

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
DEVELOPING
WORLD

Volume 1

A–E
INDEX

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E D I T O R

A new regime, dominated by Donald Reid Cabral, a former car salesman, lasted until April 1965 when pro-Bosch military officers, led by Francisco Caamaño Deñó, staged a revolt to return the exiled Bosch to power. As the death toll in the civil war mounted, and it became increasingly apparent that Caamaño Deñó's Constitutionals were taking control of the capital city of Santo Domingo, US President Lyndon Johnson ordered twenty-three thousand Marines to invade the Dominican Republic. Although the Organization of American States (OAS) eventually sanctioned the intervention by agreeing to send in additional troops, this was the first overt use of US military forces in Latin America since the Marines were withdrawn from Haiti in 1934. Ostensibly sent to protect lives and prevent the establishment of a pro-Castro government, the OAS forces supervised democratic elections in 1966, which were won by Joaquín Balaguer, who had been the titular president at the time of Trujillo's assassination. During Balaguer's tenure in office from 1966 to 1978, the Dominican Republic experienced the most spectacular growth of any Latin American nation during the 1970s. The nation's economic boom was made possible by political stability and a revitalized sugar industry.

High inflation and unemployment undermined Balaguer's hold on power during his third term. In 1978, Balaguer lost the presidential elections to the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). Although Antonio Guzmán's administration implemented numerous health and education projects, by 1980, the economy had fallen into a recession. Plagued by the rising cost of oil imports, a sharp decline in the profits from sugar exports, and accusations that his daughter Sonia was involved in corrupt activities, Guzmán, a wealthy cattle rancher, decided not to run for reelection in 1982. The 1982 elections were won by PRD candidate Salvador Jorge Blanco. The day before he would have left office, President Guzmán committed suicide. Jorge Blanco's administration experienced a tremendous loss of popularity and legitimacy when it implemented International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures in May of 1984. A series of violent riots broke out, which led to the death of dozens of Dominican citizens. Jorge Blanco was found guilty in a court of law of massive corruption and misappropriation of government funds and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Given the poor performance of the PRD governments, Balaguer returned to office in 1986. Balaguer won subsequent elections in 1990 and 1994. Acknowledging that there were voting irregularities in the 1994 election, Balaguer agreed to step down from the presidency in 1996 and hold new presidential elections.

The 1996 elections pitted José Francisco Peña Gómez (PRD) against Bosch protégé Leonel Fernández, who represented the Partido de Liberación Dominicana (PLD). Fernández, a young lawyer who had grown up in New York City, initiated a series of reforms designed to modernize the political economy and infrastructure. Sugar exports no longer represented a substantial component of Dominican revenue. Instead, tourism, mining (especially nickel), and remittances from Dominicans living abroad, primarily in the United States, accounted for the majority of Dominican revenue. Attempts were made to convert the sugar-growing lands to the production of other agricultural crops, such as pineapples, for export. Fernández was barred by the Constitution from running for reelection in 2000. PRD candidate Hipólito Mejía won the 2000 presidential elections. Mejía's administration has been characterized by excessive corruption, rising inflation, and a greatly devaluated national currency. The 2004 presidential elections were won by Fernández, who promised to reinvestigate the Dominican economy.

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See also Haiti; Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas

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DOMINO THEORY

The domino theory, or domino effect, was made famous by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), who, in order to justify US commitment to South Vietnam in 1954, compared the nations of Southeast Asia to a row of dominoes: if the Communist guerrillas were victorious in Vietnam, the rest of Indochina, and then the rest of Asia, would also eventually fall to Communism. The rapid advent of Communist regimes in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and

Yugoslavia following the end of World War II was used as evidence to support this premise.

By the same token, the demise of Communism in the Soviet Union would affect all Eastern European countries one after another, much like a chain reaction. It was hence popularly assumed to be a case of domino effect. This view overlooked that the Soviet bloc and its satellites represented a highly centralized system held together by an overarching ideology. Once the center and ideology could not hold, the periphery had no other choice but to loosen. Socialist countries were not so much independent entities prone to one another's influence, as parts of a single unified framework.

The metaphor evoked by the falling dominoes is used in both social and exact sciences, where several competing permutations can be found with slightly different meanings: chain reaction, forest fire models, avalanche dynamics, branching process, and so on. Moreover, the theoretical setup is based on medical-biological assumptions of "contagion," "disease," "viruses," and similar epidemiological jargon.

The concept reached its peak of influence during the Cold War, but continued to be applied to various international events in the aftermath of epochal changes. Even before the official end of the Cold War (marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989), the concept was used to describe the possible spread of nationalism. The theory was adopted by both liberals and conservatives in the United States.

The concept's heuristic validity is complicated by its partisan political use. Indeed, the ghost of a domino effect has been used by various regimes in order to hamper broader democratic reform, while curtailing ethnic dissent. This was particularly the case among several developing countries during and after the Cold War. In the early 1990s, a long series of human rights violations by Asian states was dictated by fear of a hypothetical nationalist domino effect caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, including: China's stepping up of repression in Tibet and Sinkiang; Burma's refusal to allow democratic reforms in fear of civil war; Indonesia's uneasiness about revelations of mass slaughter in East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua; India's stranglehold on Assam, Punjab, Kashmir, and other restless areas; Pakistan's repression of the Sindh minority; Sri Lanka's offensive against Tamil separatism; Georgia's move to autocratic rule; Turkey's confrontation with the Kurdish insurgency; and Iran's resort to radicalism in the face of occasional tensions in border areas. In Africa, the fear of a domino effect was amplified by Eritrea's independence and the separation of northern Somaliland. In Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), Mali, and Nigeria,

thousands died in ethnic clashes, often linked to the central governments' refusal to come to terms with ethnic demands. Finally, Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990 can be seen as a classic case of "externalization" of internal tensions resulting from a fear of contagion of both political Islam and ethno-national tensions.

