takes account of precipitants like the allocation of civil service posts and inter-regional migration, resource inequalities and the interaction between 'backward' and 'advanced' groups and regions (Horowitz 1985). Others stress the precipitating role of centralization, especially when re-imposed on ethnic federations. They contend that while recentralization can work in non-ethnic federations like Germany, ethnic federations like Yugoslavia cannot be unilaterally centralized. In the latter, secession was preceded by a reversal of the federalism that began with the abolition of Kosovo's and Vojvodina's autonomy in 1989 (Blitz 2006, Conversi 2000; 2003, Ramet 2006).

Ethnic Violence

In Gurr and Harff's model of ethnic rebellion, repression is presumed to increase group mobilization, which in turn powers violent secession. In tests using a 4-stage least-squares model, roughly 40 percent of the variation in rebellion outcomes was predicted. Mobilization proved the strongest predictor of rebellion. Subsequent studies reinforced the importance of mobilization factors. Thus the cohesion of an ethnic group in terms of the density of networks and institutions within the group, and the capacity of group members to communicate with each other, are both related to violent secession. What subsequent tests of Gurr and Harff's model do not bear out is the importance of grievances. In fact, some studies show that discrimination *dampens* a group's likelihood of violent secession (Gurr and Harff [1994] 2003). It is also true that the statistical links from repression and grievances to mobilization are somewhat tentative. Overall, then, the biggest contribution of Gurr's *oeuvre* has been to point theorists to the impact of mobilization factors. This supports some of the insights of the social movements literature, not to mention the older social communications school of Karl Deutsch (1966) or the reverse modernization approach of Walker Connor (1994, 2002).

Gurr and his collaborators have rightly been criticized for the case-selection bias of the MAR dataset. In other words, what is a 'minority at risk' and who defines such a creature? In order to redress this problem, the dataset will need to be augmented by the inclusion of majority groups and dominant minorities (Kaufmann 2004a; 2009). Allowance could also be made for the 'ethnicity-within-ethnicity' or 'onion'-like nature of ethnicity – especially in sub-Saharan Africa – where groups can sometimes fuse into higher-level units with their own mytho-symbolic structures. In a field where the particularism of history and local environments looms so large, missing variables greatly increase the risk of spurious findings. More fatally, the large gaps in the data going back in time make time-series analysis difficult and thus we are confronted with the chicken-egg problem of what causes what. It is likely

that country and year controls would wipe out some of the added value of such an exercise. This said, no statistical dataset can definitively prove causation and dispel all doubt. Some of the findings of the MAR dataset have already proven groundbreaking and this exercise deserves to be developed further.

Other quantitative work has examined the link between ethnic diversity or 'fractionalization' and ethnic conflict. Fractionalization is typically measured by counting the number of ethnic groups within a territory and their relative size to produce an index of ethnic fractionalization (ELF) (Fearon 2003). Much of this work looks at Africa. Here some argue that more homogeneous states like Botswana experience less conflict than heterogeneous ones like Nigeria (Vanhanen 1999). Others contend that the link between ethnic diversity and conflict is a more pronounced feature of the post-Cold War period (Ellingsen 2000). In a recent study of the impact of federalism on ethnic conflict, Saideman and Lanoue also find that ethnic fractionalization is a significant contributor to ethnic violence (Saideman and Lanoue 2005). Using a comparative method, Brendan O'Leary (2001a; 2004) makes a similar point, claiming that federations need a dominant ethnie or *staatsvolk* to cohere over time. Those which are too heterogeneous risk breaking apart in the long term. However, this is disputed by those who argue that the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on violence falls away when we control for poverty (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Meanwhile, some comparativists have remarked upon the lack of a relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and civil strife (Fishman 1997). Whether there is a statistically significant correlation between cultural diversity and ethnic conflict is a matter of dispute. Neither ethnic nor cultural differences can in themselves spur mass violence and civil war (Conversi 2008b), but more diverse contexts are associated with higher levels of civil conflict, especially when there is polarization between two relatively large groups, i.e. Sri Lanka (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Urdal 2008). Moreover, there is a broader consensus that ethnic heterogeneity can be negatively correlated with the effective provision of public goods, thereby providing an occasional catalyst for conflict (Easterly and Levine 1997).

Those who built on the ethnic conflict tradition established by Horowitz include the late Donald Rothchild and his collaborator Anthony Lake. Their instrumentalist-oriented perspective engages with the IR concept of the security dilemma, whereby contending groups overestimate the malign intent and resources of their opponents, and thereby attack pre-emptively, sparking a spiral of violence (Lake and Rothchild 1998a). An attempt to reconcile their work with that of Kaufman's symbolism is found in Cordell and Wolff's framework. It integrates four causal elements including ethnic security dilemmas, symbolic concerns, greed and external interference, and applies these at four layers of analysis: local, state, regional and global (Cordell and

Wolff 2010: 44). Some of the literature also emphasizes the long-running nature of ethnic conflict. Namely, that past conflict feeds present conflict and that conflict prevention depends upon stopping the emergence of a cycle of violence. This literature flags the cumulative rise in violent intra-state conflicts since the 1950s, peaking in 1990, but declining by 2003 to levels unseen since the 1960s (Laitin and Fearon 2003; Marshall and Gurr 2003). However, this trend was reversed from 2004 onwards. Indeed, some conflicts have dramatically deteriorated after 2001, most notably in places like Chechnya and Darfur, while others have become more entrenched and difficult to eradicate, such as Mindanao and West Papua. Finally, new conflicts have erupted in, for instance, southern Thailand, Baluchistan, Waziristan and Ingushetia, while entire regions of Afghanistan and Iraq were engulfed in new civil wars. Despite this, much of the credit for lower aggregate levels of ethnic violence during 1990-2003 goes to new dispute resolution efforts by outside mediators, as well as new forms of democratization like power-sharing (Kriesberg 1998). This in turn opens up an entire literature on democratization and ethnic conflict.

The Role of Democratization and Democracy

Zakaria (1997) famously wrote that despite the new third wave of plebiscitary democracies in the 1990s, there were few impartial judges. The new 'illiberal democracies' frequently failed to deliver freedom and prosperity to their populations. In fact, noted Zakaria, the reverse was more often true: democracy often gave vent to 'hypernationalism' and ethnic conflict. Gurr and Marshall empirically confirm this, pointing out that the incidence of violent conflict is much higher in democratizing or semi-democratic states than in either autocracies or consolidated democracies (Marshall and Gurr 2003). This theme was developed further by Jack Snyder and Harvey Mansfield, who looked at the issue historically (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Snyder argues that democracy allows a winning party to appeal directly to the people and use populist nationalism to curtail the power of liberal institutions like the judiciary. Even a free press may turn to nationalism and can serve as an instrument for whipping up ethnic conflict. Snyder further contends that nations undergoing democratic transition are substantially more likely to be aggressive and war-prone. Over two centuries in Europe, for example, Snyder found the average chance of war in any decade to be 1 in 6, but for democratizing states this climbed to 1 in 4. The only solution, claims Snyder, is to allow societies to develop cross-cutting cleavages and liberal institutions prior to the introduction of plebiscitary democracy (Snyder 2000).

Zakaria and Snyder's work gave rise to a rapidly expanding body of research, which can be described as 'demo-skepticism' (Conversi 2006). This

work often finds a link between democratization and increased *ethnic* conflict, much as Horowitz (1985) would have predicted. Linz and Stepan argue that it is the sequential order of electoral turnouts that influences conflict: when the first free election occurs at the regional level, ethnic conflict is more likely to occur, when national elections are held first, conflict is less likely to take an ethnic form (Linz and Stepan 1992).

Constitutionalism and constitution-making are also essential (Reynolds 2002). In the case of Yugoslavia, anti-Constitutionalism was an essential factor in the ensuing break-up (Conversi 2003; Gallagher 2003; Ramet 2006). For Sabrina Ramet a partial liberation of the media in a heavily polarized environment can provide a congenial framework for ethnic conflict, as with Serbia between 1987 and 1999 (Ramet 2006). Meanwhile, Amy Chua points to the explosive combination of economically-dominant ethnic minorities, market liberalization and democratization. Mass elections and plebiscites allow the economically marginal majority to vent their discontent on increasingly prominent global trading minorities like the overseas Chinese or Indians (Chua 2002).

Some demo-skeptic authors maintain that exclusionary nationalism is woven into the logical fabric of democracy. Andreas Wimmer claims that nationalism is both inseparable from modernity and inherently exclusionary in its logic. Simply put, popular sovereignty and ethnic exclusivity are two sides of the same coin, while political modernity unfolds in a nationalist way. As the 'people' become the fount of authority, the 'others' (mercenaries, foreign rulers, ethnic minorities, non-citizens) are expunged (Wimmer 2003-4; 2006). Similar arguments emerge from historically-informed normative theory (Ringmar 1998). Michael Mann takes the point further, claiming that ethnic cleansing is associated with stalled democratization (Mann 2005). From Yugoslavia to Burundi, democratization has also been linked to the rise of ethnic parties which seek to outbid their more moderate rivals by making extremist ethnic noises (Chandra 2004). One problem remains the difficulty in defining democracy in the context of ethnic politics, especially in highly ethnicized polities (Conversi 2006, 2008b). In cases where one ethnic group exercises control, the term 'ethnocracy' has been applied (Ben-Dor 2007; Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004).