All these cases were related to a worldwide concern about the inevitable dissolution of multinational states. The ghost of "balkanization" was raised as a tangible threat. Although threats from political opposition were sometimes tangible, they often became only a pretext to eliminate internal dissidence. Indeed, the same illiberal trend has pervaded the domestic and foreign policy of most multinational states, with the possible exceptions of federations like Canada and the European Union—the latter through the elasticity of Brussels' accommodating politics.

Although the theory had initially some strategic validity, the fear of a domino effect was, and will remain, at the roots of catastrophic choices in foreign policy. It was this fear that impelled Western elites to support Saddam Hussein's totalitarian regime in his war against Iran (1980–1988). The consequences of this decision, causing over a million deaths, will probably carry through for decades. The tragic blunder stemmed from the conviction that, following Iran's Islamic revolution, the fall of the Shah (1979) would be the first domino to tip other autocratic states in the Middle East toward Islamic rule. A panic-struck Western world reacted by supporting Iraq's Ba'athist regime with massive input of weapons and cash.

The danger of expanding Communism was certainly vivid in the aftermath of the Korean War (1950–1953). However, the theory's more recent adaptations rely mostly on a paranoid vision of the world and are rather characteristic of nationalist or imperial *geopolitics* (*Geopolitik* in German). The latter discipline was associated with the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) and his theory of the organic nature of the State. Geopolitics was easily appropriated by the Nazi expansionist state, with its idea of *Lebensraum* ("Living space") as "essential" for the survival of the German race.

The domino theory has been particularly influential among US foreign policy and security experts, as an exemplification of what Richard Hofstadter called "*The Paranoid Style in American Politics*": "The exponents [of the] . . . paranoid style . . . regard a 'vast' or 'gigantic' conspiracy as the motive force in historical events. . . . The paranoid spokesman sees the fate of this conspiracy in apocalyptic terms—he traffics in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political orders, whole systems of human

values. He is always manning the barricades of civilization” (1996, p. 29).

A more “assertive,” less defensive, version of the theory was adopted by the interventionist hawks in President George W. Bush’s administration: They argued that Saddam Hussein’s fall would be followed by the quasi-automatic embrace of democracy by other Arab states in the region.

There is often some confusion between the factual image of falling dominoes and the ideological influence the theory may exert in action. The phrase “domino effect” refers to a movement of possible structural and international changes brought about by the emulation of successful political movements. It can be considered the subcategory of a more general demonstration effect: the latter refers to the reshaping of ideological orientation within political movements across frontiers as stimulated by international events. The domino effect is a more restricted concept, insofar as it is only a particular kind of demonstration effect with immediate implications in real political alignments: “domino” is about supposed or feared political change at the regime level, whereas “demonstration” is about ideologies and putative models at the grassroots level. Various assumptions underlie this approach, often defined as “ideological diffusionism,” mostly that ideologies spread in a parallel outward and top-down process. That is, ideas are disseminated horizontally from an ideological centre to the periphery, and vertically from the elites to the masses, both in a non-reciprocal way.

Given the domino theory’s incapacity to adequately explain, let alone predict, changes at the regime level, it remains at best an illusion, especially when accounting for non-institutionalized political movements. In particular, non-state nationalism and political Islam are often too vague, pervasive, malleable, and unpredictable a force to be prognosticated on the grounds of the diffusion of immanent forces.

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DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

In an effort to specify and ensure greater respect for the rights of indigenous people to lands traditionally utilized by them, as well as to ensure their access to resources and the protection of their languages and cultures, the formation of a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was first proposed in 1985 by a series of resolutions submitted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. A Working Group on Indigenous Populations was formed to prepare the Draft Declaration, taking into account the comments and suggestions of participants in sessions composed of representatives of both indigenous peoples and governments. In July 1993, the Working Group agreed on a final text for the draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and submitted it to the Sub-Commission. The Draft has been under review by the Inter-Sessional Working Group of the Commission on Human Rights, who hoped to have it approved by 2004, the close of the United Nations’ International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Populations.

Although the Working Group within the Commission on Human Rights held annual meetings with participation from government representatives and indigenous organizations each year between 1995 and 2004, no consensus was reached. Significant polarization between indigenous and state positions characterized the Working Group from the start, particularly surrounding the issues of self-determination, collective rights, and territorial rights. As the year 2004 came to a close, several drafts had been proposed but none had been agreed upon. Hunger strikes (called spiritual fasting) by indigenous peoples delegates and an Appeal of Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva, expressed the concern that the mandate of the Working Group would not be extended or that critical principles would be weakened in negotiations. The strike was ended when the Office of the Commission on Human Rights agreed to recommend to the General Assembly a second International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, to follow the conclusion of the present International Decade in December 2004.

Although disagreements remain between indigenous representatives and governments, and the amount of power to be accorded each in the process is still contested, the process of debate can be seen as contributing to awareness about indigenous rights within communities, among government representatives, and within supranational decision-making bodies. It has created a space for indigenous participation within the United Nations and altered some