Ranged against those who argue that democratization spawns ethnic and nationalist conflict are a more optimistic set of scholars with feet in either the older canon of democratic peace theory or the newer field of democracy in divided societies. For instance, using the well-regarded Correlates of War (COW) and Polity III datasets, Ward and Gleditsch (1998) found little support for Mansfield and Snyder's 'democratization equals nationalist conflict' equation. Even so, they acknowledged that Snyder's point was more valid for cases where the transition to democracy was unsteady, experiencing reversals. Other theorists challenge the theoretical linkage between democracy and

nationalism posited by writers like Wimmer. A consensus view is that consolidated democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, and that the greatest risk of ethnic and nationalist conflict comes during the transition from autocracy to democracy. The recent democratic revolutions of the Arab Spring will provide an interesting test of competing propositions.

Whatever the impact of democratization on nationalist inter-state conflict, fewer are willing to contest the claim that democratization has led to deeper *ethnic* (intra-state) divisions due to the rise of ethnic party systems in divided societies. Yet even here, some observers believe that democracy, by serving as an institutional outlet for ethnic claims, can ultimately lead to lower levels of conflict. This is particularly true if there are a large number of parties, which can satisfy a full range of ethnic constituencies, or if cross-cutting electoral cleavages have gained an institutional footing, as in India (Chandra 2004; Oommen 1994). In addition, theorists of multicultural and consociational democracy – see chapter 3 in this book – claim that the recognition of collective rights and identities can allow democracy to flourish in divided societies (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Patten 2003).

Here, some have found that consociationalism combined with the art of local-level political compromise and segmental autonomy helps to explain success stories like that of Indian democracy (Lijphart 1996; see also Lustick 1997). Lijphart (2002) also pointed out the need to distinguish between negotiation democracy and consensus democracy.

Following the milestone work of Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1977; 2008), there is an extensive body of literature extolling the virtue of 'consociational democracy' in clear opposition to majoritarian democracy. Long-term stability in deeply divided societies characterized by ethnic segmentation is seen as a consequence of non-majoritarian institution building endowed with non-majoritarian mechanisms for conflict resolution. This debate has produced a wealth of data, controversies and widely respected policy recommendations (Cordell and Wolff 2010; Wolff 2010). Policy recommendations are central to this approach, highlighting the need for consociational engineering as the most promising way to achieve stable democracy, despite the risk of gridlock like in Belgium. Particularly important here is John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary's comparative work on power-sharing, based on the experience of post-conflict Northern Ireland as an ethnically divided society (McGarry 2001b; McGarry and O'Leary 2004c).

The record of consociational and federal arrangements is, however, mixed. Some, like Lebanon, have become unstable as the demographic balance has altered (Di Mauro 2008; McGarry 2001c; Schulze 2001). A recent study could identify no more than thirteen true cases of power-sharing worldwide, and Lijphart himself could only name four instances of consociationalism outside Europe. For Donald Horowitz, power-sharing arrangements have no significant effect on political stability, though they positively affect a

country's democratic accountability rating (Horowitz 2001). According to a more econo-centric approach, the raising of human development indicators like education and income are a more effective tool than constitutionalism for dampening conflict (Norris and Mattes 2003). Consociationalism's mixed empirical record has bred skepticism among some of the model's critics (Dixon 2012; Horowitz 2003). This has, in turn, led consociationalists to powerfully rebut their opponents' proposals, particularly Horowitz's conflict resolution propositions. For instance, O'Leary and McGarry's advice is directly at odds with Horowitz's view that the inclusion of militants [in peace agreements] is destabilizing and should be resisted (McGarry 2001b: 24). Thus there remains no settled view on how best to achieve stability and 'normality' in deeply divided societies, even economically prosperous ones like Northern Ireland (McGarry 2001a; McGarry and O'Leary 2010).

Ethnic and Nationalist Mobilization

One of the reasons for the persistence of deeply divided societies is ethnic institutions which reproduce ethnic cleavages over time. These are causally prior to the emergence of ethnic or nationalist political parties. Though Lipset and Rokkan's seminal (1967) work on cleavages acknowledges that political institutions can help to produce cleavages, most political scientists too readily reach for endogenous political explanations based on institutional mechanics. In fact, much of the story is missed if we ignore the sociological forces operating 'from below'. The dynamics of ethnic mobilization in associations remains a sorely neglected area of study. As Mann notes, it is simply insufficient to assume an automatic process of mass mobilization following on from the discourses of elites (Mann 2005). Likewise, one should not assume that ethnic political parties or armed insurgents spring up instantly. Given the importance of mobilization in quantitative studies, we need more research on manifestations of ethnicity and nationalism in civil society.

This means more examination of ethnic associations and patriotic societies. Patriotic societies were important in the development of nationalism in revolutionary France (i.e. Republican clubs), Switzerland (i.e. the *Helvetic Society*) and elsewhere in Europe (Cossart 2003; Zimmer 2003). Later, cultural associations like the *Gaelic League* in Ireland helped spread the ideas of romantic intellectuals and generate the impetus for the nationalist movements within the European empires in the nineteenth century (Hutchinson 1987). For Hroch, phase 'A' nationalism involves small coteries of romantic nationalist intellectuals, who spawn cultural associations (phase 'B') which in turn generate mass political nationalism (phase 'C') (Hroch [1985] 2000). Associations continued to play a role after the state was formed, as during the age of growing nationalist belligerence in Europe during 1870-1914. Here Snyder

has charted the rising membership of nationalist pressure groups in Germany in this period (Snyder 2000: 114).

There is a small case-study literature on groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Munson 2001), Hindu nationalist RSS in India (Bhatt 2004), British-Protestant Orange Order in Ireland, Canada and Scotland (Houston and Smyth 1980; Kaufmann 2007; Patterson and Kaufmann 2007) and Afrikaner *Broederbond* in South Africa (Bloomberg 1989). Putnam's work on social capital in the United States highlights the rise and decline of American associations – many ethnic or religious in nature – over the course of the twentieth century (Putnam 2000). Some of these – notably patriotic societies like the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) or American Legion – played key roles in organizing mass commemorations and parades which reinforced national identity (O'Leary 2001a; Kammen 1991; Bodnar 2000). Varshney (2002) makes a valiant attempt to link the two solitudes of ethnic conflict and social capital studies by examining the role of associations in ethnic conflict, notably in India. He finds that where inter-ethnic associational life is weak and intra-ethnic ones strong, ethnic conflict is more likely, and vice-versa.

We also find a theoretical literature on social movements, with some application to nationalism (Johnston 1994). Tarrow points to the importance for mobilization of easy communication within a group and the fact that social movements are often constituted by congeries of smaller face-to-face groups (Tarrow 1994). This echoes Gurr's large-N quantitative findings. However, much of the social movements literature related to nationalism examines framing narratives. Less has been written on what causes mobilization to succeed or fail. Why, for instance, did Sinn Fein's attempt to mobilize support for Irish nationalism fail so miserably in 1914 and then succeed in 1916? Why did the Orange Order in Northern Ireland help organize successful Protestant protests against power sharing with Catholics in 1974 and 1987 yet see support for this stance ebb during the early 1990s (Kaufmann 2007)? An interesting attempt to explain the Sinn Fein case has been provided by Githens-Mazer (2006), who argues for the importance of a 'cultural trigger point'. This is defined as an event which takes place in a symbolically-charged setting and leads to a step-change in support for nationalist organizations.

Munson's work on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt contends that the Brotherhood's decentralized structure and mosque-building activities allows its membership to hold a diversity of views and practices while insinuating itself into local communities and national politics. This contains serious ideological disagreements within the organisation by sequestering them at local level. Members join for various reasons – such as conviviality – and bring their pre-existing social networks into the Brotherhood, increasing its size and power. This resource can then be used by politicians. On the other hand, the overly centralized communist party in Egypt suffered from its 'one-size-

fits-all' model and failed to map onto pre-existing social networks (Munson 2001).

A similar tale could be told about the success of the Orange Order in Northern Ireland, whose membership has been heavily divided over issues like support for land reform, class issues and backing for the Official Unionist Party, but has cohered due to the social attractions of local Orange parades, lodge meetings and family ties (Kaufmann 2007). In radical Basque nationalism, ideological contrasts, cultural differences and political pluralism could be superseded through both the boundary-building effect of violence and the powerful street presence of nationalist symbols. Thus the roster of Basque nationalists includes not only peasants, small businesspeople, cultural traditionalists and Marxists, but newer subcultures like environmentalists, punks and gays (Conversi 1997).

As we move from the associational level to democratic politics – sidestepping non-democratic forms for the moment – we encounter the growing literature on ethnic parties. Once again, this emerges out of Horowitz's magisterial work (1985). The norm in 'third wave' democracies in divided societies is to spawn ethnic party systems. This arises due to the ready presence of ethnicity as an organizing principle for political mobilization and the absence of institutionalized cross-cutting cleavages (Chandra 2004). In Africa, elections were responsible for ethnic conflict in many societies in the 1990s, including Kenya, Uganda, Malawi, Angola and Cote d'Ivoire. Horowitz defines ethnic parties as those that derive their support from an identifiable ethnic group and serve the interests of that group (Horowitz 1985). According to Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes, Afrobarometer data from 1999-2000 covering twelve sub-Saharan African countries confirms Horowitz's hypothesis that ethnicity is a significant predictor of party choice. This was true in 8 of 12 states sampled even when controlling for social variables like age, class, poverty and urbanization. Ethnic voting is marked in heterogeneous societies like Nigeria and South Africa, but less evident in more homogeneous societies like Botswana and Lesotho (Norris and Mattes 2003).

Some writers qualify this picture by pointing to the unstable, multilayered and shifting nature of ethnopolitical cleavages in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus the multi-layered, 'onion'-like morphology of African ethnicity interacts with the political system to produce shifting multi-ethnic coalitions rather than the enduring binary or tripartite ethnic cleavages of the kind Horowitz described in societies like Guyana, Trinidad, Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka. Thus most African societies are not 'deeply-divided' in the Horowitzian sense. Though there is a debate as to whether African societies are deeply divided into competing ethnic blocs, there does seem to be a consensus that politics on the continent is based primarily on ethnopolitical cleavages in the broadest sense – even if these shift. This is confirmed in the handful of quantitative studies

which look at the connection between indices of ethnic diversity – such as the ELF (ethnic fractionalization index, based on cultural groups) or PREG (politically-relevant ethnic groups – based only on politically salient groups) – and the number of political parties (Posner 2005; Cox 1997; Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2000; Mozaffar et al. 2003). These might be viewed as analogous to the class or religious cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan identified as the basis of European electoral cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Floating voters and cross-cutting cleavages are thus not particularly evident. Another point of relative agreement is that third wave democratization has led to an increase in the politicization of ethnicity – whether this takes the form of ethnic parties, multi-ethnic parties or multi-ethnic coalitions of small ethnic parties.

The International Dimension

Thus far we have mainly considered domestic sources of ethnic and nationalist mobilization. However, international factors, though often overstated by International Relations (IR) scholars, have an important role to play in the last two stanzas of our five-stage model in figure 1. The new paradigm of constructivist theory in IR, as developed by Alexander Wendt, among others, has made great strides in refining the crude paradigm of neo-realism. Neo-realism views states as billiard balls with well-defined, state-national interests. The constructivist critique of the neo-realists and neo-liberals, remarks Checkel, 'concerns not what these scholars do and say but what they ignore: the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics'. In other words, peering into the black box of states, constructivism finds competing ethnic interests/lobbies, diasporic ethnic ties and ethno-cultural ties between countries which structure the decisions of state actors (Checkel 1998; Wendt 1994). There are five distinct modes of international influence on ethnicity and nationalism: state support for ethnic secessionist movements for neo-realist or neo-liberal reasons; second, ethnic foreign policy lobbies within states; third, national identity and foreign policy, including irredentist nationalist lobbyists; fourth, international law and norms pertaining to rights of self-determination and sovereignty; and finally, globalization and cosmopolitanism.

For the sake of brevity, we will not deal with traditional neo-realist and neo-liberal accounts of state sponsorship for secession as these were more potent issues during the Cold War. This literature continues to be important, however (Esman 2005). The second mode, ethnic lobbies/interests, has been covered by many, particularly foreign policy lobbies like the Israel or pro-Serbian lobbies in the United States (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006; Blitz 1996) or the diasporic nationalism of overseas communities like the Hindus,

Sikhs and Irish (O'Day 1999; Shain and Barth 2003; Mukta and Bhatt 2000). This links up with the vast literature on diaspora ethnic consciousness and long-distance nationalism. Here new communications technologies are viewed as a useful tool for maintaining ethnic consciousness over long distances and across generations (Eriksen 2007; Safran 2006; Huntington 2005, ch. 10).

Theoretical work has also examined national identity and foreign policy, our third form of international influence. The sympathies linking Russia and Greece to Orthodox Serbia (Michas 2002), or those which bind the nations of the Muslim Middle East, cannot be brushed aside by those who decide these states' foreign policy. Cultural determinists go so far as to say that these cultural interests are the primary drivers of state policy (Conversi 2004). Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1996) is a classic work of constructivist IR theory premised on civilizational-religious ties which constrain foreign policy. That said, the thesis has been heavily criticized, not least for ignoring the power of intra-civilizational conflict (i.e. Japan vs China; Iran vs. Iraq) and cross-civilizational overtures (i.e. the Armenia-Iran entente) (Fox 2002). One researcher found that despite neorealist predictions that many states – notably in Africa – would not foment secession for fear of destabilizing their own societies, ties of ethnic kinship across state boundaries drove many African states to support separatist movements in neighboring countries. The same dynamic operated in the former Yugoslavia (Saideman 2001). Quantitative studies have also demonstrated that ethnic kin in neighboring states who also harbor separatist desires were a major spur to domestic secessionist and irredentist movements in the 1980s and 1990s (Saideman and Ayres 2000).

Another body of research directly examines the connections between national identity and foreign policy. For example, EU nations like Britain which have long traditions of liberal democracy and statehood and cultural ties to the United States will respond very differently to EU expansion than Germany, a nation which in many ways seeks to transcend its political past by acting through the European project. The argument has been refined furthest by Ilya Prizel, who provides numerous historical examples of mass national identity driving states to undertake policy, often against their own material interests – as with the Crimean War, Anglo-Spanish War of 1739 or the aggressive foreign policy stance of Japan in its 1894 wars against Korea and China. He also brings the argument into the present by examining the influence of national identity on the foreign policy of several Eastern European states (Wallace 1991; Prizel 2003).

International recognition is the final step in figure 1, and secessionist movements are only 'fully-fledged' when they gain international recognition as independent states. Though Taiwan and Somaliland are *de facto* states, one could argue that they lack an element of existential security. Although not recognized by the international community, there are numerous such 'quasi-

states'. The Transdniestrian Republic in Moldova, Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and (till 2006) Montenegro in the ex- 'Yugoslav federation', Iraqi Kurdistan, the Bougainville islands in Papua New Guinea, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland and Puntland in ex-Somalia, and several regions of Burma. All are instances of states not recognized by the international community and therefore situated in a position of political limbo (Jackson 1990).

A related vein of literature charts the evolution of international norms of self-determination and state sovereignty. The general view is that international law and norms are influenced by state leaders in such bodies as the UN (a 'club of states') and as such there is little incentive for recognizing the right of peoples to self-determination. Though there was a slight pause in this rule after World War I with Wilson's sympathy for self-determination, the idea was bedeviled by great power considerations and problems in defining precisely who are 'the people' who deserve self-determination. The breakup of empire is seen as the one exception which may allow for the recognition of secession, not only after World War I (i.e. Habsburg, Ottoman), but in the two subsequent waves of state creation following decolonization and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Thus among the numerous secessionist movements of 1945-89, only Bangladesh and Singapore succeeded.

Though some saw the end of the Cold War as heralding a revival of self-determination, the reality has been much messier (Mayall 1991). The recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by the European Community was highly controversial (Ramet and Coffin 2001; Ramet 2006), and cases like Eritrea (Tronvoll 1999), South Sudan, Kosovo and East Timor (Kiernan 2002) appear to be the exception rather than the rule. Multicultural ideas have tended to back away from the idea of separatism and instead endorse intermediate solutions involving cultural recognition and some measure of political autonomy short of independence (Coakley 2001; Ghai 2000; Jackson-Preece 1997). All of this means that the international community will continue to resist the creation of new states on the back of separatist movements and instead opt for federal and consociational arrangements.

The final form of literature on international influence on ethnicity/nationnalism runs through globalization and cosmopolitanism. Globalization, defined as the intensification and spread of interactions across state and national boundaries, has certainly expanded since the invention of the term 'globalization' in 1960. Though the globalization debate has stagnated in recent years and globalists' voices are fainter than they were, this is still an important concept to grapple with. Global imagery drawn from both multinational-corporate iconography and a *pastiche* of national cultures increasingly constitutes the mass-cultural landscape of many parts of the world. Global events instantly register with many across the world, thus the global helps to constitute the local (Waters 1995; Giddens 1991; Held 1995). The global

economy has become increasingly standardized and capital and resources flow freely via global financial markets. Multinational corporations maintain ever more global operations and are thriving (Barber 1995; Ohmae 1995). Political globalization has also advanced, albeit falteringly. Many of these changes have taken place in Europe, where the European Union has acquired real powers from European nation-states in areas such as monetary policy, migration policy, trade and, especially, law, which is in turn often subordinate to international law.

On the other hand, some might argue that if we extract cross-border transactions between neighboring countries (*transnationalism*) and exclude *international* forums like the UN which reinforce national identity, then the influence of global networks still remains relatively weak. The growing proportion of GDP spent by state governments also suggests that states are strengthening rather than weakening their grip. Only in Europe is there a case for arguing that the state has become modestly weaker (Mann 1997) and the EU is currently in crisis, facing unprecedented opposition, even in Europhile nations. Elsewhere, evidence is murkier. Canadian trade with the United States, for example, has expanded markedly as a percentage of the Canadian total since the 1970s, despite 'Asia-Pacific' rhetoric and talk of globalization. The growth of the nation-state often accompanies globalization rather than running counter to it (Hirst and Thompson 1995). Still others flag up the ubiquitous nature of globalization in world history, speaking of the 'archaic globalization' that has taken place in many pre-modern epochs (Bayly 2004). Some argue that the use and abuse of the term globalization has rendered the concept largely vacuous and ineffective (Conversi 2010). Others have written that the idea of nationalism is itself a global one, and that its global spread helped to unseat an *ancien regime* of religious dynasties and spread the norm of national self-determination (Hutchinson 2005). Once again, nationalism and globalization often make good bedfellows.

There is also the problem of distinguishing the globalization of *culture* from global *identity* (or cosmopolitanism). Some assume that one automatically leads to the other. However, the image of the hard-line Islamic militant celebrating the 9/11 bombings in a Chicago Bears t-shirt is not a contradiction. It has long been the case that cultural interaction is the catalyst for heightened cultural consciousness. As Walker Connor notes, the Irish became nationalist as they lost their distinctive language (Connor 2004). Similar developments occurred in Wales, and we can also note this trend among the native-born children of immigrants, who substitute ethnic identity for the ethnic culture they have lost. Even so, the outcome of interaction is never predetermined. The Cornish never developed their nationalism as strongly as the Welsh or Irish despite language loss, and many have been attracted by cosmopolitan identities (i.e. Islamic, Roman) in history while numerous immigrants have assimilated to their host societies. Assimilation and national

reawakening are both common throughout recorded history and it remains unclear whether the trend today favors one or other mode.

Coercive assimilation may not be as successful as voluntary assimilation. According to George Schöpflin (2000, p. 272), top-down assimilation is unworkable in most contemporary polities: even if apparently effective, coercive assimilation is counterproductive, as it is often achieved at enormous costs, leaving a legacy of bitterness and resentment. It was a realistic option only when people migrated from the countryside to the urban centers, where they had to shed an entire lifestyle. Assimilation was then part of a wider package of adaptive tricks that, willingly or not, peoples were constrained to accept. Peering closely at concrete cases, we seem to find increasing voluntary assimilation in western societies where inter-ethnic, inter-racial and inter-religious marriage have grown markedly since the 1960s. Some have also remarked upon the rise in 'symbolic' and optional forms of ethnicity as individual genealogies become increasingly polygenetic (Lieberson and Waters 1988; Alba 1990; Gans 1979; Pieterse 1997). Rogers Brubaker adds that mid-1990s shifts in the intellectual and political climate within the centre-left in the United States and Europe have reversed the emphasis on multiculturalism and revived integrationist and even assimilationist ideas (Brubaker 2001; see also Sabbagh 2005). Worldwide, this trend may be the exception and not the rule, however: residential segregation and endogamy have increased in divided societies like Northern Ireland since 1995, and remain entrenched in most of the world's conflict areas.

Another key development in the West is the post-1960s upsurge in post-ethnic norms of nationhood and citizenship (Martiniello 2001). This is linked to liberal value changes which largely preceded the new waves of non-white immigration. Dominant ethnic groups within nation-states found a liberal wedge driven between them and 'their' nation-state (Kaufmann 2003). These post-1960s liberal norms typically prod nations to define their identities inclusively rather than ethnically and to craft public policies on citizenship and immigration which can accommodate ethnic diversity. The repeal of ethnically and racially exclusive immigration laws in the United States (1965), Canada (1962-67) and Australia (1966) is cited as evidence of this shift (Breton 1988; Forrest and Dunn 2006). Others note the discursive change in many western separatist nationalisms from Quebec to Catalonia and Scotland from ethnic to civic/linguistic nationalism (Brown 2000, Juteau 2004). One can also add the shift away from ethnically circumscribed citizenship laws in Germany (1999) and EU/OSCE pressure on new member states like Estonia to adopt inclusive citizenship policies and accord minorities cultural rights. Some contend that the impetus behind these developments stems from norms of 'universal personhood' (Soysal 1994) while others see domestic liberal reform as the key to understanding these shifts (Joppke 1999).

The rise of far right parties in Europe and Australia provides a partial exception to the rule of declining dominant-ethnic nationalism in the West.

Even so, despite impressive shares of the popular vote in certain elections, notably in Austria and France, and the far right's ability to influence policies through coalitions with the mainstream right, they have been unable to steer public policy in the direction of ethnic nationalist policies like the introduction of ethnic criteria for immigration and citizenship (Betz and Immerfall 1998; Bale 2003). This said, many western nation-states like Britain, France or Holland – to some degree due to pressure from the far right – have taken steps to shore up a republican-style civic nationalism, while mainstream left-wing discourse has increasingly turned away from identity politics and multiculturalism (Brubaker 2001; Sabbagh 2005). Canada remains as a multicultural outlier, though this policy bitterly divides English-speaking liberals from both Anglo conservatives and Quebec nationalists (McRoberts 1997).

A different strand of globalization research shows that economic globalization need not entail cosmopolitanism (Resnick 2005): for example, Hindu nationalists switched from the *Swadeshi* doctrine of economic self-sufficiency to advocating neo-liberal competition and globalization – all the while promoting their ethno-nationalist agenda (Wyatt 2000). On the other hand, some states like Canada have used the rhetoric of economic globalization to push their societies toward a post-national, multicultural model in which nationalism is weakened (Sigurdson 2000). Arguably the content of globalized messages matters more than their sheer volume. Are the messages of globalism nationalist or cosmopolitan? Eriksen argues that the internet has enabled the development of nationalist and ethnic connections, though trans-national interests also flourish (Eriksen 2007). Overall, research suggests that globalization has probably been accompanied by stronger ethnic and national identities outside the West, while the verdict within the West is mixed. In summary, while global interactions have increased in speed and number since the 1960s, this has not been at the expense of national identity.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out developments in the field of ethnicity and nationalism, broadly conceived. As we move from ethnogenesis through to ethnic and nationalist mobilization to separatism and thence to the international dimension, we find blossoming new literatures at each step. These have built upon the foundations laid by pioneering theorists in the early-to-mid 1980s. Many advances have been made. The European-dominated nationalism literature has fleshed out an increasingly wide variety of approaches in the theoretical toolkit, encompassing materialist, political-instrumentalist, military, institutionalist, culturalist and sociobiological explanations. Modernist and instrumentalist explanations continue to dominate, but are resisted by a significant minority. Few would now argue – as Marxists and modernization

theorists once did – for the complete plasticity of human actors in the hands of elites, and many recognize that the determinants of ethnicity and nationalism are multiple and vary by case. A small literature on ethnogenesis has explored the interface between older identities like religion and newer ones like ethnicity (Mitchell 2006; Zawadzki 2005) while instrumentalists have delineated the ways in which political exigencies have shaped the boundaries of ethnic communities.

In the United States, large-N quantitative studies have demonstrated the importance of mundane mobilization factors like intra-group communication networks in the development of separatist movements. The social movements literature points to the importance of decentralized organizations and dense, overlapping social networks in spawning successful ethnic and national movements. Where ethnic associations are dense and impede inter-ethnic contact and integration, ethnic conflict is more likely. Work on nationalism and democracy tells us that democratization, especially if tenuous, often increases violence and instability, though consolidated democracy dampens conflict. Research on ethnic party systems reinforces the insights of Horowitz (1985) that democracy in deeply divided societies without strong liberal institutions or cross-cutting cleavages fragments along ethnic lines, further deepening ethnic cleavages. However, in states which consist of a deeply diverse array of groups (as in parts of Africa), multiethnic parties and coalitions flourish which may mitigate the kind of binary divisions that produce enduring conflict.

Work on the international aspect of ethnicity and nationalism has expanded due to the success of the constructivist paradigm in IR. Research has flagged the centrality of ethnic kin support in neighboring states as a driver of separatism and traced the role of ethnic lobbies in states' foreign policies. Other work sketches the ethno-cultural affinities between nations as a determinant or constraint on a 'realist' foreign policy based purely on material state interests. Those who track developments in international norms and law see little change in the trend toward privileging state sovereignty over the self-determination of minority peoples. Separatists will continue to find little international support for new state creation, but will be encouraged to seek cultural recognition and political autonomy within the existing state system. Finally, research into the impact of globalization indicates that while global connections have increased, they remain dwarfed by traditional cross-border flows. Moreover, even global networks have not dampened national identity: conversely, they have arguably strengthened nationalism in many parts of the world. Only in the West has cosmopolitanism made headway: there has been a limited decline of state sovereignty in Europe and a pronounced decline in ethnic nationalism throughout the West. Nevertheless, the specter of a rising far right throws the future of even these modest trends into doubt.